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War, death or sickness did lay siege to it.
–William Shakespeare, A Midsummer-Night’s Dream.
These are men whose minds the Dead have ravished.
–Wilfred Owen, Mental Cases
In Weary Warriors we examine psychologically wounded soldiers from 
confl icts spanning the American Civil War, through the two world wars, 
the war in Viet Nam, UN peacekeeping missions, Iraq, to the current 
war in Afghanistan. Our interest primarily is not with the question of 
why soldiers are stressed or how they become exhausted from a given 
war, nor is our interest to detail the specifi cs of individual weary sol-
diers emerging through a particular war in order to compare illness and 
combat experience. Our chief interest rather is with the questions of why 
and how claims of combat stress are regularly contested by psychiatric 
and military authorities, and how combatants themselves, individually 
and in various forms collectively, struggle for recognition, treatment, and 
support for war-related neuroses. Major questions we address are these: 
How do material bodies and bodily discourses of individual lives create 
weary warriors? How are psychological wounds and the emotional dis-
tress of military personnel taken up by diff erent confi gurations of power 
and knowledge over time? How are distinctions between the well soldier 
and the ill soldier established and enacted? How do soldiers fi nd support 
institutionally within and outside the military? And, a  er discharge into 
civilian life, where and how do veterans with ill bodies seek help and 
understanding?
We have wri  en this book with three groups of people in mind. The 
fi rst group is a group of scholars and students in military studies and 
the history of warfare, the sociology of health and illness, disability and 
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public policy studies, social and cultural geography, and the growing area 
of Foucault studies based prominently in history, philosophy, political 
science, and women’s studies. We see that these students and scholars in 
these fi elds share an interest in psychiatry and trauma and in the subjec-
tivity of embodied individuals in pain and distress. A second group is vet-
erans themselves from both recent and distant ba  les as well as veterans’ 
partners, other family members, and organizations representing veterans 
in advancing their claims to state organizations and medical institutions. 
A third group includes professionals: caregivers and health practitioners 
working with veterans dealing with pos  raumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and other mental health issues as well as policy- and decision-makers in 
legislatures and executive departments of government that administer 
the programs and regulations that govern the lives of so many weary 
warriors.
While these people remained at the front of our minds as we wrote, 
we cannot claim that this book was wri  en for them as readers. Indeed, 
it is the fi rst group, scholars and students, which are most likely to read 
this book. And that is okay with us. Our overall goal is to show how a 
particular way of thinking—developed in dialogue with the works of Mi-
chel Foucault and of several poststructural feminists—breaks open what 
weary warriors are and how those warriors get constructed. Once we un-
snarl the knots that have produced traumatized soldiers as ill in the way 
they are ill and reentangle lines of thinking that have been submerged 
or le   out of the way we think about soldiers enduring deep emotional 
and psychological distress are thought, we can begin to act diff erently. 
By acting diff erently, we do not mean forcing traumatized soldiers into 
prewound lives or ensuring assimilation into existing social and cultural 
environments. We mean that weary warriors need to be taking up their 
place within society, at home, and in their lives without being marked 
with a ostracizing mental illness, while feeling alive and ready to engage 
in living every single day, and having ample and appropriate support to 
reduce suff ering.
With such an array of interests, titling our project proved diffi  cult. Fol-
lowing Judith A. Lyons (2007: 312), we recognize that the “term ‘warrior’ 
is controversial, o  en deemed politically incorrect [within civil society]. 
However, it is deliberately used … to highlight that the experience of war 
does change a person.” Charles R. Figley and William P. Nash (2007b) 
employ the expression “war fi ghters” to designate those who served their 
country in ba  le through the armed forces as combatants. Noah Richler 
(2012) calls Canada a warrior nation as do, more critically, Ian McKay and 
Jamie Swi   (2013). Trevor Greene and Debbie Greene (2012) refer to the 
warrior path for a soldier’s journey of survival and healing following a 
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brain injury. Chris Linford (2013) employs the term “warrior rising” to de-
scribe his journey as a soldier from PTSD and back. Martin L. Cook (2004) 
talks about the moral warrior among U.S. soldiers faced with diffi  cult 
choices to make. And Michael Ignatieff  (1998: 112) writes of the warrior’s 
honor in modern times as the notion of “war as a moral theatre in which 
are displayed manly virtues in public.” As we will show in the following 
chapters, the extent to which war changes a person and whether such 
change is unique to wartime are subjects of longstanding and continuing 
debate. Our focus in this book is on the mental anguish and emotional 
wounds of combat exhaustion, war-related stress, operational trauma, 
and psychological disorders of military personnel engaged in both war 
operations and peacekeeping missions.
Similarly, we had diffi  culty in deciding what other terms to use to de-
scribe what it is that we were trying to capture. We use the term “soldier” 
interchangeably with “combatant,” and both include the wide range of 
military combat personnel: sailor, pilot, gunner, and marine. For us, the 
word “soldier” denotes the one who fi ghts on orders from state-based 
armed forces. We variously use terms such as “traumatized soldiers,” 
“psychologically wounded soldiers,” “soldiers enduring deep emotional 
distress during combat,” and “the soldier with a ravished mind” to un-
se  le the notion that weary warriors suff er from the same illness in every 
war. Likewise, there is no corresponding link between our choice of de-
scriptor in any passage and either a diagnostic category or a preference on 
our part to describe these invisible wounds. We chose to use “Viet Nam” 
instead of “Vietnam.” “Vietnam,” primarily in the U.S., sets up a state-
centered view on the war. This particular view is manifest in the names of 
war neuroses themselves, as in “Vietnam Syndrome” and “Post-Vietnam 
Syndrome.” We try to distance ourselves from this view and to write more 
from an international view without any disrespect to American weary 
warriors who served during that war. We also recognize that our use of 
“combat” itself is problematic. Although much of our work concerns the 
soldiers whose paths of weariness began on the ba  lefi eld, we appreci-
ate that other active- and nonactive-duty military personnel can endure 
emotional trauma as an eff ect of war. We also acknowledge that the way in 
which we framed our interests guided us to historical sources that take up 
emotional trauma in the military as something aff ecting combat soldiers. 
The idea that it is not only soldiers in combat units that endure distress to 
the point of breakdown, but also noncombat soldiers, nurses, medics, and 
other active-duty personnel became more popular in the past twenty-fi ve 
years or so. We a  ribute this shi   in thinking in part to the way in which 
wars and armed military confl icts now take place.
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Key to our argument is the idea that discourse and materiality are en-
tailed within the other, and inseparable in the reality we experience. In 
keeping with our theoretical goal of providing an alternative understand-
ing for the changing course of war neuroses over roughly the past one 
hundred years, one rooted in Michel Foucault’s work and in feminist post-
structural theory, we need to fi gure out how to refer to the discursive prac-
tices (report-writing, record-keeping, movie-making, policy-making) and 
materialized discourses (reports, records, movies, policy) that generate 
weary warriors. To this end, we conceptualize soldiers’ ill bodies as the ef-
fects of the intra-action among ideas, notions, and a priori understandings 
of what ill bodies are and what they can do with the concrete bodies that 
have suff ered some disruption to a biological, neurological, or physiologi-
cal process simultaneously. Empirically, we focus on the interplay between 
the actual bodies of soldiers with war neuroses and the discursive con-
structs associated with being a soldier and being ill via diagnostic catego-
ries, regulating policies, masculinized gender roles, and popular cultural 
depictions. Throughout the book, we refer to a wide range of elements 
that fall within the realm of how we understand discourse and material-
ity to be connected. We sometimes use the terms “discursive-material” or 
“material-discursive” to describe something, as a text, a practice, or an 
eff ect. We sometimes use discourse and materiality as separate things, 
mostly with the purpose of conceptually highlighting one aspect of the 
text, practice, or eff ect—but we do so with the understanding that both are 
deeply implicated within the other.
In this book, we examine psychiatry, the military, and masculinity, and 
the ways in which these three come together to generate weary warriors. 
We understand that these are but three sets of relations, processes, and 
realms of infl uence that actually inform the way in which soldiers come to 
be ill. That we chose to focus only on these three does not negate the need 
to understand how other dispositifs (which is how we come to understand 
the three in chapter 1), other sets of power relations (such as capitalism, 
citizenship, or sexuality), and other realms of infl uence (such as private 
lives, nation-state politics, or pacifi st ideologies) contribute to how it is 
weary warriors surface diff erently according to the place and time of the 
confl ict, whose side the soldier fought on, and the wider, political, and 
economic outcomes of a particular confl ict.
One way in which these ideas play out in the book is through our anal-
ysis. For example, our understanding of institutions as fl uid and fl exible 
entities feeds our interpretations of how weary warriors come to be. We 
see that military psychiatry is not a place of uniformity but one full of 
discrepancies and contradictions. Rather than claiming that the military is 
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a rigid, fi xed structure, an image that is prominent when studying or read-
ing about the military, we try to highlight military sites that are fl exible 
and elastic to show how generative a set of practices can actually be.
Another way these ideas manifest is through the manner in which we 
include the voices of weary warriors. Voices appear in the book in the 
wri  en words of veterans themselves in relation to memoirs, diaries, and 
poems; in the testimonies and transcripts of military courts or tribunals; 
in reports by military psychiatrists and health professionals; and in the 
anguished u  erances of parents and partners as reported in media stories. 
The voices are heard in the shouts and screams of panicked fear and terri-
fi ed anxiety. As well, voices of weary warriors are heard in their silences, 
whether a state of uncommunicativeness from combat shock, a general 
lifelessness resulting from extreme despair or trauma, or the quietness of 
meditative prayer.
These sensitivities—of the people we write for, the terms we use, the 
premises of our thinking, the analytical choices we make, and the voices 
we hear—frame the way we have taken up our project. Our objectives 
in writing this book have been to highlight how the conceptual catego-
ries of soldiers’ neurotic bodies rooted in military psychiatry (as, e.g., 
shell shock, ba  le fatigue, PTSD, and operational stress injury [OSI]) as 
well as the physical expression of war neuroses located fi rmly in soldiers’ 
ill bodies (as, e.g., irritable heart, paralysis, nerve strain, and fl ashback) 
shi   over time in particular places and specifi c confl icts; to elaborate on 
the processes through which soldiers, military psychiatrists, and society 
more generally both reinforce and contest these categories and physical 
expressions of war neuroses; and to extend the critical thinking and un-
derstanding of the social practices that create, reinforce, and contest both 
the discourses about and the material existences of the ravished minds 
and troubled souls of weary warriors. Not simply the object of positiv-
ist knowledge, the burned out soldier’s mind, body, and soul compose a 
ba  lefi eld of symptoms, varying diagnostic tools, rival treatment meth-
ods muddled by diff erent mixes of care and coercion side by side with 
the contending imperatives of the armed forces, the creed of a practicing 
psychiatrist, and cultural constructs of masculinity. Our overall goal of the 
book is to generate a path through which to see this ba  lefi eld in a diff er-
ent way, one that off ers an alternative theory that reads weary warriors as 
minds, bodies, and souls seeking some surety within a changeable set of 
power and knowledge relations.
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Combat, Knowledge Circulation, and 
Naming Traumatized Soldiers

He who fi ghts with monsters might take care lest he thereby 
become a monster. And if you stare for long into the abyss, 
the abyss gazes also into you.
—Frederich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
I was caught in an emotional mental ba  le that pi  ed what I now 
considered the “real” world—genocide in Rwanda—and the “artifi cial” 
world—the detachment and obtuseness of the rich and powerful.
—Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil
Weary warriors are soldiers who have suff ered deep emotional distress 
during combat. Whether in reaction to the din of artillery fi re, the stench 
of a ro  ing corpse, or the glance of dead comrades a  er a short skirmish, 
some soldiers, pushed beyond the edge of emotional constancy, break 
with soldierly behavior. They rush the enemy, taking admonitions as ad-
miration, earning nicknames of madness. They run away into the cover 
of trees, wandering for days, forge  ing armed encounters. They weep, 
poised to fi re, incapable of pressing the trigger. They collapse, they break, 
they fall to pieces—sometimes during combat, sometimes on leave, and 
sometimes a  er the end of the war with a delay of weeks, months, or per-
haps even years. Yet soldiers survive these moments of seemingly endless 
anguish, their minds ravished by the threat of death, their bodies dazed 
and muted by the sight of the dead, and their souls vacant to make room 
for the dying. They are gathered up by other soldiers, hailed as heroes and 
returned to their regiments, condemned as cowards and court-martialed, or 
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evacuated to hospital with a case of nerves. The so-called heroes, stunned 
by their own actions, receive medals and other honors for their coura-
geous acts, reinforcing the soldier’s way of life in ba  le. Military courts 
sentence cowards to death or dishonorably discharge them, cu  ing them 
off  from any future relationship with the military. Others, the ones who 
suff er shock, those who recoil from their own training to kill, and the ones 
who manifest mental illness, are either whisked away and treated as war 
casualties or regarded as returning veterans and le   on their own to be-
come civilians once again.
Weary warriors are not a product of modern warfare, having been 
recognized as early as Ancient Greece, in both Classical and Hellenistic 
Greek civilizations (Shay 1995; Tritle 2000). Weary warriors were noted as 
neither ordinary nor extraordinary, or even in need of “fi xing”; they were 
generally viewed as a possible, though not an inevitable, result of soldiers 
engaging in warfare. One of the noblest warriors in Western Civilization, 
Achilles, seems to have suff ered a mental breakdown demonstrated by 
his outrage at the death of Patroclus, his feeling dead inside, and his re-
morse at the betrayal by his leader Agamemnon (Shay 1991). Rather than 
a point of entry for one’s own demise, the vulnerability of Achilles’ heel 
could be read as the vulnerability of a soldier’s mind, a soldier’s body, 
and a soldier’s soul. Herodotus ([440 BC] 2002: 117) tells a story of an 
Athenian soldier at the Ba  le of Marathon, Epizelus, going blind a  er 
being “opposed by a man a great stature in heavy armour, whose beard 
overshadowed his shield,” a phantom who felled a close comrade by his 
side. A soldier’s life during the fi rst millennium .. was o  en sequestered 
from the rest of society, and what actually became popular within the 
rest of society were stories of heroism and images of grandeur, no doubt 
to feed the nation’s need for honor, the soldier’s need for chivalry, and 
society’s need for manhood (see Braudy 2005). Descriptions of war veter-
ans, though, continued to include images of soldiers suff ering emotion-
ally from the cruelties and atrocities of war, and perhaps even from war’s 
absurdities in ways that were accepted and for the most part unremarked 
upon. Although anguish, guilt, and rage plagued veterans, these aspects 
of a veteran’s persona were not cause for alarm. They were an expected 
part of a veteran’s temperament.
Notwithstanding these sentiments, in 1688 a Swiss physician, Johannes 
Hofer, wrote about the unusual mental state of soldiers stationed away 
from home and called it mal du pays or nostalgie (homesickness or nostal-
gia) (Sedikides, Wildschut, and Baden 2004). Explanations of nostalgia 
over the years ranged from the struggle over demons and the vibrations 
of animal spirits in the fi bers of the brain, to a change of barometric pres-
sure causing a rush of blood downward, all resulting in the strong draw 
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to go home. While initially thought to aff ect only Swiss soldiers, it became 
clear that nostalgia was present among soldiers across nations. Over the 
next two centuries, nostalgia as a physiological disease of the brain be-
came a popular explanation for soldiers’ illnesses, particularly among the 
French military. The term was resurrected to describe soldiers’ illness in 
the American Civil War (E. Dean 1997). Nostalgia and insanity were the 
two most common diseases for which Union soldiers were released by 
the Army. Discharged Union soldiers were sent home, to nonmilitary asy-
lums, or remained in service and formed into Invalid Corps (later to be-
come Veteran Reserve Corps) (Dean). In the defeated confederacy, soldiers 
had li  le support nationally, except for the National Asylum for Disabled 
Volunteer Soldiers that was accessed primarily in Union states for Union 
soldiers (Marten 2011). Such inadequate support and funding, as well as a 
culture of “resisting progress and preserving tradition,” provided support 
for the soldiers’ homes movement in the Southern states throughout the 
1880s and 1890s (Rosenburg 2011 ). These homes were somewhat closed 
communities where veterans, especially those with nostalgia, did not have 
to engage with the outside world.
During the Great War of 1914–18, the numbers of soldiers wounded 
emotionally during combat dramatically increased on both sides of the 
trenches. Changes in the technologies of war fostered a wider range of 
potential wounds than previously encountered, especially emotional and 
psychological ones, including the deployment of units (with as few as 
ten soldiers thus intensifying the combat experience), the replacement of 
cannon fi re (with indirect fi re thus extending the time a soldier is actu-
ally engaged in warfare), and the introduction of trench and chemical 
warfare (thus bringing closer the possibility of death even in nonba  le 
times). Stories began to circulate among soldiers and civilians alike that 
the new mechanized weaponry was able to infl ict undetectable brain dam-
age through mortar fragments (Leese 2002). During lulls in a ba  le, per-
haps as a temporary break in logistics or a short-lived negotiated truce, 
stretcher bearers picked up the bleeding while orderlies roamed the fi elds 
and trenches collecting soldiers who were wandering aimlessly among or 
cowering next to the dead. “Shell shock,” as it came to be known, iden-
tifi ed soldiers who had cracked or broken down under the emotional 
strain of combat. Even though early descriptions of these types of nervous 
breakdowns seemed always to include tremors and ceaseless twitching as 
identifying features of a soldier’s illness, somewhat in line with the fi tful 
fi re of machine guns (Leese: 62), shell shock remained the descriptor of the 
soldier’s ill body. Once at the fi eld dressing station, these soldiers with ad-
ditional symptoms of crying, muscle weakness, and paralysis were tagged 
and pulled from combat. The rapid increase in the numbers of weary 
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warriors was alarming in terms of both the severity and the cause of the 
trauma. Accounts of traumatic shock cases in the early part of the war set 
the tone for choice of treatment in the fi eld following the advice of such 
physicians as Charles Myers, Herman Oppenheim, and Karl Boenhof-
fer (Lerner 2001; E. Jones, Fear, and Wessely 2007). Once away from the 
frontline, soldiers presenting with shock were given a couple of days rest, 
were transported to the nearest military hospital, or were evacuated to 
psychiatric hospitals back home.
The sheer numbers heightened awareness of the existence of weary war-
riors and caused concern in many quarters. For military leaders who were 
preoccupied by developing a strategic response to enemy aggression, sol-
diers breaking down in the fi eld signaled the potential for mass hysteria 
and desertion, something untenable so early in a war. For politicians wor-
ried about waning support for the war, stories of prolonged illness com-
municated fear of the unknown among constituencies. For bureaucrats, 
concerned about fi nancing the war, sick soldiers indicated fi nancial strain 
in the form of future treatment and disability pensions. For military psy-
chiatrists, torn between care for the patient and duty as an offi  cer, soldiers 
in shell shock bespoke fundamental challenges to existing understandings 
of the impact terror and fear had on soldiers in combat, particularly in the 
face of modern warfare. Thus, the soldiers with physical manifestations 
of invisible mental wounds became a focal point of medical inquiry in the 
military, especially because only some soldiers were aff ected by combat. 
Discussion of the cause of mental breakdown in combat included hys-
terical, psychological, predisposition, and neurophysiological arguments, 
each with a diff erent set of treatment protocols. Disagreement ensued 
over what constituted traumatic shock as opposed to malingering or cow-
ardice. For the authors, the increased numbers, awareness, and discussion 
of weary warriors within and outside the military marked the emergence 
and collective recognition of the ill soldier. It appears that this conundrum 
has fuelled the dispersion of psychiatric knowledge during a century of 
struggle, with soldiers’ ill bodies as ba  lefi elds.
Names for Soldiers’ Ravished Minds
Shell shock, although void of its original, tactile meaning, is still one of 
the most recognizable names associated with the eff ects of the distress sol-
diers experience in and a  er combat. Over the past century soldiers’ rav-
ished minds have had numerous names. In the Great War, British soldiers’ 
charts might have read “Shock,” while German charts might have read 
Kriegsneurotiker, Nervenschoken, Granatfernwirking, or Granatkontusion, and 
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French charts possibly read simulateur de création or simulateur de fi xation 
(Binneveld 1997: 95, 119, 141; Lerner 2003: 61). There were late-nineteenth-
century names of irritable heart and nostalgia alongside new ones, o  en 
specifi c to experiences in the Great War: barbed-wire syndrome, ba  le 
dreams, brain fog, debility, eff ort syndrome, fatigue, hysterical disorder, 
irritable heart syndrome, lassitude, mental trouble, nerve strain, nerve 
shaken, nerve wrack, nervous breakdown, soldier’s heart, traumatic hys-
teria, traumatic neurasthenia, war neurosis, and war psycho neurosis.1 By 
the end of 1917, British military psychiatry had dispensed with shell shock 
as a diagnosis, opting instead for a more the general term NYD (N) (not 
yet diagnosed [nerves]) (Leese 2002: 56); their Allies followed suit. The 
imperial Russians tended to favor neuropsychiatric (NP) for all mental 
illness, with nervous exhaustion being but a small percentage of overall 
psychiatric illness (Wanke 2005).
By the Second World War military psychiatrists in all the Allied forces 
were forbidden to use shell shock and instructed to use the term “ba  le 
fatigue” in reference to the emotionally and psychologically wounded. 
Roughly equivalent for the same illness in other places at the same time 
were NP for the Soviets, shinkeisuĳ aku for the Japanese, and Kriegsneurosen 
for the Germans (Binneveld 1997; Lin 1989; Wanke 2003). In the United 
States, the term “ba  le fatigue” to designate the distress soldiers suff ered 
during and a  er combat soon gave way to operational exhaustion among 
UN troops during the Korean War, and, only a few years later, ba  le 
exhaustion gained popularity among military psychiatrists during the 
American Vietnam War. By the 1980s throughout the West, in, for exam-
ple, Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, the United States, and West 
Germany, “combat stress” was widely used as a term to depict the experi-
ence of a soldier who had endured emotional or psychological trauma in 
ba  le, while “delayed stress” emerged as a mark of Viet Nam veterans 
developing stress-related symptoms months and years a  er returning 
home. Names for war neuroses are again proliferating, much as in the fi rst 
twenty-fi ve years of the twentieth century, including, for example, “Gulf 
War Syndrome” (GWS), “postcombat disorder,” “pos  raumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD),” and, most recently, “operational stress injuries” (OSI).
Changes in the name of the sickness soldiers experience are not simply 
the result of bureaucratic orders, scientifi c discoveries, or popular psy-
chology trends. They refl ect shi  ing knowledge bases used to diagnose 
and treat emotional and psychological distress soldiers endure; they also 
deal directly with the concrete manifestation of bodily disruptions soldiers 
suff er. For example, in the la  er half of the nineteenth century biomedi-
cine was increasingly becoming the dominant knowledge base used to ad-
dress issues of illness and disease in civil society (Foucault 1994), a context 
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that informed the development of military psychiatry. One of the more 
fascinating types of illness during this period was hysteria, a seemingly 
somatic illness on which neurologists, biologists, and psychologists were 
focusing a  ention. At the onset of the twentieth century, then, it is not sur-
prising that military psychiatry as part of this wider medical knowledge 
base took a soldier’s invisible wounds to be indicative of an emotional 
state beyond the breaking point of what a soldier can usually endure. It 
is also not surprising that they o  en treated the physical manifestations 
of the trauma—mutism, paralysis, blindness, and deafness—as hysterical, 
meaning in this instance psychosomatic. The psychologically wounded 
soldier, much like the hysterical woman, was a complex entity in need of 
explanation and of treatment. Tangible markers produced as evidence of 
the breakdown included disruptions in physiological (circulation, diges-
tion), neurological (muscles, sensations), and cognitive (concentration, 
memory) processes. Military psychiatrists maintained that the subcon-
scious mind was producing bodily sickness because soldiers repressed the 
horrors of the experience of war.
In contrast, by the 1990s psychiatry had become the key knowledge base 
governing diagnosis and treatment of any malady identifi ed as having a 
psychological component, including the emotional distress experienced 
by combat soldiers. Symptoms associated with the emotional distress sol-
diers suff ered in combat were less about a few soldiers not being able 
to withstand combat and more about the emotional and psychological 
transformation a soldier undergoes during deployment, something fam-
ily members and society more generally would notice when a soldier 
returned home (see, e.g., Bedford 2002; Hart 2000; Sloane and Friedman 
2008). Parallel to hysteria a century before, psychiatrists identifi ed physi-
ological, neurological, and cognitive disorders among distressed soldiers. 
However, rather than hysteria being the rubric around which to organize 
soldiers’ ravished minds, psychiatrists ordered soldiers’ bodies in terms of 
deep, long-lasting stress eff ects on systems and processes in the body, par-
ticularly the overactivation and sensitivity of the fi ght-or-fl ight response. 
Soldiers who have served on the frontline in recent wars no longer present 
with symptoms of neurosis—weeping, disorientation, fear, nightmares, 
amnesia, sensory disruption, and paralysis. Instead, soldiers present with 
symptoms of stress—disturbed sleep, outbursts of violent behavior, agita-
tion, irritability, moodiness, pain, hypervigilance, anxiety, and short-term 
memory loss.
Over the past two decades, there has been an upsurge in interest in 
soldiers’ ravished minds among medical historians, social scientists inter-
ested in psychiatric illness, and the general public (e.g., Babington 1997; 
Bouvard 2012; Carden-Coyne 2009; Hoge 2010; Kilshaw 2008; Tyquin 
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2006; Wheelwright 2001). Such interest has no doubt been buoyed by the 
increase in number of armed confl icts worldwide, the rise of national 
identity-based separatist wars, the global circulation of detailed descrip-
tions and images of war, and the media coverage of war crimes trials. This 
renewed interest is evident in medical and political debates over the actual 
existence of syndromes associated with combat missions; in works writ-
ten by veterans as to their personal symptoms and profound struggles, 
at times highly publicized; and in policy and program responses by mili-
tary personnel and by federal governments to a new generation of weary 
warriors.2 Roughly one in three American soldiers serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan develop some degree of PTSD postcombat.3 In addition, me-
dia reports indicate that between 22 and 52 percent of American soldiers 
injured in Iraq and Afghanistan suff er traumatic brain injury (TBI) that 
leads to depression and Alzheimer’s-like conditions.4 Popularity, though 
useful in drawing a  ention to the long-term damages of the eff ects of war, 
does not necessarily lead to nuanced explanations of the creation and 
proliferation of traumatized soldiers. Detailed contemporary accounts 
of the history of the diagnostic category of PTSD tend to claim that this 
particular war neurosis is an invention motivated by social and political 
agendas of physicians and/or suff erers, a timeless condition reformulated 
in the presence of be  er insight, or an illness imbued with social and cul-
tural norms and mores (see, e.g., E. Jones et al. 2003; Summerfi eld 2001). 
Much of the recent history about soldiers’ nervous disorders focus on the 
la  er two explanations, thus relying on either the assumption that the 
changes in the name of the illness refl ect more precisely the psychogenic 
origins of the illness, which in turn has a benefi cial eff ect by routing out 
cowards and malingerers, or the somewhat neutral assessment that there 
are factors contributing to understanding nervous conditions that are not 
psychopathological (see, e.g., Figley and Nash 2007a; E. Jones and Wes-
sely 2005a; Shephard 2000). It is even the case that soldiers, and families 
of soldiers, clamor for a psychiatric diagnosis, both in the sense of legiti-
mating the tragic eff ects of war on individual soldiers and their families 
and of claiming full and partial veteran disability pensions (see Coleman 
2006). The consistency with which these types of explanations have ap-
peared, and subsequently reappeared, over the past century, intimate that 
the immediacy of governing needs (funding for the production of capable 
soldiers, health-care provision for mental illness, disability benefi ts for 
veterans, and psychiatric-based medical research) eclipses the need for 
other types of understandings of soldiers’ psychological wounds, under-
standings located outside psychiatry and the military.
An understanding of weary warriors arising from critical thinking in 
social theory can provide insight into the contexts within which psychia-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
 8 Introduction

try and the military exist and draw authority. We maintain, in contrast to 
the prevailing literatures about war neuroses, that this recent swelling of 
interest in war neuroses suggests a general unease about what psychiatry 
as science and the military can off er combat soldiers and veterans. Focus-
ing on individual motivations for diagnosis serves the interest of only 
a few, especially those making out soldiers to be lazy malingerers and 
psychiatrists to be money-grubbers. Boring deeper into the psychology 
and physiology of combat trauma is useful, but limited. Unlike explana-
tions of weary warriors that rest on the seemingly prima facie foundations 
such as the inevitability of psychological wounds, the physiology of the 
fi ght-or-fl ight refl ex, or the breakdown of the morality of individual sol-
diers, critical social theory assists in untangling the sets of relations that 
have given rise to the emergence of traumatized soldiers. Critical social 
theorists show extensively that ideas, thoughts, and notions about illness, 
disease, and the practice of medicine have a considerable impact on the 
way in which illness is experienced and taken up more generally by so-
ciety, including the diagnosis itself. Yet drawing a  ention to the socially 
constructed nature of illness, disease, and the practice of medicine is not 
enough. Examining how the specifi c pathways, through which knowl-
edge about illness circulates, is important to generate credible explana-
tions of the place war neurosis has on a soldier’s ill body. This circulation 
of knowledge in itself is in need of explanation.
Circulation of Knowledge and Its Relationship with Power
In recent works about the history of war neuroses, none of the orientations 
draws a  ention to the sets of relations through which power is either ex-
ercised or deployed (Binneveld 1997; Holden 1998; E. Jones and Wessely 
2005a). These works do not capture the mechanisms, as sets of social rela-
tions imbued with power, through which knowledge about war neuroses 
come to be used within psychiatry, the military, and wider society. There 
is nothing evolutionary about the terms used to describe emotionally tat-
tered soldiers; that is, there has not been enhanced clarity over the men-
tal distress combat soldiers experience. Rather, the changes in names for 
soldiers’ ravished minds mirror changes in the ways knowledge about 
war neuroses come to describe the psychologically wounded soldier. By 
tracing shi  s in the names of war neuroses over time and placing them 
in contexts wider than just the military or psychiatry, one can fi nd refl ec-
tions of specifi c confi gurations of power dispersed through various social 
relations that support the circulation of specifi c characterizations of war 
neuroses, including psychiatry, the military, and society more generally.5 
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Examination of these social relations, with both discursive and material 
aspects, shows how the exercise of power has profoundly shaped soldiers’ 
experiences, psychiatry’s conceptualizations, and society’s depictions of 
psychological distress among combat soldiers.
Understandings of weary warriors as malingerers, as constitutionally 
weak, or even as an inevitable part of war, break apart when focusing at-
tention on the deployment of power. In their place comes the idea of the 
designation of war neuroses as an eff ect of specifi c confi gurations in the 
exercise of power and the dispersion of knowledge. In these confi gura-
tions of social relations, there is interdependency among those who get to 
say what truth is and what claims they use to support what they say. The 
control military psychiatrists have in designating who is ill and who is not 
illustrates how the exercise of power is inextricably wound within what 
counts as knowledge (Foucault 1980a).This notion of power/knowledge 
ma  ers because it provides an alternative basis around which to organize 
the social practices that support conventional notions about combat sol-
diers and war neuroses.
In Psychiatric Power (2006: 202), Michel Foucault suggests “it was espe-
cially the child much more than the adult who provided the support for 
the diff usion of psychiatric power in the nineteenth century.” Throughout 
the nineteenth century, with the increased merging of the school with the 
hospital as institutions of learning and health care, the child became the 
locus of the struggle by psychiatrists over that which constitutes normal. 
Following Foucault, we would like to suggest that it was soldiers in war-
fare (alongside other confi gurations, especially women in patriarchy, see 
Appignanesi 2007) who provided support for the diff usion of psychiatric 
power in the twentieth century.6 Throughout the twentieth century the 
coupling of a particular type of masculinity, honed and then instilled by 
the military, via psychiatry, as institutions of war and mental health, the 
weary warrior became the site for the formation, application, and con-
testation of psychiatric forms of power/knowledge. Changes in names 
of soldiers’ ravished minds, sometimes abrupt, through offi  cial military 
memoranda, and sometimes subtle, through the persistence of the use of 
shell shock as a descriptor of soldiers’ sha  ered nerves in popular media, 
mark identifi able points in the shi  ing nature of competing understand-
ings, explanations, and applications of psychiatric power/knowledge.
War neuroses generally and soldiers’ ill bodies specifi cally have be-
come the ba  leground on which the diff usion of psychiatric power plays 
out. As a major fi gure in the elaboration and exercise of psychiatric power/
knowledge throughout the entire twentieth century, the weary warrior 
has roots in the practice of late-nineteenth-century psychiatry, especially 
in relation to soldiers, trauma victims, and women. Positioned promi-
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nently in the late 1800s, psychiatry sought to off set the polarity of medi-
cal knowledge that explained madness in terms of either psychology or 
pathology, by making claims about the interdependency of the mind and 
the body (see Foucault 1988a). This particular knowledge base set the 
stage for the deployment of power through various sets of relations in 
the early twentieth century, feeding into treatment protocols for neurotic 
soldiers presenting with hysterical forms of bodily symptoms. As well, the 
forward psychiatry system set up in the Great War, adapted in the Second 
World War, and (seemingly) perfected in the Viet Nam War, informed the 
psychiatric power and knowledge confi gurations in the military over the 
last quarter of the century.
Examining the contexts within which the names of war neuroses shi  , 
permits observation of various expressions of the diff usion of military and 
psychiatric power/knowledge. Contexts in which one is acutely aware of 
the exercise of psychiatric power can be eff ective in demonstrating how 
the organization of power both distorts the regularity of order in the in-
stitution, in the case of warfare the intersection of psychiatry and the mili-
tary, and, at the same time, makes the institution function, in this case the 
institutionalization of military psychiatry (Foucault 2006: 15). For weary 
warriors, these contexts—fi eld dressing stations, fi eld hospitals, military 
hospitals, convalescent homes, asylums, and treatment centers—are usu-
ally the fi rst institutions they encounter following emotional distress or a 
psychological breakdown in combat. With the advanced development of 
forward psychology strategies for treating war neuroses in tandem with 
the introduction of heavy screening for potential psychological break-
down in combat situations and later the intensifi cation of realistic and 
refl ex training for combat soldiers, the contexts within which psychiatric 
power is exercised spanned longer periods of time and included more 
people in the soldiers’ lives. Scrutiny of contexts farther afi eld from the 
direct experience of combat trauma, including cultural media depicting 
soldiers and veterans in plays, novels, fi lm, and television, can establish 
pieces of the pathways that texture and sustain the confi guration of psy-
chiatric power and knowledge at any given moment.
In each of these contexts, losing sight of the fl eshed aspect of the weary 
warrior can only cause misunderstanding of what emotional distress and 
psychological wounds mean. Parallel to scrutinizing the contexts that re-
fl ect confi gurations of power/knowledge related to military psychiatry, 
the body needs a  ention in order to show more clearly the materialized 
aspects of the expressions of power. The body is the scene of both the 
expression of power, even in its most radically relational form, and the 
individual, in power’s eff ects (Foucault 1988a, 1990a, 2006). For soldiers 
in the Great War, once the pall dropped over them in ba  le their bodies 
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were transformed into vessels of sickness, with fatigue, muscle weak-
ness, constipation, uncontrollable weeping, nausea, and inconsolable fear. 
During the fi rst two years of the Second World War, German soldiers did 
not collapse like soldiers in the Great War as military leaders expected; 
rather, they suff ered terribly from stomach and intestinal problems, a phe-
nomenon referred to by German psychiatrists as Symptomsverschiebung 
([displacement of symptoms]; Binneveld 1997: 92). Military psychiatrists 
initially deemed the psychiatric services in place for American soldiers 
in Viet Nam a huge success because of the low rates of combat stress, 
between 2 and 5 percent of all combat troops. What military psychiatrists 
had not been prepared for, however, was the high incidence of “delayed 
stress” or “post–Vietnam syndrome” a  er return home (E. Jones and Wes-
sely 2005a: 128–31).
Arguments and Themes
Our argument stems from the premise that the transition from shell shock 
to PTSD is not merely an extension of an understanding of weary war-
riors, enhanced by insight into war, nor a new or improved psychiatric 
explanation of soldiers’ experience of war. To understand how weary war-
riors today walk among us, what needs a  ention is the organization of 
power, in particular military and psychiatric power, and of knowledge 
that psychiatry and the military tender. Organizations of power can be 
described by examining the contexts within which soldiers experience 
war neuroses, including the way in which their own bodies are part of set-
ting the parameters for reckoning deep emotional distress as psychiatric 
illness. One part of the cultural context we feature in the analysis is mas-
culinity. We treat masculinity as an important element in the generation of 
the weary warrior rather than as an explanation for emotional trauma and 
mental breakdowns.
Combatants and veterans we call weary warriors can be seen to be part 
of “the large, ill-defi ned, and confused family of ‘abnormal individuals’ ” 
observed in recent centuries (Foucault 2004: 323). The soldier with a rav-
ished mind appears as a psychiatric personage in the nineteenth century 
a  er the emergence of other types of abnormality. Indeed, it may be said 
that the weary warrior is a fourth fi gure in the modern domain of abnor-
malities coming a  er, then joining alongside, the dangerous individual or 
moral monster in penal ma  ers; the undisciplined or incorrigible person 
to be confi ned and corrected; and the onanist or sexual deviant, to be 
supervised and educated. Like other categories of abnormal individuals, 
weary warriors are the subject of psychiatric techniques of identifi cation 
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and diagnosis, therapeutic interventions and disciplinary treatments, and 
formal organizational arrangements—all of which involve relations of 
psychiatry, the military, and masculinity as well as their practices. Thus, 
we keep warriors in homage to the path through which they became 
weary.
Weary warriors have distinct origins and distinguishing systems of 
knowledge, comprising a contested interplay of psychiatry, the military, 
and norms of masculinity that manifest (or materialize) variously over 
time and space within a range of diff erent social institutions, including 
the state and family. From the mid nineteenth century to today, the char-
acter of the agitated, exhausted, and shocked soldier has been the object 
of psychiatric and military gazes. Accordingly, we are interested in un-
derstanding how certain soldiers and veterans both bodily and textually 
are deemed by psychiatric and military systems to be traumatized, while 
others are not. In exploring the way authority features in the manufactur-
ing of normal and abnormal military personnel, we engage in fi guring 
out how war neuroses and combat stresses off er a site for an analysis of 
power relations in and around the psychiatric practices, armed forces, and 
societal customs of masculinity.
Our concern about how the psychological wounds of military person-
nel in combat have been conceptualized, labeled, and challenged during 
any given war and over time across confl icts and ba  les does not remain 
solely discursive; we want to be sensitive to the materiality of these dis-
cursive practices. We understand discourse to be deeply material, and 
materiality to be deeply discursive. In academic language, we refer to 
this as the ontological politics of ill soldiers. The reality of war trauma 
is not a fi xed given, drawn from a general reality of war, but rather is a 
changeable entity that takes form in the context of cultural, historical, and 
material se  ings. These se  ings are similar to the se  ings soldiers emerge 
from and are returned to postconfl ict, and those that these soldiers have a 
hand in shaping as they make their way through their deployments. The 
politics of ontology is about who gets to determine what, when, and how 
weary warriors belong to the real. An offi  cer presiding over the medical 
boarding process? A military psychiatrist at a fi eld dressing station desig-
nating a soldier with combat stress? A government bureaucrat adjudicat-
ing an application for disability pension seven years postdeployment? A 
journalist covering an unjust war claiming that soldiers were automatons 
of an imperialist nation-state? A family refl ecting the social norms of the 
day encouraging a veteran to seek support from the resource center? The 
ontological politics of weary warriors involve struggles over shaping what 
is real and could be or ought to be made more real or less real (Mol 1999)—
that is, these politics involve struggles over how to defi ne, fi x, and support 
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soldiers’ ill bodies. They also involve the conceptual tools professionals, 
family members, advocates, and academics use to disclose a particular 
reality of traumatized soldiers (Hekman 2010). 
The arguments we put forward in this book diff er from the works in 
the burgeoning literature about the emotional trauma of soldiers in three 
key respects. First, we do not accept the a priori notion that the discussion 
of war neuroses needs to be solely, or indeed primarily, located within the 
purview of military psychiatry. To date, much of the discussion of war 
neuroses has been located in, and mostly about, the fi eld of military psy-
chiatry. Our analysis focuses on the interplay between the confi gurations 
of social relations, or power/knowledge formations, within the expression 
of the science of psychiatry vis-à-vis military imperatives. Granted, much 
of the empirical data about war neuroses exist primarily in psychiatric 
military contexts. Still, there are other places to look for data that can 
demonstrate how knowledge about emotional distress among veterans 
circulates within psychiatry, within the military, and in society more gen-
erally. Scrutinizing the links and connections between these data and the 
formation of power/knowledge can lead to insights into the diff usion of 
psychiatric knowledge. As well, in contrast to other historical analyses, 
our analysis highlights the mechanisms through which psychiatric power 
shapes the ascription of diagnostic categories to soldiers’ ill bodies via 
diagnosis and treatment, and creates cultural and social awareness about 
emotional and psychological distress among combat veterans in wider 
society.
Our approach is akin to historical medical anthropology, feminist cul-
tural geography, and critical social theory, and therefore signals how our 
work diff ers from military histories, especially offi  cial accounts, as well 
as most histories of clinical psychiatry that consider the incorporation of 
psychology and human sciences into military establishments and civil 
society. Although examples of the dispersion of psychiatric power/knowl-
edge of war neuroses are readily available from the American Civil War 
and Russo-Japanese War through to contemporary UN peacekeeping mis-
sions and the Iraq War, we do not present a chronological report of as-
sorted confi gurations. Rather, we concentrate on those confi gurations that 
sharply contrast the ideas about war neuroses (as expressed through the 
name), traumatized soldiers (with their ravished minds, ill bodies, and 
injured souls), and the social practices that support, reproduce, or chal-
lenge the ideas about both. Through the formulation of in-depth snap-
shots, we are able to bring into focus particular organizations of power in 
how soldiers suff er trauma and emotional distress. We maintain that this 
approach provides a fruitful avenue for insight into the assorted confi gu-
rations of the social relations of power over time. These snapshots off er 
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an occasion to explore in more depth the exercise of power in particular 
power/knowledge confi gurations.
Second, we maintain that the dispersion of psychiatric power over the 
twentieth century took place on and through the psychologically wounded 
soldier. Much of the research about war neuroses focuses on cause, diag-
nosis, and treatment in theaters of war, with only scant a  ention paid 
to the psychologically traumatized soldiers themselves, and even less to 
their positioning within power/knowledge confi gurations. This research, 
too, tends to focus on the British and American experiences, which have 
been informed by the German and Russian experiences in the early twen-
tieth century and by nonmilitary psychiatry more recently. Our analysis 
breaks this pa  ern.
We draw on multiple data sources in order to generate in-depth snap-
shots of time-specifi c and place-specifi c confi gurations of power/knowl-
edge, and then juxtapose the data against other specifi c snapshots. 
Drenched with the specifi cs of a particular context, these data provide 
room to consider alternatives to conventional understandings of soldiers’ 
psychological wounds and their emotional distress in ba  le and off er 
insights into the processes that construct war neuroses and create weary 
warriors. This approach in format supports our arguments about the shi  s 
in understanding war neuroses over time and how this took place on the 
backs of the soldiers with invisible psychological wounds. Through these 
snapshots, we are able to situate soldiers’ ill bodies institutionally, cultur-
ally, and experientially so as to clarify the mechanisms through which 
psychiatric power circulates and lays claim to knowledge about soldiers’ 
ravished minds. We also integrate more fully the Canadian experience, 
drawing on Canadian medical journals, Canadian soldiers’ autobiogra-
phies, Canadian military psychiatry documents, and various Canadian 
state policy and programs introduced to deal with soldiers’ ill bodies.
Third, we hold that changes in confi gurations of power/knowledge 
take place gradually over long periods of time. We fi rst identify two points 
in time, the mid nineteenth century and the early twenty-fi rst century, and 
then frame our analysis around fi guring out how understandings and 
arrangements changed over that time period. We note particular ideas, 
events, and practices throughout the time period that illustrate a shi   in 
thinking, acting, and reacting to soldiers’ psychological wounds. Much 
of the empirical work about war neuroses centers on military psychiatric 
developments in the Great War, the Second World War, and the American 
Vietnam War. The empirical data found in these works are extremely use-
ful, primarily because of the sheer amount of information included in the 
detailed descriptions. The analyses ma  er less for us because they fail to 
come to terms with the gradualness of change in the social relations of 
power and the circulation of knowledge. By including empirical sources 
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outside these time periods, we can provide a more nuanced analysis of the 
shi  s in thinking about psychologically wounded soldiers beyond simply 
that of a name change. The long period of time we analyze permits the 
identifi cation of temporal and spatial pa  erns, comparative moments of 
the exercise or deployment of power, and changes in social and cultural 
a  itudes toward war, soldiers, and illness.
Our approach is somewhat like Braido  i’s (2012: 4) cartographic 
method: “a theoretically based and politically informed reading of the 
process of power relations [that] fulfi lls the function of providing both 
exegetical [explanatory] tools and creative theoretical alternatives.” We 
apply this method to both the concepts we use to illustrate our arguments 
as well as to our analysis of the texts to show how conceptualizations of 
the traumatized soldier changed gradually over time. Rather than looking 
for the same illness time and time again, we strive to make theoretical and 
empirical space for the coexistence of continuities and disparities, control 
and collapse, discipline and disorder, and enabled and disabled selves to 
demonstrate just how distinct soldiers’ ill bodies are and how fraught the 
change in thinking about psychological war wounds is in practice. Thus, 
we do not try to describe or explain the history of weary warriors in terms 
of a single theoretical perspective or universal narrative. Instead, in our 
poststructural approach to understanding weary warriors we examine 
multiple realities and manifold practices, consider resistance and disso-
nance, and move toward a more nuanced understanding of historically 
specifi c weary warriors.
We frame our thinking about psychiatry, the military, and masculin-
ity in the fi rst two chapters through a review of some poststructural and 
feminist theory as the basis for explaining the role of power and knowl-
edge in the cause, onset, symptoms, and treatment of trauma in combat 
soldiers, as well as being ill and living with a war neurosis. The order of 
the following chapters (chapters 3–8) roughly coincides with the course a 
soldier’s life might take a  er having developed or been diagnosed with 
a war neurosis: how soldiers would come to know about war neuroses, 
how the lives of soldiers suff ering emotional distress in combat would be 
transformed by both psychiatry and the military, how the soldiers them-
selves would make sense of being ill with a war neurosis, what treatment 
traumatized soldiers would receive, how psychologically wounded sol-
diers would be seen socially and culturally, and how ill veterans’ lives 
might be a  er leaving the military. In chapter 9 we revisit the framing of 
our arguments and refl ect on the advantages and limitations of conceiving 
war neuroses as we have. Through our own refl ections, we came to see 
that our cartographic approach mimics the weary warrior—that is, they 
are both a patchwork of sorts. Our approach embraces multiple sources 
from various time periods to challenge the idea that research needs to 
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have a unitary subject; uses conceptual and theoretical sensitivities that 
foreground fl exibility in form and substance; and off ers an alternative 
way to look at, understand, and engage with soldiers encountering com-
bat trauma. Similarly, we argue, weary warriors are nonunitary subjects 
whose positions change, shi  , fl uctuate, and multiply in an assortment 
of situations. Weary warriors are somewhat like a patchwork in that even 
though they comprise disparate parts, there are still pa  erned, discernible 
individuals that hang together as wholes no ma  er how seemingly loose, 
fl eeting, or fragile they may appear.
Notes
 1. We compiled this partial list from a review of four medical journals from Can-
ada, Great Britain, and the United States between 1914 and 1919, all of which 
had international elements that included drawing on information from non-
English-speaking countries, most prominently Germany and Austria: British 
Medical Journal, Canadian Medical Association Journal, Journal of the American 
Medical Association, and Lancet. 
 2. For a debate over the existence of war trauma syndromes, see McHugh and 
Treisman (2007) and Summerfi eld (2001). For examples of struggles publi-
cized and popularized through books and news media, see Dallaire (2003), 
Douce  e (2008), and Finnegan (2008). For examples of think-tank publications 
that discuss the impact of invisible war trauma wounds, see Cesur, Sabia, and 
Tekin (2011); and Tanielian and Jaycox (2008).
 3. Mainstream media reports suggest that one in three American soldiers serv-
ing in Iraq were diagnosed with at least one mental health problem, with 
PTSD being the most common diagnosis (Dao 2009). The report was based on 
a University of San Francisco study.
 4. Of American veterans from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars treated by Veterans 
Aff airs between 2001 and 2005, 31 percent were diagnosed with mental health 
and psychosocial problems, most commonly PTSD (Paddock 2007). 
 5. Moss (2013b) off ers a detailed look at how the underlying psychiatric knowl-
edge explaining mental breakdown in combat shi  ed from the individualist 
idea of a soldier’s psychological fl aws to the universalist claim that every-
one has a breaking point. She argues that aff ect, in this case expressions of 
love, mediates the practice of military psychiatry via the military psychiatrists 
themselves. This analysis is an example of how to show the fl uidity of the 
military and to trace how things other than military discipline and psychiatric 
protocol, for example, manage the generation of weary warriors.
 6. Women throughout the twentieth century have been subject to similar eff ects 
of particular confi gurations of power and knowledge. We maintain that the 
arguments laid out here could usefully be applied to women throughout the 
twentieth century, especially in light of myalgic encephalopathy, which is 
known variously as a hysterical, psychosomatic, and a contested illness. 
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For it is the psychologist’s business to try to understand “the mechanism 
and power” of the individual, to know “what men can do and what 
they cannot do,” and to learn how human conduct is governed.
—Frederic C. Bartle  , Psychology and the Soldier
Moreover, it is no accident that Freud, refl ecting on the neuroses 
of war, should have discovered, as a counterweight for the life 
instinct, in which the old European optimism of the eighteenth 
century was still expressed, a death instinct, which introduced 
into psychology for the fi rst time the power of the negative.
—Michel Foucault, Madness
As part of our task to unravel the pathways through which power and 
knowledge circulate to produce ill soldiers and shape the way ill soldiers 
experience the trauma of breakdown in combat, we draw on poststruc-
turalist and feminist thinking. Poststructural thinking calls into question 
fundamental, taken-for-granted concepts, such as power and knowledge, 
as well as the tangible acts and events shaping everyday life.1 Poststruc-
turalists invite refl ection and critique as ways to engage the concepts used 
to make sense of the world and also the processes through which the 
world comes to be the way it is. They do so by not focusing always on 
the obvious, by taking up atypical lines of query, and by challenging con-
ventional understandings of a phenomenon. Concepts arising from post-
structuralists’ a  empts to rethink the world assist us in disentangling the 
sets of relations within and among discourses that shape how truth claims 
solidify and are subsequently circulated in specifi c encounters between, 
for example, soldiers and physicians.
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In addition to drawing on poststructural arguments about power, 
knowledge, and discourse, we follow a number of feminist arguments. 
Contemporary feminist theory has a long-standing interest in exploring 
the intersection of gender, health, and medicine, especially in terms of how 
women have been treated over time by psychiatry as mad, hysterical, and 
depressed (Appignanesi 2007; Mitchell 1974; Oppenheim 1991; Showalter 
1985). Women’s bodies as diff erentiated from the normative male body in 
gendered discourses of science and knowledge became an obvious site 
for the investigation of power and how it circulates.2 For feminists to take 
cultural phenomena, including illness, seriously, they also need to take 
into account political and economic contexts when trying to understand 
the material aspects of living, including the material aspects of the body.3 
Thus, within these feminist discussions, ill bodies—as more than just ail-
ing biological entities and more than just products of failed idealizations 
of healthy bodies (Bendelow 2009; Birke 1999; Einstein and Shildrick 2009; 
Howson 2005; E. Martin 1995; Munch 2004; Ussher 1997, 2006)—make for 
a rich source of information to trace various pathways that power and 
knowledge have come to take.
In this chapter we frame our reading of the numerous and wide-rang-
ing accounts of soldiers suff ering deep emotional distress as a result of 
combat. We fi rst discuss Michel Foucault’s ideas about power, knowledge, 
and discourse so as to provide a vocabulary to articulate our tracings of 
the pathways through which weary warriors emerge as entities. We then 
engage with Foucault’s more elaborate concept of the dispositif (or disci-
plinary apparatus) that captures to some extent the circulation of power 
and knowledge in the production of subjects. We next turn to a discussion 
of embodiment as a way feminists have conceptualized the link between 
discursive constructs and material realities of the body in response to ten-
sions in Foucault’s work. We close the chapter with our own concept of 
embodied apparatus to emphasize the discursive-material aspects of the 
life and experience of an ill combat soldier.
Power, Knowledge, and Discourse
Power, according to Foucault, is not located in any one place, structure, or 
authoritative fi gure; rather, power is produced “from one moment to the 
next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” 
(Foucault 1990a: 93). Because it is generated in each and every encounter, 
power is not something “acquired, seized or shared” (94); instead, it is rec-
ognized, exercised, and deployed, the eff ects of which we live through in 
the sense of facilitating some behaviors and restricting others. Thus, power 
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is everywhere not because it has a singular location (as in the general or 
the psychiatrist or in a military hospital for psychiatric cases) but because 
it emanates from each point through which power passes (an encounter 
between an offi  cer and a soldier or between a psychiatrist and a patient). 
Because power originates in so many diff erent places, its practice is not 
the same. Power can be both blatant, as in a violent act of destruction, and 
subtle, as in a hidden act the impact of which comes only later. There is co-
ercion, manipulation, corruption, and malevolence as well as cooperation, 
persuasion, ethics, and benevolence. Never absolute in its deployment, 
power is always negotiable. Just as there is assertion, there is contestation; 
if there is subjugation, there is opposition; where there is oppression, there 
is resistance. The question to ask about the role of power in the emergence 
of the psychologically wounded soldier is not, “ ‘What is power and where 
does it come from?’ but ‘How is it practised?’ ” (Deleuze 1999: 71).
The notion of power as disciplinary pervades Foucault’s body of work, 
especially in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). Its omnipresence in 
the rituals of everyday life of modern times does not simply refl ect some 
centralized power, but expresses that power in a microphysics through 
gestures, acts, mechanisms, and eff ects in a multitude of ways (26, 139). 
Discipline acts on bodies in specifi c ways, bringing into existence what 
Foucault called “docile bodies” (135–69), ones that could be “manipulated, 
shaped, [and] trained” to obey, respond, become skillful, and increase its 
force (136). Disciplinary power is subtle, pernicious, and sometimes un-
seen. Yet, as Foucault notes emphatically, because power arises in situ, 
at the point of encounter, there are inevitably circumstances mediating 
its eff ects, thus making the microphysics of power an uneven terrain. So, 
while more discipline increases the forces of the body enhancing utility 
as in screening soldiers for psychiatric illness, that same discipline erodes 
the same forces generating disobedience as in soldiers allegedly feigning 
illness.
Being both productive and relational, Foucault’s notion of power is 
useful in understanding how certain sets of practices (psychiatry and the 
military) and groups of people (psychiatrists and offi  cers) come to have 
an infl uence on subjugated bodies (psychologically wounded soldiers). 
Power is intricately woven into the production of knowledge, bodies, 
and subjectivities through what Foucault refers to as power/knowledge. 
Power/knowledge describes a specifi c coalescence of relations that link 
particular strategies of the deployment of power with a specifi c set of 
truth claims, as, for example, the relationship between a psychiatrist who 
is also a commissioned offi  cer acts as the knowledgeable guide and a 
patient who is a soldier in active service then submits to treatment. By 
se  ing the parameters around what counts as knowledge, the circulation 
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of power/knowledge in various fi elds of study (biomedicine, neuropsy-
chology) and in practice (diagnosis, military training) still holds sway in 
determining expectations and norms of behavior. Because power is rarely 
practiced on someone, the subject (as knower and the object as known) 
becomes the eff ect of the circulation of multiple, and competing, confi gu-
rations of power/knowledge.
Power/knowledge is a valuable conceptual tool when looking closely at 
relatively large-scaled entities because it provides a way to both maintain 
an entity’s shape and to acknowledge the fl uidity of its boundaries. Thus, 
when thinking of psychiatry as a particular confi guration of power/knowl-
edge at a given time in a particular place, there is still plenty of conceptual 
space to access the ba  ery of infl uences such as advances in neurology 
and brain science (at the turns of the twentieth and the twenty-fi rst cen-
turies), patient resistance to treatment (the anti-psychiatry movement in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century), society’s pulse for acceptance of 
psychiatric knowledge (the mainstreaming of Freudian psychoanalysis in 
the mid twentieth century), and diff erent psychiatric practices across the 
globe (psychotherapy, electrotherapy, and pharmacotherapy in Ameri-
can, British, Canadian, German, and Russian military practices). Similarly, 
when thinking about the military, masculinity as a specifi c confi guration 
of power/knowledge circulating through and articulating with military 
practices at particular moments in time and space gives form to masculin-
ized subjectivities as part of a soldier’s identity.
The circulation of power, or what Foucault in his later work calls re-
lations of force (Foucault 1990a: 92), is not uniform. Because power is 
productive, expressions of power are never identical (but can be similar), 
always local (but never localized), and inevitably unstable (though fi xed 
enough to generate eff ects, known as power-eff ects). Because power is 
relational, what ma  ers more than the notion of power itself are the ar-
rangements of force relations and how they connect to one another. Tracing 
these connections, or articulation points, can show how specifi c bodies are 
eff ects of the circulation of power and knowledge. Foucault argued that 
subjects, too, like bodies, are eff ects of power and that subjectifi cation, or 
the process of making subjects, is embroiled in the same productive and 
relational sets of power/knowledge (Foucault 1980a, 1988b, 1990a, 1990b). 
He characterized his body of work as “a history of the diff erent modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 
1982: 777). Similar to Foucault, the process of making soldiers enduring 
emotional breakdown in combat into a subject is part of our project. More 
specifi cally, we are interested in how soldiers traumatized by encounters 
in combat come to be subjects and to act in the web of power relations that 
comprise various confi gurations of power/knowledge.
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These articulation points within particular power/knowledge confi gu-
rations can be traced through various discourses of power and knowl-
edge. Discourses can be best described in Foucault’s work not as signs 
that produce meaning, but rather as “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49; emphasis added). These 
practices form discursive structures that bring into recognition entities like 
psychiatry, the military, and masculinity. Through these discourses, both 
power and knowledge circulate; it is in their systematicity (via pa  erning, 
repetition) that a specifi c confi guration of power/knowledge emerges and 
can be identifi ed. The practices involve material acts that are themselves 
imbued with ideas, unarticulated notions, and opinions about ways of 
thinking and behaving that have eff ects on particular things. Recogniz-
ing discourse permits the analysis of similarities across texts, images, and 
stories that are eff ects and products of specifi c confi gurations of power/
knowledge (S. Mills 1997). For example, discourses about illness, mental 
health, trauma, emotion, family, spirituality, combat, manhood, chivalry, 
and camaraderie shape how a soldier comes to express psychological 
wounds as a result of combat to a fi eld medic, a commanding offi  cer, a 
medical doctor who is a commanding offi  ce, or a military psychiatrist.
To understand more precisely the production of subjects and bodies 
as eff ects of power relations, Gore (1995) identifi ed eight dimensions of 
power in Foucault’s work: classifi cation, distribution, exclusion, indi-
vidualization, normalization, regulation, surveillance, and totalization.4 
Though all these dimensions are disciplinary in nature, each works dif-
ferently in the production of subjects and bodies. For example, a PTSD 
diagnosis as both psychiatric knowledge and psychiatric practice is a type 
of classifi cation that not only marks bodies as ill within particular circles 
of knowledge producers (such as military psychiatrists), but also invokes 
value-laden readings of that ill body (as in mentally disturbed veterans 
with tendencies toward violence). These dimensions o  en work together, 
such as a psychologically wounded soldier self-monitoring (as a type of 
surveillance) through psychotherapy while in treatment in a military hos-
pital, who is also excluded from the general population for being ill. As 
well, the productive aspect of deployment of power generates innumer-
able confi gurations of relations organized around a particular concept, 
notion, or aggregation of knowledge like psychiatry, masculinity, and the 
military. By rethinking the notion of power as something not to be held or 
redistributed, but rather as something that is negotiated constantly, a con-
textualized space for action emerges rife with the potential for resistance. 
Resistance, however, is not always the easiest or most readily accessible 
response. Instead, resistance takes multiple forms—rejection, contesta-
tion, indiff erence, nonengagement, revolution—that join together over 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
 22 Weary Warriors

time to reshape the confi guration of power/knowledge itself. In the case 
of recruits, soldiers, and veterans who endure or have endured emotional 
distress as a result of combat, resistance may manifest itself in the simula-
tion of illnesses, the self-affl  iction of actual harm, insubordination, deser-
tion (or going AWOL), displays of perceived cowardice and lack of moral 
fi ber (LMF), and legal challenges to adverse decisions regarding eligibility 
for disability benefi ts and/or related social services from the state.
With regard to the soldiers with traumatized psyches as a result of liv-
ing through combat, an inquiry into the organization of multiple confi gu-
rations of power/knowledge involved in producing soldiers’ bodies and 
minds as ill can provide insights beyond those available in the literature 
about war neuroses, whether these are biological, culturalistic, naturalis-
tic, therapeutic or militaristic.5 Indeed, centering analysis on the organi-
zation of power/knowledge as it relates to war neuroses is the analytical 
method advocated by Foucault in Psychiatric Power (2006: 4; emphasis 
added): “Power does not belong to anyone or even to a group; there is 
only power because there is dispersion, relays, networks, reciprocal sup-
ports, diff erences of potential, discrepancies, etcetera. It is in this system 
of diff erences, which have to be analyzed, that power can start to function.” 
Access to these relays, networks, supports, and discrepancies in an analy-
sis of power/knowledge about war neuroses clearly arises from the ways 
that diff erent confi gurations of power/knowledge overlap, entwine, and 
interact. Tracing articulation points between soldiering and masculinity 
or ill bodies and mental illness can assist us to fi gure out how shell shock 
was relatively accepted as an outcome of the Great War whereas delayed 
stress among American veterans of the Viet Nam War came to be deval-
ued culturally.
Focusing on arrangements of power/knowledge and their articulation 
with one another does not preclude experience of illness or disciplinary 
power as something of analytical interest. These arrangements must be 
recognized as complex and multifaceted phenomena that can be both 
individual and collective (Moss and Dyck 2003: 58–60; J.W. Sco   1992). 
Refusing the naturalization of experience as the taken-for-granted base 
from which knowledge emanates permits alternative understandings of 
experience to emerge. Casting experience as generative somatically and 
discursively is a practical conceptual strategy that parallels the conception 
of power as productive and relational. Experience is at once both the act 
of interpretation of bodily sensations, emotions, events, and encounters, 
and in need of interpretation vis-à-vis the processes through which expe-
rience comes to be understood as experience (a  er J.W. Sco  : 37). In this 
way, experience, deeply material and simultaneously socially constructed, 
is integral to, not determinant of, the production of subjects and bodies. 
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One way to ensure that experience is central to a reading of weary war-
riors is to take into account feminist understandings of the concept of 
embodiment.
Feminist Understandings of Embodiment
Conceptually feminist theorists have developed nuanced understandings 
of how bodies, knowledge, power, and discourse come together to produce 
subjects. The body itself became a site for feminist inquiry both because 
of its biology, with women’s bodies being diff erent from men’s bodies, and 
because of its meaning, with women’s bodies associated with emotions, 
caring, and social reproduction, and men’s bodies associated with ratio-
nal thought, provision, and economic production (Lloyd 1984; Shildrick 
and Price 1998). Indeed, women’s bodies were central in the discussion of 
science as a privileged space for producing knowledge (Haraway 1988; 
E. Martin 1991). Power, always integral to feminism, became part of the 
discussion of how bodies were read, how they acted, and how they were 
treated in various se  ings (Bordo 1993; Currie and Raoul 1992; Ebert 1996; 
Ussher 1992). Informed by many diff erent theoretical traditions, one con-
cept, that of embodiment, captured feminists’ theoretical a  ention as a 
way to address both the materiality and the social construction of bodies 
and their interaction with both power and knowledge (Davis 1997; Di-
prose 1994; Kitzinger 2007; McLaren 2002; Moss and Dyck 2003). Missing 
from the discussion about feminist embodiment is the weary warrior. We 
maintain that feminist notions of embodiment can contribute to under-
standing military psychology as masculinist spaces in the production of 
nervous shock as a widespread illness/condition among warriors through 
soldiers’ bodies and the process of subjectifi cation. 
Although initial feminist engagements with Foucault’s ideas were neg-
ative, sometimes to the point of hostility (Alcoff  1990; Fraser 1985; Hart-
sock 1990), some feminists saw benefi t in Foucault’s thinking in terms of 
the overall feminist project.6 Two key works—Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile 
Bodies (1994) and Rosi Braido  i in Nomadic Subjects (1994) infl uenced the 
ways in which feminists came to take up embodiment conceptually and 
empirically.7 Grosz’s account of subjectivity, particularly in the area of sex-
uality and gender, emerged out of a concern over how dualistic thinking 
frames the ways in which Western philosophy understands the body, es-
pecially dichotomous thinking that separates mind from body and locates 
corporeality singularly with one type of body (based on, e.g., sex, race, 
class, nationality, or gender). She meticulously lays out a model that un-
dermines the fl ight to essentialism in biologic accounts of the body and to 
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relativism in social constructionist accounts. Her conceptual reorientation 
of the body as being neither—and simultaneously both—discursive and 
material has been incredibly infl uential in feminist accounts of the body. 
Her work cautions against taking the physical body for granted and using 
it to determine the subject, against presuming the body is a blank slate on 
which society writes the idyllic norm, and against containing concepts of 
the body in tightly woven frameworks. A notion of embodiment drawn 
from her corporeal feminism seeks to break apart the notion of a unifi ed 
subject and provide an account of subjectivity that can accommodate both 
diff erence between bodies and the specifi city of one body, a notion that 
could readily be applied to soldiers breaking down during combat partic-
ularly over time. Thinking of ill soldiers as having embodied subjectivities 
could assist in moving the debate about whether soldiers enduring pain 
from irritable heart in the la  er half of the nineteenth century were suff er-
ing from shell shock, ba  le fatigue, or PTSD, toward a discussion of which 
discursive-material circumstances led to the various categorizations of, 
and interventions in, soldiers’ ill bodies over time.
The fl uidity of Grosz’s idea of the body is echoed in Braido  i’s work on 
subjectivity. Like Grosz, Braido  i focuses on the materiality of the body 
as a means through which to break the presumed neutrality of the subject 
common in Western confi gurations of subjectivity. Feminists have argued 
that the assertion to be neutral actually masks the presence of man, man-
hood, and masculinity as the norm against which all subjects are defi ned 
(see Lloyd 1984). For Braido  i, once the materiality of the body is taken 
into account alongside the idealized notion of what a woman is (i.e., once 
the body is embodied)—by having worked through the discursive and ma-
terial sites that reduce woman to either her biology or her idyllic form—
subjectivity can become nomadic and thus move from place to place, body 
to body. In other words, nomadic subjects are no longer pretied to par-
ticular bodies; nomadic subjects are fl uid with permeable boundaries, 
on the move, and ready to incarnate through a diff erent confi guration of 
power relations. Yet, as she is quick to point out, severing a subject from 
the overarching collective sense of identity is never complete; it is a strat-
egy that creates space for the emergence of more nomadic subjects.8 Her 
understanding of embodied subjects stretches beyond sexual diff erence 
to include other signifi cant markers of diff erence such as “race, culture, 
nationality, class, life-style preferences, and so on” (Braido  i 1994: 199). 
It is not too diffi  cult to think of bodily material breakdowns as another 
signifi cant marker of diff erence, a diff erence that ma  ers considerably in 
the life of a soldier who suff ers extreme distress as a result of engagement 
in ba  le. Freed from both discursive and corporeal harnesses that ensure 
stasis, nomadic subjects can be at once bound sharply to a confi guration 
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of a specifi c materialized subject positioning (as a masculinized soldier 
suff ering psychological breakdown in combat manifested as mutism), and 
then just as abruptly can detach from, rearrange, and slide into, or over 
time make a slow transition toward, a diff erent confi guration of material-
ized subject positioning (as a rehabilitated combat soldier prepared once 
again for ba  le).
Empirically, feminists interested in embodiment and illness have ap-
plied the ideas developed by Grosz and Braido  i and their engagement 
with Foucault, resulting in fascinating studies of social norms, networks 
of power, and the production of knowledge. Liz Eckermann (1997), for 
example, uses embodiment—as an eff ect of power/knowledge in the poli-
tics of truth—to highlight the (ironic) nexus between cultural values of 
beauty and medical treatment modalities. (For more on the politics of 
truth, see Foucault 1980c and 1997.) Instead of viewing self-starvation 
as part of a woman’s quest for a beautiful body, Eckermann claims that 
the ideas about thin bodies in psychiatry vis-à-vis self-starvation are a 
result of local circulations of power/knowledge. Because of the constitu-
tive nature of power/knowledge, women engaging in self-starvation acts 
are produced by prevalent beauty discourses and psychiatric categories as 
well as actively resisting widespread understandings of women’s bodies 
in both realms. Thus, acts of self-starving challenge Western sensibilities, 
which in turn dismiss self-starvers as irrationally deviant (Eckermann 
1997: 169). Ineke Klinge (1997) considers the production of osteoporotic 
bodies in biomedical discourses through intervention strategies in labs, 
clinics, and health policy. Her analysis shows the subtle ways in which a 
normal process of aging confl ates with women’s (potential) health status 
and then intertwines with health-care systems and the delivery of health 
care. She argues that in lieu of one biological body, there are in fact mul-
tiple bodies serving multiple, disciplining agendas, and that women’s 
bodies through engagement with the health-care system become man-
aged care sites. However, within these bodies there is room for women 
individually and collectively to resist disciplinary power and create their 
own stories about bri  le bones, stories that may or may not jibe with the 
various bone stories on off er. Nelly Oudshoorn (1994), in her study of sex 
hormones, demonstrates how scientifi c knowledge informs, shapes, and 
produces natural bodies. Instead of clinging to the idea that sex hormones 
exist and defi ne natural bodies, she maintains that it is through both the 
activities of scientists researching sex hormones and the decontextualiza-
tion of scientifi c knowledge that sex hormones have become naturalized 
and associated primarily with women’s bodies. With the recognition that 
power is relational and mobile, she is able to trace how the production of 
knowledge intimately relates to women’s bodies through sex hormones.
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These types of feminist analyses of embodiment have opened up the 
discussion of how bodily discourses and material bodies generate byz-
antine entities enmeshed in their own multifaceted contexts. Yet some 
feminists remain concerned that the materiality of everyday life has been 
eclipsed by the intense focus on discourse, text, and language (Alaimo 
and Hekman 2008). Karen Barad (2003) calls for a material turn in feminist 
theory and insists on moving the focus away from the representational 
toward performativity. She maintains that Niels Bohr’s account of theo-
retical concepts not being ideational but physical arrangements provides 
a link between the conceptual and materiality that Foucault misses (Barad: 
814–20). Although Barad concedes resonance between Bohr’s apparatus 
and Foucault’s discursive practices (those repetitive acts that people draw 
on to shape their own responses in certain situations), she argues that a fo-
cus on Bohr’s understanding of apparatus as a set of open-ended practices 
that assume neither a bounded exteriority (a fi xed set of acts) or a unifi ed 
interiority (a fi xed entity without its own diversity) will actually be closer 
to understanding how the discursive and the material are inseparable. 
Bodies, both human and nonhuman, then, in her account, are from the cel-
lular level already discursive and material because of the dynamic intra-
action of phenomena. Claiming nondeterminacy of discourse, materiality, 
and the fusion of the two permits a refi nement of embodiment that can 
account not only for a snapshot of a path to the here and now, but also for 
an endless menu of possibilities for the next step. When soldiers suff ering 
deep emotional distress as a result of combat are cast as embodied entities 
with discursive-material aspects, processes involving masculine norma-
tive expectations of being soldiers and soldiers’ experiences of mental and 
body breakdowns, for example, highlight the infi nite possible pathways 
through which these psychologically wounded soldiers come to be and 
how their choices get shaped for both immediate and future acts.
In contrast to centering the subject in the body as Barad does, Annema-
rie Mol (2002), in her ethnography of atherosclerosis, purposefully relo-
cates her bodily notion of the subject in the various sets of relations within 
which individuals exist. She frames a discussion of subjects, subjectiv-
ity, and bodies in terms of two dichotomies: subjects and objects, and 
subjects as knowers and objects as known (44–50). She maintains that 
performance, as a concept to describe the identity garnered by the body 
and the self, though both idealized and material, carries with it a reso-
nance with staging the subject (which then turns into an object), and an 
idea that success comes only at the end through hard work.9 Instead, she 
chooses the verb “enact” to describe what subjects do, with no qualifi ers 
so that the reader can give a fresh interpretation of what lies in her text 
(41–43). For Mol, coming to terms with pathology of the body alongside 
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the talk and medical interventions in the outpatient clinic reintegrates the 
subject and object, and the knower and the known. As she introduces the 
knowledge embedded in practice into the usual pa  ern of a physician’s 
medical background and the patient’s experience, she is able to show how 
the spreading of knowledge enacts objects through specifi c practices (50). 
One site of enactment for psychologically wounded soldiers is psychiatric 
practice with all the a  endant knowledge embedded within the practice 
outside the relationship between the offi  cer as psychiatrist and the soldier 
or offi  cer as patient, including military codes of conduct (punishment for 
cowardice, medical boarding), medical protocols (on diagnosis, treatment, 
and understandings of mental illness), combat duty orders (about service 
and deployment), and individual oaths (confl ict between healing the pa-
tient and winning a war).
These particular understandings of subjectivity, subjects, discourse, 
materiality, and bodies frame our feminist notion of embodiment. As a 
concept, embodiment needs to capture the tension between the specifi c 
materiality of a soldier’s body in a particular place and the discourses 
and practices that constitute that same body historically and in the pres-
ent (a  er Moss and Dyck 2001). For us, embodiment concerns lived-in 
spaces, generated through webs of power/knowledge, the eff ects of which 
are spun around, through, and with each other, where bodies engage 
in common tasks and routines as well as extraordinary acts and deeds. 
Because bodies are neither wholly discursive nor solely material, but are 
both profoundly discursive and intrinsically material, bodies as eff ects of 
power have draughty boundaries with undetermined courses of conduct. 
Much like bodies, these lived-in spaces are objects enacted through re-
petitive daily social practices that are already drenched in the inseparable 
discursive-material aspects of thoughts and deeds. Much like the lived-
in spaces, force relations too are saturated with integral pa  erns of the 
discursive and the material. Conceptually, embodiment ravels together 
diverse, concrete practices embedded with (and within) specifi c confi gu-
rations of power/knowledge that in turn hold a subject’s subjectivity in 
place until the subject is nomadically incarnated elsewhere. As eff ects of 
power, bodies populate these spaces and engage in these practices as both 
materialized subjectivities and enacted subjects.
In relation to weary warriors, using embodiment to frame how an ac-
count of soldiers’ ill bodies comes into being, how they are treated by the 
military including by military psychiatrists, and how soldiers heal from 
and live with ill bodies, entails detailing the sensorial, psychical, and emo-
tional distress combat soldiers encounter during service and demonstrat-
ing how various psychiatric, masculine, and military discourses inscribe 
fl eshed bodies with idealized notions of psychiatric illness, soldiering, 
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and manhood (c.f., Meyer 2009; Roper 2008). We argue that soldiers’ ill 
bodies are enacted as specifi c discursive-material entities in these lived 
spaces relationally and recursively. Relationally various sets of social re-
lationships and webs of power/knowledge (psychiatry, masculinity, and 
the military) both discipline soldiers’ ill bodies and open up spaces of pos-
sibilities for action (suff ering, learning, healing). Recursively, ongoing and 
repeated pa  erns of practices (in combat, through convalescence, with 
coping) and enactment of texts (diagnosis, treatment protocols, and social 
policy) assemble the contours of the present as much as the reading of 
the past and the shape of the future. To trace the relational and recursive 
pathways constituting soldiers’ ill bodies with war neuroses, we need to 
integrate our notion of embodiment into Foucault’s analysis of how the ar-
ticulation of discourses within the power/knowledge confi gurations work 
in tandem with other elements in these social relations and practices that 
produce, as eff ects, both bodies and subjects. In other words, we need to 
integrate our notion of embodiment into Foucault’s concept of dispositifs, 
or disciplinary apparatuses. 
Toward Embodied Apparatuses
Psychiatric Power, a set of lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 
1973 and 1974, provides a more nuanced demonstration of the exercise of 
power through psychiatry as a specifi c confi guration of power/knowledge 
in the nineteenth century. Foucault draws out the social practices of the 
psychiatrist within the asylum as well as the acts of those residing inside 
the asylum. He focuses on the recurrent engagements of the psychiatrist 
with the mad to show how the exercise of power manages bodies before 
curing them. The practice of asylum psychiatry entails the psychiatrist 
repeatedly telling a patient that he or she is ill until that patient embraces 
this notion as fact. Only when the patient accepts madness can therapeutic 
intervention begin. The psychiatrist in the asylum demands not only the 
management of illness, but also the management of all patients’ needs as 
well as the deprivations generated as a result of not meeting these needs. 
This is but one example of the way in which psychiatric power is prac-
ticed in the asylum. Other practices include cold baths, laudanum, and 
cauterization prescribed on the basis of the etiology of illness (Foucault 
2006: 180–81).
Yet it is not just these types of activities that defi ne the asylum as a 
medical treatment center for the mad. The manner of the patient’s initial 
encounter with the psychiatrist (Foucault 2006: 182), the organization of 
patients within the asylum according to symptom not disease process 
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(180), and the visible power a psychiatrist holds over other patients all 
contribute to the facilitation and reproduction of the potential for disci-
pline by the psychiatrist. What makes the asylum a disciplinary medi-
cal space is the omnipresence of the doctor, literally and symbolically. 
This disciplinary space comes into being not through the content of the 
knowledge the psychiatrist holds, but through the supplementary power 
ceded to the psychiatrist because of the formalized medical stamp on that 
knowledge (184). Disciplinary practices organized as a regime manage 
and administer the lives of the mad to the point that the reality of the asy-
lum is inevitable, the power of the psychiatrist is realized (173–75, 188). 
The asylum then is an eff ect of power at the scale of the institution and 
in the form of exile, and is arranged through the relationships between 
the subjugated patient’s body and the knowledgeable psychiatrist’s body 
(188–89).
Because repeated pa  erns of the exercise of disciplinary power, or 
what Foucault calls discursive practices, within a disciplinary space like the 
asylum shi   and change according to new ideas, individual preferences, 
funding regulations, or devaluations of particular types of knowledge, 
the porous boundaries of power/knowledge are indeterminate and sub-
ject to both internal resistance or external infl uence. Thus, the notion of a 
dominant knowledgeable body enacting a specifi c stamp on a disciplinary 
space as an extension of the institution, such as the medical stamp on an 
asylum, has waned throughout the twentieth century. With the dissolu-
tion of the asylum through mental hygiene reform, the rise of private 
practice, and deinstitutionalization, psychiatrists’ bodies are no longer 
panoptic institutions in and of themselves. Instead, their bodies eff ectuate 
the regulations of a professional association organized around a particular 
knowledge base. The same is true generally for physicians and surgeons. 
Even though their bodies represent the institution of medicine, and more 
specifi cally biomedicine, by way of hospitals and specialized clinics, the 
striking institutional practices as seen in the asylum no longer exist.
Foucault refers to both the arrangement of social practices of power 
within a specifi c confi guration of power/knowledge and the mechanisms 
through which power is exercised as dispositifs or “disciplinary appara-
tuses” (Foucault 2006: 46–57, 63–87). He defi nes “apparatus” as “a thor-
oughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientifi c statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic proposi-
tions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. … The apparatus itself is 
the system of relations that can be established between these elements” 
(Foucault 1980b: 194). Apparatuses emerge within specifi c historical con-
texts and strategically function to address a societal need—as, for example, 
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the asylum acting as a repository of the mad and incorrigible children and 
the public school system addressing the need for socializing children who 
are under the legal working age. The continued existence of disciplinary 
apparatuses refl ects the fl exibility of the relations and pa  erning among 
the constitutive elements.
Because of the heterogeneity of any one apparatus, there inevitably 
is overlap between apparatuses, thus permi  ing psychiatry, for exam-
ple, to “plug into a whole series of disciplinary regimes existing around 
it” (Foucault 2006: 222). Articulation of various disciplinary apparatuses 
reinforces existing power relations, with one apparatus using the disci-
plinary stamp of the other to support a host of diff erent social practices. 
A diagnosis, for example, generated within the disciplinary apparatus 
of psychiatry o  en serves as a signifi cant marker in other apparatuses, 
like the military, to make decisions about individual people. Diagnoses 
circulate through discourses among various disciplinary apparatuses as 
plugs, and administrative forms as manifestations of regulations act as 
the outlets. Commanding offi  cers assess competency for soldiers to return 
to service according to the existence (or absence) of particular psychiatric 
diagnoses just as state offi  cials rely on the same diagnoses to determine 
eligibility of veterans for disability benefi ts. Masculinity, too, ma  ers in 
both the assessments of competency and determination of disability ben-
efi ts. Though not always explicit in the forms themselves, the expectations 
of manly behavior contradict potential options—that is, lifetime public 
fi nancial support for mental breakdown while serving the nation.
As an expression of power/knowledge within an apparatus, Foucault’s 
elaboration of disciplinary power leaves more room for understanding 
the nuances of how power is exercised which, in turn, permits a more 
fl exible view on the productive potential of power, particularly in terms 
of embodiment. An embodied apparatus does not have to be disciplin-
ary. Because of the way in which force relations are productive and re-
lational, power is both restrictive and liberating (or potestas and potentia 
a  er Braido  i 2002) at the same time. We seek to highlight the materiality 
of the social practices that produce the elements of an apparatus—indeed 
apparatuses—without dismissing the impact of discourse as a set of ideas, 
linguistic practices, and wri  en texts that have regulatory eff ects. Em-
bodiment is not the anthropomorphized description of the relationship 
between bodies and other phenomena, such as good citizens, well-trained 
soldiers, or cured neurotics. Rather, embodiment challenges us to think in 
terms of bodies being a mechanism of the deployment of power instead 
of being vessels to carry out a particular discourse or a venue through 
which an individual can internalize a set of ideas. At the same time, we 
wish to pull out the discursive aspects of deeply material relationships 
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between, for example, the state and the soldier, as in pay schedules, dis-
ability benefi ts, and danger pay, and between the body and identity, as 
in masculine ideals of virility and militaristic accounts of mental health. 
Just as discourse does not determine individuals’ actions, the materiality 
of the body as ill does not create an undiff erentiated subjectivity without 
social or cultural meaning. Maintaining the simultaneity of materiality 
and discourse allows the detailing of the relational and recursive aspects 
of soldiers’ concrete actions as well as the organization and regulation of 
those actions in dealing with the experience of war.
A diffi  culty in employing the concept of an apparatus is the sweep-
ing way such a widely encompassing concept disconnects subjects from 
historical processes. Our notion of embodiment provides a framework 
for noting the specifi city of the relationships within an apparatus as well 
as recognizing the existence of multiple possibilities arising within each 
confi guration of power/knowledge. When thinking in terms of embodied 
subjectivities, manifestations of distress can be unique to an individual 
soldier while at the same time being part of a collective outbreak of a group 
of soldiers at a particular time. As the soldier is not isolated from the same 
web of processes that the treating psychiatrist is caught up in, the eff ects 
of the interaction between the two contribute to the constitution of both 
the soldier and the psychiatrist as subjects, as well as to the tone of the 
relationship itself. Something similar could be said of the sets of relations 
within which the soldier and psychiatrist are positioned, in that these 
power relations contribute to the framing of the pa  erns of the relation-
ships of the elements in the apparatus. Thus, the eff ects of the multiple 
interactions of relations of power are generating subjects as soldiers, as 
psychiatrists, or as veterans; so, too, are the material-discursive manifes-
tations of those force relations, such as the architecture of the exhaustion 
unit, the cultural depictions of traumatized soldiers, and the organization 
of resistance movements both inside and outside the war theater.
Foucault gets beyond the discursive trap of claiming that processes are 
socially constructed by reaching into the organization of power relations 
and their material eff ects. Yet there is li  le doubt that thinking in terms of 
disciplinary apparatuses defl ects the analytical focal point away from an 
individual, body, or subject, toward an analysis of relationships among 
complex entities, like institutions, professional practices, and discourse 
of ideal bodies. Keeping the analysis of extreme psychological distress at 
such a scale cannot capture the subtleties of what actually happens to sol-
diers during a breakdown in ba  le, the experience of the breakdown, and 
the life-changing eff ects of having broken down in combat. Embodiment, 
however, refocuses the analysis onto the weary warrior without having to 
rely on experience as an unmediated event or on the material body as the 
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only surface on which to inscribe discourse. Broken embodiments frame 
the way in which weary warriors come to populate these disciplinary ap-
paratuses. Thus, following weary warriors through these apparatuses as 
they engage the relays, networks, supports, and discrepancies of diff er-
ence, we come to see the embodied and nomadic aspects of weary war-
riors as they endeavor to maintain the boundaries of their minds, bodies, 
and souls.
Tracing Conceptual Paths
Historically psychiatry as a fi eld of study casts a wide net. The mind, the 
brain, the body, the emotion, the heart, and the soul all come under the 
psychiatric gaze. The power deployed via psychiatric practice within the 
military actively enacts illness through the minds, bodies, and souls of sol-
diers who contend with the eff ects of combat. Their bodies break emotion-
ally, physically, and psychically, and it is psychiatrists and related mental 
health professionals who a  empt to fi x that which is broken. The relational 
and recursive pa  erning of military psychiatric practices are the points at 
which illness becomes shell shock, ba  le fatigue, or an OSI. These names 
a  ached to individual bodies and printed in texts contain embodiments, 
but not necessarily the embodiments they intend to contain. 
In this chapter we have traced our own conceptual path that frames our 
understanding of the ways in which power and the body fi gure into the 
organization of knowledge. In the following chapters, we hold in tension 
the discursive aspects alongside the material manifestations of the lived-
in spaces of weary warriors. Weary warriors are not born, they are made. 
One of the things that we emphasize is the discursive-material character of 
not only the relations and interactions weary warriors engage, but also the 
bodies themselves. The goal of our analysis is to critically explore multiple 
expressions of embodiment with both individual soldiers and groups of 
soldiers in order to describe some of the various ways in which mobile 
fragments of subjects break and come to constitute the weary warrior. To 
bring specifi city to weary warriors, we need to look more closely at ideas 
of weary warriors that are more conventional. We turn to this task in the 
next chapter.
Notes
 1. The fi eld of poststructural thinking is incredibly wide. We draw primarily on 
the poststructuralist work of Michel Foucault, and to a lesser extent on the 
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works of Gilles Deleuze (1990, 1999) and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Gua  ari 
(1987).
 2. Such philosophers as Fox Keller (1985), Haraway (1989), and Harding (1986) 
set up the critique of science from feminist perspectives. 
 3. Three collected volumes of material feminism pieces that show a range of 
views on materiality from a feminist perspective are Alaimo and Hekman 
(2008), Delphy (1984), and Hennessy and Ingraham (1997). Material feminism 
draws on critical theory for some of the thinking about wider structural pro-
cesses. See Calhoun (1995), Durham and Kellner (2006), Fraser (1989), Held 
(1980), J. Martin (1973), Miklitsch (2006) and Zoller and Du  a (2008) for gen-
eral understandings and contemporary applications of the critical theory that 
inform our framing, including the area of health. 
 4. Although identifi ed to assist in fi guring out how children were disciplined 
in a classroom, the classifi cation system is still useful for understanding how 
power is practiced in diff erent se  ings.
 5. See Cantor (2005); Foa, Keane, and Friedman (2000); E. Jones and Wessely 
(2005a); and Tanielian and Jaycox (2008). 
 6. With regard to the body, see McLaren (2002) and Sawicki (1991). 
 7. Nomadic Subjects is now in its second edition (Braido  i 2011). 
 8. This is the case for subjectivities either as eff ects of power or as categories 
of positioning to which a subject is a  ached. A collective subjecthood is still 
needed for grounding politics.
 9. She draws on Goff man’s (1959) notion that people perform and present their 
self in everyday life (Mol 2002: 34–35) and Butler’s (1990) notion that people 
engage in performativity wherein identity is not given but practiced (Mol: 
37–39). This referencing by Mol of Goff man’s work fi ts nicely with Foucault’s 
own acknowledgement of Goff man’s work on asylums and the social situation 
of mental patients and other inmates.
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Unsettling Notions
War Neuroses, Soldiering, 
and Broken Embodiments

Without the neurotic the mind of man would be stationary. The war may 
teach those who have not already learned the lesson by what slightly 
graded steps the normal diff ers from what we call the abnormal.
—Montague David Eder, War-Shock
Over the years, combat psychiatry has evolved from a barely 
recognized entity to a sophisticated science with ramifi cations in 
every area of military planning. Beginning with the Civil War, 
each subsequent confl ict has led to a refi nement of treatment 
techniques and has added progressively to our understanding and 
conceptualization of man’s ability to deal with the stresses of combat.
—Peter Bourne, “Military Psychiatry and 
the Viet Nam War in Perspective”
Soldiers subject themselves and their bodies to a whirlwind of activity 
when seeking assistance for something that somehow feels broken, or not 
quite right. Medical interventions begin once a soldier presents to a physi-
cian, by choice or sometimes without volition, with bodily sensations that 
get worked up as symptoms once they are transcribed onto the physician’s 
notepad. Diagnosis as a practice begins with physicians seeking physi-
cal causes for the manifestation of symptoms fi rst and diagnosing war 
neurosis only when there is no physiological etiology. Once a physician 
ascribes a specifi c war neurosis—irritable heart syndrome, ba  le fatigue, 
or mild TBI (mTBI)—as a category of illness, a psychiatrist then prescribes 
treatment as a collection of modalities that for many turn into regiments 
that structure the organization of daily living. Psychiatry, the military, 
and masculinity each play a role in the constitution of ill soldiers and war 
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neuroses and together set the stage with a specifi c cast of characters and 
a script for living as a weary warrior. All three are complex ensembles of 
values, power relations, and social practices and each can be identifi ed as 
a separate entity with its own internal structures, practices, and processes 
that strive to sustain and reproduce in relation to each other; that is, each 
is a specifi c confi guration of power/knowledge.
The weary warrior is a unique entry point into an inquiry of these 
ensembles, for it is through psychiatry, the military, and masculinity that 
the psychologically wounded soldier comes into focus and is disclosed 
as a subject (Hekman 2010). In its early years of existence, psychiatry as 
a medical practice focused solely on madness and insanity, leaving neu-
rologists to deal with illness associated with nerves as the visceral parts 
of bodies. Over the twentieth century, psychiatry extended its purview, 
taking over the mental (or nonbodily) side of nervous conditions and ex-
panded to include a host of illnesses and disorders related to the mind.1 
Against a backdrop of an ascending dominance of medicine as the way to 
treat ill bodies, psychiatrists became part of the standing military—that is, 
psychiatrists were integrated into military service rather than as civilians 
in service to soldiers, and psychiatry as both a science and a practice be-
came subject to military rules, conventions, and imperatives. Over time, as 
mental health se  led into one aspect of the overall health of the individual 
soldier, psychiatry, psychiatrists, and psychiatric thinking became more 
integrated into recruitment eff orts, training protocols, and structures of 
command. Commonly held beliefs about what it means to be a man were 
part and parcel to the joining of psychiatry and the military, especially as 
played out through being ill as a result of deep emotional distress during 
combat. Although hard-and-fast rules do not govern all aspects of mas-
culinity, there are ideas and notions that weeping, cowardice, and break-
downs are not manly, and that stolidity, courage, and control are.
Information about trauma, neuroses, soldiering, citizenship, treatment, 
disability benefi ts, and tactical training is useful in order to explore to 
what extent particular ideas organize possible activities psychiatrists and 
soldiers engage in. Yet it is not just the ideas we focus on; from information 
on the same topics, we also examine the arrangement of the mechanisms 
used for the exercise of power (force relations) as constitutive of the lives 
of ill soldiers. We can trace palpable eff ects of psychiatry, the military, and 
masculinity on traumatized soldiers, including ongoing emotional dis-
tress, intensity of symptoms, limited economic opportunities for veterans, 
and material acts of violence done to veterans in the name of psychiatric 
treatment.
In this chapter, we make our way through literatures about the use of 
culture in psychiatry, the military and its practices, and a range of dif-
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ferent types of masculinities. We pick at the use of culture as a means to 
explain illness and psychiatry, and explore some of the ways that culture 
fi gures into our own framing. We take up conventional theories of the 
military and contrast them with oppositional descriptions of power as a 
way of rereading the military. We also critically engage with the notion 
of masculinity in a way to trouble stereotypical ideas about men without 
dismissing them as signifi cant in defi ning what it means to be a soldier in 
the military.
Renegotiating the Link between War Neuroses and Culture
One of the diffi  culties in studying illness, whether at the scale of the in-
dividual body or of society, is how to account for diff erences across cul-
tures. Manifestations of symptoms associated with war neuroses vary 
from place to place and time to time, nervous exhaustion bringing on epi-
lepsy among Russian soldiers in the Russo-Japanese war, gastrointestinal 
problems among German soldiers in the initial years of Nazi Germany’s 
advance across Europe, and low rates of ba  lefi eld nervous breakdown 
among American soldiers in Viet Nam in the early 1960s (Binneveld 1997: 
97; Shephard 2000: 340; Wanke 2005: 18, 24). Diff erences could partially 
be a  ributed to the way in which psychiatry was being practiced in these 
particular places. In Russia, military psychiatry focused on the neurologi-
cal aspects of mental disease producing a materialist bias far exceeding 
the type of psychiatry being practiced elsewhere at the time. A  er the Sec-
ond World War, German psychiatrists maintained that they had put into 
practice the lessons learned from the Great War, and thus used military 
discipline to halt the creation of neurotic soldiers in combat. For American 
soldiers, the increase in the number of psychiatrists serving in Viet Nam, 
the twelve-month service rotation, and a general state of high morale were 
credited as having kept low rates of combat fatigue in the early years of 
the war.2 
 A limitation in the existing literature on war neuroses is the consistent 
use of culture, in various guises, as an explanation for diff erences in the 
manifestation of neurotic symptoms among soldiers and veterans. There 
is no place other than in analyses of hysteria that culture stands out as the 
root cause of illness. In the formidable sea of writing about women’s hys-
teria, Elaine Showalter’s body of work is the most recognized and popular 
contemporary scholarship on the topic.3 Her interpretations of the work 
of Jean-Martin Charcot, Josef Breuer, and Sigmund Freud form the basis 
of a feminist critique of hysteria based on two premises: that hysteria 
is a cultural construct arising out of women’s social circumstances, and 
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that women even in hysterical states can speak for themselves. In France, 
Charcot (1987) legitimated hysteria as a range of bodily manifestations of 
psychological distress, which for him was in part hereditary and in part 
psychological. Although maintaining that hysteria was predominantly a 
female condition, Charcot argued against hysteria being solely a female 
problem; the causes of hysteria, however, diff ered for males and females.4 
In Austria, Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud ([1905] 1997) introduced, and 
for the most part developed, psychoanalysis through famous case stud-
ies, including those of Anna O. and Dora.5 Their work on theorizing the 
unconscious through “talk therapy” solidifi ed the link between hysteria 
and sex by making the singular cause of hysteria a psychological confl ict 
over a sexually traumatic incident (Freud [1905] 1997).6 Freud a  empted 
to outline a theory on male hysteria to a professional audience of psy-
choanalysts who were simply not interested (Showalter 1993: 290). That 
hysteria was primarily a  ached to women’s bodies changed drastically at 
the onset of the Great War with soldiers presenting with what doctors at 
fi eld hospitals saw as hysterical neuroses. Even though psychiatry on the 
whole recognized male hysteria, it was not a popular diagnosis, not the 
least of which because hysteria implied an eff eminate way of being and 
seemed to be linked to homosexuality and sexual impotence (Showalter 
1985: 171–73). This movement from women’s hysteria to warrior’s neuro-
ses waned once the war ended, with military psychiatry severing men’s 
war trauma from women’s maladies.
Showalter maintains that ideas about hysteria as an illness made great 
strides in Charcot’s and Breuer and Freud’s times, if for nothing else be-
cause of the break with the biologically deterministic role of women’s 
reproductive system (which had been the prevailing medical view before 
Charcot). Her criticism of this work lies with the dismissal of other social 
circumstances that lead to hysteria and further reinforce the restrictive 
pillar of sexual repression, thus providing welcomed cultural support to 
a patriarchal society. Showalter maintains that a  er the end of the Great 
War women knew be  er than men about shell shock because they knew 
how powerlessness can lead to pathology (Showalter 1985: 190). She also 
argues that the soldiers and military psychiatrists, even the most sensitive 
ones, were so fi rmly ensconced in patriarchal culture that they could not 
see the true meaning of hysteria.
What is problematic with Showalter’s focus on culture to explain the 
manifestation of war neuroses is that by using socially constructed cul-
tural concepts that organize bodies (patriarchy) as causes for other so-
cially constructed cultural concepts that describe the experiences of bodies 
(hysteria), she fails to identify a material basis to hold the concepts in 
place. Showalter repeats the same weakness when she applies the same 
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argument she developed for understanding war neuroses among male 
hysterics to Gulf War Syndrome (GWS), which she calls a contemporary 
collective expression of hysteria, some seventy-fi ve years later (Showal-
ter 1998: 133–43). Even though GWS arose in a diff erent era from the era 
in which shell shock arose, among diff erent social and cultural circum-
stances, Showalter reiterates that soldiers presenting with somatic illness 
can only be a response to a collective cultural narrative that renders mate-
rial diff erences in the bodies of ill soldiers as mere physical expressions of 
emotional trauma—that is, Gulf War veterans clamoring for the recogni-
tion of GWS are the same as the male hysterics from the Great War. Yet in 
contrast to mutism and other forms of paralysis indicative of male hyste-
ria among soldiers during the Great War, GWS veterans present with skin 
rashes, headaches, fatigue, burning semen, anxiety, respiratory ailments, 
and birth defects in their children born a  er the war.7 Bodily diff erences 
do not count in her analysis. Her grip on culture remains tight, and as a 
result she reinforces the need for the power of psychiatry as a medical con-
fi guration of power/knowledge to silence soldiers’ stories of their own ill 
bodies that link deleterious eff ects of their bodies to toxic vaccinations and 
depleted uranium, and that ends up bolstering the moralistic imperative 
that these suff ering soldiers would be be  er off  with a psychotherapist 
and not another medical test.
In contrast to Showalter’s use of culture as an explanation for the wide-
spread onset of bodily symptoms, the practice of military psychiatry dur-
ing wartime uses culture to explain diff erences in dealing with soldiers 
presenting with symptoms associated with war neuroses. Culture can 
be used to explain diff erences at a very fi ne scale, such as the profes-
sional practices among a group of military psychiatrists. In Britain during 
the Great War military psychiatrists were apt to describe war neuroses 
diff erently depending on the rank of their patients, a practice that led 
to variations in treatments off ered. Offi  cers suff ering traumatic neuroses 
and treated at Craiglockhart Hospital near Edinburgh had recorded in 
their medical notes vaguer descriptions of symptoms than the rank-and-
fi le soldiers treated at Maghull Hospital near Liverpool—fatigue, depres-
sion, lapse of memory versus loss of speech and hearing, paralysis, fi ts, 
and hysterical gaits (Leese 2002: 85–102, 103–20). At Craiglockhart, psy-
chotherapy or the talking cure was the favored choice of treatment; at 
Maghull, electroshock therapy was more prevalent (Leese). Culture also 
can refer to the organization of military practices in the treatment of trau-
matized soldiers. In Nazi Germany, the low rates of mental breakdown 
among combat soldiers in the la  er part of the 1939–45 war have been 
explained in terms of extreme military discipline—that is, the execution of 
an estimated 15,000 young men in the last two years of the war who had 
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cried, showed cowardice, tried to leave the ba  le, or broken down in any 
other way (Shephard 2000: 305).
These various uses of culture to explain particular aspects of the psy-
chologically wounded soldier tend toward being culturalistic explana-
tions of individuals. Culturalistic explanations use an aspect of culture as 
the direct causal link for a particular action (a specifi c diagnosis used by 
a group of physicians at a particular hospital; low rates of mental break-
down being the result of military disciplinary policy), a symptom (mutism 
among the rank and fi le because they are unable to speak against their 
leaders; an issue civilians are grappling with being introduced into mili-
tary contexts, such as sexual repression being sublimated or irrational fear 
of toxins causing rashes), or a treatment (materialist bias in Russian psy-
chiatry focus on organic processes, psychotherapy preferred by Western 
psychiatrists).
Determining a causal link between some aspect of culture and onset of 
war neurosis is not always straightforward. Culture, when invoked as ex-
planation, glosses over complex processes of the constitution of the mate-
riality of meaning. Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely (2005a: 192) claim that 
by drawing on Cliff ord Geertz’s (1973) defi nition of culture as “systems 
of meaning” as “learned pa  erns of behavior and thought,” “functional 
disorders are prone to its eff ects in terms of symptom identifi cation, label-
ing, explanation and treatment.” Besides oversimplifying Geertz’ notion 
of culture, they set up a direct link between culture (as a set of learned 
behaviors) and the malfunctioning of soldiers’ bodies. Rather than explor-
ing the learned pa  erns of behavior and thought within military psy-
chiatry, they identify the psychiatrist as the medium through which a set 
of nonmedical ideas enter into the clinical encounter that the individual 
psychiatrist as clinician then acts on in some manner. For instance, they 
claim that disordered action of the heart did not “go away” and was actu-
ally reintroduced a  er the Great War as “eff ort syndrome” by cardiologist 
Sir Thomas Lewis of Mount Vernon Hospital. They argue that in lieu of 
his organic rationale for disordered action of the heart in his early work, 
Lewis (1920) chose a psychogenic diagnosis for eff ort syndrome in 1940 
because psychiatry—as a cultural practice, not as an eff ect of power—
“eclipsed” organic models for understanding soldiers’ irritable hearts (E. 
Jones and Wessely 2005a: 194).8 
Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely (2005a) go even farther with their 
claims about how war neuroses are linked to culture, and use it to ex-
plain how diagnosis relates to the incidence of illness. They maintain, “it 
remains conventional wisdom that as psychological enlightenment spread 
during the twentieth century, psychiatric models for unexplained symp-
toms gained ascendancy over more intellectually suspect organic claims” 
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and that “[t]he former popularity of the [hysteria] diagnosis was a cultural 
phenomenon, which may be unrelated to real changes in the incidence 
of hysteria” (196; emphasis added). They relegate the medical practice 
of diagnosis to the cultural sphere and hysteria to the realm of mental 
illness, while at the same time claiming that hysteria is a psychiatric dis-
order without organic genesis. They support their argument by showing 
how nonulcer dyspepsia prevalent during the Second World War among 
British troops and the exposure to toxins for soldiers during the Gulf War 
were eff ects of popular health concerns among civilians being transported 
into war theaters (198–99). They argue that contemporary fears of gastro-
intestinal illness among urban dwellers during the Second World War, 
and later the impact of phosphates, pesticides, vaccinations, and radiation 
in everyday understandings of the body and the environment during the 
1990s infl uenced the ways in which soldiers presented symptoms and 
came to tell their stories of illness.9 They conclude that these illnesses were 
merely conversion disorders. What is signifi cant in all these claims that 
Jones and Wessely make is the use of culture as an authoritative justifi ca-
tion for the wielding of psychological explanations of soldiers’ ill bodies.
Culture can also be called upon to explain individuals themselves, es-
pecially in terms of a set of collectively held cultural values inscribed onto 
the body. Masculine notions of soldiering, for example, though multi-
faceted, generally include some form of camaraderie and loyalty among 
themselves and fellow soldiers, chivalry toward the vulnerable, obedience 
to authority and nation, bravery in ba  le, and fi tness of the body—in 
short, the honorable warrior (Ignatieff  1998). Such masculine values of 
soldiering usually exclude any and all moral and physical weakness, ex-
cept for wounds resulting from acts of bravery. As an ideal, these notions 
shape the context within how soldiers come to understand themselves as 
soldiers. With regard to illness, a general understanding of a set of cultural 
values as part of masculinity and as part of the military can explain the 
general tenor of how illness is integrated into soldiers’ identities. However, 
culture in this sense cannot explain either the individual or the collective 
body (the antebellum, Victorian, or Jazz Age body in the United States, or 
the Biedermeier, Weimar, or Nazi body in Germany) or the specifi city of 
a symptom (paralysis, memory loss, diarrhea, fl ashbacks, or outbursts of 
violence). Arguments based on culturalistic premises also support natu-
ralistic framings of bodies. In further discussion of the impact of culture in 
the ascription of diagnostic categories on soldiers’ ill bodies, for example, 
Jones and Wessely conceptualize culture as an entity separate from the 
military practice of medicine and psychiatry and come to the naturalistic 
conclusion that “war syndromes are one more phase in the continually 
evolving picture of man’s [sic] reaction to adversity” (208). Undoubtedly, 
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these types of explanations tend to reduce individuals to strands of form-
less thoughts, positioned as mere points in a wider trajectory of history.
Works that draw on culture to explain aspects of the ascription of a war 
neurosis onto a soldier’s body are even more problematic when claims 
rest on the assumption that psychiatry and the military either are outside 
culture or should be immune to the eff ect of cultural values and practices. 
Psychiatry over the past century has increasingly dealt with the biologi-
cal basis of mental illness, with brain science being given more credence, 
respectability, and authority to explain the mind. However, even though 
psychiatry is a discourse about biological and physiological processes, it 
remains a body of knowledge that is sustained by practices regulated by 
a professional body, and as such is (a) infl uenced by other discourses and 
bodies of knowledge and (b) not anchored in any way to the mind as a 
physical entity. Moving toward a more science-based psychiatry, free from 
cultural values, further reinforces a naturalistic view of illness based on 
culturalistic practices. Thus, when Jones and Wessely (2005b) claim that 
war syndromes should be categorized as medically unexplained symp-
toms, they are actually pulling all soldiers’ bodily sensations into a psy-
chiatric discourse that endorses one particular way of understanding the 
body and the mind—in biological and physiological terms.
Breaking away from a culturalistic grounding in accounts of situating 
war neuroses entails renegotiating the link between illness and the process 
of creating weary warriors. So, in lieu of unscrambling the infl uences af-
fecting symptoms, diagnoses, and treatments of psychologically wounded 
soldiers in cultural terms, one could focus instead on how weary warriors 
come to be—both conceptually and in practice. Claiming culture as some-
thing needing explanation rather than invoking it to explain war neuroses 
takes seriously the notion that weary warriors are not culturally specifi c. 
Illness is not determined by culture, nor is it merely infl uenced by cultural 
values. Accepting that illness is not simply a breakdown, malfunction, or 
defect in or of the body means looking farther afi eld at how bodies de-
velop, sustain, and live with illness within and across various cultures. If 
illness itself is something that cannot exist outside multiple sets of social 
relations, then tracing the articulation points of culture and the ill bodies 
of soldiers with ravished minds can show how cultural explanations are 
eff ects of the circulation of power and knowledge.
Soldiering as an Institution
By engaging theoretically and empirically with military institutions, we 
maintain that there is both more and less to military institutions than 
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meets the conventional gaze, especially with regard to what constitutes 
soldiering. We are drawn to question the model of military establishments 
depicted by most of the literature over the past century or so as a set of 
stable, formal structures that wield sovereign power. The actual functions 
and lived eff ects of the military in the arena of military psychiatry for emo-
tionally traumatized soldiers—rather than only, and simply, the offi  cial 
claims and institutional-centric portrayals of military establishments—are 
signifi cant. We reject the conception of soldiers as static machines, instilled 
with a set of national and civic values, trained to obey orders, and invoked 
as needed to sustain the state, as too one-dimensional, and instead probe 
for additional eff ects and multiple meanings of both the military and sol-
diers.10 Similarly, we reject the assumed self-evident solidity of the mili-
tary, and prefer to look for unstable identities, changeable social practices, 
and fl uctuating relationships.11 By looking at fl uidity and diversity within 
military establishments, we are not rejecting the realities of state coercion, 
formal authority, and prescribed hierarchy. Rather, we are building on and 
engaging with these highly visible actualities because we are interested in 
identifying processes and techniques that constitute soldiers in relation 
to o  en contending domains of psychiatric knowledge and in relation to 
particular historical periods and cultural se  ings, technological innova-
tions, and military contexts.
The idea that the military is a human machine rests on a history of 
organizational studies and social theories that include bureaucratic ratio-
nalization and domination, classical leadership and management studies, 
a scientifi c view of war and systems analysis for military operations (with 
constructing scenarios and applying game theories), offi  cial war histo-
ries, and new public management, especially in our contemporary age 
of neoliberalism (Becker 1998; Morgan 1997; P. Smith 2008). The machine 
imagery is longstanding in the social and natural sciences, an image that 
“works best when the social world acts in a very repetitive way,” or when 
those in control desire an environment or organization to operate in a 
systematic and predictable manner (Becker: 40). The emphasis, with this 
mechanistic imagery, is on a system organized around hierarchies and 
formal positions, around a legal-rational administration in which behav-
ior is rule-based, and around a narrative tradition that highlights leaders 
and downplays the rank-and-fi le. This emphasis is especially apparent in 
military history.
Five dimensions characterize the machine-like nature of the military. 
First, in recent centuries the need for a close alignment between the na-
tion-state and sovereign power has led to the institutionalization of coer-
cive powers. Historically, in empires and kingdoms, militaries were tied 
to “the consolidation of power by national monarchs who felt the need for 
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permanent military forces to protect their dominions and to support their 
rule” (Huntington 1957: 21). In more contemporary times, militaries are 
integral to the modern state that, as Max Weber argues in his defi nition of 
the state, is “a compulsory organization with a territorial base [where] the 
use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permi  ed 
by the state or prescribed by it” (M. Weber [1922] 1968: 56). The modern 
military is thus inextricably linked to the legitimate coercion of the state; 
military force is lawful force. Morris Janowitz (1960) elaborates on this 
fundamental dimension: “The unique character of the military establish-
ment derives from the requirement that its members are specialists in 
making use of violence and mass destruction” (200). As an institution for 
the exercise of state-sanctioned force, the military must “maintain combat 
readiness [and be] prepared to fi ght eff ectively and immediately” (201).
Second, modern militaries are professional militaries, a phenomenon 
with origins in the Prussian army of the early 1800s (Huntington 1957), 
if not earlier. John Keegan (1976: 63) writes of post-Renaissance armies, 
“from the seventeenth century onwards, it is Roman military practices—
drills, discipline, uniformity of dress—and Roman military ideas—of 
intellectual leadership, automatic valour, unquestioning obedience, self-
abnegation, loyalty to the unit—which are dominant in the European 
soldier’s world.” A new and conspicuous branch of knowledge regarding 
warfare and militaries, symbolized by the work of Carl von Clausewitz in 
the 1830s, articulated a scientifi c view to war and combat, prioritizing the 
professional status of the military. Alongside the emergence of the offi  cer 
corps and military education was the conscription of men, producing a 
shi   from “the temporary citizen, soldier, sailor, and aviator [to] profes-
sional armed forces” (Janowitz 1960: 204).
Third, military institutions are elaborate bureaucracies; they are large, 
complex systems of interrelated branches and divisions with an overall 
functional unity of command. With formal structures organized on the 
hierarchical principle that higher-rank offi  cers supervise and order lower-
rank offi  cers and enlisted men, militaries contain elaborate regimes of 
rules that determine the roles, statuses, and actions of all personnel. In 
comparison to other formal organizations in contemporary societies, the 
military has a high degree of diff erentiation in functions and of stratifi ca-
tion in positions and formal status. Structures are real, in this understand-
ing, entailing controls and constraints, with a primacy over the actions and 
choices of the actors who populate military structures. Military establish-
ments also have a high degree of expected conformity to the norms and 
values of the armed forces. Even more than bureaucracies, militaries are in-
stitutions. Institutions, as theorized in organizational sociology, are a more 
developed form of complex organizations in society by “develop[ing] an 
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inner logic and direction of their own” encouraging a well-defi ned iden-
tity and recognition as a special depository of cherished social values and 
exercising considerable autonomy (Perrow 1986: 176).
Fourth, military institutions spawn cultural systems with their own 
confi gurations of practices and rituals, histories and critical events, heroes 
and villains. More-particular sets of beliefs and values—military subcul-
tures—are recognized to operate, and are offi  cially encouraged to persist 
within the navy, army, air force, marines, merchant sea, and special forces 
branches. As mini-societies, they contain their own personnel, courts, po-
lice, rules, housing, health care, and education services. They constitute a 
symbolic universe of distinctive values, beliefs, vocabularies, ideologies, 
and outlooks on the world (English 2004; Freeman 1948; Huntington 1957; 
Janowitz 1960; Jenkins 2004; Spindler 1948); this universe is also known 
as a total institution that is relatively closed and disciplinary in nature. 
Erving Goff man (1961), from a less structural viewpoint than the ones 
elaborating the bureaucratization of the military, coined the term “total 
institution” to describe organizations in which the everyday spheres of 
work, sleep, and play occur in the same place, with the same copartici-
pants, and under the same authority and staff  surveillance. Goff man sug-
gests that military academies and induction centers, naval ships and air 
bases, army barracks, concentration camps and POW camps, as well as 
military hospitals and treatment centers resemble total institutions in the 
way in which they organize everyday life.
Fi  h, the relationship between the military and civil society is fraught 
with tension. As Samuel Huntington (1957: viii) expresses it, “the for-
mal, structural position of military institutions in the government [raises 
the issue of] objective civilian control” over this system of force and au-
thority. If the prime intended benefi ciaries of military organizations are 
the citizenry, then “the crucial problem posed … is the development of 
democratic mechanisms whereby they can be externally controlled by the 
public” (Blau and Sco   1962: 42). At the height of the Cold War, alongside 
the alarm over the military-industrial complex, the military’s relationship 
with civil society came under heavy scrutiny with much a  ention given 
to the existence of a separate political system within a state. More recently, 
even with the declared end of the Cold War in 1989, issues of civil-military 
relations remain a serious issue for military leaders and scholars across 
nations (Charters and Wilson 1996).
These fi ve dimensions sum up most social science literature on military, 
focusing on institutional distinctiveness, internal cohesion and discipline, 
and the apparent stabilities of command structures and functional conti-
nuities in actions over time. Yet our refusal to view soldiers and the mili-
tary as static entities forces us to turn to competing understandings that 
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emphasize fl uidity, porosity, aberrations, and multiplicities, like those in 
Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge. Even so, Foucault himself was 
not immune from the tendency to assume these dimensions in his refer-
ences to the military in his own work.
On many occasions, Foucault wrote or spoke about the military far 
more like a structural functionalist than one might expect, describing the 
military as a set of coherent hierarchical arrangements of force relations, 
together with a discursive logic of strategies, commands, and tactics, built 
on a juridical notion of power tied closely to national sovereignty, and to 
civil and international law (Foucault 2003). From this perspective, military 
institutions are constitutional systems of domination, organizations of 
right and might, repressive powers with single centers of legitimacy and 
control, with “the professional and technical prerogatives of a carefully 
defi ned and controlled military apparatus” (Foucault: 267). Recruits are 
selected, trained, and disciplined to be capable, dedicated, and obedient 
within highly formalized, rigidly hierarchical, and explicitly nationalistic 
structures in order to produce strong identifi cations to the unit and overall 
institution through feelings of camaraderie, duty, and patriotism.
Foucault argued that most studies of institutions focus on the overall 
structures and the people who rule them or on the ideologies developed 
to legitimate their existence, activities, and resource claims. He preferred, 
however, a third approach, investigating “the techniques, the practices 
that give concrete form” to the institution and the political rationality 
embedded in the strategies and processes of a given institution, whether 
an asylum, hospital, or prison (Foucault 2000b: 410). But he did not iden-
tify the military as a social institution in need of investigation. In other 
work, Foucault (2007) off ered analytic guidelines for studying major so-
cial institutions. Institutions as such were not the prime focus of analy-
sis for Foucault; instead he conceived them as mechanisms of conduct 
and eff ects of power. He recommended going behind the institution and 
seeking, in a wider perspective, what he called a technology of extrain-
stitutional power; querying the internal function offi  cially expected to be 
performed and, instead, examining the actual functions linked to external 
factors; and detaching the relations of power from a given object and 
examining those power relations from “the perspective of the constitu-
tion of fi elds, domains, and objects of knowledge” (Foucault 2007: 118). 
Likewise, we do not endeavor to write a history of the military, psy-
chiatry, nor how masculinity fi ts into either; rather, we a  empt to unravel 
regimes of discursive and material practices concerning the ill bodies of 
soldiers as constituted in the military through psychiatry; both these in-
stitutions are embedded within and informed by various understandings 
of masculinity.
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During what turned out to be the fi nal decade of his life (1975–84), 
Foucault turned his research a  ention to ma  ers of war, struggle, and the 
army.12 As the intermediary between war and civil society, Foucault (2003: 
159, 163) saw military institutions as having general eff ects on the whole 
society through developments in medicine and teaching clinics and, in 
regards to “the distribution of weapons, the nature of weapons, fi ght-
ing techniques, the recruitment and payment of soldiers, [and] the taxes 
earmarked for the army,” as having implications for “the economy, taxa-
tion, religion, beliefs, [and] education.” He wrote also about the “military 
dream of society,” an ideal type of discipline that emerged in the 1700s, 
with “its fundamental reference … to the meticulously subordinated cogs 
of a machine … to permanent coercions, to indefi nitely progressive forms 
of training, and to automatic docility” (Foucault 1979: 169). In a view of 
history undoubtedly infl uenced by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzsche, 
Foucault stated, “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to 
combat until it fi nally arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of 
law fi nally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a 
system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (Fou-
cault 1977: 151). Here Foucault is making a claim, one with deterministic 
overtones, that a persistent militarism exists supported by the ongoing 
militarization of culture, economics, and politics in our age (Cowen 2005; 
Enloe 1983, 2000, 2007; Shigematsu and Camacho 2010a).
This deterministic approach appears in Foucault’s general tendency 
to describe the military in mechanistic images and in terms of sovereign 
versus disciplinary power. While Foucault called for analyzing the tan-
gible functioning of institutions and acknowledged that technologies of 
discipline never quite work out as planned, he repeatedly refers to armies 
and military institutions as “a manifestation of force, … the physical, ma-
terial and awesome force of the sovereign, … [and as] a precise system of 
command” (Foucault 2000c: 232) . In comparison with other institutional 
fi elds of action he examined—asylums, sexuality, and prisons are clear ex-
amples—Foucault never saw the military as an institution in and of itself 
with people and processes or an entity in need of analysis. For Foucault, 
the military as an institution is a “crystallization of diverse programs, 
technologies, practices, mechanisms and strategies” (232) that in turn “in-
form individual behavior” (232) and “act as grids for the perception and 
evaluation of things” (232). Foucault’s threefold types of power—sover-
eignty, disciplinary, and governmentality—were not broadly employed 
in understanding militaries or the military as an institution. There is a 
surprising reliance on the legal and constitutional powers of the body 
politic as repressive and negative (Wickham 2006) and, to some extent too, 
a reliance on disciplinary power as subjection. With a heavy emphasis on 
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offi  cial practices and systems of authoritative discipline, bodies then were 
produced as static and monolithic. In this way, the military as an institu-
tion works to “produce permanent and solid eff ects that can perfectly well 
be understood in terms of their rationality. … This is what gives the result-
ing apparatus its solidity and suppleness” (Foucault 2000d: 23). And so is 
the case with soldiers. Yet apparatuses are fl uid entities formed through 
various articulations of force relations and informed through both mate-
rial processes and competing discourses that produce only the appearance 
of being solid and supple.
In a similar fashion, Foucault habitually depicted soldiers in mechanis-
tic terms as docile bodies. He emphasized macrostructures and top-down 
power relations rather than the relational approach to the microphysics of 
power elaborated on in his other writings.13 Docile bodies are subjected 
and practiced entities, with increased aptitude and utility along with in-
creased submission and domination. The docile body is subjected to vari-
ous techniques of control designed to transform the human body (gestures, 
behaviors, and self-awareness) to instill certain qualities and skills, and 
above all what we may call productive obedience for use within machiner-
ies of power, such as schools, factories, hospitals, and, of course, armies. 
In a military context, docile bodies are produced through processes of 
recruitment and screening, basic training, socialization and indoctrination, 
exercises and drills, plus other practices, all the while under close surveil-
lance. The soldier is “a sort of machine with many parts, moving in relation 
to one another, in relation to arrive at a confi guration and to obtain a spe-
cifi c result” (Foucault 1979: 135). Being both an object and target of power 
soldiers are produced to be compliant bodies as well as practical bod-
ies. From training, marching drills, and command structures of militaries 
comes the “body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex” (153).
In a careful assessment of the docile body thesis from a feminist per-
spective, Monique Deveaux (1994) identifi es as pitfalls the reductionist and 
static conception of the subject and power. She writes, “Foucault’s extreme 
reluctance to a  ribute explicit agency to subjects in this early account of 
power results in a portrayal of individuals as passive bodies, constituted 
by power and immobilized in a society of discipline. Signifi cantly, this 
analysis gives way, in Foucault’s later works, to a more complex under-
standing of power as a fi eld of relationships between free subjects” (228). 
Basically, Foucault failed to take his own evolution in thinking on power 
and the body, and apply it to the military and to soldiers. In addition, 
the distinction between the body and the soul or psyche, which Foucault 
proposed in some of his works, remained underdeveloped and certainly 
never applied to military contexts.14 The promise of Foucault’s approach 
to the military, though unfulfi lled, is worth undertaking along analytical 
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lines of poststructural inquiry for examining soldiers suff ering distress in 
or a  er combat. We do not try to describe or explain war neuroses, ill sol-
diers, and broken bodies in terms of a single universal narrative. Instead, 
in our poststructural approach to the military and weary warriors, we 
examine multiple practices, consider resistance, and move away from an 
institutional-centric view, just as Foucault counseled. We go beyond Fou-
cault’s work by tracing specifi c points in the military of how ill bodies of 
traumatized soldiers are produced, processes that challenge the conven-
tional images of the military as stable, closed, and formal systems. In the 
later years of his work, Foucault wrote about people as living, thinking 
beings, ideas suggestive of soldiers as active, self-refl ective subjects. And 
while Foucault tended to present military establishments as purposefully 
coherent and systematic organizations, he also advised students in his lec-
tures that such structures mask confrontations and subjugate knowledge; 
that is, structures stifl e awareness and understanding from those below, 
those at lower ranks in an organization, and those deemed unqualifi ed by 
leaders or experts to speak with credibility on particular issues. For us, the 
idea of subjugated knowledges masked by seemingly fi xed structures fi t 
the experiences of shocked soldiers, traumatized veterans, fatigued pilots, 
exhausted troops, and their emotional struggles in combat and memories 
of ba  les. For us, it is crucial to imagine the individual soldier or veteran 
not as a docile body that is solely the eff ect of disciplinary mechanisms, 
particularly ones in the military, but rather as an embodied self consti-
tuted by material and discursive forces within a given power/knowledge 
confi guration.
Ravished Minds and Broken Bodies
Scholars and researchers interested in war neuroses tend to address psy-
chological wounds either through medicalized understandings of the 
mind—that is, via psychiatry and psychology—or through the context 
within which a war neurosis as a set of unse  ling bodily sensations is 
experienced—that is, the military. Even if indeed primary, psychiatry and 
the military are not the only ensembles of discourses, materialities, and 
practices that shape soldiers’ experiences of psychological wounds. Mas-
culinity, too, has a dramatic impact on the ways in which weary warriors 
express illness and engage with psychiatry in the military, and beyond 
to other social institutions, to seek medical advice. Weak, sick, and ailing 
bodies contradict the masculine ideal of soldiers’ bodies being strong, 
healthy, and energetic, and set up ill bodies as unreliable, gutless, and 
fallible, not worthy of being soldiers, not worthy of being men.15 Women, 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Unsettling Notions 49

too, are subjected to these masculine ideals. Because military training in 
most Western countries rests on specifi c ideas of manhood as tough, vir-
ile, and honorable, for example, ill bodies by defi nition cannot be soldiers 
(Goldstein 2001; Huebner 2008). A soldier becoming ill a  er suff ering 
deep emotional stress during combat questions the very constitution of a 
warrior.16 Such readings of the discursive links between masculinity and 
soldiers’ ill bodies cannot account for deviations, contestations, and trans-
formations of relations and practices within psychiatry, the military, and 
masculinity itself. The challenge becomes one of recognizing masculinity 
as part of the constitution of a warrior without using it, or its breakdown, 
to explain the existence of weary warriors in the military.
Studies of men have coalesced into a fi eld of study over the past thirty 
years or so. The fi eld itself has shi  ed toward understanding masculinity 
rather than focusing on men. Key to understanding men’s studies is the 
concept of masculinity that has undergone various conceptual shi  s over 
time. Most prominently, masculinity has been conceptualized in three dif-
ferent ways: as a pa  erned hegemony, a cultural ideology, and a gendered 
performance (see Reeser 2010; Whitehead 2002).
Robert Connell, for example, suggests four general pa  erns of mascu-
linity in Western society: hegemony, complicity, subordination, and mar-
ginalization (1995: 77–81).17 Connell’s model casts men and masculinity 
as social constructs, with a hierarchical organization of multiple ways of 
being a man and producing the identity of man. The dominant concep-
tion of masculinity, the hegemonic one, is at the top of the hierarchy and 
describes the organization of gender relations as the support of a patri-
archy that subordinates women. The la  er pa  erns exist in relation to 
the hegemonic pa  ern within any given context; each pa  ern serves to 
maintain the hegemony of one particular type of masculinity. Men may 
choose to do their gender in a way to make them appear normal (complic-
ity), while gay and bisexual masculinities are marginalized and nonwhite 
masculinities subordinated. In eff ect, the classifi cation structure could be 
applied anywhere when there are various masculinities subordinate to a 
dominant masculinity; it is only when manhood, manliness, and men are 
a  ributed specifi c characteristics that specifi c masculinities emerge. In a 
Western hegemonic masculinity, men’s identities are valued over wom-
en’s, white identities over nonwhite, heterosexual identities over homo-
sexual and transsexual, aggressive identities over passive, and able bodies 
over bodies that are impaired. The idea of a hegemonic masculinity means 
that heterosexual aggressive white men are advantaged, even when not all 
men and women engage in practices of hegemonic masculinity, because a 
hegemonic masculinity entails men’s subjugation of women, nonwhites, 
nonheterosexuals, and passive identities.
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In contrast to Connell’s conceptualization of masculinity as a pa  erned 
hegemony, John MacInnes (1998) favors understanding masculinity as a 
cultural ideology, or a system of thinking about behavior (and of behav-
iors themselves) that serve the interests of a dominant group. This use of 
ideology emerged to describe the hegemony of one class over another, 
which, as Sara Mills puts it in Discourse (1997: 30), entailed one class be-
ing “duped into using conceptual systems which were not in their own 
interests.” MacInnes argues that the notion of masculinity emerged as a 
process of socialization at the advent of modernity in order to maintain 
inequalities between men and women. Rather than being built on biologi-
cal claims about men being superior to women, claims that were popular 
at the time, masculinity as a cultural ideology could eschew sexual dif-
ference as the basis for which to diff erentiate women and men in society 
and could rely on the social constructed nature of gender to support the 
subordination of women, reproduce the sexual division of labor, and sus-
tain men’s privilege in society.18 Like Connell’s use of hegemony in under-
standing various forms of masculinity, MacInnes also relies on a model of 
dominance to explain how masculinity retains value and privilege at the 
expense of women.
Distinguished from being either a pa  erned hegemony or an ideol-
ogy is the notion of masculinity as a gendered performance. As Judith 
Butler (1990) argues, gender identity, including masculinity, is a cultural 
construct invoked to maintain heterosexual desire by defi ning what is 
feminine and what is masculine. Individuals perform gender in accordance 
with what is culturally accepted to be indicative of what women and men 
do and how they are to act as women and as men. Because masculinity 
when performed is a social construction that does not rely on biology as 
the basis for manhood nor on ideology as the glue that holds identity in 
place, the focus of masculinity is more on the doing, rather than the being, 
of manhood.
These views of masculinity are readily apparent when looking at the 
military, especially in terms of training. Following Connell, if the prac-
tice of training warriors in the military were organized around a set of 
values that sustain an idealized form of masculinity, then the threat of 
the feminine and the homosexual would become central in the mainte-
nance of that hegemony. Reinforcement of masculine qualities in train-
ing techniques takes place through routine humiliation tactics, such as 
a drill sergeant calling recruits ladies, girls, fags, and homos, names that 
serve to emasculate recruits; and group sanctioning practices, such as the 
threat of rape or rape itself, for those whose behavior is somehow out of 
synch with the others, in a  empts to force peers to adhere to the (for the 
most part unwri  en) warrior code. These techniques are also used with 
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female recruits (Francke 1997). In tandem with MacInnes (1998), if mas-
culinity were conceived as a cultural ideology, it is easy to see how train-
ing recruits by invoking hypermasculine values parallels the creation of 
nationalist ideologies through the identifi cation of military heroes, both 
of which sustain masculinity culturally as something needing to privilege 
men in se  ings even beyond the military (see Dawson 1994). Butler’s idea 
of masculinity as a gendered performance is apparent in the training song, 
“This is my rifl e, this is my gun; this is for fi ghting, this is for fun,” with 
the recruits holding their rifl es in one hand, and grabbing their crotches 
with the other.19 Through these types of repetitive acts, soldiers are set up 
to perform their military identities in specifi c ways.
Yet all these conceptual frameworks for masculinity preserve the rela-
tively tight links between men and masculinity and between women and 
femininity by framing masculinity in opposition to femininity, and men’s 
identities in opposition to women’s. This is even the case with performa-
tivity, whereby performative acts assume empirical bodies. Studies jux-
taposing women with masculinity and men with femininity expose how 
concrete bodies are presumed to be a certain way. As soldiers, women’s 
bodies are a rich site for exploring the presumed links between mascu-
linity and male bodies because women are not expected to be located in 
male institutions like the military. Annica Kronsall (2005) looked at Swed-
ish women in the military to sort through how a hegemonic masculinity 
actually works. She argues that the norms of the institution appear more 
clearly through the comportment of female offi  cers when wanting to be 
seen as a member of the military rather than as a woman. As well, the 
toning down of sexualized language and the ridding of the armed forces 
of pornography, both of which challenge the militarized link between sex 
and violence, reveal how the very presence of women in the military alters 
how the hegemony of masculinity works. Kronsall’s argument supports 
the idea that hegemony is a process that is never complete, is subject to re-
sistance, and is fl exible in the production of masculinities in the military.
These conceptualizations of masculinity also tend to keep out other 
types of discourses that eff ect complex identities. For example, the mili-
tarization of masculinity describes the process through which notions, 
ideals, and expectations of men’s behaviors generally are linked to global-
ization, war, and the military, particularly in the context of nation-building 
and national identity. Cynthia Enloe examines militarized masculinities in 
her work on globalization and international relations (Enloe 2004, 2007). 
She argues that masculine ideals have to include the delineation of femi-
nine ideals and that the national identities of men and women are judged 
by these ideals. In her extended example of Serbian militias, militarized 
versions of masculinities, when embedded within the context of nation-
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building, cast women as mothers-of-soldiering-sons, as making maternal 
sacrifi ces for the sake of the nation (Enloe: 106–9). While the idealization 
of (younger) women as Serb soldiers in service of the Serb nation con-
tradicts mothers-of-soldiering-sons, Enloe maintains that the mothering 
ideal is stronger and therefore takes up a more prominent positioning of 
defi ning femininity.
Even though the conceptualizations of masculinity variously as a pat-
terned hegemony, an ideology, and a gendered performance a  empt to 
separate bodies from concepts, the confl ation between bodies and con-
cepts is reproduced in empirical studies about masculinity in the military. 
In both Kronsall’s and Enloe’s works, women as part of a militaristic un-
derstanding of the world are inserted into a male institution, both literally 
and symbolically, to draw out how a hegemonic masculinity works on 
the ground. But both interpretations of women’s bodies in these se  ings 
remain tied to expectations of how men’s bodies look and behave. Women 
change their comportment when called upon to be an offi  cer to a norma-
tive demeanor, one closely resembling that of a male offi  cer. The idea of 
integrating women as mothers-of-soldiering-men as integral to the repro-
duction of the nation keeps women’s bodies out of masculinity and aligns 
them fi rmly as a defi nition of femininity. In addition to the strength of this 
defi nition of femininity that Enloe notes, the woman as soldier threatens 
the defi nition of masculinity in that there is too much overlap between 
possible acts and expectations of men’s and women’s behaviors.
This confl ation of concepts and bodies is further enhanced when layered 
with culturalistic understandings of soldiers suff ering mental breakdown 
or nervous exhaustion in ba  le. Although scholars, particularly feminists, 
have sought to highlight the gendered nature of the structures of the mili-
tary, militarization, and globalization, less a  ention has been paid to the 
link between traumatic stress issues and masculinity. Two exceptions are 
Sandra Whitworth’s (2008) examination of masculinity and PTSD and 
Susie Kilshaw’s (2009) anthropological reading of GWS. Whitworth ar-
gues that the presence of war neuroses lays bare the foundation upon 
which militarized masculinities are based. Through a gendered analysis, 
she explores the rites, myths, and training that constitute the recruit as a 
warrior, and argues that because of the diff erential rates of PTSD among 
women and nonwhite men, PTSD appears to stem from cultural norms 
rather than combat per se. She makes the case that for men, PTSD arises 
from the failure to live up to the standards of the military’s expectations 
of manhood; for women, from experiences of sexual assault and abuse; 
and for nonwhite men, from being assigned to dangerous duties and high 
risk activities. Then she reasons that because the masculinity activated in 
the military is a type of hypermasculinity, all aspects of femininity, indeed 
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all aspects of the other including homosexual and nonwhite identities, 
must be excised from the psyche in order for masculinity to take hold and 
sustain itself among those in the military. It is only when the feminine 
emerges through, for example, PTSD, that the fragility of what constitutes 
the military’s idea of masculinity is disclosed. Though on the surface com-
pelling, the argument falls prey to the same pitfalls of culturalistic claims; 
that is, using culture in the form of the cultural norms of a militarized 
masculinity to explain onset of a war neurosis.
Kilshaw’s (2009) account of GWS echoes the culturalistic claims made 
by Whitworth as well as those made by Elaine Showalter, Edgar Jones, 
and Simon Wessely. Kilshaw refuses the construction of GWS as a re-
sult of toxic poisoning of depleted uranium or long-lasting reactions of 
vaccinations, and characterizes GWS as a collective bodily expression of 
communal war experiences, experiences that threaten a warrior’s sense of 
masculinity.20 She identifi es several types of threats to masculinity, rang-
ing physically from lack of fi tness to infertility, impotence, and burning 
semen syndrome; culturally from the practice of men serving alongside 
women to the acquisition by men of women’s diseases; and emotionally 
from shame over being ill as a noncombatant to anxiety over being house-
husbands a  er the war. She argues that the acute juxtaposition of detest-
ing the feminine during training and then enduring seemingly feminine 
bodily sensations once a warrior, such as fatigue, weakness, and emotions, 
causes a general anxiety over a warrior’s gendered identity, which serves 
to ensconce the idea of a threatened masculinity even further as a cause of 
illness. Muddled in this jumble of threats are wider cultural practices that 
infl uence the ways in which veterans make sense of their illness, including 
medical classifi cations of somatic syndromes as medically unexplained 
physical symptoms and general angst over health. Kilshaw agrees that 
GWS, like other new illness movements, tends to illustrate at an extreme 
scale a more generalized theme of risk society, that of being worried over 
threats to health.21 Relying on culture, including the threat of masculinity, 
to explain GWS as a warrior’s illness reinforces the bifurcated understand-
ing of war neuroses—that is, instead of being understood as organic ill-
ness, war neuroses are expressions of cultural anxieties and beliefs and 
reduced to being understood and subsequently treated psychologically.
Within most frameworks about masculinity, militarism, and war neu-
roses, as Whitworth’s and Kilshaw’s works illustrate, soldiers crystallize 
within a military that seeks to keep masculinity in the soldier and the 
soldier in a masculine institution. Yet masculinity as a concept is more 
complex and as a practice works in more subtle ways than simply a dog-
matic military code prescribing manhood and defi ning manliness among 
warriors. There is agreement that there is no singular masculinity pro-
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moted in the military (see Agostino 1998; Belkin 2012; M. Brown 2012; 
Connell 2000; Highgate and Hopton 2005). Studying the deep distress 
soldiers experience during and a  er combat poses conceptual barriers 
when trying to understand how masculinity—as a material discourse that 
sets up expectations for behavior and as a practice that reinforces ideas 
about manhood—shapes the task of soldiering as well as appropriate 
means through which soldiers express illness. Categorizations of fi xed 
and semifi xed identities for men, historically specifi c cultural ideologies 
of masculinity, and ideas of gendered performances have given way to 
more subtle understandings of how men’s subjectivities are constituted 
through changing notions of manliness over the life course and from con-
text to context.
Connell (2002) values the subsequent work by others that have intro-
duced fl exibility and fl uidity into the concept of masculinity. These works 
have enriched understandings of how men’s lives as men come to unfold, 
by identifying multiple types of masculinity, both conceptually and em-
pirically, that have complex relationships with one another in tolerance 
and tension. Yet studies of men’s fl eshed bodies have not kept pace with 
the extensive theorizations, partly because of the way in which masculin-
ity entered into academic debates: via discussions about identity, ideol-
ogy, and performativity (Edwards 2006: 151ff ). The scene has been slowly 
changing. Stephen Whitehead (2002) reintroduces the male body as some-
thing that is a product of both genes and ideas, and of both expectations 
and acts, rendering the body as both a discursive and a material construct. 
Judith Halberstam (1998), in Female Masculinities, undermines the pre-
sumed link between masculinity and manhood with men’s bodies and 
off ers a more open reading of what constitutes gender. Todd W. Reeser 
(2010) follows up on Halberstam’s notion of stripping masculinity of its 
inherent link to men and challenges people to think about how compli-
cated masculinity as a concept actually is, how visible it becomes when 
one does not assume that it resides only with men, and how unstable the 
practices of masculinity are in everyday life. Aaron Belkin (2012) shows 
how militarized masculinities are falsely unitary, and routinely engage the 
unmasculine to fi rm up a fi ctitious masculine norm.
There is li  le doubt that the onset of a collection of bodily sensations 
that military psychiatrists frame as a war neurosis compromise the mas-
culinities the military have on off er to warriors and pave the way for 
soldiers’ ravished minds and ill bodies to be key sites in the feminization 
of military bodies. But explaining the onset of symptoms as a breakdown 
of coherence in a warrior’s sense of identity fails to account for the more 
fl exible notions of masculinities and the ways in which other sets of rela-
tions may be psychiatrized, militarized, or masculinized in diff erent ways. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Unsettling Notions 55
R
Tracing various articulations of the sets of force relations and the associ-
ated practices within psychiatry and the military as part of an embodied 
account of an apparatus that produces soldiers with ill bodies as subjects 
could show how masculinity informs the way weary warriors experience 
illness, engage in treatment, and live as veterans.
Toward Broken Embodiments
In challenging and amending some of Foucault’s ideas with his own con-
ceptual apparatus, we are not rejecting the role of hierarchy, the place of 
sovereign state power, or the effects of disciplinary mechanisms. Rather, 
we critically investigate their contingencies and disjunctures and consider 
various forms of resistance and struggles in military contexts over the ill 
bodies of soldiers. In addition, we do not readily accept the thesis that 
after the Cold War militaries shifted from a modern to postmodern form 
of organization (Gilroy and Williams 2006; Janowitz 1976; Moskos, Wil-
liams, and Segal 2000). In this view, “the postmodern military is said to be 
less tied to nation-states, increasingly ‘androgynous,’ and more fluid and 
permeable with civilian society” (Shigematsu and Camacho 2010b: xxvii). 
To be sure, transformations have taken place in western militaries, such 
as the shift from conscription to all-volunteer forces in many countries in 
recent decades (Gilroy and Williams), yet scholars who have interrogated 
this notion of postmodern military suggest that “heteronormative and 
racialized relations of power” persist in contemporary militaries (Cowen 
2005; Shigematsu and Camacho 2010b).
Throughout the remaining chapters, we present our analysis by gener-
ating in-depth snapshots and pulling out bits and pieces of overarching 
narratives located in psychiatry, the military, and masculinity. Through 
these snapshots, we place war neuroses in and on soldiers’ ill bodies and 
demonstrate some of the effects of this placement. We show how the au-
thority of psychiatric knowledge guides the initial diagnosis of a war 
neurosis and shapes the range of options for treatment in specific time pe-
riods. We also pay close attention to how masculinity as an effect of power 
shapes the maintenance and contestation of particular configurations of 
psychiatric knowledge and popular cultural norms, especially in the sense 
of how particular forms of manhood dovetail with military practices. To 
guide our analysis we introduce complementary theoretical concepts that 
elaborate our main argument as laid out here about embodiment as a 
lived fusion of discourse and materiality, and embodied apparatuses as 
arrangements of mechanisms used for the diffusion of power/knowledge. 
Embodied diagnosis highlights the body and its descriptors as a dynamic 
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interaction between discourse and materiality, and takes embodiment 
more seriously than merely an avatar of a familiar idea. Contested illness 
pulls together our ideas about power relations and ill bodies as cultural 
constructs. It refers to illness that is “dismissed as illegitimate—framed 
as ‘diffi  cult,’ psychosomatic, or even non-existent—by researchers, health 
practitioners, and policy-makers operating within conventional para-
digms of [power/]knowledge” (Moss and Teghtsoonian 2008: 7).
As we si   through various military psychiatric as well as nonmilitary 
se  ings that address soldiers’ ill bodies, we show how specifi c environ-
ments provide space to both reinforce and contest discourses and social 
practices about war neuroses, sometimes even at the same time. As well, 
we identify processes that soldiers diagnosed with a war neurosis engage 
in that reproduce and challenge prevalent notions of what it is to be ill as a 
result of trauma from combat as both a diagnosable psychiatric entity and 
an illness not recognized as legitimate by the military. These processes 
comprise specifi c discursive and material practices, including entitlement 
to health-care benefi ts, claims for social welfare, clinical presentation of 
symptoms, and policy formulation. Engaging ideas about resistance and 
activist acts among soldiers and veterans to claim and reclaim their bodies 
as ill or disabled, especially in terms of collective identities, is a signifi cant 
component of understanding the eff ects of war neuroses.
Notes
 1. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) has been the 
standard for psychiatric diagnoses from its fi rst publication in 1952. Since that 
time, the DSM has expanded in its four subsequent editions to include not 
only major mental illness such as psychoses, schizophrenia, and phobias, but 
also learning disabilities, personality disorders, environmental and psychoso-
cial factors, and acute medical conditions, with special a  ention to children 
under eighteen years old. Critiques of the DSM focus on the pervasiveness 
of mental illness categories describing things having to do with the mind, 
the creation of diagnoses that transform everyday life activities into mental 
illness, and the authority of psychiatry to determine mental illness. For a 
discussion of these issues, see Loughran (2012). In the context of diagnosing 
depression, see Horwitz and Wakefi eld (2007). See also the thoughtful review 
of their works by R. Williams (2009).
 2. Although this number never exceeded twenty (Shephard 2000: 343).
 3. Showalter’s most signifi cant works on hysteria are from 1985, 1990, 1993, and 
1998. Other recent interesting feminist analyses of women’s hysteria include 
Mazzoni (1996) and Appignanesi (2007). Other feminist takes on mental ill-
ness more generally can be found in Fee (2000).
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 4. Even so, Charcot created a spectacle of the hysterical women he was treating 
at the Salpêtrière in Paris by parading them through his Tuesday night lec-
tures and featuring their images in photographs as part of his physiognomic 
records. See Charcot (1987) and Didi-Huberman (2003). See also Showalter 
(1985: 147–54 and 1993: 315). See also the discussion in Lerner (2003: 22–27) 
about Charcot’s interest in traumatic neurosis and English physician John Eric 
Erichsen’s interest in Railway Spine, and their link to the wider discussions 
about hysterical conditions in the 1870s and as precursors to contemporary 
diagnoses of PTSD.
 5. The case study of Anna O. was included in this volume. The case study of 
Dora was published later by Freud, and gives a stricter interpretation of hys-
terical neurosis in Sigmund Freud ([1905] 1997). Dora’s name was Ida Bauer.
 6. “Talk therapy” was a phrase coined by Anna O. [Bertha Pappenheim] for the 
psychoanalytic process between the therapist and the patient. For details, see 
Breuer and Freud ([1895] 1974).
 7. Symptoms associated with GWS are designated in a variety of places. Kilshaw 
(2008: 229–30 [appendix]) presents a collection of the symptoms soldiers in 
the United Kingdom reported that were drawn from Gulf War veterans’ 
associations. 
 8. Although E. Jones and Wessely (2005a: 194) note that perhaps the hypoth-
esized organic reasons for disordered action of the heart could have been 
proven incorrect, it is clear that they understand the trajectory of Lewis’ eff ort 
syndrome to be one with a psychological cause and not an organic one. 
 9. See Kroll-Smith and Kelly (2008: 304–22) for a discussion of general under-
standings of the interactions among bodies and, in, and with the natural 
environment. 
10. The idea that bodies are subject to the exercise of disciplinary power to the 
point of docility was developed by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1979: 
135–69). In this perspective, the body becomes a cog in a machine that can be 
moved from place to place, from task to task. Our critique, based on Foucault’s 
own arguments in Discipline and Punish as well as his later works on sexual-
ity, challenges this idea. The critique does so by undermining the intensity 
of docility by reintegrating a relational notion of power into a reading of the 
military. For more details on power and its circulation, see chapter 1.
11. Teresa Iacobelli (2007) examines the seemingly random pa  ern of executions 
in the Great War among Canadian soldiers on trial for desertion. She queries 
how military justice and discipline work in a military where only 25 of 222 
guilty verdicts led to execution. She maintains that this high number of par-
dons challenges the generalized notion of the military as an absolute, closed 
institution and that military justice was accomplished in diff erent ways dur-
ing wartime (see also Iacobelli 2013). 
12. In a self-admi  ed fascination with the ideas of Clausewitz on war, Foucault 
was curious to explore if war provided a valid analysis of power relations, of 
making sense of modern societies, and of understanding historical processes. 
He wondered “if military institutions and the practices that surround them 
… are … the nucleus of political institutions” (Foucault 2003: 47). When ad-
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dressing the political signifi cance of military institutions, however, he reiter-
ated a structural functionalist approach, remarking that national militaries 
“obviously make it possible to win victories [and] they also make it possible 
to articulate society as a whole” (158).
13. For an in-depth inquiry into Foucault’s preoccupation with war, force, and 
power, see Hanssen (2000), chapter 3. 
14. For discussions of soul and psyche in Foucault’s work, see Discipline and Pun-
ish (1979: 29–30), The Care of the Self (1988b: 133–44), The Government of Self 
and Others (2010: 303–6, 352–74), and throughout both The Hermeneutics of the 
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Classifi catory thought gives itself an essential space, which it proceeds 
to eff ace at each moment. Disease exists only in that space, since 
that space constitutes it as nature; and yet it always appears rather 
out of phase in relations to that space, because it is manifested in 
a real patient, beneath the observing eye of a forearmed doctor.
—Michel Foucault, Birth of the Clinic
Another problem is if a soldier purposefully misa  ributes symptoms 
of PTSD to MTBI [mTBI]. Unfortunately, mental health problems 
are still stigmatized in the military, more so than brain injury. Soldiers 
may be concerned that seeking care for mental health problems will 
impede career advancement or ability to obtain a security clearance. … 
Thus, soldiers may knowingly assign PTSD-related symptoms and 
emotional distress to the more acceptable MTBI [mTBI].
–Karyn Dale Jones, Tabitha Young, and Monica Leppma, 
“Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and Pos  raumatic Stress Disorder”
We now begin following the arc of how soldiers become weary warriors, 
both in the sense of individual bodies breaking down under the pressures 
and acts of war and as a group of people having witnessed, endured, 
and perhaps engaged in inhumane acts. We begin with a discussion of 
diagnosis, a process through which bodies become marked with a specifi c 
category that carries with it a set of meanings generated in many spaces, 
including the ba  lefi eld. In classifying bodies as well as groups of sol-
diers, psychiatry and the military work together to seek clarity in what 
they are facing or having to deal with. Soldiers have minimal input into 
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how they are classifi ed; when they a  empt to make changes, there can be 
harsh repercussions.
Over the course of his writings, Foucault distinguished a number of 
techniques in the deployment of power that work toward subjugating 
bodies and controlling populations. Foucault used the term “biopower” 
to describe life power—desire, agency, and resistance—and power over 
life—increased management, organization, and control by institutions 
over bodies, including groups of people, individual persons, biological 
processes, and genetic constitutions. Using the body as an entry point, 
Foucault argued that the various elements within an apparatus articulate 
with forces, desires, multiplicities, and other bodies to come together to 
produce human subjects (Foucault 1980d: 74). The politics arising from 
the exercise of biopower are organized around either the human body as 
an eff ect of power (anatomopolitics), or the human species for social con-
trol or enhanced productivity (biopolitics). An anatomopolitics highlights 
the disciplinary nature of a specifi c technique of power and a biopolitics 
emphasizes the regulatory eff ects of the exercise of power.
What does this mean for us in undertaking an embodied study of sol-
diers enduring the eff ects of deep emotional distress of combat and war? 
Mapping an anatomopolitics might focus on the practices a soldier en-
gages in as a recruit, active soldier, or veteran to identify, mitigate, or 
recover from the eff ects of stress, fatigue, or trauma. For example, a male 
Canadian soldier deployed in Afghanistan might recognize the onset of a 
nervous collapse in a member of his combat unit because he was trained 
to observe restlessness, outbursts of anger, and erratic behavior as signs 
of emotional diffi  culty among his intimate peers. An interesting research 
question for cultural theorists would be: How does a soldier negotiate his 
own masculinity under such pressure for performance and responsibility, 
in light of his own potential breakdown. In contrast, a biopolitics of weary 
warriors might focus on specifi c mechanisms through which power is de-
ployed in order to generate a particular type of soldier through the regula-
tion of behavior. For example, third location decompression (TLD) centers 
set up and reinforce expectations of what life is to be like postdeployment. 
Key in the formal aspects of decompression is a series of seminars and 
lectures on what symptoms of operational stress to look for in daily life. 
An interesting research question for social scientists would be, How do 
soldiers come to incorporate self-monitoring of their behavior on an ongo-
ing basis and then act on diffi  culties when they arise?
Instead of using biopower as an entrée into how power/knowledge cir-
culates within and between our understandings of apparatuses as embod-
ied, we prefer something less abstract that allows us to fi gure out some of 
the pathways that permit the emergence of neurotic and traumatized sol-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Classifying Bodies through Diagnosis 61

diers both discursively and materially. We draw on empirical descriptions 
of the exercise of power, whether disciplinary or regulatory. Jennifer Gore 
(1995) identifi ed eight distinct ways that Foucault described power being 
exercised and even found each technique present in the elementary-level 
classroom. The eight techniques are surveillance, normalization, exclu-
sion, distribution, classifi cation, individualization, totalization, and regu-
lation.1 Though not inclusive of all the ways power can be exercised, it is 
useful to think about the exercise of power along these lines for at least 
two reasons. First, we are able to provide texture to some of the practices 
that materialize the ideals shaping psychiatry, defi ning the military, and 
signaling masculinity. Second, we are able to cut into the graininess of the 
texture to trace points of connection that can show how power produces 
ill soldiers. Some of our analysis tends toward an anatomopolitics, while 
other parts appear to build on a wider biopolitics. We develop neither a 
hybrid of the two nor a full multiscale analysis. Our goal is to not rest too 
long on any one type of analysis of power so as to demonstrate how prac-
tices of power generate eff ects.
Given our interest in the subtleties of how simple techniques of power 
ma  er, it makes sense for us to focus across many of the techniques rather 
than on just one. Much has been wri  en about these techniques of power, 
especially surveillance and the panopticon, about normalization and the 
adherence to social norms, about classifi cation and psychiatric diagnoses, 
and about regulation and the conduct of conduct.2 Although we refer to 
some of these techniques throughout the book, in this chapter we want to 
direct our analysis primarily toward classifi cation.
Classifi cation is the systematic practice of ordering that is based on a set 
of agreed-upon sorting principles. Although systematic, classifi cation is 
not smooth in practice; there is debate, disruption, and discord alongside 
consensus, coalescence, and congruence. This is certainly the case with di-
agnosis. Diagnosis is one of those practices that already hold within them 
competing confi gurations of power/knowledge. Although diff erentiated 
primarily on the basis of disease etiology, other sets of values inform the 
practice of diagnosis, such as the military need for mentally sound sol-
diers for combat as well as the idea that men with nervous conditions are 
sissies. Yet because of the authority a diagnostic category holds outside 
diagnosis as a psychiatric practice, the eff ects for soldiers and veterans are 
not a ma  er of origin, expediency, or appraisal. Rather, the eff ects of di-
agnostic power ma  er with regard to pension, social status, employment 
opportunities, and general well-being.
In this chapter, we focus not only on the eff ects of classifi cation as a 
technique of power—that is, soldiers categorized as neurotic through 
the designation of psychiatric wounds, but also on the jumble of power/
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knowledge relations that give rise to the exercise of classifi cation, as, for 
example, academic debates over disease etiology, lines of command, and 
expectations of manhood. We pull out the discursive-material elements of 
classifi cation as a technique of power in order to highlight how discursive 
practices of naming and labeling feed into the reading of bodily sensa-
tions, and vice versa. We then narrate accounts of diagnostic categories 
across time periods as they have been taken up in particular spaces of 
military psychiatric practice in a number of wars. We tell these stories 
through the conceptual framework we set out in chapters 1 and 2.
Classifi cation as a Process of Embodiment
To be sure, for those who have endured deep emotional distress or psy-
chological stress as a result of combat, making sense of the intense expe-
rience of breakdown brings with it countless benefi ts; some of the most 
desirable of these are inner peace, relief from pain, and freedom from 
fear. How a traumatized soldier goes about making sense of the break-
down of the psyche and the body in the context of the repugnance of war 
is both circumscribed and constituted by the ways in which psychiatry 
plugs into the military. Tracing the connection between the two via the 
many elements of the dispositif (apparatus) entails identifying practices 
that facilitate the establishment of a general coherence for the collective 
understanding of ba  le trauma. Medical practice in psychiatry in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and fi rst two decades of the twentieth 
century centered on translating clinical observations into a classifi cation 
system of mental disease and was beginning to make etiological inroads 
by sorting symptoms through the pathology of anatomy (Foucault 1994). 
The preoccupation with ordering generated a set of protocols designed for 
psychiatrists as medical physicians to sort through the bodily sensations 
and behaviors of psychologically wounded soldiers. This classifi catory 
thought in diseases of the mind of the traumatized soldier set similarity 
as the trajectory of a disease and diff erence as a contraindication, a prem-
ise that underlay most branches of psychiatry at that time. Yet this clas-
sifi catory thought also set as a standard a general ordering of psychiatric 
knowledge that held within it the thinking, the nature, and the scope of the 
medical gaze under military circumstances. Although initially intended 
perhaps to be a tightly ordered, Linnaeus-like naming system, diagnosis 
in practice ran into bodies that simply did not fi t the categories in exis-
tence, especially the bodies among the droves of soldiers breaking down 
in combat in Europe in 1914 and early 1915. The use of the knowledge 
going into classifi cation systems, inclusive of its congruence and discord, 
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resulted in fi eld and hospital decisions that created uncertain boundaries 
in the ascription of a diagnosis, in the rationales for breakdown, and in 
the options for continued service. These fl uid diagnostic practices early in 
the twentieth century generated spaces where the soldiers did not belong; 
they were not necessarily mentally ill, but neither were they of sound 
mind. And, given their embodied status and the circumstances surround-
ing the onset of their distress, they had li  le choice as to what they were 
going to do about it.3
The liminal spaces soldiers are positioned to take up are generated by 
the practice of diagnosis as it unfolds in the ba  lefi eld (following Men-
delson 2009). Once located in a space that already holds within it codes of 
illness (a physician’s training, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (DSM), triage protocols) and eff ects of the exercise of power 
in shaping the situation (e.g., casualty evacuation paths, frontline orders, 
state policies), soldiers, particularly combat troops, have li  le agency once 
wounded (Lee 2009). The liminal spaces generated by the medical under-
standings of ill bodies were vital in enacting weary warriors. The idea that 
the psychologically wounded warrior could be part of the constitutive 
process of psychiatric wounds was anathema to practicing physicians 
and psychiatrists when war neuroses were fi rst conceived as an object of 
psychiatric inquiry. They were integrated into existing frameworks and 
diff erentiated with the empirical description of war neuroses in contrast to 
peacetime neuroses. Soldiers were li  le more than bodies to observe for 
the advancement of knowing more about hysteria and neuroses, bodies 
to scrutinize for cowardice or malingering, or bodies to fi x for carrying 
out militaristic goals through honor and duty. As part of our tracing, what 
if we reread a soldier’s agency back into the classifi cation system of war 
neuroses by psychiatrists? Integrating the idea that the wounded warrior 
is active materially and discursively as part of the constitution of the cat-
egories of war neuroses undermines the premises that were central to de-
fi ning war neuroses initially as an object worth investigating. Making the 
claim that the constitutive interaction among ill bodies and knowledges 
informing ill bodies that shapes choice, acts, and arcs of experience plays 
out through the agency of psychologically wounded soldiers, military 
psychiatrists, and the bodies of both turns classifi catory thought about 
war neuroses into a cultural record that holds within it exemplars of par-
ticular scientifi c practices.4 Introducing agency is not just a ma  er of giv-
ing soldiers choice; rather, agency is a complex process that is constituted, 
enabled, and circumscribed by ma  er and discourse at the same time.
Andrew Pickering’s idea of a performative paradigm for science fi ts 
nicely here and helps tease out some of the complexities of dealing with 
the agential aspects of multiple elements of an ensemble. Pickering fol-
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lows Foucault’s ideas about scientifi c knowledge in that knowledge is 
not revealed or representative of a world external to the language used to 
articulate that world; rather, scientifi c knowledge is the doing of things, 
the practice itself. He conceptualizes practice in two senses, both of them 
part of science: as an act around which all that follows is organized, and 
as “specifi c, repeatable sequences of activities on which scientists rely 
in their daily work” (Pickering 1995: 4); the second sense is the cultural 
aspect of knowledge formation. Protocols and methods organize scien-
tifi c practice just as observing, measuring, counting, and conceptualizing 
compose the doing of science. Through the introduction of agency—both 
human and nonhuman—Pickering comes to understand science as less 
representational and more performative. Through what he calls a “dance 
of agency” between resistance and accommodation among human and 
nonhuman elements, he combines a deep materialism with the social and 
cultural aspects of scientifi c practice. As agents in scientifi c practice, both 
humans and nonhumans (rivers, clouds, molecules, and compounds) act 
and do things. Their doing is neither completely by choice nor determined 
by something outside the act; agency is already integrally part of the con-
stitutive elements comprising what he calls the “mangle” (Pickering 1995: 
23). By conceptualizing science as a mangle of practice, he is be  er able to 
understand the doing of science as complex, unpredictable, and fl uctuat-
ing performances. His performative image of science can be “regarded 
as a fi eld of powers, capacities, and performances, situated in machinic 
captures of material agency” (Pickering 1995: 7).5
As a way to negotiate military psychiatry as a mangle of practice, Pick-
ering’s ideas about scientifi c practice can facilitate a critical reading by re-
focusing the military psychiatric gaze away from classifying broken down 
soldiers toward the production of weary warriors. In other words, rather 
than being set up to fi x the broken pieces clogging a war machine, military 
psychiatrists engage in practices that address how war itself is constitu-
tive of soldiers’ psyches. Poring over the diagnostic categories created 
specifi cally to capture what happened with someone who was “blown up 
by a shell” (Malloch 1915: 1038) or someone “ge  ing their bell rung” (K. 
Jones, Young, and Leppma 2010: 372) with no visible injury can show an 
alternative view of the plight of weary warriors. Although looking at the 
classifi cation of war neuroses in this way cannot clarify defi nitively what 
is “wrong” with a soldier or how neuroses develop within and among 
soldiers (not that these are even desirable goals), it can bring to light other 
parts of the mangle that Pickering talks about. Recall that Annemarie Mol 
(2002) also understands science to be made up of practices that consist 
of organized protocols (such as diagnostic criteria for screening recruits 
for nervous disorders) and repeatable acts (such as MRIs for ruling out 
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organic brain disease or damage in soldiers presenting with neurotic sen-
sations) that sustain and reproduce a particular power/knowledge confi g-
uration (that of a masculinized military psychiatry, for instance).6 Rather 
than using the verb “perform” and the noun “performance,” we, like Mol 
(2002: 41), use the verb “enact” and the noun “enactment” to highlight a 
generative ontology that values disruption, suspension, and perturbation 
alongside resemblance, resonance, and reverberation.7 Tracing some of 
the classifi catory thinking that has gone into understanding war neuroses 
over time can show some of the ways psychiatric practice in the military 
has enacted weary warriors.
Enacting weary warriors through military psychiatric practice is more 
than tying a tag onto the toe of a weeping warrior who is lying on a 
stretcher in the desert of southern Iraq, awaiting evacuation by transport 
helicopter. Enactment entails the weaving together of the assumptions, 
values, and practice norms emerging from the specifi c ontologies around 
which power/knowledge confi gurations are organized. Embodied enact-
ments are at the crux of our critical reading. The ontologies that both 
Pickering and Mol use are generative and embodied—embodied in a way 
that takes as central the idea that both human and nonhuman elements 
are both deeply material and deeply discursive at the same time. Both 
are reminiscent of Karen Barad’s (2003: 814) understanding of agential 
realism, expressed as a relational ontology inclusive of ma  er and mean-
ing that is both intra- and interactive. Classifi catory thought about war 
neuroses confi nes disease and illness, and subsequently ill bodies of sol-
diers, to a disembodied category that only comes to be embodied once 
ascribed to a living being. In contrast, an embodied understanding and 
critical reading of diagnosis in psychiatric practice in the military includes 
acknowledgment of the material-discursive constitution of body parts, 
bodies (as assemblages of body parts), and the intra- and interaction of 
the body and the body parts. As well, the production of knowledge about 
psychic trauma wounds in the military utilizes highly discursive means 
via abstract categories to talk about neurological processes of broken bod-
ies. Repeated pa  erns of similar symptoms defi ne diagnosis as a taxo-
nomic practice. Yet, as Pickering notes, “we live in the thick of things, in 
a symmetric, decentered process of the becoming of the human and the 
non-human. But this is veiled from us by a particular tactic of dualist de-
tachment and domination that is backed up and intensifi ed … by science 
as our certifi ed way of knowing” (Pickering 2008: 8). One is intrinsically 
wound up in the psychiatric knowledge of the day, one that is informed 
both by discourse and materiality, ma  er and meaning (Barad 2007). This 
is no less the case now than it was when Jean-Martin Charcot was parad-
ing hysterics on stage for both entertainment and prestige (Charcot 1987), 
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when Sigmund Freud gave up dissecting eels and worms and began a 
psychiatric practice at Berggasse 19 in Vienna, or when Charles S. Myers 
(1915) wrote about what he called shell shock near the beginning of the 
Great War. 
What was signifi cant at the time when war neuroses became central to 
the circulation of power/knowledge as part of psychiatry was the debate 
over soma and psyche, ma  er and the abstract, the body and mind. What 
is signifi cant to military psychiatrists now as interest in war neuroses is on 
the rise is the move toward dissolving the seemingly rigid classifi cations 
of the body and the mind. In the midst of deconstructing classifi catory 
thought as a social practice of power that subjugates marginalized and 
historically oppressed groups of people and individuals, feminists are 
revisiting theories that discount the fusion of mind and body in order to 
excavate insights into the materiality of disciplinary discourse. Elizabeth 
A. Wilson (2004b) argues that much can be learned about the relationship 
between the body and the mind by reengaging with neuroscientifi c theo-
ries that have been heavily criticized, particularly by feminists, for being 
biologically reductionist and deterministic. She off ers a set of claims that 
open up discussion about the role materiality plays in movement, aff ect, 
illness, and knowledge claims. Wilson arrives at her argument from close 
readings of Sigmund Freud’s theory for treating hysterical pains, Simon 
LeVay’s proposition that functioning of the hypothalamus determines 
sexual orientation, Paul MacLean’s proposition that the limbic system me-
diates emotional responses, Peter Kramer’s kindling model of pharma-
ceuticals in treatment of depression, Charles Darwin’s study of blushing 
lizards, and Oliver Sacks’ inquiry into lytico-bodig disease.
Two of Wilson’s points—that medical interventions into biological 
functioning are normalizing acts (à la Griggers 1997) and that evolution-
ary theory itself is based on divergence of species rather than the repro-
duction of similarity—provide insight into how we can make sense of the 
production of weary warriors. First, medical intervention on the ba  le-
fi eld and in the military is necessarily circumscribed by the need to fi x 
bodies that are broken, return them to a normative state of fi tness, and 
stave off  onset or recurrence of cases of nerves. Once psychological sound-
ness became part of the nomenclature for defi ning a fi t warrior, military 
psychiatrists became more intrinsic to the military as an institution and 
part of defi ning military imperatives. And just as the ideal masculinity 
in the military must close off  and keep out femininity and homosexuality 
to maintain its own discursive boundaries, the ideal military psychiatric 
practice must close off  and contain sickness and mental illness to maintain 
its discursive boundaries, boundaries that are continually being assailed 
by the military’s own practices—that is, combat, service, training, and 
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treatment—that generate weary warriors. Psychiatry in the military is in 
the business of producing normal soldiers, and psychiatric practice sup-
ports this normalization process by classifying ill bodies as neurotic ones.
Second, the concept of divergence, on which theories of species devel-
opment evolved, has o  en been overlooked in favor of the application and 
popularization of the modernist scientifi c notion of sameness that sup-
ports the goals of regularity, effi  ciency, and prediction. With these goals at 
the forefront of decision-making within the military, disciplinary power 
deployed through the military as an institution models relationships and 
bodies (normalization) wherein one soldier could possibly stand in for 
the whole of the army symbolically (in recruitment posters [individual-
ization]) and substantively (as in the chief commander in state negotia-
tions over military action [totalization]).8 Ensconced in these principles, 
military psychiatrists base their practice on systematically diff erentiating 
neurotic warriors from normatively healthy ones who are free of mental 
illness (classifi cation).
By reorienting our inquiry toward divergence rather than similarity, we 
are able to intervene into the production of acts and explanations and fol-
low cracks, account for anomalies, and implicate ruptures in the thinking 
about psychologically wounded soldiers. The question is not really about 
becoming more precise in capturing what a war neurosis is, its etiology, 
or its manifestation of psychosomatic symptoms, which is what much of 
the medical literature on war neuroses is about (see chapter 2). For us the 
question is, How do the diagnostic categories arising out of classifi catory 
thought resonate or break with the power/knowledge confi gurations in 
play at the time of their generation? And, How does an embodied reading 
of war neuroses open up alternative understandings of psychologically 
wounded soldiers? In order to access and partially trace these oscillations 
in meaning and breaches in words and ideas, in the rest of the chapter we 
focus on the practice of diagnosis, the pa  erning of grouping bodily sensa-
tions into symptoms forming categories as well as the activities military 
psychiatrists rely on to conduct their work. The reverberations and dis-
continuities we write about are located at multiple scales within this intra- 
and interaction constitutive of material-discursive bodies. We hope to give 
a sense of the variation among the ensemble of elements that compose an 
embodied apparatus.
War Neuroses and the Great War
The story of war neuroses begins in medias res. Lengthy and detailed 
descriptions of surviving warriors’ emotional and mental ailments existed 
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well before psychiatry emerged as a scientifi c knowledge formation. In the 
Trojan wars, the deep emotional distress of combat brought on Achilles’ 
rage at the death of his most honored friend and warrior, Hector, and Ajax’s 
killing spree of sheep before taking his own life (Tritle 2000). Alexander 
the Great’s murder of one of his own offi  cers and long-time friend, Clei-
tus the Black, in a focused outburst of anger was no doubt infl uenced by 
Alexander’s increased excessive consumption of alcohol during the years 
of Greek war campaigns (Tritle 2003). Gaius Marius’ intrusive thoughts 
about war, acts of mass violence, traumatic nightmares, insomnia, and 
heavy drinking (alcohol abuse) can all be sorted into the classifi cation of 
PTSD (Birmes et al. 2010). However it was the struggle between psychia-
try and neurology for dominance of understanding the mind that the case 
of war neuroses emerged as an entity worth investigating. 
In the la  er half of the nineteenth century, as psychiatry was emerging 
as a coherent knowledge formation, hysteria and neurasthenia occupied 
a premier place in the debates of the time. The origin of the onset of hys-
terical symptoms (diagnosed predominantly in women) and neurasthenic 
symptoms (predominantly in men) were not sorted by diagnostic category; 
the discussions about etiology were parallel within each category. Organi-
zation of classifi catory thought in these debates was around whether war 
neuroses were physical (somatic) or psychological (psychical). There were 
at least four distinct conceptualizations in the debates over etiology of war 
neuroses at the turn of the twentieth century, ranging from the imaginary 
to a fi rm organic basis to a mental disease. (1) A group of psychiatrists 
who had been trained as neurologists conceptualized hysteria as originat-
ing in the relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient (following 
French psychiatrists Jean-Martin Charcot and Joseph Babinski). (2) Emer-
gent psychoanalysts (e.g., Sigmund Freud, Karl Abraham, Ernest Jones, 
and Ernst Simmel) from German-speaking countries and Great Britain, 
many of whom trained as neurologists, and psychiatrists fi nding psycho-
therapy useful in treatment (e.g., William H.R. Rivers, William McDougall, 
Charles S. Myers) claimed that war neuroses were either solely or mostly 
psychical in origin, with varying somatic eff ects. (3) A mixed group of 
neurologists and forensic psychiatrists claimed neuroses emerged from a 
combination of physical and psychological infl uences (e.g., German scien-
tists Hermann Oppenheim, Alfred Goldscheider, Gustav Aschaff enburg). 
(4) A group of neurologists primarily claimed war neuroses arose strictly 
from the physical part of the body (e.g., Austro-Hungarian scientist Ar-
thur von Sarbo). Among these four conceptualizations there is some over-
lap, most of it arising from a similar notion of a material body. 
A predominant, almost stereotypical, image of the soldier’s neurotic 
body was one of an emotionally weak, feminine, exhausted, cowardly, and 
immature body that was highly suggestible, withdrawn, and o  en times 
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silent or unable to speak clearly. There was a notion that the soldier was 
trapped, lost in an abyss. And, if not either psychotic or psychopathic, 
then the nervous soldier was probably simulating weakness to get out of 
doing a soldier’s duty (malingerer). Locating the discussion of the emo-
tional breakdown of military personnel in peacetime debates over hyste-
ria and neurasthenia set up the study of nervousness solely in the medical 
and scientifi c camps. These debates tend to dismiss the specifi c case of a 
soldier’s arc of experience and to displace the horrors of war into the vicis-
situdes of daily living. This image of the soldier’s body informed the break 
from the physical aspects of the dual line of argument—both psychic and 
somatic—whereby the psychological took over as primary etiological in-
fl uence. A key shi   in this break is Adolf Strümpell’s argument about neu-
roses of covetousness that arose secondarily from desire, especially with 
regard to securing compensation for injury (Ferenczi 1921).
Changes in warfare technology in the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the fi rst decades of the twentieth century that included enhanced 
artillery and larger mortar shells, higher-accuracy rifl es, long trenches de-
lineating the frontline, and aerial combat seem to have had an impact on 
the type of wounds soldiers were presenting with during the Great War. 
Sorting through such wounds was an empirical challenge not just to the 
military, but also to those practicing psychiatry. Psychiatrists, pressed into 
military service, faced a never ending stream of nervous soldiers. Psychiat-
ric diagnosis as a practice set up ill bodies as the place to play out on a mass 
scale what had been thought about for some years. In the fi eld, empirical 
observations tended toward specifi c diff erentiations of bodily processes 
supported diagnostic categories that described bodies, whereas the aca-
demic psychiatrists located in the hospitals away from the frontline tended 
toward fi nding similarities among bodies and identifying trends in groups 
of symptoms. Thus, competing names for what seemed to capture nervous 
breakdown in combat emerged, organized around how a specifi c physi-
cian read the ill body. For example, the terms “commotional syndrome,” 
“shell shock–wounded,” and “Granatschock” highlight symptoms associ-
ated with a blow to the head; “pension neurosis” and “compensation hys-
teria,” a perceived desire to live off  the state; and “eff ort syndrome” and 
“cowardice,” a value system running contrary to the masculine ideal of a 
good and honorable soldier. See table 3.1 for a partial list of the names as-
signed to soldiers’ ill bodies as a result of combat-related breakdown.
This empirical challenge for psychiatrists serving in the military, how-
ever, did not negate or even mitigate the drive toward locating the source 
of breakdown, even as the war wore on. The categories assigned preserved 
the existence of war neuroses as an illness safely ensconced in psychiatric 
classifi catory thought. Diagnostic practices—both in the fi eld and in the 
hospital—enacted war neuroses as a collective designation of soldiers 
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Table 3.1. Diagnostic Categories of Hysterical, Neurotic, and Traumatic 
Illness among Military Service Personnel and Medical, Colloquial, and 
Operational Names Describing the Bodies and Minds of Combat Troops 
Enduring Deep Emotional Distress or Psychological Wounds 
Acute Ba  le Neurosis Acute Stress Disorder Acute Stress Reaction
Acute Stress Syndrome Aeroasthenia Aeroneurosis
Anxiety Neuroses Arctic Stare Aviator’s Neurasthenia
Aviator’s Stomach Barbed Wire Disease Ba  lebrain
Ba  le Exhaustion Ba  le Fatigue Ba  le Hypnosis
Ba  le Reaction Ba  le Shock Ba  lefi eld Brain
Bengal Head Brain Fag Cardia-Neurosis
Cerebral Blast Concussion Chronic-Fatigue Combat Exhaustion
Combat Fatigue Combat Stress Reaction Commotional Syndrome
Compensation Hysteria Cowardice DaCosta’s Syndrome
Debility Delayed Stress Delusory Psychosis
Disabled Soldiers Disordered Action of the Heart Disturbed Action of the Heart
Eff ort Syndrome Extreme Exhaustion Fatigue
Flying Stress Functional Dyspepsia Functional Nervous Disease
Gastric Neurosis God Only Knows Goldbricking
Granatschock Gross Stress Reaction Gulf War Syndrome
Hysteria Hysterotraumatism Irritable Heart
Kriegsneurosesn Malingering
Mental Breakdown Arising 
from Shock
Mental Disturbances Mentally War Wounded Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
Nerve-Shaken Soldiers Nerve-Sha  ered Soldiers Nerve-Strained Soldiers
Nervous and Mental Shock Nervous Breakdown Nervous Exhaustion
Neurasthenia Neurasthenic Insanities Neurasthenic Prisoner
Neurocirculatory Asthenia Neuroses of Covetousness Névrose de Guerre
Nostalgia Nostalgie Not Yet Diagnosed (Nerves)
Obusite Old Sergeant Syndrome Operational Stress Injury
Operational Stress Pension Neurosis Pilot Fatigue
Pithiatism Polytrauma Postoperational Strain
Pos  raumatic Headache Pos  raumatic Stress Disorder Pos  raumatic Stress Reaction
Pos  raumatic Shock Post–Vietnam Syndrome Psychic Trauma
Psycho-Neuroses Schreckneurosen Scrimshanking
Shell Shock




Soldier’s Heart Staleness Traumatic Brain Injury
Traumatic Neurasthenia Traumatic Neuroses Traumatic Shock
Tropical Neurasthenia Vietnam Syndrome War-Hysteria
War Neuroses War Psychoses War Shock
War-Strain
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who were weak-willed, damaged, and emotionally predisposed to debil-
ity.9 Whether the source was designated as an overprotective mother, an 
absent father, or unresolved sexual tension, bodies still had uneven gaits, 
deafness, nightmares, mutism, and anxiety. Psychiatrists enacted war neu-
rotics through their meticulous observations and bodily examinations of 
individual troops, working under the assumption that if there were no 
identifi able underlying organic process causing illness, then the illness 
had to lie in a cracked, fractured, or broken psyche.
Elizabeth Wilson (2004a) helps break apart this assumption and reintro-
duces an embodied way of understanding the bounded connection among 
body parts and organic processes. She argues, “conversion hysteria does 
not point to what is beyond the organic body. On the contrary, it directs us 
right back into the heart of organic ma  er; hysteria is one particular mode 
of biological writing. If this seems to render hysteria prosaic, is this not 
because we have known biology only in its most inert forms?” (78; em-
phasis in original). Assumptions informing the knowledge used to make 
sense of ill bodies—or, in terms of practice, the psychiatrist’s reading of 
the ill body—shape the way in which bodily (biological) sensations (such 
as pain) and acts (such a deafness) get worked up into symptoms. Sets 
of symptoms can then be included in a category that ostensibly captures 
an organic process of disease or describes a psychiatric condition. This 
transformation of bodily sensations and acts into symptoms is a crucial 
mechanism in accounting for an ill soldier because the mechanism short-
circuits the agency of the body and the soldier. Cancellation of bodily 
agency aff ects the way a body enacts its trauma, stress, or shock, and thus 
glosses over the diff erences of that which cannot be readily accounted 
for—such as nervous disorders among combat soldiers—rendering them 
less textured and able to fi t into multiple categories at the same time. 
Such displacement in diagnostic practice, of course, is supported by the 
articulation of other apparatuses and discourses, as, for example, nerve-
stricken soldiers are cowards and sissies. What Wilson’s ideas mean for 
war neuroses and weary warriors is that the body as an agent in its own 
constitution can be brought back into the center of diagnostic practice in 
military psychiatry. This move makes hysteria—as diagnosed in the Great 
War—actually only one way of seeing how trauma is etched onto a body. 
But it is not the only way to understand weary warriors.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Of the thirteen diff erent diagnostic categories reported in the fi ve-week 
period from 1 January to 9 February 1945, in 2nd Canadian Exhaustion 
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Unit’s operating near Ravenna, Italy (Canadian Exhaustion Unit [CEU] 
#2 Quarterly Report, April 1945), a diagnosis of one case stands out: post-
traumatic syndrome (table 3.2).
This rupture—relocating the cause of nervous breakdown from sensi-
tive or unstable psyches to an external stimulus that could cause a break 
in any psyche—refl ects wider social and cultural processes. And although 
the diagnostic category did not stick or become dominant until more than 
a quarter of a century later, its presence refl ects the oscillation between 
the various dichotomies on off er at the time (that persist even now) to 
place weary warriors into an illness schema—diff erence/similarity, psy-
chogenic/somatogenic, internal/external, and permanent/transient.
As a diagnostic category of mental illness, PTSD did not appear for-
mally until 1980 with the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed. (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association 
[APA] 1980). Richard J. McNally (2004) recounts some of the conceptual 
problems with the category of PTSD. Inclusion of PTSD in the 1980 ver-
sion of the DSM was fraught with controversy over whether it was a medi-
cal disease or a social construct of a medical disease. McNally notes that 
PTSD is unique in the DSM in 1980 because it is a phenomenon that has 
Table 3.2. Neuropsychiatric Casualties Admi  ed to the #2 Canadian 
Exhaustion Unit, 1 January to 9 February 1945
Psychoneuroses (Anxiety State, Anxiety Hysteria, Hysteria, Reactive 
Depression, Psychoneuroses Unspecifi ed)
85
Psychopathic Personality–Inadequate Type 52
Mixed States (Psychopathic Personality with Anxiety State, Anxiety 







Pos  raumatic Syndrome 1
Concussion 2
Narcolepsy 1
NYD (N) (Not Yet Diagnosed [Nerves]) 29
NAD (Nerves) (Not Able to Diagnose [Nerves]) 19
TOTAL 234
Source: CEU #2, Quarterly Report, April 1945 (our emphasis).
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within its defi nition an external cause for the disorder. The precedent for 
including an external cause for disease was the inclusion of gross stress 
reaction in the 1952 DSM-I (APA 1952), which legitimated—medically and 
psychiatrically—psychological wounds for soldiers. In the most recently 
revised version (APA 1994), PTSD can be either from an external stressor 
or an emotional reaction to an event, making PTSD a category with both an 
internal and an external cause. The present defi nition according to DSM-
IV (APA 1994) of PTSD involves exposure to a traumatic stressor of fear, 
helplessness, or horror either through personal experience, witnessing an 
event, or learning about the death or injury of a loved one that causes a 
set of characteristic eff ects that are persistent and medium to long term, 
including mood swings, violent outbursts, nightmares, increased state 
of arousal, hypervigilance, intrusive thoughts, psychic numbing or emo-
tional anesthesia, trigger avoidance, feelings of guilt, failure and lack of 
a future, anxiety, reduced ability to express a range of emotions, persis-
tent reliving of traumatic event (both asleep and awake), and social with-
drawal. PTSD can be acute, chronic, or with delayed onset. And PTSD is 
not restricted to combat situations.
The circumstances within which the identifi cation of pos  raumatic 
syndrome potential surfaced as a rupture in the Second World War per-
mi  ed and even facilitated movement of trauma into and across a range 
of infl uences; such infl uences include the gaze of military psychiatry, in-
creasing interest in trauma in civilian psychiatry, and modifi cations in the 
structure of the medical corps in the military.10 Rather than scrutinizing 
the etiological diff erences within and between hysteria and neurasthe-
nia, military psychiatrists shi  ed their focus to understanding psychiatric 
wounds specifi cally relating to military operations. This shi   gathered 
steam during the Second World War with the delineation of “pilot fa-
tigue” and “old sergeant syndrome,” refl ecting the specifi c tasks soldiers 
carried out; or “tropical neurasthenia” and “arctic stare,” refl ecting the 
physical environmental context within which soldiers undertook their 
duties. Use of fatigue, exhaustion, and stress as concepts to capture what 
was going on psychically with soldiers’ ill bodies made empirical sense 
as the intensity and frequency of ba  les and armed confl ict increased. 
Use of the terms “operational” and “combat” as descriptors for the type 
of fatigue, exhaustion, and stress soldiers were enduring refl ects the psy-
chiatric gaze on military operations rather than the ill bodies outside the 
military, which had been the departure point for psychiatric engagement 
during the Great War.
During the Second World War, trauma became an organizing concept 
around which to place ideas about fright, fear, and psychological injury, 
especially in clinical social work and clinical psychology, but also in civil-
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ian psychiatry. So, while the military psychiatrists were negotiating the 
infl uential roles that internal and external factors play in nerve cases, and 
were valuing the impact of the harsh physical and psychological condi-
tions soldiers fought in (M. Jones and Lewis 1941), civilian psychiatrists 
were focusing on trauma as an element useful in understanding psychi-
atric conditions. They began making claims that everyone had a breaking 
point, trauma takes a toll on everyone, and the breakdown is just a ma  er 
of when it will take place (R. Greene 1976: 429).
These ideas seeped into the practice of psychiatrists on the ground in 
the Second World War and supported the shi   of the military psychiatric 
gaze. But the shi   was not smooth, nor merely in competition with one 
other viewpoint. Indeed, psychiatrists in the military were engaged in a 
number of debates with competing moral, medical, and military claims 
while being commensurate with the patriotic and nationalist loyalties. 
Wilder Penfi eld, a surgeon representing Canada on an American, British, 
and Canadian three-week mission to the Soviet Union in 1943, reported on 
the surgical practices of the Soviet forces (Penfi eld 1943) in an article in the 
Canadian Medical Association Journal. Concluding his article, he identifi ed 
the surgical advances of the Soviets, including the use of sulfonamides for 
wound treatment, blood and blood substitutes for bleeding and shock, 
and development of surgical specialists (Penfi eld: 461). His sixth point 
strayed from surgery and into psychiatry: “[I]mproved treatment of neu-
roses. Psychoneurosis is rare in the Soviet Union for they have an ample 
supply of its specifi c antidote, i.e. high morale. This they do not need to 
import from abroad” (461). Roy R. Grinker, an American Air Force psy-
chiatrist, responded to Penfi eld in a le  er to the editor (Grinker 1944). In 
addition to commenting about the inappropriateness of a surgeon mak-
ing claims about psychiatry, Grinker expressed concern about the move 
toward denying the existence of neuroses. He wrote, “anyone can crack” 
under the strain of war, and high morale “defi ned as stern military disci-
pline, a hatred of the enemy, and a courage instilled by an ideal” does not 
combat neuroses (379).
A similar exchange took place between W. Ronald D. Fairbairne (1943) 
and John Mackwood (1943) in the British Medical Journal. Fairbairne stated 
that from a national standpoint and for military effi  ciency, instead of psy-
chotherapy, neurotic soldiers needed evangelism; the preaching of faith 
and the exercise of pastoral care (Fairbairne: 186). Mackwood responded, 
maintaining that morale defi ned in terms of evangelism does not combat 
war neuroses and that this slip into ethics and morals will not well serve 
distressed soldiers returning to civil life: “It is a psychiatric problem now, 
and will be a  er the fi ghting has ceased” (Mackwood: 396). American gen-
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eral George Smith Pa  on epitomized this patriotic nationalist approach to 
dealing with war neurotics in his infamous slap of Private Charles Her-
man Kuhl in 1943 in the 15th Evacuation Hospital, Nicosia, Italy. Criti-
cized for his act by military brass, he was ordered to apologize publically 
in front of the media and personally to Private Kuhl. Yet Pa  on’s views 
did not change. Just a  er the incident, Pa  on issued a directive forbidding 
“ba  le fatigue”—not the expression of that term, but the experience of 
ba  le fatigue itself (Axelrod 2009: 116–17).11
A  er the Second World War, psychiatry became a more formalized part 
of most Western militaries. Rather than pressing psychiatrists into service 
during wartime, military medical training included the training of psy-
chiatrists in both clinical and operational applications. For example, the 
American experience in the Second World War with insuffi  cient training 
in neuropsychiatry, nationwide shortage of psychiatrists, and lack of mili-
tary psychiatric training, paved the way for the establishment of schools 
for military psychiatry (Menninger 1966). The School of Military Neu-
ropsychiatry began running stateside 20 December 1942 as a four-week 
course open to medical offi  cers with at least one year’s training in psy-
chiatry (55). The School expanded and moved to Mason General Hospital, 
Long Island, New York, and by December 1943 a twelve-week course for 
any medical offi  cer served as core neuropsychiatric training (56). In total, 
1,000 medical offi  cers were trained between December 1942 and December 
1945 (56). Overseas training, usually only a week’s duration, was done in 
Europe and in the South Pacifi c (59–61). The School laid the groundwork 
for continued training in neuropsychiatry within the American military, 
which guaranteed a  ention to war neuroses. What that a  ention turned 
out to be has varied over the past seven decades—from focused training to 
reduce breakdown in combat (exemplifi ed by the low percentage of psy-
chiatric casualties in the initial years of American war in Viet Nam) to lack 
of experience in understanding postdeployment stress reactions to trauma 
among veterans of the Viet Nam, Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars.
These three factors—the gaze of military psychiatry, increasing inter-
est in trauma in civilian psychiatry, and modifi cations in the structure of 
the medical corps in the military—assisted in the shi   from seeing the 
deep emotional distress of combat troops as internal to the individual and 
manifest as hysteria or a neurosis toward considering each and every sol-
dier as a potential psychiatric patient.12 This expansive shi   in diagnosis, 
located in a mass of old practices and new ideas in the Second World War, 
brought mass change much later, including a rewriting of etiology, a new 
relationship between soma and psyche, and a reinforcement of similarity 
as the organizing tool for diff erentiating psychologically ill bodies.
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Weary warriors clearly are not a new phenomenon, but it is not as 
simple as exposing traumatic reaction as an acultural, achronic, and aspa-
tial entity as some psychiatrists and psychologists studying trauma would 
claim (a  er E. Jones and Wessely 2005a).13 Rather, it is a ma  er of nestling 
the psychiatric scrutiny of ill bodies in particular organizations of clas-
sifi catory thought—that is, fi guring out its placement in the mangle. For 
example, Viet Nam War veterans welcomed PTSD as a diagnosis because 
a diagnosis would mean legitimacy, legitimacy would mean treatment, 
and treatment would mean relief (see Scurfi eld 2004). Refusal of the label 
of PTSD by some contemporary veterans may be linked to the concept of 
emasculation given the hypermasculine culture in which young men are 
fi rmly ensconced. However, the popularity of PTSD in the past decade 
has risen considerably through national defense initiatives and aware-
ness campaigns in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, as well as 
through United States–based reports of the seemingly shocking numbers 
of 25 to 38 percent of troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan being diag-
nosed with PTSD or suff ering from psychological problems upon return 
(Arthur, MacDermid, and Kiley 2007; Tanielian and Jaycox 2008). These 
numbers are not higher, or lower, than the numbers of war neurotics in the 
Great War, exhausted troops during the Second World War, delayed stress 
among Viet Nam veterans, and PTSD suff erers from United Nations peace 
operations. But there is increasing public recognition that the prevalence 
of trauma among veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is indeed 
higher than in earlier wars.
This move toward locating the weary warrior in a category that not only 
applies to every potential soldier, but also to potentially everyone in civil 
society, marks the psychologically wounded soldier as “normal” under 
extreme conditions (at the frontline) yet “pathological” under noncombat 
traumatic conditions (at home). Through the practice of classifi cation, 
the soldier is cast yet again into a liminal state where the pathological is 
normalized and the normal is pathologized. The weariness of the warrior 
fl uctuates according to context.
What worth, then, does a diagnostic category have that can include so 
much and be grasped for multiple groups of people with varying reactions 
to trauma? Over a decade ago Derek Summerfi eld (2001) called into ques-
tion the utility of PTSD as a diagnosis. He maintains that the classifi catory 
power of PTSD has stretched beyond its limits and that the use of the cate-
gory needs to be reevaluated given the wide usage outside clinical se  ings. 
Like Allan Young (1995, 2004), Summerfi eld points out that PTSD is not a 
timeless entity that is being discovered by multiple generations. It is a set 
of “practices, technologies, and narratives” that serve the interests of asso-
ciated groups, as, for example, people, institutions, and moral arguments 
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(Summerfi eld: 97). His rationale for challenging the category rests on his 
claim that “society confers on doctors the power to award disease status” 
to people and that using ineff ective or outmoded categories confl ates nor-
mality and pathology (Summerfi eld: 98). Critics of Summerfi eld point out 
that the dismissal of suff ering, the usefulness of ascribing a diagnosis to 
assist people with moving on in their lives, and the lack of recognition of 
PTSD as a disease render his argument unpersuasive (Rapid Responses 
2001). The engagement with Summerfi eld’s argument resurrects long-
standing debates over organic disease versus psychiatric condition; ex-
ternal events and internal predispositions; existence or nonexistence of 
physiological malfunctioning; and the dismissal of using social theory 
to engage debate about medical psychiatric issues. When Summerfi eld 
responded to some of his critics, he reiterated his central argument: “As 
a category post-traumatic stress disorder can support some weight, and I 
am saying that we should debate how much this is, but it cannot support 
the tower block that has been erected on it” (Summerfi eld: 1301).
We would categorize both Summerfi eld and his critics as being overly 
simplistic in their understanding of the impact society and culture has 
on the notion of disease itself as well as individual diseases and illnesses. 
Then again, we agree that his argument about the confl ation of normal 
and the pathological is an important point; as is his observation about 
the parameters of the category being subject to revision. We argue that 
the category of PTSD enacts weary warriors through the practice of com-
parison in science, medicine, and psychiatry within the military, and that 
the most powerful comparative practice is between what constitutes the 
normal warrior and what constitutes the pathological warrior.14 There is 
a danger in normalizing the eff ects of war on individual soldiers, just as 
it is dangerous to pathologize each breakdown in combat. Over the past 
150 years or so, the oscillation between the two poles has been refl ected in 
classifi catory thought that in turn has served various interests—military, 
social, cultural, economic, state—at given points in time. Perhaps most 
importantly, the rupture toward externalizing etiology in congruence 
with civilian psychiatry produces everyone as a potential psychiatric 
patient. 
Shell Shock and Traumatic Brain Injury
Classifi catory thought necessarily brings with it a diff erent set of tools for 
thinking about neurotic soldiers. This can be demonstrated by troubling 
the reliance on etiology as the basis for diff erentiating bodily processes 
that have in some sense gone awry. One well-trodden path might be to 
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locate unobservable wounds in the unseeable psyche, while a less-trod-
den path might be to locate psychiatric wounds (hysterical mutism, hys-
terical deafness) in something else unseeable—that is, within unseeable 
bodily wounds. Because classifi catory thought depends on some form of 
observation, enhanced observational practices, such as computed tomog-
raphy scanning (CT scans) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), bring 
more body parts into view. Once observable, classifi cation of psychiatric 
wounds could be be  er diff erentiated between that which is psychic and 
that which is somatic. With this kind of information yet another path 
might be apropos—that is, revisiting categories of illness and applying 
insights of scientifi c observational practice to the categorization process. 
Enacting weary warriors from this angle reconfi gures the connection and 
articulation among the elements of the apparatuses so that resonance and 
rupture exist simultaneously, le  ing us see diff erent types of weary war-
riors. Reading the diagnostic categories of shell shock and TBI side by 
side can provide insight into how the machinations of apparatuses via the 
plugging of one apparatus into another apparatus work.
Shell shock was an empirical description of fi rst impressions of what 
was happening on the ba  lefi eld with the onset of symptoms. Initial de-
scriptions of what was referred to as shell shock rested on the assump-
tion that behavioral disturbances could arise from unobservable damage 
from blows to the brain and to the senses. Charles S. Myers described the 
similarities among three patients he a  ended to at the Duchess of West-
minster’s War Hospital in Le Touquet, France, in late 1914 and early 1915 
(Myers 1915) (see table 3.3).
Myers’ case notes follow each soldier’s journey from the moment the 
shell burst, through the dressing station, to the hospital. He meticulously 
observes, measures, and records the changes in the sensations of the three 
soldiers, their bowel movements, and their memories of the events. He 
pieces together the event seemingly causing the emotional and bodily 
distress through memories, other soldiers’ accounts of the same incidents 
at the hospital, and hypnosis. Case 2 recalls,
I remember the journey in the train here distinctly. There were continual of-
fers of tea, cocoa, sweets, and cigare  es. They wouldn’t let us sleep for these 
things. I had a bad headache all the way down from the trenches. I did not 
bother much about my sight, as I thought it was imaginary. It wasn’t until I 
got rid of the pain in my stomach which I came in with that I began to fi nd 
my sight wouldn’t let me read. (Myers 1915: 318).
Myers ends his comparative description with a statement that positioned 
him outside the dominant thinking of the period:
Comment on these cases seems superfl uous. They appear to constitute a 
defi nite class among others arising from the eff ects of shell shock. The shells 
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in question appear to have burst with considerable noise, sca  ering much 
dust, but this was not a  ended by the production of odour. It is therefore 
diffi  cult to understand why hearing should be (practically) unaff ected, and 
the dissociated “complex” be confi ned to the senses of sight, smell, and taste 
(and to memory). The close relation of these cases to those of “hysteria” ap-
pears fairly certain. (Myers 1915: 320) 
Refl ecting on the relationship among shell shock, hysteria, and neuras-
thenia, in 1919 Frederick W. Mo   wrote,
There is no doubt that this term [shell shock] was an unfortunate one, and 
led to a considerable amount of misconception. It was a very natural conclu-
Table 3.3. Similarities among Three Shell Shock Cases Described by 
Charles S. Myers
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Cause Shells bursting about 
him when hooked by 
barbed wire.
Preceded by period 
of sleeplessness.
Shell blowing trench 
in.
As in Case 1
Shell blew him off  
a wall.
?
Vision Amblyopia [lazy eye]. 
Reduced visual fi elds.
As in Case 1. As in Case 1.
Hearing Slightly aff ected for a 
brief time.
Not aff ected. As in Case 2.





ral odor not sensed]. 
Taste Almost absent. Reduced acuity. As in Case 2. 
Other 
Sensations
Not aff ected. As in Case 1. As in Case 1. 
Volition 
Movements
Not aff ected. As in Case 1. As in Case 1. 
Defaecation Bowels not opened for 
fi ve days a  er shock. 
As in Case 1. As in Case 1. 
Micturition Urine not passed for 
48 hours.
Not aff ected. As in Case 2. 
Memory Apparently slightly 
aff ected.
Distant amnesia. As in Case 2. 
Result a  er 
Treatment 
Gradual improve-
ment with rest and 
suggestion. 
As in Case 1, supple-
mented by hypnosis.
As in Case 1. 
Source: Adapted from Myers (1915: 316).
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sion, at fi rst, that men who had been exposed to the unprecedented stress 
of bombardment should suff er from commotio cerebri. But a great many men 
who have been returned from suff ering from shell shock would have been 
more appropriately designated as shell shy. (Mo   1919a: 439; emphasis in 
original)
Mo  ’s shi   from an external etiology to an emotional one, with close links 
between emotional breakdown and cowardice, makes sense given what 
had happened in the interim: hysteria and neurasthenia as the categories 
for understanding neuroses dominated the knowledge and the practices 
in forward psychiatry within the opposing militaries, with French and 
German psychiatrists and psychiatric debate leading the way. What is 
most interesting about Mo  ’s observations about shell shock is what he 
concedes a  er making such a statement:
It is extremely diffi  cult to diff erentiate commotional shock from emotional 
shock, for both may be a  ended by a state of unconsciousness followed by 
hysterical or neurasthenic symptoms. Still, there is no doubt about it, men 
do suff er from commotional disturbance of the brain without any signs of 
injury on the body, and that they are the subjects of organic changes, due to 
the forces generated by the detonation of high explosives, especially when 
they are in enclosed places, such as dug-outs or narrow trenches. (Mo   
1919a: 439)
Two things here that diverge from the usual understanding of war neu-
roses in the Great War as arising from a break in the psyche are worth not-
ing. One, the body appears to react to commotion and emotion in the same 
way. Two, the body appears to change organically as a result of being near 
explosions. The diffi  culty in distinguishing etiology, especially close to the 
front, makes the practice of diagnosis more intensely reliant on classifi ca-
tory thought. And the classifi catory thought of nerve cases throughout 
most of the war was either hysteria or neurasthenia. Mo   notes as proof 
of what he calls true shell shock as altered cerebral-spinal fl uid (collected 
through lumbar punctures and which contains blood and albumin) and 
minute hemorrhages in various parts of the body.15 Unfortunately for sol-
diers, these leakages were not readily observable, manifested as nervous 
symptoms, and o  en came on later as other types of illness or disease. As 
a result, soldiers themselves are pushed into a diagnostic category that 
brings with it a ba  ery of subsequent practices in, for example, the realm 
of psychiatry in terms of treatment, the military in terms of status, wider 
cultural trends in terms of acceptance or rejection of feminized veterans, 
and society in terms of pensions and postdeployment support.
A surge of diagnoses of TBI and mTBI in the twenty-fi rst-century war in 
Afghanistan and the war in Iraq among soldiers in the West rekindled in-
terest in shell shock. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 
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TBI is a certain external cause of intracranial injury that can be either focal 
or diff use (WHO 2011). Intracranial injury consists of the brain colliding 
against the skull, which may result in bruising, lacerated tissue, hemor-
rhage, or other organ damage. Diagnosis of TBI among soldiers entails 
a collection of symptoms including a history of a blow to the head, pos-
sible loss of consciousness (from a few minutes to several hours), concen-
tration problems, memory loss, sensory disruption, sleeping diffi  culties, 
headache, and mood changes. For mTBI the symptoms are the same as in 
TBI, but with less intensity, fewer incidents, and slighter eff ects. Associ-
ated conditions, such as blast lung (when explosions go off  in confi ned 
spaces), cerebral blast concussion (brain damage from a blow to the head 
that was caused by an explosion), and postconcussion syndrome (a set of 
symptoms lasting longer than the usual eff ects of a blow to the head) em-
phasize the material damage that a detonation of an aerial bomb, artillery 
shell, mine, grenade, or any other explosive device (including improvised 
explosive devices [IEDs]) can do to a body. Access to this damage comes 
through a set of symptoms mostly related with mental damage, nervous-
ness, memory loss, behavioral changes, and depression. Cognitive impair-
ment, partly because cognition is now more systematically accounted for 
through measurement, has recently been recognized as a symptom of 
combat. But only since about 2005 have the American military and other 
Western militaries acknowledged the impact TBI and mTBI has had on 
soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Jetly and Heber 2011).
Just as shell shock was the so-called signature wound of the Great War, 
TBI has fl ourished as the signature wound of the recent Western wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Controversies over hysteria and neurasthenia 
with Myers’ initial understanding of shell shock mirror the debate over 
the diagnostic categories of PTSD and TBI. The two categories are similar 
in symptomatology (unconscious for a period of time with post-injury 
amnesia) and etiology (a blow to the head). There is also resonance in the 
idea that outside of defi nitive evidence, the possibility of neurosis from 
shells blowing up (Myers 1915, 1916) and neurosis of brain damage from 
a blast injury (Thompson, Sco  , and Dubinsky 2001) need consideration. 
The diff erences between the two—presumably in terms of rejection and 
acceptance in the dance of agency—refl ect the context within which the 
idea informing the classifi cation (categorization) took place. Shell shock 
as a category—both in its popular and diagnostic forms—had to contend 
with the growing infl uence of psychiatry as part of medical science cen-
tered on debates between diff erentiating war and peace neuroses and 
distinguishing hysteria and neurasthenia.16 In contrast, TBI already has a 
solid footing outside military psychiatry and is positioned vis-à-vis the ex-
ternal etiological categories of injury-based postconcussion syndrome and 
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psychiatric-based PTSD. Like PTSD, TBI can potentially happen to anyone 
and is not confi ned to combat situations. This current debate refl ects the 
persistence of both psychic- and material-based understandings of illness 
that tie the distress to a soldier’s nervous system to either an internal (the 
mind) or external (an explosion) source to explain invisible wounds.
Cultural understandings, values, norms, and mores play a role in the 
constitution and ascription of diagnostic categories. Making tangible na-
tionalist ideologies is a strategy that can then be politically mobilized in 
support of what is becoming a less popular war. On the one hand, the 
recent rise of diagnoses of TBI in lieu of PTSD coincides with increased 
domestic dissatisfaction with American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Ba  lefi eld medicine in twenty-fi rst-century wars indicate high incidence 
of overlap between TBI and PTSD with neurological damage from blows 
to the head resulting in complex psychological reactions and pathophysi-
ological disruptions because of the ways in which the eff ects of the injuries 
and disorders are described in the medical literature. Blaming IEDs for 
the breakdown of a soldier can maintain an individual’s masculinity by 
keeping cowardice out of and honor in a soldier’s identity.17 This kind of 
explanation holds intact the ideal soldier that can only be undermined by 
sneaky opponents who do not follow the rules of combat. The message 
mobilized is that it is not the case that the nervous soldier is brain-addled, 
weak-willed, or a psychic casualty of an honorable war. There is a physi-
cal cause to soldiers’ behavioral problems and the devious enemy is the 
source, and we need to hold our ground against the tricky bastards. Even 
if a soldier cries every now and again, it is justifi ed.
On the other hand, there was no parallel cultural understanding to 
support the diagnostic category of shell shock. No social role existed that 
nervous soldiers could easily and securely occupy. The droves of soldiers 
breaking down could not easily be reconfi gured into a politically support-
ive message. Mobilization of a wide reaching message that proclaimed the 
human toll of such wounds was popularized through the writings of war 
poets and novelists, including Siegfried Sassoon, Owen Wilson, Robert 
Graves, Erich Maria Remarque, and Ernest Hemingway. Limited public 
accounts of the devastating eff ects of the war on so many young men were 
available during the war and were o  en hidden as a way to keep up the 
morale on the home front.
Myers’ descriptions of the three cases of shell shock in 1915 parallel 
these descriptions of TBI as a diagnostic category—injury from an explo-
sion, a blow to the head, or being blown into another object. Rebecca J. 
Anderson (2008) makes the argument that Myers was more accurate than 
he or his colleagues gave him credit for—he identifi ed the psychosocial 
complexities of TBI in the ba  lefi eld in 1914, and classifi ed them appro-
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priately. She maintains that the brain does not change: it has merely taken 
nearly a century to track the neurological damage caused by a blast, dam-
age that can be extreme, persistent, or even delayed (216). Because of the 
advance in technology in emergency trauma medicine in the ba  lefi eld 
and in body armor, soldiers with head injuries and pos  raumatic stress 
are surviving and living long enough for military psychiatrists to be able 
to track long-lasting eff ects. The change that Anderson talks about—lo-
cated in the structural organization of military psychiatric practice—is 
change external to the body. But Anderson’s claim renders the body itself 
without agency, insinuates that bodies act and react the same now as in 
1915, and casts the brain and associated neurological and physiological 
systems as independent of the blast injury. This is not quite the case. The 
practices of the Great War and the wars in the twenty-fi rst century diff er, 
and the categories (generated by classifi catory thought) enact weary war-
riors diff erently and enclose them in tightly woven diagnostic categories.
The unqualifi ed pursuit, acceptance, and belief that the invisible wound 
is located solely and entirely within the material realm refuses the deep 
material-discursive character of the constitution of the body, including 
human and nonhuman agency. Just as the categorical denial of material 
infl uences in psychiatric conditions (popularized in the practice of Joseph 
Babinski) that eventually subsumed shell shock into hysteria and neur-
asthenia, the repudiation of psychical infl uence or stress reaction in TBI 
closes off  the inter- and intra-action of body parts, including the brain. 
Neither conceptualization successfully blends the psyche and soma to-
gether as co-constitutive forces; underlying both is the assumption that 
the two are separate entities. An embodied reading challenges this as-
sumption and casts body parts as agential, not inert, and that the under-
standing brought into existence by discourse that already holds within it 
the materiality of that which it enacts. Elizabeth Wilson’s observation that 
hysteria is not beyond the organic body informs our reading of shell shock 
and TBI. We see both as resting on a particular reading of the biological 
body. By opening up that reading of the body and the categories used to 
read that body, a diff erent understanding of weary warriors can emerge.
Naturalistic readings of the body limit the way in which one can see a 
body. TBI may describe a body partially, just as PTSD and shell shock do; 
the categories expose only part of the mangle of practice. And it is these 
practices that enact weary warriors. But if we are to take seriously the 
notion of agency as part of embodiment, then the process through which 
classifi cation enacts a soldier’s ill body needs to be embodied. Pamela 
Moss (2008) shows how a category can become understood as embodied, 
at least partially. She analyzes four contemporary defi nitions of myalgic 
encephalomyelitis competing for dominance among clinical physicians, 
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research scientists, and activist groups. She argues, “what seems to be 
happening over a relatively short period of time is a mutual constitution 
of both diagnostic categories and ill bodies, simultaneously being dis-
cursive and material, existing in those lived (imagined and real) spaces 
of everyday life” (174). Although not part of her discussion, she points 
toward the agential characteristics of the engagement of ill bodies with 
diagnostic categories and the human agents that generated them. The 
categories of shell shock, TBI, and others a  empting to capture what goes 
on with combat soldiers need to be reread so as to enact weary warriors 
and their bodies as embodied entities that are active agents in eff ecting the 
constitution of injuries, bodily sensations, and ill bodies. We maintain that 
the debate over whether it is the breakdown of the psyche that aff ects the 
body or the breakdown of the body that aff ects the psyche is not helpful. 
If psychiatry, and medical science more widely, insist on relying on clas-
sifi catory thought (and they do and will because it is eff ective), then they 
need to generate categories (with protocols for treatment) that usefully 
and eff ectively cast the psyche and soma as co-constitutive. These catego-
ries need to be based on changing bodies, categories and bodies that are 
porous, shi  ing, fl uid, and agentic.
Combat Stress Reaction and Operational Stress Injuries
By the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, classifi catory thought had 
consolidated the eff orts of patient groups, military psychiatrists, and civil-
ian psychiatrists interested in the broken psyches of ill soldiers by locating 
the key classifi catory categories outside the medical world. This move was 
facilitated by military psychiatry’s embrace of the universal claims of post-
traumatic stress and TBI. The deepening tension between soldiers’ and 
their families’ experiences of combat-related illness, military imperatives 
of maintaining mentally sound soldiers, and military psychiatric practice 
has been ameliorated and a new category generated. The ongoing plug-
ging of one apparatus into the other—psychiatry and the military—has 
enacted a host of diagnosable illnesses associated directly with military 
service. The military classifi cation of soldiers’ ill bodies in the Canadian 
Forces, OSI, includes all combat-related stress and trauma injuries. The 
umbrella term is defi ned as “any persistent psychological diffi  culty re-
sulting from operational duties performed by a CF [Canadian Forces] 
member” (Canadian Parliament 2007: 1). With this new classifi cation, the 
military eff ectively returns debate over the etiology of broken bodies and 
ravished minds to psychiatry and contains the rupture of the seemingly 
endless ways individual bodies can break down when placed into situ-
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ations that have soldiers enduring long periods of inordinate stress. By 
creating a nonmedicalized category of illness, the military can once again 
engage in the business of creating normal soldiers, even though between 
a quarter and a third of all troops will endure some psychological illness 
a  er serving in combat situations. Classifying soldiers under a nonmedi-
cal umbrella permits psychiatry to engage in psychiatric practices such as 
debating etiology and designing treatment protocols.
This movement from one type of classifi cation to another was incre-
mental, a  enuated one particular idea about the source of deep emotional 
distress, and resolved competing mandates. Incremental changes led by 
fi eld practices were not just administrative declarations, but also descrip-
tions of the activities (practices) of combat troops. For example, offi  cial 
British policy at the onset of the Second World War a  empted to curb 
misunderstandings of combat-related breakdowns and designated that 
“Not Yet Diagnosed (Nervous)” was to be used as preliminary diagno-
sis in the fi eld, never shell shock (Binneveld 1997). Although the term 
NYD(N) persisted, military medical personnel and military psychiatrists 
used other terms to capture soldiers’ broken psyches as bodily sensations: 
functional dyspepsia, gastric neurosis, disordered action of the heart, or 
eff ort syndrome (van Nostrand 1943, part I). By the middle of 1943, the 
term “exhaustion” had become preferred by American, British, and Cana-
dian militaries. Military psychiatrists began detailing the bodies of ill sol-
diers in ways that integrated the activities (practices) of war with bodily 
sensations. For American troops in North Africa during the Second World 
War, studies showed that there was a disproportionately higher rate of 
psychiatric wounds the longer soldiers engaged in combat (Grinker and 
Spiegel 1963). As well, fear and anxiety rose as campaigns dragged on, just 
as psychological breakdown was more likely when a soldier was physi-
cally tired (Hanson 1949). For German troops, rather than war neuroses 
there were many more organic diseases, especially gastric maladies, at the 
beginning of the war. Rather than demobilizing ill soldiers, the German 
military created ba  alions of soldiers with specifi c health problems, as, for 
example, Magenba  alion for those with stomach problems and Ohrenbat-
talion for those with hearing problems (a  er Ford 2000). But by the end 
of the war, there was a documented dramatic increase in the number of 
cases of war neuroses and in German accounts of military psychiatry. This 
phenomenon was referred to as Symptomsvershiebung, a displacement of 
symptoms (Binneveld 1997: 92).
A  er the Second World War, various phrasings and descriptions of 
“combat fatigue,” “operational stress,” and the more general “combat 
stress reaction” emphasized the relationship between the broken body 
and its military context. This partial demedicalization of the categoriza-
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tion of broken psyches permi  ed soldiers’ bodies themselves to be agents 
of change. Soldiers’ illness did not fall within a disease category; their ill-
ness was context-dependent. Classifi catory thought in this sense moved 
away from the management of disease types toward the management of 
broken soldiers.
As an extension of the thesis that everyone has a breaking point, fi rst 
explored during the Second World War, etiology of the neurotic patient 
lost its central importance and took a back seat to the acceptance of anyone 
being a psychiatric patient. The a  enuation of one particular characteristic 
of psychiatric wounds—potentiality—carries with it universalizing ten-
dencies that render the practices designed to prevent breakdown, such as 
screening, less signifi cant than tendencies that emphasize training for par-
ticular situations. As a response to the successes and failures of forward 
psychiatry in the Second World War, over the following two decades most 
militaries focused on how to train soldiers to deal with combat situations 
so that they would not break down. The American military used Skinner-
ian operant and Pavlovian classical training techniques to get recruits to 
shoot more readily and become more aggressive in ba  le (see Grossman 
2009). Training for military medical personnel included some psychiatric 
training for all physicians and the introduction of clinical psychology into 
the armed forces through the permanent assignment of psychologists to 
American veteran hospitals (Kennedy and McNeil 2006).
These types of eff orts resulted in the apparent success of American 
troops in Viet Nam with low psychiatric wounds in the fi rst months and 
years of the war. Yet delayed onset of stress and trauma became an is-
sue among American Viet Nam War veterans. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s the intensifi cation of the medicalization of war wounds was accom-
panied by the medicalization of society more generally (Illych 1975; Con-
rad and Schneider 1980). With a rise in the demand for psychiatric services 
for emotional distress among veterans and the move toward diagnosing 
mental illness and PTSD, the pendulum swung back—away from con-
text-dependent understandings of war neuroses toward debate over the 
existence of war mental disorders and trauma etiology.
Reworking the tension between competing mandates facilitates move-
ment of classifi catory thought. The pronouncement of OSI by the Canadian 
Forces marks another swing of the pendulum. Articulation of psychiatry 
and the military transforms the way elements within the military connect, 
just as the military provides a venue through which to display the applica-
tions of psychiatric practice and the fl ow of psychiatric power. As the mili-
tary absorbed psychiatry, a new version was created, one that ameliorated 
tension between competing mandates, such as between healing psyches of 
broken soldiers and sending them to the frontline. Military psychiatrists 
are trained in military academies and specifi c ranks for military psychia-
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trists in the medical services branch of various militaries. In some aspects 
there is no longer an articulation, but rather an amalgamation, even an 
integration. For a weary warrior, this conversion means that a soldier’s 
incapacity due to breakdown—for every soldier has the potential to break 
down—is normalized back into the military and routinized into opera-
tions planning.
OSI characterizes the trend in contemporary approaches to diagnosing 
neurotic combat troops. The generation of this category sidesteps some 
of the stagnating tendencies in medicine generally and psychiatry spe-
cifi cally—that of pathologizing normality. Alongside the increased impor-
tance of military psychiatrists in prevention and treatment of illness rather 
than in determining etiology, this retreat into a nonmedicalized category 
for soldiers’ ravished minds opens up new articulations between psychia-
try and the military. The classifi cation of a range of mental illnesses and 
diseases a weary warrior might potentially encounter as a militarized en-
tity instead of medical category generates a diff erent set of practices. For 
example, surveillance as a central pillar in identifying and treating OSIs 
counters the burial of traumatized combat soldiers within the institution, 
which might have been the case fi  y years before. In addition to a soldier’s 
own self-surveillance, family members, friends, and civilian general phy-
sicians are also trained to be sensitive to emergent symptoms of OSI. This 
extension of surveillance widens the purview of a militarized psychiatric 
power that transfers responsibility of maintaining a sound mind and body 
of veterans to the veterans themselves and to their social networks.
From Broken-down Bodies to Weary Warriors
The military war service patient is not just a combatant with symptoms, 
nor only a soldier of specifi c rank, role, and fi eld placement based on 
combat experience. The military patient is an embodied individual with a 
life and lived experience prior to the war as a person at a certain age with 
a specifi c personal material history, including job training, education, and 
social status, that may also include a propensity to illness, a history of 
nervousness, a complex set of familial relationships, and unresolved emo-
tional issues. Use of these embodied elements to classify soldiers with ill 
bodies does not translate into an embodied practice for diagnosis; rather, 
classifi cation as a deployment of power in the mangle of practice strips 
away the relational and generative ontology on which embodiment rests 
and reinserts a supernal designation of illness based on the normative and 
totalizing scientifi c concepts of similarity and sameness.
Military psychiatric practices through which weary warriors get en-
acted are both time-specifi c and place-specifi c. Classifi cation as a practice 
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is itself fraught with tensions, arising out of other types of knowledge-
making practices (for example, etiology debates), and power relations (for 
example, the military need for troops at the front). Once inscribed with 
a category, classifi ed as a broken soldier with shell shock, PTSD, or blast 
injury, the soldier emerges as a weary warrior who is le   to forge a path 
through the eff ects of being psychically wounded; some of those eff ects do 
not manifest until a  er leaving the military when the soldier begins hav-
ing fl ashbacks, seeks employment, or even applies for life insurance.
The lessons about hysteria and neurotics from the experiences of the 
Great War were partially eclipsed by fatigue and stress for soldiers a  er 
returning to civilian life. Wrapped up in the economic well-being, and the 
patriotic success of having thoroughly defeated fascism, Allied soldiers 
returned home a  er the Second World War to a diff erent society than the 
one they had le  . The Great Depression had eased in part because of the 
growth gained in the production of military goods in the primary and 
secondary economic sectors. A postwar housing boom made home own-
ership available to the average income worker. New roles opened up for 
men with the expansion of economic roles for women. Social mores and 
cultural norms were in a sea of change. Many returning veterans felt more 
kinship with their buddies from war than with their families of origin, 
making daily life tortuous for many.
Classifi cation as a technique of power normalizes weary warriors as 
part of military operations. Military psychiatrists over time have been 
integrated into the protocols of the military and therefore are part and 
parcel to the psychological management of soldiers—both as individual 
bodies and as a group. Normalization, of course, is not free of the tensions 
constitutive of the production of weary warriors through classifi cation. 
Although soldiers’ agency exists within these classifi catory processes as 
an expression of psychiatric and military power, there is li  le expression 
of individual agency in the moment when soldiers break. Soldiers ren-
dered helpless while ensconced in a tightly woven hierarchy are in a dif-
fi cult place: there is no way out except to accept assistance and follow 
protocol. Yet each particular instant where elements articulate with one 
another generates the potential for a diff erent or alternative confi guration 
to emerge. And what emerges is this wide variation of weary warriors, 
whose various dimensions we examine in the following chapters.
Notes
 1. Foucault provides many details throughout all his writings as to how disci-
plinary power works. His descriptions were nuanced at the micro level such 
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that when teasing out his illustrations, Gore was able to distinguish these 
eight diff erent techniques. The irony that Gore’s typology itself is a practice 
of classifi cation does not elude her or us. We are very much aware that our 
own analysis reproduces the same masculinized knowledge relations that we 
critique in this book. 
 2. For a fi ne overview of the ways in which Foucault’s work has been taken up 
in the area of surveillance, normalization, and regulation, see the collection 
of Foucault’s essays and contemporary works edited by Crampton and Eldon 
(2007). On regulation and governmentality, an important fi eld of study that 
draws on Foucault’s ideas about regulation, see Miller and Rose (2008) and 
Rose (2007). On diagnosis, see Skene (2002).
 3. These circumstances changed somewhat by the end of the twentieth century. 
With much higher incidences of delayed onset, as opposed to onset on the 
ba  lefi eld or in active service, there is more choice and agency among active 
duty or peacetime personnel as well as veterans to undergo diagnosis or to 
seek medical advice and treatment for broken bodies and psyches. 
 4. By the term “arcs of experience” we mean diff erentiated assemblages of acts 
shaped by choice and restrictions that meld together (in memory, in observa-
tion, or in movement) that capture a set of events. By the term “event” we 
mean that which subsists and inheres between things and propositions as 
an “incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things” 
(Deleuze 1990: 19) that is neither located in “ ‘deep’ bodies [or] ‘lo  y’ ideas” 
(132). 
 5. By the term “machinic” he means those liminal practices accomplished by 
machines that are neither human nor nonhuman (Pickering 1995: 7).
 6. A set of “standards of physical examination during those mobilizations for 
which selective service is planned” is included as Appendix B, Mobilization 
Regulations Pertaining to Mental and Nervous Diseases and Neurological 
Disorders, in a U.S. Army Medical Department publication (R.S. Anderson 
et al. 1966: 775–7). The United States War Department created a protocol for 
physicians examining recruits for induction into the armed forces to be used 
during mass mobilization during the early part of 1942. Three categories—un-
conditional acceptance, may be accepted, and unconditional rejection—pro-
vided guidelines for the physician to determine fi tness for the corps. The 
tolerance for nervous disorders was set along the lines of four descriptive 
categories constituting what the War Department considered to be “normal”: 
“normal nervous system; who appear to have normal understanding, whose 
speech can be understood, who have no defi nite signs of organic disease in the 
brain, spinal cord, or peripheral nerves, and who are otherwise mentally and 
physically fi t; hysterical paralysis or hysterical stigmata and local muscular 
spasms which do not cause mental or physical defects disqualifying for gen-
eral military service; muscular tremors of moderate degree” (775). Leeway in 
the may be accepted category diff ers only in intensity of the “normal” recruit, 
except for the addition of drug addiction, especially opium derivatives (775). 
Reasons for unconditional rejection included 17 conditions: “insanity, epi-
lepsy, idiocy, imbecility, chronic alcoholism, stu  ering or stammering to such 
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a degree that the registrant is unable to express himself clearly or to repeat 
commands or to demand the countersign, constitutional psychopathic state, 
chronic essential chorea, tabes (locomotor ataxis), cerebrospinal syphilis, mul-
tiple sclerosis, paraplegia or hemiplegia, syringomyelia, muscular atrophies 
and dystrophies which are obviously disqualifying, hysterical paralysis or 
hysterical stigmata so serious that these defects are disqualifying for military 
service, neuritis or neuralgia which is not temporary in character and which 
has progressed to such a degree as to prevent the registrant from following a 
useful vocation in civil life, and brain tumors” (775). 
 7. Meaning of “perform” and “performance” is either in a Goff man (1959) or a 
Butler (1990) sense. 
 8. A good example of the symbolic is the American recruitment poster designed 
by J.M. Flagg, distributed in 1917. The poster had a picture of a white-haired 
man, clad in a star-banded top hat, pointing his fi nger directly at the viewer. 
Underneath the picture was the slogan, “I Want You” on the fi rst line, “For 
U.S. Army” on the second line, and “Nearest Recruiting Station” on the third 
line. The viewer was imagined to be a young heterosexual man with a strong 
physical physique. The recruits, of course, were much more varied in their 
appearance, physicality, and sexuality.
 9. A paternalistic tone accompanied the imposition of a “new” (to the soldier) 
knowledge about broken bodies that had not until this time been popularized. 
Barker (1993) takes up the issue of agency in the fi ctional character of Billy in 
his Regeneration trilogy. See chapter 5 for more discussion about agency and 
the link to subjectivity. 
10. We address the uneven integration of veterans into civilian life in chapters 4, 
5, and 8. 
11. Charles Kuhl had been suff ering from malaria at the time of the incident. 
Later, when interviewed a  er the fi lm Pa  on was released, Kuhl said that the 
general was “pre  y well worn out … I think he was suff ering a li  le ba  le 
fatigue himself” (quoted in Axelrod 2009: 116).
12. In support of this general argument, Moss (2013b) traces specifi c accounts of 
how record-keeping and report-writing among military psychiatrists contrib-
uted to this shi   through practices of love. 
13. See the collection of essays on PTSD by Rosen (2004) for a discussion of a 
range of views on the nature of traumatic stress.
14. In chapter 5 we illustrate some of the conceptions of weary warriors in the 
context of the formation of subjectivity.
15. The designation on the toe tag of true shell shock would be “shell shock–W.”
16. Shell shock was (and still is to a certain extent) a common term used to de-
scribe a soldier’s psychological response to the vicissitudes of war. E. Jones, 
Fear, and Wessely (2007) argue that such terms persist even in light of no 
scientifi c or medical proof. The use of the word “shell” in the vernacular goes 
beyond the need for “proof,” and is part of a collective (cultural) understand-
ing of how to make sense of weary warriors. 
17. This debate is refl ected in the popular international television series, Downton 
Abbey (2011). William (Thomas Howes), one of the footmen serving as bat-
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man to Ma  hew Crawley (Dan Stevens) the heir of the estate, is wounded on 
the ba  lefi eld by a shell explosion while protecting Ma  hew (Downton Abbey 
2011, 2.5). Rather than William being wri  en with shell shock as a psychic 
breakdown, William is wri  en with shell shock as a physiological breakdown. 
Much like mTBI, shell shock–W maintains the eff ects of soldiering as honor-
able and nothing to be ashamed of. Focusing on the external source of the 
wound keeps eff eminate illness out and a normalized masculinity in place; 
William dies a hero rather than (ma)lingering as a neurotic. 




Regulation, Resistance, and Truth Games

In the ham fi sted grip of military authority, it seemed, psychiatric expertise 
could become a most eff ective divining rod for emotional authenticity.
—Josephine C. Bresnahan, “Dangers in Paradise”
[I]ndividuals … are in a position to both submit to and exercise this 
power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are 
always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals.
—Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended
History tells us there are ill soldiers both falsely and truly. The questions 
thus arise, Who decides the authenticity and reality of a warrior’s ail-
ments? Is it a military doctor, nurse, or psychiatrist? Is it a senior offi  cer, 
military court, or review tribunal? Is it the individual’s own body in con-
junction with one or more of these other actors? And what do military 
authorities do about false claims and deviant actions by individuals in the 
armed forces? We are interested in the issue of the truthfulness of illness 
or abnormality in combatants with regard to how power and knowledge 
generate weary warriors. In examining the management of the ill soldier, 
our focus is not so much on this management as a therapeutic phenom-
enon of medical care, but rather as a confi guration of various forms of 
authority and ways of knowing. “Whenever an individual could not fol-
low … the discipline of … the army,” Foucault remarked, “then the Psy-
function stepped in” (2006: 86). To be sure, multiple kinds of power and 
knowledge are institutionalized within the realms of psychiatry and the 
military as well as in the power relationships of institutional force and 
constraints, medical surveillance, rehabilitation, and capacity building. 
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Managing the ill soldier commonly occurs through the exercise of coercive 
power via military laws, policies on national security, and the sheer force 
of the state in the form of incarceration, punitive sanctions, and ultimately 
execution. Since the late nineteenth century the application of psychiatric 
ideas and practices to psychically stressed soldiers has led to formulations 
of the normal warrior and the warrior who is unwell. We look at particular 
circumstances and episodes in modern warfare in which psychiatry and 
the military not only complement or substitute for one another as rela-
tions of power and knowledge, as Foucault suggested, but also collide 
and struggle over how to manage the individual soldier. Not just a fact 
of modern warfare and contemporary societies, the psychologically ill 
soldier is also an eff ect of the relations of power and knowledge in and 
among military establishments, psychiatric practices, and cultural norms, 
especially norms that pertain to ideas of masculinity and morality.
We contend that managing combat illness comprises practices of “re-
gimes of truth” or “truth games” (Foucault 2003, 2008; Weir 2008) that 
are entangled with issues of courage and cowardice, duty and irrespon-
sibility, and morale and discipline. These practices and processes invest 
relations of power and knowledge into, onto, and through the bodies 
of individual solders. We understand these truth games conceptually in 
terms of resistance and regulation at both personal and collective levels of 
soldiers in the armed forces. The fi eld of managing the ill soldier includes 
self-infl icted wounds and desertion as well as conceptions of malinger-
ing, fatigue, cowardice, and LMF, among other eff ects of combat. These 
phenomena emerge at various times in confl icts as problems for mili-
tary campaigns—strategically and scientifi cally—and become objects of 
knowledge and domains of regulatory interventions.
Regulatory techniques for the management of ill soldiers target the 
bodies of soldiers in two ways: at the general body of military personnel 
(biopolitics) and at the individual body of the soldier or veteran (anato-
mopolitics). Regulatory methods for military personnel, some of which 
are discussed in other chapters, are concerned with screening and re-
cruitment, training and discipline, propaganda and censorship, and are 
all aimed at forging a collective identity, building a fi ghting spirit, and 
maintaining morale among the armed forces and civilians alike (Foucault 
2004; Matsumura 2004). Regulatory techniques directed at the body of 
individual soldiers and veterans who may be psychologically ill or unwell 
in other ways include containment, separation from other troops, medical 
surveillance, denial, rehabilitation, redeployment, and discharge (Bresna-
han 1999). In more extreme circumstances, techniques of regulation for 
ill soldiers include court-martial, incarceration, denouncement and stig-
matization, and military execution (Babington 1983; Brandon 1996; Corns 
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and Hughes-Wilson 2001; Godefry 1998; Iacobelli 2013; E. Jones 2006; Lilly 
1996; Oram 2004). Regulatory techniques o  en manage the general body 
of military personnel and individual soldiers at the same time. For ex-
ample, regulating individual soldiers who are ill avoids the spread of 
fear, panic, and aimlessness among troops more generally. By punish-
ing specifi c individuals, the military sets an example to all troops of the 
consequences of insubordinate behaviors (which o  en includes illness). 
As well, swi   redeployment of emotionally traumatized soldiers demon-
strates that a case of the nerves is no way out. As we know, management 
is management, not control. Thus, we also have an interest in mapping 
out specifi c types of resistance by soldiers in practice as a part of military 
power and in relation to psychiatric power.
In this chapter we explore how truth gets worked up in military psy-
chiatric practices and how this truth then is used in other parts of the 
military. We couple Foucault’s understanding of power and resistance 
with our own understanding of embodiment so that we can make sense of 
how weary warriors are enacted through what we consider to be a fl exible 
military. We detail two types of war trauma that straddle the boundedness 
of psychiatry and military as apparatuses. A critical look at both types 
of trauma—LMF and deviant soldiers—indicates how the apparatuses 
articulate with one another quite diff erently from how they plugged into 
one another in the case of diagnosis in military psychiatric practice.
Power and Resistance
We are interested in applying Foucault’s conception of resistance, which 
has received notable a  ention in social theory and political analysis (Feder 
2011; Heller 1996; Hequembourg and Arditi 1999; C. Mills 2000, 2003; 
Picke   1996; J. Reid 2006), but not in applying that conception to military 
organizations or to weary warriors. As we noted in chapter 1, the military 
is an institutional domain that Foucault did not examine in any great 
detail in his body of work, despite his fascination with the conception of 
war for analyzing power. Nor did he apply in a concrete manner the idea 
of resistance within the military, probably because he tended to portray 
the army as a tightly ordered disciplinary apparatus that produces docile 
bodies. The fi gure of the soldier that appears in Foucault’s work is of the 
productive machine. Nonetheless, we begin by recalling Foucault’s state-
ment, “Where there is power, there is resistance” (1990a: 95).1 He saw 
points of resistance to be present everywhere in networks of power rela-
tions, playing various roles as “adversary, target, support, or handle” in 
these relationships. Resistance was typically “a reaction or rebound” by 
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individuals or by groups against the exercise of dominating power. As an 
example of “the microphysics of power,” resistance entails the local tactics 
and specifi c practices by those on whom the power is directed and at the 
outreaches of overriding power structures. From the viewpoint of manag-
ing hierarchical interests, resistance threatens organizational integrity by 
“fracturing unities” that, Foucault postulated, would trigger “eff ective 
regroupings” by authorities to prevent the proliferation and the regular-
ization of resistive acts (96). 
Various theorists have usefully identifi ed further elements of a Fou-
cauldian notion of resistance. For Brent Picke   (1996:461), these elements 
are that resistance “is non-hierarchical, concerned with memory and the 
body, and the negation of power, while still potentially affi  rmative of 
something else.” While a Foucauldian approach does not include norma-
tive reasons for explaining or justifying resistance, it does include “the 
possibility of resistance leading to new forms of subjectivity” (464). Julian 
Reid (2006: xi) writes that “life itself, in its subjection to governance, can 
and does resist, subvert, escape and defy the imposition of modes of gov-
ernance which seek to remove it of those very capacities for resistance.” 
Amy Hequembourg and Jorge Arditi (1999: 665) off er the insight that “re-
sistance is not one thing [but] is a multiplicity of diff erent things depend-
ing on the strategy implemented.” Catherine Mills (2000: 265) notes how 
Foucault suggested that “resistance and the subject who resists are funda-
mentally implicated within the relations of power they oppose.” Draw-
ing on both Butler’s and Foucault’s work on resistance, Mills adds that 
resistance “also carries with it the danger of the subject’s own dissolution” 
(272) or death, pu  ing the subject at risk from the effi  cacy of an authority 
striking back at the resister. As Mills expresses it, “while power will sur-
vive this encounter, the subject who resists may not,” given the inequality 
in force relations (272). At times, though, the exercise of retaliation toward 
the resister may be reversible, at least in some partial fashion.
Building on this line of analysis, we suggest that resistance is impli-
cated with power in the domain of fi ghting operations and of managing 
illness among combatants. Accompanying the power of force relations 
within a military establishment is the resistance of some of its own sol-
diers at local and specifi c sites by means of multiple tactics. Where there is 
the exercise of power by an army in militaristic or psychiatric ways, there 
is the possibility of resistance by some of its troops. Such resistance takes 
a number of forms, including malingering or simulation, self-infl icted 
wounds, desertion, cowardice, fragging, or failure to carry out one’s duty.2 
Understandably, these sorts of resistance are construed as challenges to 
the hierarchical nature of power, especially in an authoritarian system like 
a military. Such acts of resistance are a calculation, an intentional choice 
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with the objective of disengagement from the military mission at hand, an 
escape from immediate dangers.
At the same time, acts of resistance provoke countermeasures by mili-
tary authorities, ranging from disciplinary power mechanisms such as 
warnings through an array of punishments to the defi nitive exercise of 
sovereign power as the right to take life by military execution. In a mili-
tary context, especially in times of armed confl ict, resistance as insubor-
dination is a core threat to discipline, order, victory, and survival. Acts of 
resistance are intrinsically dangerous, disreputable by military standards, 
and highly controversial acts. We present empirical material to illustrate 
that sanction by the state and military on resistant or deviant soldiers can 
and has been reversible in the short term and, in certain cases, several 
decades later.
The resistance of soldiers connects with subjectivity through processes 
of agency and (re)subjectifi cation. As Picke   (1996) explains, “there is al-
ways at least some resistance to the imposition of any particular form of 
subjectivity, and thus resistance is concomitant with the process of subjec-
tifi cation” (458). He adds, “The practice of resistance is directly linked to 
the practice of self-creation. Refusing what we are” (464). Hequembourg 
and Arditi (1999: 665) agree: “resistance indeed implies the existence of a 
subject, at least partially autonomous, who actively opposes the structure 
of domination.” Soldiers accused of desertion or LMF, or in self-infl icting 
wounds are examples of subjectifi cation by which soldiers are constituted 
as cowards rather than resisters. 
Acts of resistance by soldiers relate to Foucault’s concept of technolo-
gies of the self: soldiers deploying techniques in specifi c times and places 
to act on their own bodies to become subjects that materially are or nomi-
nally appear to be injured, ill, or shocked. So-called malingerers and sim-
ulators enact an individually contrived subjectivity, engaging in public 
performances that present them as overly docile, unpredictable, and non-
productive as military personnel. Soldiers who infl ict wounds on them-
selves are consciously reshaping their bodies, reconstructing themselves 
as subjects by producing a defect or pathology. Margaret A. McLaren 
(2002: 110) argues that resistance off ers an alternative confi guration of 
power/knowledge that does not always take hold in the ways that those 
resisting might want. At the very least, however, resistance reignites the 
pathways through which power is deployed. Rather than grand ruptures 
or mutinous rebellions among soldiers, within the military “one is dealing 
with more mobile points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society [in 
the military] that shi   about, fracturing unities and eff ecting regroupings, 
furrowing across individuals themselves, cu  ing them up and remolding 
them, marking off  irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds” 
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(Foucault 1990a: 96). Although not speaking about resistance among sol-
diers, Foucault describes the way that resistance works within appara-
tuses such as psychiatry and the military: “Just as the network of power 
relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses 
and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm 
of points of resistance traverses social stratifi cations and individual uni-
ties” (96).
Malingerers and Their Practices of Simulating Illness
As an issue in the military generally and especially during warfare, malin-
gering is an old and enduring concern. It has a clinical literature that dates 
back at least 175 years (Ballingall 1855; Gavin 1838), with particular a  en-
tion to the American Civil War (D. Anderson and Anderson 1984; Chipley 
1865; E. Dean 1991; Freemon 1993), around the time of the Great War 
(Hurst 1918; Rennie 1911; F. Weber 1918; Yealland 1918), the Second World 
War (Bresnahan 1999; Brussel and Hitch 1943; French 1996; N. Lewis and 
Engle 1954), the Viet Nam War (Lynn and Belza 1984; D. Smith and Frueh 
1996), and contemporary armed confl icts (Bélanger and Aiken 2012; Nies 
and Sweet 1994). This literature, not surprisingly, derives from the stand-
point of military offi  cers, psychiatrists, neurologists, psychologists, and 
medical doctors—in other words, those in positions of authority who are 
concerned about understanding, detecting, managing, and punishing acts 
of malingering in the armed forces.3
In lectures on psychiatric power and his other works on madness, Fou-
cault commented on the issue of malingering or simulation, but generally 
downplayed the power-eff ects of such conduct. When “someone who is 
not mad could pretend to be mad,” Foucault (2006) writes, this “simula-
tion does not really call psychiatric power into question [for the reason 
that it is not] an essential limit, boundary, or defect of psychiatric practice 
and psychiatric power, because, a  er all, this happens in other realms of 
knowledge, and in medicine in particular.” He continues, “We can always 
deceive a doctor by ge  ing him to believe that we have this or that illness 
or symptom—anyone who has done military service knows this—and medical 
practice is not thereby called into question” (Foucault 2006: 135; emphasis 
added). Foucault suggests that the deception of doctors is a fairly common 
and straightforward occurrence, even in military contexts. In our view, 
however, looking at the history of weary warriors shows that malingering 
or simulation has posed, and still does pose, signifi cant challenges to psy-
chiatry and the military as embodied apparatuses. In the domain of mili-
tary psychiatry and in medicine more generally, the question of whether 
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a neurotic or hysterical soldier is really suff ering from a war-related neu-
rosis (read: is pretending to be ill) has been a striking and persistent issue 
since the nineteenth century.
Discursively, a multiplicity of judgmental terms has emerged around 
this phenomenon of malingering and simulation. These include “faker, 
goldbrick, scrimshanker, racketeer, sick bay commando, shirker and 
slacker” (Carroll 2003: 732). Still other terms that the soldier faces as a 
result of malingering are “coward,” “deceiver,” “fraud,” “lead-swinger,” 
“liar,” “pseudo-PTSD,” “sham invalid,” and “symptom exaggerator.” 
These are harsh, derogatory terms with the intended eff ect of stigmatizing 
the actions and (publicly) shaming the individuals accused. Perhaps the 
only exception, the only positive context, relates to malingering by POWs: 
“Amongst prisoners of war simulation of disease for purposes of repara-
tion tends, of course, to be regarded as fair play and as rather creditable 
than discreditable, if it is successful” (F. Weber 1918: 8).
This complex of discourse indicates that real or suspected deception 
is a direct struggle against psychiatric practice, military medical staff , 
and military commanders. The presentation of false symptoms or ill-
ness remains contested within medicine, military establishments, and 
veteran bureaucracies in welfare states. Malingering is an object of re-
search and theorizing by historians, clinicians, and policy-makers and 
is part of power/knowledge confi gurations in relation to who possesses 
the truth about a soldier’s health status. “The combination of simulated 
with genuine signs or symptoms is o  en especially diffi  cult to detect” (F. 
Weber 1918: 168). Whether real or imagined, detected or undiscovered, 
malingering in the military illustrates the prospect of resistance in power 
relationships as the eff orts, at least by some individuals, at various points 
in time in specifi c spaces (ba  lefi eld, trauma unit, convalescent hospital) 
to resist authority, to avoid the grip of military surveillance, to evade the 
duty of active service or redeployment to the lines, and to resist practices 
and knowledge associated with medicine. Malingering as a form of resis-
tance brings with it other stigmatizing forces by disparaging malingerers 
as eff eminate, challenging the masculine ideal of the fi ghting soldier.4 In 
the U.S. armed services during the Second World War, one way “to deal 
with fear of combat involved defi ning military manhood in relation to 
certain defi nitions of womanhood,” thus characterizing them “as a bunch 
of whiny women” (Bresnahan 1999: 42).
Over the past few centuries, psychiatry and other branches of medicine 
have had a good deal to say about malingering in the military (and in 
other domains of life) in classifying types of malingering, identifying the 
causes and motives, and devising and administering methods for detect-
ing feigned illnesses by soldiers. Much has been wri  en on how to detect 
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simulated symptoms, how to avoid warning the patient that any suspi-
cions were held of his claims, and how to elicit honest responses to tests 
and examinations. Typologies of malingering over time became more de-
tailed and tactics for unmasking malingerers changed with developments 
in medical technologies, forensic science, computerized record keeping, 
and cultural a  itudes. During the American Civil War, doctors in both the 
Northern and Southern military forces diagnosed ailing soldiers as either 
suff ering from a physical illness, such as irritable heart, or simulating 
symptoms to avoid military duty (Freemon 1993). In the early decades of 
the twentieth century, various classifi cations with more elaborate types of 
malingering were developed by physicians who referred to malingering as 
“mythomania” and the simulation of disease as “pathomimia.” Forms of 
malingering sorted by health specialists came to include feigned insanity 
or mental disease and “false claims of depression and suicidal behavior … 
or other legitimate psychiatric disorders” (Carroll 2003: 735); assumed fi ts, 
including epilepsy; pretended or grossly exaggerated defects of back pain, 
hearing, vision, or speech; voluntary starvation; spurious pyrexia, en-
uresis, hemoptysis, sleepwalking disorder, or artifi cial hernia; simulated 
cases of chronic venereal disease; and pseudo-PTSD or factitious PTSD.
An early classifi cation informed by initial work on psychoanalysis dis-
tinguished between neuromimesis (the unconscious mimicry of disease) 
and hysterical malingering (the awareness and more or less voluntary 
imitation of disease, or conscious shamming) (F. Weber 1911). Other spe-
cialists similarly distinguished between involuntary malingering (“the ex-
aggeration of symptoms and prolongation of incapacities”) and pure, true, 
or voluntary malingering (purposeful simulation and deception) that, in 
the experience of one neurologist during the Great War, was “very rare 
in the British and French armies” (Hurst 1918: 28). In 1915 the Neurologi-
cal Society of Paris debated the issue of the simulation or exaggeration of 
symptoms in nervously wounded soldiers. The classifi cation of malinger-
ing adopted set out the following categories (Roussy and Lhermi  e 1917): 
assumed malingering—produced by such actions as taking picric acid to 
produce jaundice, or tobacco to produce conjunctivitis; invented malin-
gering—creating or copying a disorder so as “to excite a  ention, com-
miseration and pity,” “the form most commonly observed in the army”; 
exaggerated malingering—“an amplifi cation of the symptoms caused by 
some real objective lesion, either neuropathic or organic”; and “prolonged 
malingering—the willful persistence in a pathological a  itude or a symp-
tom associated with some defi nite lesion, a  er the la  er is healed or obvi-
ously improved” (xxxi–xxxii).5 
Underlying these categories of malingering, a range of causes were 
acknowledged. Refl ecting on the American Civil War, an army surgeon 
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suggested that the motives behind soldiers feigning insanity were self-
preservation; to gain charity, public relief, and shelter; and “to excite pub-
lic interest and curiosity and to obtain notoriety” (Chipley 1865: 6). A 
physician in the Royal Army Medical Corps in the early years of the twen-
tieth century described the etiology of simulation in terms of wishing to 
secure exemption from military service altogether, feeling nostalgia and 
homesickness, avoiding exposure to new dangers at the front, evading 
an unpleasant duty, circumventing the consequences of misconduct, and 
hoping for a pension or other fi nancial compensation for supposed inju-
ries (Pollock 1910). Other explanations on how and why the exaggeration 
of symptoms may occur centered on clinical se  ings and practices: the 
patient’s need for sympathy induced by emotional disturbances, the ef-
fect of repeated examinations by medical staff  in intensifying the patient’s 
subjective sensations, and the eff ect of suggestions by family members 
or colleagues in intensifying or prolonging the symptoms (Rennie 1911). 
This range of motives and factors is comparable to those identifi ed by 
clinicians in the early years of the twenty-fi rst century to understand ma-
lingering in today’s militaries (Carroll 2003; Geraerts et al. 2009).
From the perspective of authority positions in psychiatry and the mili-
tary, possibilities of clinical deception and malingering have produced 
several techniques for exposing contrived physical or psychiatric symp-
toms and determining the true status of the soldier. We have identifi ed fi ve 
technologies of truth.
1.  Tribulation. This is a set of mechanisms that are tests or ordeals. As criti-
cal examinations more than clinical evaluations, these trials of hardship 
are conducted under o  en dramatic and severe circumstances designed 
to fi nd out the presence or absence of a condition. In the American Civil 
War, methods used by army surgeons and offi  cers on suspected ma-
lingerers included threats, fl oggings, water-therapies, whirling-chairs, 
and chloroform (D. Anderson and Anderson 1984; Chipley 1865). Car-
roll (2003: 734), a forensic psychiatrist, observes, “tactics to unmask 
malingering were used that would not be allowed today. For example, 
a man who was suspected of faking blindness was taken to the edge 
of the river and told to walk forward. He promptly fell into the river. 
Another man who claimed he could not straighten his back was placed 
in a large cask of water. The cask was fi lled, and he was given a choice 
of either straightening his back or drowning. He subsequently was able 
to stand up straight. Firing a pistol near the ear was a method used to 
expose feigned deafness.”
2.  Clinical Evaluation. Through the use of initial assessment and succes-
sively extensive examinations, CT and MRI scans, medical workups, 
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and therapeutic interviews, the medical gaze and psychoanalytical ear 
are at play. Practitioners generally believe that most simulated symp-
toms and feigned activities will be recognized at this stage of malin-
gering management, although they acknowledge that probably not 
all inventive simulators will be detected nor all simulated symptoms 
unambiguously distinguished from actual conditions.
3.  Continual Observation (Surveillance). Carefully watching the soldier 
or veteran on a regular and at times unobtrusive basis over a prolonged 
period—at a field hospital, rehabilitation facility, outpatient clinic, or 
alcohol and detoxification unit, among other sites—offers opportuni-
ties to establish the veracity of the diagnosis and symptoms, or to de-
termine that the presentation of clinical signs is missing, inconsistently 
manifested, or wildly exaggerated (Roussy and Lhermitte 1917; Yeal-
land 1918). “Occasionally an unskilled malingerer may be detected 
flagrante delicto. … The appropriate treatment for a paraplegic man, 
who is discovered walking in the ward when he thinks he is alone 
and unseen, is to send him to the military authorities for punishment” 
(Hurst 1918: 28).
4.  Verification of Records. A standard technique for determining the va-
lidity of claims is through collecting and confirming information about 
the soldier. This includes such methods as contacting relatives and 
reviewing family history, obtaining any previous medical records, and 
ascertaining military details that, in the United States for example, can 
be obtained through national service records and the national POW 
register. This gathered body of evidence may then be compared against 
patient-supplied information to confirm or challenge the truth claims 
of the ill soldier.
5.  Confession by Person or Body. A confession, in this context, is not about 
a soldier admitting to a disorder but rather about a soldier owning up 
to shamming ill health. Confessing is a multifaceted phenomenon, a 
process with various dimensions: whether the confession is voluntary 
or forced (as under tribulations), conducted in the presence of medical 
or military personnel, judged as credible or fanciful, deemed to be pun-
ishable or not, and communicated by bodily signs and/or spoken words. 
In the military, confessions do not seem to be a major technique for pro-
ducing truth about maladies or malingerers. Writings by psychiatrists, 
neurologists, and other types of physicians suggest that confessions 
of simulating disorders are an uncommon occurrence and not always 
straightforward, depending in part on whether the traumatic experi-
ence is a recent or distant event. An admission of guilt of malingering is 
not necessarily a true statement: “a confession is by itself no sure indica-
tion of simulation [of insanity]. A genuine psychotic may try to achieve 
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early release from certification by asserting that he has simulated” (At-
kin 1951: 385). “Very rarely a malingerer confesses that he is shamming 
[convulsions or hysteria], but a confession should only be accepted if it 
is not forced from a man and it fits with the facts. … Such cases should 
be sent back to duty at once, but without punishment” (Hurst 1918: 28). 
 As well as by an admission through speech, a confession of ma-
lingering can come from the body itself through the presentation of 
dubious movements or other corporeal signs. As an American military 
publication for the Second World War warned troops, “the malingerer 
posing before a psychiatrist as a nervous-breakdown case will almost 
invariably meet with an unpleasant surprise. It is difficult to escape 
detection for the simple reason that a man cannot fake the dilation of 
the pupils in his eyes. This dilation, which can’t be faked, accompanies 
the symptom of extreme jumpiness, which sometimes can” (Bresnahan 
1999: 203). Here the body speaks the truth, disclosing to medical and 
psychiatric experts the true state of a soldier’s health. Malingering, 
therefore, involves a double betrayal: the first, the act to conceal one’s 
actual conditions; the second, discursive and bodily actions that reveal 
that actuality.
Malingering as a practice by some soldiers makes what does not ex-
ist to be something that does seem real. Such practices function within a 
truth game or regime of truth that Foucault (2008: 18) describes as “the 
articulation of a particular type of discourse and a set of practices … that 
… legislate on these practices in terms of true and false.” Certainly in the 
military and in a combat context, a regime of truth is not a neutral space 
nor is it simply consensual, especially when both self-reporting and medi-
cal diagnoses of symptoms are involved. Indeed, “truth is a thing of this 
world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And 
it induces regular effects of power” (Foucault 1980c: 131), through, for ex-
ample, technologies of self. Different participants may all express versions 
of a psychiatric discourse of (materialized) symptoms and treatments and 
of a military discourse of (materialized) service, combat, and fatigue. Yet 
through these discourses there operates particular perspectives of this or 
that soldier in this or that situation.
Initial truth claims of a soldier or veteran generate a sequence of re-
sponses and actions by medical and military personnel. Claims of identities 
and one’s psychiatric conditions—expressed psychical and physiological 
conditions—become subject to a determination of what is true and what is 
false. Consider this dramatic report of several cases of factitious PTSD at a 
Veterans Health Administration medical center:
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A growing number of young men have reported an array of symptoms 
that suggest a diagnosis of pos  raumatic stress disorder. Five such men, 
all claiming to be Viet Nam veterans, were treated at a VA medical center; 
three said they were former prisoners of war. In fact, none had been prison-
ers of war, four had never been in Viet Nam, and two had never been in the 
military. Instead, all fi ve suff ered factitious disorders. (Sparr and Pankratz 
1983: 1016)
The health specialists who authored this report conclude,
Guilt or indiff erence about our treatment of Viet Nam veterans should not 
prevent clinical objectivity and reasonable confrontation of a patient’s fabri-
cated histories and factitious symptoms. It is not necessary to be suspicious 
of everyone, but a brief military history should be taken on all veterans to 
look for service-related stressors. (Sparr and Pankratz 1983: 1019)
Signs of a problem of truth include exaggerated complaints disproportion-
ate to the material results, contradictions in the documentary record of the 
soldier, numerous discrepancies in their life story and family history, and 
the apprehension by health specialists of ulterior motives by patients, 
such as seeking to gain fi nancial benefi ts or free services (Carroll 2003; 
Sparr and Pankratz 1983). Military and medical authorities deploy various 
techniques (discussed above) to investigate and judge the claims, to assess 
the problematic signs, and then to establish a dominant discourse of truth 
using powers of sovereignty and psychiatry.
Constructing Cowardice: Lack of Moral Fiber
As a diagnosis and a discourse, LMF is situated within its own history, 
truth claims, and relations of power/knowledge. During the Second World 
War, refusal to fl y in combat or training missions, when constructed as 
something other than for psychological reasons of a neurosis, emotional 
stress, or physical fatigue, was designated by the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
and the Royal Canadian Air Force as a fl aw in the individual’s integrity, 
an illness of his soul.6 This policy constructed categories of soldiers as 
the psychologically normal and the morally fi t aircrew in contrast to the 
psychologically abnormal and the morally defi cient. Aircrew members 
offi  cially labeled LMF or a waverer were deemed to have lost confi dence 
in their own abilities; their commanding offi  cers and probably their fel-
low crew members also lost confi dence in them. The history of LMF is an 
example of a multiple and layered knowledge on managing soldiers’ ill 
bodies. Offi  cial information is almost absent, with li  le mention in his-
tories of the RAF medical services and with records and fi les destroyed 
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or missing. Similarly, memoirs of air commanders or histories of bomber 
commands tend to take an uncritical view of LMF (E. Jones 2006). The 
actual experiences of aircrew are largely forgo  en and only occasionally 
reported (Trainer 1994), although a modest academic literature has ap-
peared decades a  er the war, wri  en mainly by historians (Brandon 1996; 
English 1995, 1996; E. Jones; McCarthy 1984).
LMF policy processes and techniques involved administrative action 
by the RAF, a particular normalization of fl ying and combat stress, and 
the segregation and investigation of aircrew designated as LMF. As an 
operational policy, LMF was formally adopted by the RAF in April 1940, 
offi  cially altered somewhat in July 1943, and offi  cially ended in late 1945, 
although E. Jones (2006) off ers documentary evidence that indicates the 
policy was practiced in the RAF into the late 1950s. The concept of LMF 
was not a psychiatric diagnosis but military judgment acting like a psychiat-
ric diagnosis. LMF was an administrative term deployed within the senior 
ranks of the RAF command (Brandon 1996; E. Jones). “In the prewar pe-
riod [of the 1930s] planners made li  le provision for psychiatric casualties 
among aircrews, mistakenly assuming that a highly selected, volunteer 
service would be virtually immune from psychological breakdown” (E. 
Jones 2006: 449). A core assumption underpinning the LMF policy was 
that men volunteering to be aircrew would not withdraw their consent 
to fl y and go into combat missions (Brandon 1996: 124). Another offi  cially 
held belief was that LMF, however it might be understood, was conta-
gious and could rapidly spread throughout a crew, squadron, or entire 
base if not addressed by means of the removal and segregation of those 
aircrew designated as LMF or not yet diagnosed (Balfour 1973; Brandon 
1996).7 The LMF policy rested on the sovereign rights of the British state 
and the RAF as a branch of the armed forces, the la  er of which defi ned 
the norms of LMF as the lack of self-control, personal fortitude, and cour-
age. The RAF was the moral authority, developing an explicit policy and 
implicit cultural code within it, which expected aircrew to perform their 
duties steadfastly and without faltering. Those members of aircrew with 
LMF were seen as posing a clear threat to the morale and fi ghting capacity 
of comrades, endangering others and the general operations. Such norms 
intended to discipline the individual member as well as to regularize the 
aircrew and squadron alike.
Power-eff ects of the LMF policy encompassed the assertion and exercise 
of military authority, a control over and containment of what could be con-
sidered psychiatric in nature, and the disgrace and degradation of aircrew 
unwilling or unable to continue fl ying operations. The RAF’s LMF policy 
was an executive action by senior commanders involving scrutiny by offi  -
cers for its enforcement and the imposition of severe penalties as disciplin-
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ary measures, such as the demotion of offi  cers and others to lowest ranks, 
expulsion from the air force, and assignment to other military duties or 
civilian work. The very design and implementation of the LMF policy was 
meant to limit the role of psychiatrists and of physician medical offi  cers 
as well as the application of psychiatric and psychoanalytic techniques in 
deciding why a crew member was unwilling to fl y again. According to 
Brandon (1996: 127), “it is estimated that over 30 percent of all LMF cases 
were disposed of purely by executive action, without involving any spe-
cialist medical referral.” Statements at the time by medical staff  involved 
in treating cases of anxiety neuroses and lack of confi dence among RAF 
aircrews indicate that “physicians were called upon to modify their diag-
noses and treatment to conform to military requirements” (English 1995: 
26). Confl icting opinions between military staff  and medical staff  over the 
validity of the LMF designation indicate interplay between regulation 
and resistance in managing fl ying combat stress and fatigue. In 1944 and 
1945 there was some easing in the punishments imposed under the LMF 
policy—a de-disciplinarization or relaxation of military authority—and 
somewhat more recognition of the stress and strains from repeated fl ying 
in dangerous operations—a medicalization and psychiatrization of sorts 
(E. Jones 2006: 450, 456).
Stigmatization was most certainly an intended eff ect of the LMF policy. 
The label of LMF was a mark of personal shame and a technique of con-
trol used by the British air force to manage pilots. The aims were “to deter 
aircrew from reporting sick without due cause or simply refusing to fl y”; 
to minimize the withdrawal rate from bomber missions; to contain fear, 
reinforce discipline, and maintain morale “among fl ying personnel.” The 
belief of RAF commanders was that “a measure of stigma is needed to pre-
vent both conscious and unconscious resort to psychological disorders as 
an exit from situations of personal danger” (E. Jones 2006: 455–56). What 
made LMF so stigmatizing was a combination of the administrative diag-
nosis, discourse, and degradations inscribed onto the aircrew. Breakdown 
by an aircrew member labeled as LMF was by defi nition due to nonmedi-
cal factors. The fault then lay with the individual, not the combat or the 
number of missions or the cumulative strain and shock of experiencing 
the loss of comrades. The individual was characterized as lacking confi -
dence and fortitude; he was weak, ji  ery, and of bad stock.
Based on Freudian psychoanalytic ideas, RAF psychiatric doctrine ex-
plained that the breakdown of an aviator was due to character defects and 
an individual’s predisposition to collapse or failure (English 1995). Under 
the LMF policy, the diff erence between aircrew who were medically ill 
and those who were not had severe consequences. Penalties for being 
LMF were harsh, producing a discredited subject: the immediate removal 
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of fl ying badges while under investigation, reduction in rank and loss of 
privileges, discharge from the air force with no fi nancial compensation, 
and reassignment to the army, to work in mines or other civilian labor. 
The U.S. Army Air Force, when based in Britain in the Second World War, 
pursued a less stigmatizing approach to dealing with aerial combat stress, 
employing the concept of operational fatigue rather than LMF or a type 
of neurosis; in contrast to RAF practice, American commanders did not 
remove the fl ying badges of personnel unable or seemingly unwilling to 
fl y in combat (Brandon 1996: 128: E. Jones 2006: 440).
Reassessing Deviant Soldiers
At the end of the Second World War, British Army Headquarters pro-
duced a “Report on ‘Soldiers under Sentences’ for Such Off ences as De-
sertion, Cowardice, Mutiny, etc., Whose Case Have Been Reviewed in 
British Second Army” (Moll 1945). A fascinating account of the interplay 
of psychiatric and military practices during wartime conditions, the re-
port concerns 596 soldiers who were serving sentences of three years for 
penal servitude for military-related off enses commi  ed in June, July, and 
August of 1944, following the invasion of Normandy. Most had therefore 
seen a number of months of active service before they were charged and 
most had given themselves up. In an eight-week period from November 
1944 to January 1945, these men were interviewed by a reviewing board 
(the British Second Army Reviewing of Sentences Board) made up of the 
deputy adjutant, quartermaster general, and assistant adjutant general of 
the Second Army along with one psychiatrist. The Board had the author-
ity to suspend sentences on these soldiers whom it considered “worthy 
and would acquit themselves well. Each was warned of the serious conse-
quences should he again commit a similar off ence” (2).
The role of the psychiatrist and psychiatric knowledge emerged from 
evidence in court records and interviews by the Board with the convicted 
soldiers. “Those men, who at the interview were not impressive or showed 
signs of nervous instability, mental dullness or complained about their 
nerves etc., were subjected to a detailed psychiatric examination before 
a fi nal decision was made with regard to future disposal. Similarly, if the 
Court Proceedings contained any reference to such disabilities, then a 
psychiatric examination was carried out” (Moll 1945: 2). Of the 596 cases 
reviewed, 204, or about one-third, were referred for psychiatric assess-
ments. Of these 204 cases, most were transferred to auxiliary employment 
within the military; about one-quarter returned to full duty, a dozen were 
admi  ed to psychiatric hospitals for treatment, two were deemed to be 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Managing Illness through Power 107

conscientious objectors and transferred to the army medical corps, and 
one was discharged from the service.
On the consequence of imprisonment, the Board observed both pu-
nitive and corrective eff ects: “The three months in prison had acted on 
many, not only as a deterrent to further crime, but as a ‘rest-cure’ or ‘re-
habilitation’ ” (Moll 1945: 4). Moreover the three months in prison “had 
given them ample time and opportunity to refl ect hard and fully realize 
what a terrible mistake they had made” (4). As a general comment about 
the prisoners, the Board reported, “The great majority of prisoners were 
good personality types, only too anxious to be given the opportunity to re-
deem their characters. They were completely and u  erly ashamed of their 
failure” (5). Thirteen soldiers from the cases before the Board were kept in 
prison because they are an “incorrigible type of man” (7). 
The real “bad eggs” or incorrigible types were weeded out, segregated and 
further punishment administered. For this group, fortunately extremely 
small number, Board members felt that harsh and rigorous treatment was 
the only alternative. Even some of these, a  er a further period of imprison-
ment, appeared to have had their warped outlook modifi ed and eventually 
became reasonable soldiers. For the remainder we had no alternative but 
to retain them in prison, but who knows, they were probably just made of 
poor clay which could not be moulded, no ma  er how hard one tried! (Moll 
1945: 14)8 
The Board concluded that the majority of deserters in these cases were 
not true cowards. Most off enses were not believed to be premeditated but 
rather happened at the spur of the moment when the soldier was under 
great stress. Immaturity and peer pressure were other identifying factors: 
“Very o  en it was a case of a younger soldier led astray by an older man 
of low morale” (Moll 1945: 10). Some prisoners explained their behavior 
in terms of lack of training a  er being transferred to infantry from another 
arm of the service. The Board noted, “although one was careful not to 
show it, one felt that perhaps there had been too li  le preparation for a 
change to an active combat role” (11). Furthermore, the Board observed 
that certain types of these prisoners were war-weary individuals: “At this 
stage of the war there are many combatant soldiers, of good previous 
personality and a  itude with good records, whose length of action in dif-
ferent theatres is considerable and who have reached the end of their re-
sources to deal with ba  le stress” (12). The Board therefore accepted that 
many of these individuals had a “reduced capacity to adjust to further 
ba  le stress. Such cases needed, not further punishment, but considerate 
treatment for their past service” (12). With the aid of psychiatric assess-
ments in some cases and the imperative to fi nd additional troops for the 
frontline, the military went some way to normalizing these acts of devi-
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ance by soldiers through identifying mitigating factors, admi  ing to some 
gaps in offi  cial practices, and recognizing the role of external infl uences on 
the soldiers sentenced. That most soldiers had done some active service, 
served some prison time and were now ashamed were also signifi cant 
considerations by the Board in concluding that most of these off enders 
were good personality types. “Courage and cowardice are held to be psy-
chological imponderables whose measurement and promotion still await 
fi nal decision. The dividing line between real fear of external dangers and 
neurotic anxiety is extremely fi ne” (10).
From the cases reviewed, 435 soldiers were returned to full duty, many 
of them back to the frontline. Of these 435 soldiers, 37 received psychiatric 
assessments. What happened to these deviant soldiers—including soldiers 
with psychological wounds—who were off ered a second chance to be 
warriors? Approximately 70 percent or 306 of those returned to duty were 
a success: 287 were reported as giving a satisfactory or greater service as 
a soldier, 17 were wounded in action and 2 were killed in action. Another 
94, or 22 percent, were deemed to be a failure in that they were reported as 
unsatisfactory soldiers or convicted again, refused to go forward, went ab-
sent without leave, or wounded themselves as a way to get out of combat 
(self-infl icted wounding). A small group was examined by a psychiatrist 
and either downgraded, transferred, or admi  ed to a hospital. In explain-
ing the 70 percent success rate of the redeployed soldiers, the Board wrote, 
“These were good personality types who for various reasons had failed 
once, realized their shortcomings, were given the chance to prove their 
worth and not again let the side down. The obvious neurotics, psycho-
paths, misfi ts, dullards etc., were spo  ed and directed into employment 
within the limits of their capabilities. The percentage of ‘real bad eggs’ has 
been small. This has been a tonic and serves to emphasize what has al-
ways been the case—the British soldier is by nature neither a coward nor a 
malingerer” (Moll 1945: 5). Between January and May 1945, when the war 
in Europe ended, the British Second Army Reviewing of Sentences Board 
returned an additional 372 soldiers to full duty at the frontline.
The Board’s report to the Army underscored the importance of psy-
chiatric knowledge and comparable forms of expertise in such proceed-
ings, recommending that “there should be available to the board data 
of a scientifi c nature in the form of intelligence and aptitude tests, per-
sonality pointers etc. Thus, when a board was convened, it would have 
available, not only reports from the Prison Commandant, Prison Visitor 
[an experienced soldier who would talk to each prisoner], Padre, Welfare 
authorities and Educational Branch, but also a comprehensive technical 
assessment of each soldier” (Moll 1945: 3). Underlying this claim was the 
belief that “with this additional information, more accurate disposal rec-
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ommendations will be possible” (14). Psychiatric knowledge could then 
assist military authority in determining which soldiers ought to have an 
opportunity to redeem themselves through redeployment to the ba  le 
lines, which soldiers needed care, and which ones were just plain bad.
On Whose Authority?
In modern times of warfare, the detection and naming of illness, coward-
ice, desertion, fear, malingering, LMF, and self-infl icted wounds are all 
implicated in relations of psychiatric and military power. The bodies of 
weary warriors are places of regulative acts and resistive actions. At some 
time or another, soldiers may grumble about their mission, question the 
judgment of their commanders, or complain about their situation. Such 
expressions of discontent regularly take place in private or safe quar-
ters, outside the view of offi  cers. Some soldiers, however, openly resist in 
the immediate or imminent presence of military commanders, including 
military psychiatrists. Simulating serious symptoms of fatigue, emotional 
trauma, or war neuroses or infl icting wounds on one’s own body are force-
ful and public acts of resistance (J.C. Sco   1990). These acts of resistance 
operate at the confl uence of psychiatric and military power and practices 
of knowledge. Such acts indicate a nuanced and complex set of power 
or force relations in the authoritarian structure of the military hierarchy, 
pointing to a microphysics of power where assertions are not unidirec-
tional, and an exercise of power challenges military authority.
Even in military systems, individual members, as subject positions, “are 
not the exclusive ‘property’ of the dominant ensemble of power relations” 
(Heller 1996: 99), whether those power relations are the formal chains of 
command or the health sciences of the body and mind. Regulation and re-
sistance both involve a capacity to create and recreate personal and social 
realities within relations of power of life and death. The review of incar-
cerated soldiers from the British Second Army under sentences for such 
off enses as desertion and cowardice near the end of the Second World War 
in Europe, illustrates that “the mechanisms of power that a group uses to 
control other groups are always potentially reversible” (Heller 1996: 101; 
emphasis in original). In this instance, senior levels of authority a  empted 
to control a group of deviant soldiers for larger strategic reasons—that 
is, the need for troops at the frontline. Deviant soldiers, commi  ing of-
fenses against sovereign authority, were found guilty of serious breaches 
of military law. Yet when needed for other purposes, they were reassessed 
as objects of psychiatric and military objects of knowledge and given a 
second chance at redemption through continued service. This was a case 
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of military tribunals making and then unmaking soldiers as criminal sub-
jects. It also was a case of “a truth that can be deployed … from its combat 
position, from the perspective of the sought-for victory” (Foucault 2003: 
52).
Forms of resistance examined here reveal a connection between resis-
tance to power and soldiers’ relationships to their own selves, their own 
bodies, and their own souls. Malingering, simulation, and self-infl icted 
wounding, as acts of resistance by soldiers, represent tactics for redefi ning 
the boundedness of one’s own subjectivity, from being subject to the risks 
of combat and the dangers of the frontline, to becoming a subject who 
presents as sick or injured and thus unable to be a warrior. If found out by 
military authorities, the malingerer—in all-out eff orts to appear abnormal 
or unfi t for regular duties—forfeits the positioning of the traumatized 
individual, grounded in psychiatric knowledge, for another, the exposed 
and disgraced faker, grounded in military norms and general morality. 
Such acts of resistance are taken by soldiers who face only a fi eld of impos-
sibilities, of intolerable conditions, of unthinkable horrors. Their actions 
are local tactics, calculated ruses a  empting to alter relations of military 
force and to assert, in some measure, the primacy of their relationship to 
their own self, their own reputation, or their own family. From the per-
spective of military authorities (and the nation-state offi  cials authorizing 
the military), these acts of resistance are not practices of freedom, but 
rather are grave threats to their comrades, to the wider military mission, 
and to a nation-state’s basic interests. If anything, such resistance by sol-
diers is framed as ultimately a threat to the freedoms of civilian popula-
tions and thus is met by an array of responses of control by the military 
and sanctioned by the nation-state.
The primary purposes of managing and regulating responses by the 
military include minimizing panic or fear among troops, punishing resis-
tance and thus deterring further acts of insubordination, and maintaining 
morale among the troops. The preparatory mechanisms through which 
the military accomplishes its purposes are the enhancement of the combat 
and operational readiness of soldiers, both individually and collectively, 
and the maintenance of a military ethos as a set of regularized and ex-
pected norms for the manner of conduct. Inventions by the military, and 
in some cases the nation-state, relate to the production of specifi c subject 
positions or types of identities, such as how a number of aircrew in Brit-
ish bomber command in the Second World War were labeled as LMF 
individuals. With the LMF policy, an argument can be made that the RAF 
produced cowardice as a byproduct of offi  cial assumptions, administra-
tive defi nitions, and limitations on psychiatric practices.
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The relation between truth claims and varied modes of resistance and 
power exercised by and through soldiers pulls together our understand-
ing of the ways in which psychiatric and military power relations feed 
into one another. From the viewpoint of psychiatry and military psychia-
trists, malingering and the question of truth among fatigued soldiers is 
established through tests of tribulation, clinical examinations, repeated 
observations, verifi cation of personal and offi  cial records, and, at times, 
confessions by soldiers or their bodies. With respect to malingering, there 
is a simulation of gestures, movements, and behaviors all with the aim 
of producing an image of the recruit or soldier as someone who is suff er-
ing deep emotional distress. Through the power of false discourses and 
contrived material practices, the individual is manufacturing a factitious 
persona and subjectivity. With respect to self-infl icted wounds, the soldier 
is actually producing bodily impairments as an altered corporeal reality 
in hopes of giving up the frontline job as a combat troop. As an obvious 
example of an embodied truth, self-infl icting a wound is constructed as 
an abnormal and questionably ethical act that has a falsity behind the 
reality. The LMF policy disclosed aviators who refused to fl y, whereas our 
analysis discloses a discourse of truth based partly on a specifi c hierar-
chy of social class and set of historical beliefs about masculinity. It must 
be remembered that LMF was created by senior offi  cers and backed by 
both sovereign and disciplinary forms of power. The power-eff ects gener-
ated by this truth regime involve stigma, condemnation, and the disgrace 
of psychologically wounded fl ight crew members. Truth, resistance, and 
subjectivity are all bound up with complicated and contextualized rela-
tions of power.
Notes
 1. Some of the terms related to resistance that Foucault used in his writings are 
“contestation,” “perpetual agitation,” “transgression,” “struggle,” “rebellion,” 
“insurrection,” “ruse,” “opposition,” and “interruption” (Hequembourg and 
Arditi 1999; Picke   1996; J. J. Reid 2006). 
 2. The word “fragging” comes from a fragment of a grenade, and means killing 
a commanding offi  cer by someone in the unit. Although popularized during 
the Viet Nam War, fragging was present throughout the twentieth century as 
a type of resistance among soldiers.
 3. There is a deep-rooted literature on malingering, dating from about the 1870s, 
that deals with the simulation of disease or illnesses, both physical and men-
tal, in relation to accident and life insurance and railway and tramway ac-
cidents; and to the establishment of state-sanctioned workers’ compensation 
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systems, initially in Germany, and then spreading to other industrial countries 
in the late nineteenth through the twentieth century. For an entry point into 
this literature, see Caplan (1998), and Herbert and Sageman (2004).
 4. The feminine is not only a  ributed to the soldier, but also to the type of care 
off ered to the soldier. An article, “War Psychiatry,” published in the British 
Medical Journal (June 16, 1916), identifi es femininity—the women’s touch in 
the care of wounded soldiers—as a contributing factor to malingering. Thus, 
“Simulators had a wholesome dread of the army doctor, but in these centers 
his visits were made at too long intervals. Infi rmaries and lady volunteers 
were also responsible for much exaggeration by the wounded. Their very 
devotion tended to encourage morbid sentimentality in the men” (25).
 5. Picric acid is a yellow-tinged explosive. 
 6. We are using the word “soul” in a way that is similar to Foucault (2001) and 
Rose (1999). That is, the soul is that which is ontologically distinct from the 
mind and the body. Although we have not developed the idea in any depth, 
we would maintain that it is a discursive-material entity.
 7. Brandon (1996: 127) outlines the following offi  cial beliefs about the LMF pol-
icy: “1. Courage equated with character, and that it was possible to identify 
and select those with the ‘right stuff .’ 2. LMF was a dangerously contagious 
state. 3. The maintenance of morale depended on early identifi cation and 
removal of ‘waverers’. 4. Disposal of those unwilling to continue operational 
fl ying was not a medical decision. 5. Unless rigorous measures were taken, the 
operational effi  ciency of Bomber Command would be compromised.” 
 8. Compare this remark to one by Foucault (1979: 135) in his discussion of docile 
bodies and soldiers: “By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become 
something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the ma-
chine can be constructed.” The British Army report cited here metaphorically 
suggests otherwise; that the clay of men is not a neutral material that can be 
manipulated any which way but rather varies in its own qualities and thus 
deviates in innate potentialities and limitations. 
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To be worn out is to be renewed.
—Lao-tzu, The Way of Lao-tzu
Evaluating fundamental questions of health in large populations 
is always extraordinarily diffi  cult, but is particularly so a  er 
traumatic and complex wartime events. Nevertheless, unless these 
diffi  cult questions are answered, we risk repeated occurrences 
of unexplained symptoms among veterans a  er each war.
—Kenneth C. Hyams, F. Stephen Wignall, and Robert Roswell,
 “War Syndromes and Their Evaluation”
Mary Fissell (1991) argues that, in England, the patient’s narrative disap-
peared as a medicine dominated by competing private practices giving 
way to a medicine centralized in a hospital se  ing. In the early part of 
the eighteenth century, medicine was part of popular culture and (mostly 
elite) individuals used a wide range of concepts to describe ill bodies and 
had access to an even wider range of remedies. Because of their lack of 
control over the “production and consumption” (93) of the circulation 
of such knowledge, physicians had to fi t both their diagnoses and their 
recommendations for treatment to specifi c individuals. Once medicine 
was relocated to the hospital, with standard training and treatment prac-
tices, patients’ narratives were replaced by observation and classifi cation. 
Clinical observations turned into clinically defi ned protocols that began 
the practice of defi ning illness through observable symptomatology. The 
practices associated with the clinic set the trajectory of fi guring out what 
was wrong with a body and how to treat it, which is still the norm today. 
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The shi  , of course, was not quick, smooth, or orderly; hospital medicine 
emerged slowly over a long period of time with multiple impediments 
that served to erode patients’ narratives, particularly around generating 
a diagnostic and therapeutic knowledge outside a patient’s own under-
standing (105).
Fissell’s arguments dovetail nicely with Foucault’s (2006) understand-
ing of psychiatric power—with the rise of both the psychiatrist in the asy-
lum and psychiatry as a science and a practice that takes on “the power to 
defi ne, control, and correct what is abnormal” (221). Foucault wrote about 
the production of the psychiatric subject through both exclusion and clas-
sifi cation. Foucault’s work Madness (2011b), originally published in 1954, 
lays out the intellectual issues he was dealing with while thinking about 
psychiatric illness vis-à-vis Freudian psychoanalysis. In 1962 he published 
a revised edition of Madness to articulate how dramatically his ideas had 
changed. In this version, the range of techniques of power—though not 
named as such—are evident in his descriptions of the constitution of men-
tal illness. While not teased out, the kernel of the idea of how the exercise 
of disciplinary power excludes, classifi es, individualizes, and regulates 
bodies is present. For example, Foucault’s discussion of cultural defi ni-
tions of illness by Emile Durkheim and Ruth Benedict shows how disci-
plinary power works in terms of scientifi c applications of knowledge (via 
statistical analysis and deviation from the norm à la Emilie Durkheim) 
and of cultural possibilities (via relegating people with mental illness into 
particular cultural positions à la Ruth Benedict) (Foucault 2011b: 99–105). 
For Foucault (2011b), the practice of psychology excludes mad bodies 
by interning them in asylums; the science of psychology classifi es mental 
illness to further subjugate bodies. Through exclusion and classifi cation, 
the relationship between psychology and madness relies on
a disequilibrium so fundamental [that the relationship itself] render[s] vain 
any a  empt to treat the whole of madness, the essence and nature of mad-
ness, in terms of psychology. The very notion of “mental illness” is the ex-
pression of an a  empt doomed from the outset. What is called “mental 
illness” is simply alienated madness, alienated in the psychology that it has 
itself made possible. (Foucault 2011b: 125; emphasis in original)
Madness was an early piece in Foucault’s body of work. In it he laid out 
the architecture of his later arguments in Madness and Civilization (1988a). 
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault points out that as disease became 
more aligned with the organic, the experience of unreason was relegated 
to the psychological. Psychoanalysis did not emerge as a science to access 
the truth of madness; rather, it emerged as a way to mask the experi-
ence of unreason and to keep it in the realm of the medical. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, clinical observations recorded so meticulously 
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by trained physicians, neurologists, and psychiatrists steeped in elite and 
exclusionary scientifi c knowledge began trumping the bodily sensations 
of individuals and any other experience of illness. 
Much like psychoanalysis, military psychiatry tries to mask the experi-
ence of unreason in order to keep it tightly bound within the realm not 
only of the medical, but also of the military. In the Second World War, 
for example, military psychiatrists conceptualized combat breakdown 
as an experience of unreason, both spatially and temporally. The idea 
that, given an extreme set of circumstances, anyone could break down 
reoriented the military psychiatric gaze to all combat soldiers rather than 
just the ones that were marked—formally and informally—as potentially 
weak. Soldiers diagnosed with ba  le exhaustion were treated close to the 
front and either were returned to ba  le quickly, usually within seventy-
two hours, or were evacuated for more extensive treatment at a hospital, 
usually one designated for mental illness. Once released from medical 
care, soldiers were considered safe (but not cured) and were returned to 
duty or discharged to society. The increased reliance by the military on 
small group cohesion to maintain morale among combat troops (a social 
psychology approach) supported the quick turnaround among exhausted 
troops. Compounding breakdown recovery was the sudden separation 
from the soldier’s squad a  er a ba  le. Treatment for exhaustion relied on 
psychotherapeutic practice, mostly in groups. Psychiatrists exploited the 
deep ties formed among troops based on trust, loyalty, and cooperation at 
the organizational level of squad or patrol and used a combination of guilt 
and honor to convince soldiers to return to their unit. This arrangement 
kept unreason fi rmly circumscribed within the military medical corps 
group while delimiting how long the unreason could be considered an 
illness.
Lessons from the Great War showed that nervous breakdowns in 
combat could result in high war pensions. A  er the Second World War 
postdeployment psychiatric disability was not offi  cially linked to combat 
experience. Rather, the onset of mental illness a  er the war was causally 
linked to constitutional predispositions and social factors existing prior 
to the war. Civilian and military psychiatrists began taking war-time psy-
chological wounds of soldiers seriously only a  er the end of the Ameri-
can Viet Nam War—not in terms of exhaustion, but in terms of trauma. 
More recently, enhanced medical training for advanced trauma care and 
forward surgical teams nearer to the ba  lefi eld increased chances of sur-
vival for a far greater proportion of soldiers wounded in combat than ever 
before.1 Compared to psychological training for recruits that has delayed 
the onset of breakdown, forward medicine streamlined over the twentieth 
century is even more proximate, immediate, and expedient. The spatial 
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and temporal limitations so important in the Second World War for man-
aging combat breakdown among troops have now been fragmented into 
an anywhere, anytime strategy for determining the unreason of a soldier.
In this chapter we negotiate the tension between the soldier’s ill body 
and the way it gets talked about. Many discourses come to inform what 
counts as war neuroses, and use medicine and psychiatry as bases from 
which to circulate (assumed) knowledge about weary warriors. These 
identities are deployed through various mechanisms of the state, society, 
and economy to support or contest wider social policies, political agendas, 
cultural understandings, and individual behaviors. Our primary interest 
here is with the constitution of the weary warrior as a subject through cul-
tural forms. We fi rst lay out arguments about subjectivity and show how 
they fi t into our wider arguments in other parts of the book. We demon-
strate the fi t by locating the generation of the weary warrior in a positive 
ontology and within various sets of practice—psychiatric power, military 
activities, and masculinist culture. We then present a series of cultural 
sites through which weary warriors have been generated—fi ction, auto-
biography, and fi lm.
Situating Subjectivity through Folds
Straddling the edge of the psychic and the organic, soldiers presenting 
with symptoms of nervous breakdown in and a  er combat have li  le to 
go on to describe their bodily sensations, let alone to describe what led 
them to feel a certain way. Soldiers and veterans work up their bodily sen-
sations into categories that physicians can understand—for example, an-
gry outbursts, anxiety, blurred vision, deafness, depression, despondence, 
headache, memory loss, moodiness, mutism, pain all over, paralysis, 
sleeplessness, stu  ering, trouble fi nding words, inability to concentrate, 
weeping, and withdrawal from friends and family. It could have been 
a blast, some movement, darkness, and then waking up in a hospital. It 
could have been a summer celebration, with champagne, a vague sense 
of foreboding, and then waking up shivering underneath a picnic table. 
It could have been another blackout to numb the recurring nightmares, a 
violent act, and then seeking out help from the local veterans’ association. 
Much like seeking out a language to convey feelings and bodily sensa-
tions, soldiers search for recognizable scripts to ground themselves in 
order to reestablish stability and fi xity in a life that has been sha  ered.
Yet the preconfi gured identities available to soldiers are not necessar-
ily useful or eff ective in either dealing with their recent transformation 
or facilitating healing. In the context of invisible war wounds, a  er an 
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intense psychological wounding one’s sense of self is practically erased. 
All notions of the self the soldier occupied—courageous, strong, and in-
vincible, all part of being hypermasculine—must be rethought in light of 
the identities available for war neurotics and fatigued soldiers, character-
ized as weak, cowards, and merely shells of the masculine forms they 
once were. Even in the relatively progressive twenty-fi rst century, when 
there is a general acknowledgment in the military and among civilians 
that anyone could break down in the face of war atrocities, when mental 
illness is apparently less stigmatized than ever before, and when soldiers 
can access resources to assist in treating emotional breakdowns, there is 
still the scepter of failure, worthlessness, dishonor, and femininity hang-
ing over the soldier’s head.
How does one go about rereading the weary warrior so that more pos-
sibilities appear to soldiers and veterans? No doubt the task of reestablish-
ing a suitable identity without basing it on a sense of failure is gargantuan, 
especially given the limitations of engagement in such a task just a  er 
combat, just a  er diagnosis. And even before any identity can provide 
a script into which a soldier or veteran can walk, a portrait of a subject 
with crisper brushstrokes has to be imagined. The enactment of such a 
subject can counter the bounded, incongruous image of a war neurotic, 
fatigued soldier, or a soldier with mTBI. Subjects emerge that can distin-
guish specifi c historical periods as in the Greek subject via sexuality in an-
cient Greece (Foucault 1990b), the modern subject emerging as universally 
human (Latour 1993), or a postmodern subject arising from late capitalism 
(Jameson 1984). Rather than focus on a subject of an epoch, we want to 
trace various enactments of weary warriors in specifi c time periods that 
sometimes run counter, sometimes reinforce, and sometimes sha  er the 
weary warrior as subject. The fi rst step toward our goal is coming up with 
a way to see how subjectivity comes into being. Once we provide a critical 
account of how subjectivities emerge, we can reread the broken embodi-
ments of weary warriors as subjects in critical, less-distressing, and more-
compassionate ways.
In his critique of Foucault’s body of work, Gilles Deleuze (1999) lays out 
a way of understanding subjectivity within a positive ontology. Deleuze 
describes a process through which subjectivities are created through the 
“fold.” Subjectifi cation involves four folds: the material part of self (or-
ganic, physiological, biological), the relation between forces (among hu-
man and nonhuman), the relation of truth to being and vice versa (power, 
knowledge), and the outside itself (institutions, ascriptions, acts). Through 
these four folds, a subject emerges that is not reducible to any one fold. 
Rather, at each and every moment a new subject forms, one that holds 
momentarily the eff ect of the variable depth, speed, and intensity of each 
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folding and its relationship to the others. There is no subject other than 
that which emerges through folding and unfolding, mixing and matching, 
variation and diff erence.
Foucault’s overall project of drawing a  ention to the conditions of the 
emergence of the subject via power and knowledge sets the stage for the 
claim that “the conditions are never more general than the conditioned 
element, and gain their value from the particular historical status. The con-
ditions are therefore not ‘apodictic’ but problematic. Given certain condi-
tions, they do not vary historically; but they do vary with history” (Deleuze 
1999: 114; emphasis in original). Variation and diff erence are already impli-
cated in the folds that include the outside in the interior of the individual. 
Instead of a direct link between cause and eff ect, there is more of a Markov 
chain shaping and informing the emergence of an individual subject.2
What sorts of things happen in these folds which can produce a sub-
jectivity that meshes with what we understand to be a weary warrior? 
How do pa  erns emerge that permit us to talk about a weary warrior? 
Annemarie Mol (2002) provides insight into these two questions in her 
ethnography of the practices that enact atherosclerosis. She a  empts to 
unlace the tight binding of the subject to individual humans and to being 
active knowers. She locates her arguments in the discussion over dualistic 
ideas of the subject as human and the object as nature, as well as the active 
knowing subject with the passive object that is known. To break the bi-
nary of human/nature, Mol collapses the distinction between the doer and 
the deed, and argues that the deed itself constitutes the doer—one does 
not exist without the other. “Enact” as a verb comprises this idea, which 
applies to both subjects (humans) and objects (nonhumans). Thus, both 
war neuroses and weary warriors are enacted through diagnostic and 
treatment practices. Such practices include the presentation of a soldier at 
a dressing station with amnesia, a tale of a bomb exploding nearby, and 
a vague memory of unconsciousness. Then, a  er some time interval, the 
enactment continues through acquisition of a disability pension based on 
psychiatric illness, newspaper articles about the rising suicide rate of war 
veterans (see Alvarez 2009; Wilhelm 2011), and a movie depicting the psy-
chological stress with which a bomb defuser lives (The Hurt Locker 2008).
Mol (2002) also challenges the idea that the subject is the knower and 
the object is the known. She argues that a foundational aspect of medicine 
clings to Marie-François-Xavier Bichat’s pathology in that the subject as 
knower where the patient presents an informed narrative, for example, 
was eclipsed by the physician becoming the knower by making the cadaver 
the object known.3 This switch supported the exaltation of the physician’s 
knowledge at the expense of the patient as a knower and facilitated the 
rise of clinical observation as the golden standard for medical diagnosis 
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(see Fissell 1991; Foucault 1994). In modern medicine, the patient has been 
gra  ed back onto the material body through the reintroduction of a series 
of codifi ed behaviors of individuals through the psychosocial dimensions 
of health. Yet the inclusion of psychosocial dimensions of an individual 
into medicine is but one way to go about reintroducing the subject back 
into medicine. Such an introduction reinforces medicine as the knower 
and the patient as the known. To break this pa  erning, Mol suggests a 
strategy to call into question the fundamental arrangement of medicine 
itself. That is, she argues that social critics need to focus on the knowledge 
generated in the practice of medicine.4 
Susan Hekman (2010) provides insight into one tension that arises 
when thinking about how subjects can come into being. She argues that 
for a subject to emerge one has to take on an identity. An identity is some-
thing on off er within a society that an individual takes up and walks with. 
Without a distinctive identity that one can slip into, one’s ontological sta-
tus is erased: one ceases to be. She refocuses her question away from how 
a subjectivity is constituted toward the question, “what are the options for 
subjects who are denied identity and hence an ontology?” (95). In other 
words, what happens when an identity exists outside the range of ac-
ceptable identities, such as a war neurotic, traumatized soldier, or weary 
warrior? Hekman partially addresses her question by conceptualizing the 
subject along the lines of Andrew Pickering’s mangle, arguing that
Subjects are constituted through the intra-action of discourse, genetically 
coded bodies, social norms, technology, science, and many other factors. No 
single factor is causal; all are constitutive. And, as the postpositivist realists 
argue, the identities that subjects inhabit are real; they have material conse-
quences. But I have argued that these identities are not real in the sense of 
objectively right or true. Reality is disclosed through our concepts and, most 
importantly, through my understanding of which subject position I inhabit. 
The reality this subject position discloses is my reality; other subject posi-
tions disclose a diff erent reality. What avoids relativism in this formulation 
is not that I can declare that one subject position provides a truer picture 
of reality, but that I can compare the material consequences of the diff erent 
disclosures. Some subject positions entail privilege, others deny subjects 
a viable life. These are real diff erences that can and should be the basis of 
social critique. (Hekman 2010: 107)
For Hekman (2010), variation and diff erence reside in the reality disclosed 
by a specifi c subject positioning. Social critique involves mapping out the 
material consequences of any one disclosure, such as a weary warrior, 
from multiple subject positionings (that are embedded in the mangle of 
the subject) via diagnosis, via policy, via culture, via … et cetera.
But what subject are we talking about? Which subject positionings mat-
ter in a study of weary warriors? Are they the ones that can situate sol-
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diers’ deep emotional distress in combat? Is it only the bounded entity of 
a soldier with nervous exhaustion? Is it the traumatized individual that 
has a formal diagnosis of PTSD? Or is it the bodily sensations themselves, 
so carefully wrapped up in something called symptoms? In an innova-
tive writing project, Annemarie Mol (2008) queries the situations that au-
thors use to write subjects and works through how subjectivities can be 
thought. She uses eating an apple as a way to tease out some of the usual 
poststructural aspects of subjectivity, as well as some uncommon aspects. 
She supports the argument that subjectivities are situated (temporally and 
spatially), decentered, and relational. In her descriptions, she draws out 
materialities invoked by thinking about eating an apple:
Let’s leave Braeburns out of this, but, let me tell you, I don’t like Granny 
Smiths. In the late 1970s and early 1980s we (my political friends and my-
self) invested a lot in disliking Granny Smiths. At the time they were always 
imported from Chile, and thus stained with the blood spilled by Pinochet 
and his men. Once Pinochet had gone, it turned out to be diffi  cult to re-
educate my taste. … It should be possible, but so far I have not succeeded. 
Yes, I can eat a Granny Smith apple: bite, chew, swallow, gone. But it does 
not give me pleasure. … For how to separate us out to begin with, the apple 
and me? One moment this may be possible: here is the apple, there am I. But 
a li  le later (bite, chew, swallow) I have become (made out of) apple; while 
the apple is (a part of) me. Transubstantiation. … A person cannot train the 
internal linings of her bowels in a way that begins to resemble the training 
of her muscles. I may eat many apples, but I will never master which of their 
sugars, minerals, vitamins, fi bres are absorbed; and which others I discard. 
(Mol 2008: 29, 30; emphasis in original)
These passages point toward the complexities of how subjects—ones that 
can be human or nonhuman, as, for example, a weary warrior, an ill body, 
a set of bodily sensations, or an entity that captures all of them—inter-
mingle with one another. They also show how one might think about 
the inter- and intra-activity that goes on in the constitution of a subject. 
Though we do not use novel exemplars, we still are trying to invoke a 
diff erent way to think, see, and thus enact weary warriors. We seek to 
challenge explanations of shell shock, ba  le exhaustion, combat fatigue, 
PTSD, and TBI, for example, that rely on culture as the diff erentiating 
factor in onset or expression of severe reactions to combat stress; that con-
ceive breakdown in combat as a timeless organic process; and that locate 
psychiatric wounds and mental breakdown in the relationship between 
the patient and psychiatrist, in the personal circumstances of an individu-
al’s history, or in each and every one of us.
For us, the subjectivities associated with weary warriors, including 
those beyond the individual, can be traced along a particular fold, can be 
disclosed via a particular subject positioning, or can be enacted through a 
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specifi c set of practices. Such a multiplicity of tracings disclose sundry sets 
of implications, some of which support stability and fi xity, some of which 
generate disorder and permeability, some of which aff ect the circumstances 
of daily life, some of which indicate discursive shi  s. For example, just as 
war neuroses were new to psychiatry at the turn of the twentieth century, 
psychiatry as a scientifi c and medical system of organizing thought was 
new to war neuroses. The clash of these confi gurations of power/knowl-
edge enfolded the shell-shocked soldier and generated a (relatively) new 
subject. Just as psychiatry as subject solidifi ed claims to truth about shell 
shock, the material bodies of soldiers were subjugated, and sent back to the 
front or subjected to treatment that o  en depended on class background—
upper- and middle-class offi  cers received psychotherapy, and working-
class ordinary soldiers underwent harsher treatment regimes.
The new subject of the shell-shocked soldier posed problems for the 
emerging welfare states in Australia, Europe, and North America because 
of the cost of pensions for disabled veterans. There were no prewrit-
ten scripts for soldiers once discharged. Veterans of the Great War were 
thrown back into civilian life where their families, friends, and communi-
ties had to deal with their wounds, their discontents, and their outbursts 
of violence.5 A  er the discursive splash they made both in psychiatry and 
in the media as shelled shocked soldiers, they were le   in large part to 
generate their own scripts, negotiate constraints, and move toward fi xed, 
more comfortable, identities.
Subjectivities, as we have argued before, are one of the many elements 
in apparatuses. Strategies connect elements that then support and are sup-
ported by various types of knowledge (Foucault 1980b: 196). In this sense 
apparatuses are indeed strategic. Military psychiatry as an apparatus con-
geals around a strategic purpose—that of dealing with groups of soldiers 
who are burdensome to the military because of their inability to be pro-
ductive, who are mobilized as defi cient through discourses of masculinity, 
and who justify the existence of psychiatrists in the military as well as the 
integration of psychiatry into military operations. Together, the practices 
arising from these strategic connections generate subject positionings for 
soldiers with nervous exhaustion to take up. These are not bodies that 
are ill necessarily in conventional ways—organically, orthopedically, or 
functionally. They are embodied subject positionings for the psychologi-
cally wounded, that in turn disclose a certain set of truths, realities, and 
knowledge that are themselves eff ects of power/knowledge. We are not 
saying that each individual engages in practices that intentionally support 
or purposefully thwart the generation of a collective subject positioning of 
a soldier enduring deep emotional distress as a result of combat. Rather, 
military psychiatric practices and those associated with them, such as 
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general physicians, with awareness of war trauma come with sets of rules 
that regulate how the psychiatrist engages with the patient. And it is these 
practices that collectively generate a space that circumscribes a soldier 
traumatized by war while at the same time projecting a fi xed identity of 
the shell-shocked soldier, the war neurotic, the soldier with PTSD, and 
the soldier with mTBI. Resistance to these subject positionings is as, if not 
more, numerous as the popularized subject positionings. For example, 
American veterans and veteran groups of the Viet Nam War were instru-
mental in ge  ing PTSD into the DSM-III (APA 1980). Indeed, the military 
designation of OSIs as the encompassing term for all sorts of psychiatric 
wounds and the scientifi c distinction between PTSD and mTBI counter 
the major trends in generating weary warriors as subjects. We maintain, 
however, that most individual and collective resistance is buried in the 
lives of those soldiers enduring deep emotional stress in and a  er combat 
who may already be dead, whose stories are salvageable from historical 
texts, and in the lives of those who walk among us whose stories are still 
emerging as they try to establish some footing in the everyday. For us, the 
subjectivities associated with weary warriors, including those beyond the 
individual, can be traced along a particular fold, can be disclosed via a 
particular subject positioning, or can be enacted through a specifi c set of 
practices.
One way to access and then trace subjectivities and the processes and 
practices through which subjectivities emerge is by critically reading texts 
wri  en by, about, and for soldiers. These texts include an array of mate-
rial and discursive practice-based enactments, as well as subject-making 
activities that soldiers and others engage in. Gleaning subjects from a 
variety of texts brings into focus the multiplicity—both in number and 
magnitude—of subjectivities available and taken up by psychiatrically 
wounded soldiers and veterans. Refusing singular understandings of sol-
diers and veterans who have endured deep emotional distress in and a  er 
combat permits a more robust appreciation of the myriad of connections 
among the elements of various apparatuses and their links to soldiers and 
veterans. Thinking in terms of folds, disclosures, and enactments facili-
tates the appearance of diff erent understandings of the subject, subject po-
sitionings, and subjectivities that involve soldiers’ and veterans’ resistance 
to and accommodation of their multiple framings (a  er Pickering 1995). 
We now turn to critical readings of a number of cultural sources that work 
toward generating specifi c subjectivities associated with weary warriors. 
We trace folds, we disclose materialities via subject positionings, and we 
show how specifi c practices enact particular subjects. We have chosen 
these works purposefully for they illustrate our arguments by texturing 
the claims we make.
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Un/Masking Un/Reason through Fiction
Pat Barker’s novel Regeneration aff ords a rationale for rejecting the irratio-
nality of war: “a society that devours its own young deserves no automatic 
or unquestionable allegiance” (Barker 1997, 249).6 She questions why it 
is that a normal reaction to war is considered to be abnormal. Her mes-
sage plays out in a series of relationships among war neurotics sent to 
Craiglockhart Hospital near Edinburgh for recovery, and the psychiatrists 
enlisted to cure them. She de  ly weaves together invented characters and 
historical fi gures in order to comb through the complexity of what consti-
tutes a war neurosis. The novel opens with Siegfried Sassoon’s declaration 
against military authority that the war was being prolonged unnecessarily 
and that he, on behalf of other soldiers being sacrifi ced and those being 
treated unjustly, protests the war and refuses to return. Sassoon maintains 
that he was neither a pacifi st nor insane when he made his claim that he 
was fi nished with the war (see Sassoon 1930). The tension between reason 
and unreason plays out through Barker’s primary character, Dr. William 
H.R. Rivers, an anthropologist and psychotherapist dra  ed into the Brit-
ish Army Medical Corps to serve as a psychiatrist. She uses his refl ections 
to provide a more nuanced reading of war neurotics from the Great War. 
Throughout the novel, Barker sets up diff erent scenarios through which 
the context of the emergence of psychiatry as an infl uential fi eld of science 
informs the characters’ actions, refl ections, and tensions. For example, she 
writes,
As soon as he started work at the hospital he became busy and, as [Dr.] 
Head had predicted, fascinated by the diff erence in severity of breakdown 
between the diff erent branches of the RFC [Royal Flying Corps] [see Arm-
strong 1936]. Pilots, though they did indeed break down, did so less fre-
quently and usually less severely than the men who manned observation 
balloons. They, fl oating helplessly above the ba  lefi elds, unable either to 
avoid a  ack or to defend themselves eff ectively against it, showed the high-
est incidence of breakdown of any service. Even including infantry offi  cers. 
This reinforced Rivers’ view that it was prolonged strain, immobility and 
helplessness that did the damage, and not the sudden shocks or bizarre hor-
rors that the patients themselves were inclined to point to as the explanation 
for their condition. That would help to account for the greater prevalence 
of anxiety neuroses and hysterical disorders in women in peacetime, since 
their relatively more confi ned lives gave them fewer opportunities of react-
ing to stress in active and constructive ways. Any explanation of war neu-
rosis must account for the fact that this apparently intensely masculine life 
of war and danger and hardship produced in men the same disorders that 
women suff ered from in peace. (Barker 1997, 222)
Although not necessarily accurate in most interpretations of Rivers’ own 
views and practices through his publications, Barker captures the milieu 
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in which Rivers as a practicing military psychiatrist made sense of the ner-
vous breakdowns among the various branches of the military involved in 
the Great War. Injuries of the mind are neither feminized nor cast as ritu-
als of emasculation; rather, she writes into the subjecthood of the soldier a 
sympathetic place to alight when laden with helplessness and inaction as 
markers of long stretches of danger. Why not a neurosis? A  er all, women 
at peace were o  en hysterical and neurotic when languishing in a society 
that aff orded them few paths and scripts that could move them away 
from their social morasses. As well, Barker compares Rivers’ psychothera-
peutic approach to Lewis Yealland’s shock and persuasion approach (see 
Adrian and Yealland 1917) to contrast the debate within psychiatry about 
whether neurosis arose from weakness in character or was a result of the 
war. She writes that, for Rivers, “[psycho]therapy was a test, not only of 
the genuineness of the individual’s symptoms, but also of the validity of 
the demands the war was making on him” (Barker 1997, 115).
Barker also provides insights into how a psychiatrist constructs the 
practice of psychiatry. For example, she writes about how Rivers must de-
mythologize each individual patient’s actions and memories. Rather than 
thinking of Jonah and the whale, Rivers needs to assist the patient in living 
with the memory of his head in a dead soldier’s belly (Barker 1997, 173). 
Healing may actually go on even if in not the intended direction (242). She 
also permits the soldiers to generate spaces where they can actually be sol-
diers. She writes about them not talking about what went on in France to 
the women at home, less to protect the women and more because soldiers 
need the women’s “ignorance to hide in” (216). Being part of the military 
also meant living in temporally bounded places, where soldiers could be 
dashing, jolly, patriotic, and honorable off  the ba  lefi eld, away from the 
frontline, in order, no doubt, to survive.
Barker’s work emphasizes—by her detailed account of Rivers’ work 
in psychotherapy—both the conditions that constitute truth claims about 
the mind in psychiatry as an emerging science and the outside, not as a 
place, but as an external force, in this case specifi cally the war, in which 
individuals engage as a way to eventuate (come to) themselves as subjects 
(Deleuze 1999: 104; Lambert 2002: 26). Barker illustrates something im-
portant in our arguments: that the multiplicity of subjectivities comes into 
existence through specifi c practices; subjects are enacted. Barker’s work 
is illustrative of practices that enact subjects through cultural representa-
tions. Her work does double duty: not only does she off er a nuanced read-
ing of the shell-shocked soldier, but she also creates a space for veterans 
surviving the Gulf War to be something other than the weak-willed ma-
lingerers that can only complain of a life sha  ered by unseen forces. Her 
work was fi rst published in 1991 when much of the discussion of the day 
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focused on external events possibly causing an organic malady among 
veterans of the Gulf War, such as exposure to uranium and viral infection 
from inoculations. Barker puts back into discursive play the notion that if 
indeed something external caused nervous breakdown among soldiers, 
then the external event did not have to be something unseen and surrepti-
tious. The external event could actually be the war. And it is through the 
war that the veteran with GWS came into being. Those soldiers in service 
during the Gulf War did not always break down as a result of combat; 
rather, the “prolonged strain, immobility and helplessness” (Barker 1997, 
222) positioned soldiers to take up a subjectivity that held within it a rea-
sonable account of their unreasonable experience.
Tim Carlson, a Canadian playwright and director based in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, also uses a cultural medium to suggest alternative sub-
jectivities for soldiers enduring deep emotional distress in combat. He is 
writing in the post-2001 world of the War on Terror, the USA Patriot Act 
of 2001, and Operation Enduring Freedom, an era entailing enhanced 
surveillance, heightened suspicion, and erosion of civil liberties. His play 
Omniscience (2007), set in the not-so-distant future, focuses on Warren At-
well, a documentary fi lm editor working on a fi lm about an urban war in 
which Warren’s life-partner, Anna Larson, fought; she is now recovering 
from traumatic stress. His employer’s director of wellness, Beth DeCarlo, 
is being investigated by George Ellis, from the state, for her involvement 
in Warren’s disappearance and Anna’s recovery. Carlson de  ly entwines 
into the play Orwellian notions of surveillance, as, for example, searching 
for clear rooms and reveling in the idea that they exist (62), speaking in 
public places like the subway platform only when the sound is distorted 
by the passing trains (92–93), and twisting routine circumstances in inter-
views that support conspiracy with a veteran-led terrorist group (72, 94). 
Indeed, the entire state project—which Warren is documenting, within 
which Beth is facilitating health, in which George is investigating possible 
resisters, and for which Anna fought—is about installing a government 
commensurate with the interests of the many (read: few), aptly named the 
Reconfi guration. The story takes place in the era of postconfl ict renewal, 
where one area of the city, SouthWestFive, has just been cleansed (21). The 
goal of individual soldiers returning to civilian life is “to confi gure transi-
tion toward a positive future” (21), and Beth’s role is to assist Warren and 
Anna to “reconfi gure your life for wellness” (17).
Lieutenant Anna Larson is not the main character. It is only through her 
that the story unfolds. She joined the forces not because she would die for 
the cause, but because she wanted an education and a career. She served 
under extreme conditions cleansing SouthWestFive and became debili-
tated a  er involvement in a friendly-fi re incident. Part of her reintegration 
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(transition toward a positive future) includes decompression therapy on 
an island outside the city and taking a long list of medications (Carlson 
2007, 17, 44, 56). Anna’s general demeanor throughout the play is either 
angry or withdrawn. Her symptoms of disorientation and hallucinations 
are symptoms acknowledged by Beth and George (38), and Beth describes 
the typical traumatic stress victim as wanting to hide (53). She acts para-
noid (31), has seizures (48), and is drug-dependent (60–61, 67–68). When 
she has a voice to talk about herself she calls herself a “ghost soldier” (29), 
yells out “I’m the mental case. That’s my role” (81), and taunts Warren 
about his interest in her being the “crazy vet segment” in his documentary 
(42). The circumstances under which Anna mistakenly fi red on her own 
soldiers are played out in one of her fl ashbacks (50). Eventually, Anna tells 
Beth about the incident that Anna pinpoints as the beginning of the break-
down when, three weeks into her tour, she kills a soldier because he begs 
her to (89–90). She sent in a “bird” (drone) and through the “third eye of a 
dead man” she “fi red a rocket in” (89, 90).
Carlson (2007) sets up a disturbing view of a surveillance society, a 
view that theater goers could see is not that far-fetched. Through the char-
acter of Warren, who acts suspiciously and is paranoid as a result of the 
repressive measures of the Reconfi guration, Carlson is able to hint that 
traumatic stress is part of a wider society—omniscience is the precur-
sor of a traumatic stress. While Carlson is interested in forcing contem-
porary society to face the potential consequences of intense surveillance 
and infringement of privacy seeds now being sown, we are interested in 
his depiction of Anna as the metaphor for a society racing toward stress 
from trauma. The depiction of the character of Anna reinforces popular 
understandings of soldiers coming home to Australia, Europe, and North 
America from the twenty-fi rst century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Carl-
son utilizes a fi xed identity—that of a combat soldier with anger, fl ash-
backs, hallucinations, medications, paranoia, and social withdrawal—to 
explore the travails of a repressive society. He chooses a woman for that 
identity, one usually reserved for male veterans, perhaps as a device to 
play up the shock of seeing a woman acting out traumatic stress from war, 
or perhaps to sharpen the idea of trauma as the weak-willed, submissive 
citizen of repression. His choice works well, given that women can easily 
be seen as emotional, as hysterical, and, in what is described o  en enough 
in the play, as insane. As a subject, Anna is rigid, though docile: there is no 
room for her to be something other than what society wants her to be. In 
a failing society, those who fi t survive, and those who do not fi t die. Anna, 
full in her ill body, survives as the living wounded for trying to escape 
who she is; Warren dies for trying to escape as he is. What Carlson brings 
to bear in this stringent framing is the notion that Anna’s response is actu-
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ally far more reasonable a reaction to the wrenching pangs of horror than 
the unreason of war. Yet what he does for weary warriors is to corral their 
potential subjectivities, cram them into one expression, and use it to show 
the ills of society.
Making Sense of Experience through Autobiography
In addition to novels and plays, autobiographies and autobiographical 
writings are useful sites to survey the contours of subjectivities enacted 
through the practice of writing as well as disclosed given the particular 
subject positioning taken up by the writer. War memoirs are a genre unto 
themselves (Harari 2007), with a large subset of those wri  en by weary 
warriors as a strategy to deal with the experience of war and distress. 
Some autobiographers write shockingly candid versions of war, destruc-
tion, and death (e.g., Jünger [1920] 2003; Sassoon 1930; Tamayama and 
Nunneley 2000), while others embed their experiences in wider versions 
of their lives (e.g., Richardson 2005; Scurfi eld 2004), an amalgam of ex-
periences shaping who they are (e.g., Douce  e 2008; Swoff ord 2003), or 
poignant messages directed at society writ large (e.g., Graves [1929] 1995; 
Kovic 1976; Moore and Galloway 1992, 2008; Navarro 2008). Still others 
are brought under scrutiny for their permeable boundaries between truth 
and fi ction, authenticity and imagination, and truth-correspondence and 
fabrication (e.g., Sajer 1971). When tracing subjectivities of soldiers with 
psychiatric wounds through autobiographies and autobiographical writ-
ings, the subjectivities captured are not necessarily the ones intended to be 
marked, nor are they the ones that resonate with popularized understand-
ings of weary warriors as subjects. Subjectivities, as Mol (2008) suggests, 
are situated, relational, and decentered. Accordingly, an exploration of 
subjectivities can come in various forms.
Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire is the highest-ranking military of-
fi cer who has come out and publicly talked about his psychiatric struggles 
with fl ashbacks, depression, and suicidal thoughts. His autobiography, 
Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (2003), is his 
story of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 
1993–94. His autobiography begins much like any other, with stories of 
his childhood in east-end Montréal, the eldest of three and son of an army 
sergeant and his war bride from Holland. He writes about his formative 
moments, his wife and family, and his training in the Canadian Forces. 
Unlike many autobiographies of weary warriors that cover postwar ex-
periences of dealing with war trauma, the bulk of Dallaire’s story is about 
his deployment in Rwanda. In August 1993 Dallaire went on a fact-fi nd-
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ing mission to Rwanda to assess whether a peace-keeping mission needed 
to be sent to the country. Three months later he was head of UNAMIR, a 
mission charged with working with the interim government in support of 
the Arusha Peace Agreement. In April 1994 a one hundred–day civil war 
broke out, and by the end well over 500,000 Tutsi were dead.7 Dallaire le   
Rwanda 20 August 1994, feeling as if he had failed. His story is an indict-
ment of a world that closed its eyes and turned its back to slaughter, hate, 
and evil. As his account of the mission unfolds, the clarity of his under-
standing of the toll that witnessing genocide takes on soldiers deployed 
to observe and off er assistance begins to emerge. Strewn over the pages 
are accounts of a plethora of acts that Dallaire sees as transgressions of 
humanity. His deep Christian faith set the parameters of his engagement 
with the genocide going on around him, something he dedicated himself 
to avert (64) but could not stop or even slow down, and something for 
which he felt “deeply responsible” (1).
Because he did not organize his story around onset, treatment, or liv-
ing a life with PTSD, we scrutinized the text for his descriptions of his 
body and of illness. Woven into his narrative is an account of the onset of 
traumatic stress and of his reactions to what psychiatry refers to as PTSD 
(see also Prince 2006). There were organized events to release tension col-
lectively (Dallaire 2003, 134); there were accounts of dreams to provide 
insight into the politics of the key players in Rwanda (261); and there were 
eff orts to allay the underlying fear of loved ones who lived on pins and 
needles waiting the phone call, visit, or television report of the death of 
UN soldiers (273–74). He recounts an iniquity of the eff ect of this tension, 
witnessed by a close aide and a UN soldier from Bangladesh, where hun-
dreds of Tutsi were dead and dying in a church, an event that marked for 
him the beginning of the “wholesale massacre” (279–80). There are quips 
and brief asides describing bodily sensations that could be worked up into 
symptoms of PTSD: falling objects startling him when dropped to the fl oor 
(325), outbursts of anger (334–35, 494, 499, 500), zombie-like hollowed 
eyes with blank stares (454), claustrophobia (499, 504), emotional intensity 
accompanied by emotional repression (458, 462, 491), disturbing dreams 
(467), and “adolescent” acts pointing out the absurdity of the war (480). In 
a short passage where he describes the state of fatigue that some soldiers 
were in, he clearly articulates the tension he faces as a soldier when he 
weighs the health of his staff  against his own operational imperative:
I had a mission headquarters staff  of fewer than thirty offi  cers, with varying 
levels of skills and knowledge, trying to keep a multitude of operational 
tasks moving: I had made a vow that UNAMIR would never be the stum-
bling block to peace and stability in Rwanda, and the staff  worked them-
selves ragged to fulfi ll that promise. I had not allowed my principal staff  any 
leave time, with only a few exceptions, since the start of the war. A couple of 
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people had become zombies, blank and unresponsive, and we’d had to send 
them home. Others were over-irritable and would become very emotional 
over conditions that we had been living with for some time. It was as if a 
line had been crossed and they began to interpret everything as if they were 
Rwandan, wholly identifying with the victims. Once they started inhabiting 
the horror they could not handle any serious new work. We started to send 
them off  to Nairobi on the Hercules for a couple of days’ rest. Their fatigue 
was a recognized medical state. A  er seeing a doctor in Nairobi, they would 
move to a hotel room and then wash, sleep, eat and somehow a  empt to 
relax. Since there was no budget to handle the walking wounded, such bouts 
of rest and recuperation were at the expense of the injured person. (Dallaire 
2003, 484)
Because of his position as a commander, Dallaire no doubt considered 
himself at least partially responsible for the walking wounded, which 
probably fuelled the recognition of his own condition that he vowed to get 
help at some point (488, 501, 505, 509). 
Throughout the book, in his descriptions of traumatic stress, Dallaire 
describes situations, reactions, and bodily sensations that psychiatry 
would consider to be symptoms of PTSD. He described what could be 
considered a fl ashback, but does not use the word “fl ashback.” He writes 
about reliving the deep emotional distress. A  er having been briefed of 
recent atrocities in the Goma area (near Zaire, present-day Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), Dallaire (2003) writes,
I listened to the report without moving a muscle. It wasn’t shock any more at 
the horrifi c descriptions. Instead I now entered a sort of trance state when I 
heard such information; I’d heard so much of it over the past two weeks that 
it simply seemed to pile up in my mind. No reaction any more. No tears, no 
vomit, no apparent disgust. Just more cords of wood piling up waiting to 
be sawed into pieces in my mind. Much later, back in Canada, I was taking 
a vacation with my wife and children, driving down a narrow road on the 
way to the beach. Road workers had cut a lot of trees down on either side of 
the road and piled the branches up to be picked up later. The cut trees had 
turned brown, and the sawn ends of the trunks, white and of a fair size, were 
staked facing the road. Without being able to stop myself, I described to my 
wife in great detail a trip I had had to make to the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic 
Front] zone, where the route had taken me through the middle of a village. 
The sides of the road were li  ered with piles upon piles of Rwandan bodies 
drying in the sun, white bones ju  ing out. I was so sorry that my children 
had no choice but to listen to me. When we got to the beach, my kids swam 
and Beth read a book while I sat for more than two hours reliving the events 
reawakened in my mind. What terrible vulnerability we have all had to live 
with since Rwanda. (Dallaire 2003: 314–15)
Dallaire takes up his emotional distress and reoccupies his broken em-
bodiment with a new understanding of who he might become as part of 
who he is. In this passage, he follows the subjective fold of his material 
body, activated by external factors that then highlight for him the deep de-
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spair he lived through and would now live through again. Instead of using 
words that inscribe him with the diagnosis of PTSD, he a  empts to write 
his own subjectivity, not as one of someone ill, mad, or insane. Rather, he 
writes himself as a subject that has been part of an unspeakable inhuman-
ity, who simply acts rationally to irrationality. He sidesteps psychiatry as 
medicine to unmask unreason, to show how anyone could break under 
such extreme distress. In eff ect, he naturalizes such a reaction, and normal-
izes what psychiatry has determined to be symptoms of PTSD.
In several such instances Dallaire explains his actions in rational terms 
against an irrational background. He writes about his own short-tempered 
responses to UN personnel who refused to listen to his plea for help, but 
does not refer to it as irritability (Dallaire 2003, 402–3). He tells about un-
common, valorous acts in dangerous situations, but does not refer to these 
acts as emotional numbness or feelings of detachment (405). He recounts 
dreams, some of them recurrent, of dead bodies, incidents he has been 
involved in, and images of cruelty, but does not call them nightmares (414, 
467). His story, a disclosure of his subject positioning as one of the walk-
ing wounded who survived the genocide as a witness, works to naturalize 
what psychiatry understands as PTSD. His social and political standing 
as a high-ranking military offi  cer in the global community reinforces the 
legitimacy of his version of truth claims within the power/knowledge 
confi guration of war and psychiatric illness. Did Dallaire intend to put on 
display a subjectivity that challenged the conventional subjectivity of a 
weary warrior? No, we do not think so. We consider that his objective was 
to reassert the human condition as something fragile and not to be taken 
for granted. Through his acts, through his practices, through telling his 
story, he enacted a variant of the common subjectivity for the weary war-
rior, one that takes authority away from psychiatry and places a soldier’s 
reactions to war trauma squarely within reason, a rational being. Dallaire 
enacts the weary warrior as a natural, logical reaction to the inanities of 
inhumanity. Naturalizing these particular reactions to deep emotional dis-
tress to war trauma does not make traumatic stress reactions inevitable—it 
is stories like Dallaire’s that legitimize them. To generate this counternar-
rative, he draws on and recenters Christian values of mercy, compassion, 
and forgiveness, and invokes a pastoral knowledge of power.
Living Neurosis through Film Noir
Film, too, can be a site where weary warriors are made into subjects. War 
fi lms construct returning veterans into many diff erent subjects (Early 
2003), some of which complement, contradict, or negate each other. Re-
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turning war veterans are cast as heroes, poseurs, and anti-heroes (The Best 
Years of Our Lives 1946; Cu  er’s Way 1981; Le Retour de Martin Guerre 1982; 
Taxi Driver 1976); they serve as social symbols (The Big Chill 1983; Dances 
with Wolves 1990; The Legend of Bagger Vance 2000); they are motivated by 
guilt and revenge (Lethal Weapon 1987; Rio Lobo 1970; The Searchers 1956), 
act as comic sidekicks (The Big Lebowski 1998; Meet the Parents 2000), and 
encounter existential dilemmas (The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit 1956; The 
Seventh Seal 1957). These depictions, sometimes layered alongside contem-
porary social issues (e.g., the drug wars of Harlem in Gordon’s War [1970]), 
sometimes centered on the disturbed psychological aspects of a troubled 
life (e.g., The Long Night 1947), and sometimes focused on the tribulations 
of war veterans transitioning to civilian life (e.g., Till the End of Time 1946), 
rely on some image of war veterans being damaged psychologically in 
some way.
Yet it is the genre of fi lm noir that details many of the subjectivities wider 
society has to off er weary warriors. There are the walking wounded with 
ravished minds, symbols of postwar ennui (e.g., Macao 1952), castaways 
in their own homes and jobs (e.g., Thieves’ Highway 1949), and foils against 
which war heroes emerge (e.g., Brute Force 1947). The structure of each 
fi lm noir lays out the terrain that veterans travel postdeployment. Char-
acters live in moody (rainy, stormy) and o  en uncomfortable (excessive 
heat) urban environments where the bad guys are ensconced in pristine 
rural se  ings (ranches, mountains). These fi lms feature men negotiating 
the blurry lines of right and wrong and women as either their redeemers 
or their Achilles’ heels. The plot guides the main character along a path 
of self-understanding where he fi nds himself in a do-or-die situation and 
is forced to determine—for a fi nal time—his place in the world, which 
is o  en death. Indeed, fi lm noir as a genre is an exemplar of exhaustion, 
trauma, and shock. The terrain mapped is not the terrain of a masculine 
hero as a confi dent, honorable, and grounded veteran; nor is it the terrain 
of the displaced war veteran having diffi  culty reintegrating into home 
life, family, and intimate relationships, fi nding a job, or securing a pen-
sion. More accurately, it is the path of a weary warrior, one fatigued from 
the grind of the war and disenchanted by the acts witnessed and his own 
complicity in them. No other genre does what fi lm noir does: show what 
happens to individuals and the social connections these individuals have 
when war produces broken embodiments and sha  ered subjectivities. 
Film noir as a genre—including those fi lms without characters as war vet-
erans or direct links to the military or soldiers—calls into question what a 
society does a  er the supposed defeat of evil.
Each fi lm takes one confi guration of a neurotic syndrome, disorder, 
illness, or condition to feed into a larger argument about something else, 
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whether it is placelessness as in Macao (1952), time and personal trans-
formation as in Somewhere in the Night (1946), anti-fascism as in The Fallen 
Sparrow (1943), or anti-Semitism as in Crossfi re (1947). Even when there 
are no soldiers’ bodies searching for redemption, transitioning to civilian 
life, or reliving the atrocities of war, places themselves undergo similar 
transformations. For example, in The Third Man (1949), postwar Vienna as 
a city, culture, and society is caught up in the throes of fi nding a place in 
a world that is just emerging from a devastating struggle while having to 
deal with foreign occupation as punishment, guilt from bowing down to 
a dictator, and the threat of being controlled economically by black mar-
keteers. Vienna is damaged, but continues to exist, regenerated over and 
over again by trajectories set from its far and recent past, as well as by the 
characters that inhabit its heights, li  er its streets, and scurry through its 
sewers.
Discourses of heroism pervade much of fi lm noir, but it is not always 
the ideal hero that is circulating. While not quite the anti-hero that emerges 
in French and American cinema in the 1970s (a  er the Indochina and Viet 
Nam Wars), there are elements of undermining oneself, being driven by 
guilt, and eclipsing the signifi cance of what happened during the war by 
foregrounding relationships with the other soldiers. The sense of survival 
sometimes governs the discourse of heroism and serves as the catalyst 
for weariness, as played out in Key Largo (1948). Major Frank McCloud 
(played by Humphrey Bogart) visits the family of one of the men who 
served with him during the Italian campaign. McCloud has no people to 
go home to, and has been kicking around for a few years with no goals in 
mind. He lands in Key Largo at a busy time: the sheriff  is trying to bring 
two young Seminole brothers back to jail to serve thirty-day sentences, a 
Milwaukee boss and his gang have taken over the hotel, and a hurricane 
is on the way. McCloud spars with Rocco (Edward G. Robinson) through-
out the storm—their pasts are visited not through fl ashbacks (which is a 
common technique used in fi lm noir) but through dialogue about their 
character and the specifi c acts they engage in.8 They of course have com-
peting renditions of masculinity: Rocco humiliates women, pistol whips 
men, sacrifi ces innocent people, and cheats, double-crosses, and kills his 
enemies, while McCloud negotiates a tension between a desired cynicism 
(“All I care about is me and mine”) and an imminent heroism (“Your head 
says one thing and your life says something else”). For McCloud, one 
place is as good as any other to make a home. The sense is that he worked 
through survivor’s guilt and feelings of helplessness, and that he is willing 
to trust again. Once he has resolved these tensions (around the fold of the 
outside itself), he can come home—even if it is someone else’s home—be-
cause he can come home as the transformed (and refolded) war veteran.
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Ba  le exhaustion has been depicted in a variety of ways in fi lm noir, 
resulting in multiple enactments of weary warriors on fi lm. The nuanced 
understanding of how emotions and actions come together with veterans 
with psychiatric wounds in the character of Frank McCloud contrasts 
starkly with the heavy-handed, nearly stereotypical view of the weary 
warrior in The Blue Dahlia (1946). Johnny Morrison (played by Alan Ladd), 
a lieutenant commander and military hero, with two members of his crew, 
George Copeland (Hugh Beaumont) and Buzz Wenchak (William Bendix), 
returns home only to fi nd out his wife, Helen (Doris Dowling), is having 
an aff air with Eddie Harwood (Howard Da Silva), the gangster owner 
of a night club called the Blue Dahlia. When he fi nds out that she was 
responsible for their son’s death by car accident because of her drinking, 
he pulls a gun, throws it down, and storms out. The next morning, Helen 
turns up murdered. During the search for the murderer, a strong sense of 
displacement hangs in the air—no one seems to know where anyone is and 
everyone is looking for someone (something) else. A foggy ennui pours 
into each pause in dialogue and encloses each movement. As the search 
drones on, the hope for a peaceful denouement remains out of sight. Buzz, 
wounded in the war by shrapnel, has a plate in his head (making vis-
ible psychiatric wounds permits more legitimacy). Loud sounds and music 
set off  excruciating headaches. He is unable to concentrate, forgets where 
he is, is preoccupied with insignifi cant issues, bothered by repetitive acts, and 
becomes aggressive at the drop of a hat. As an eff ect of ba  le exhaustion, 
Buzz’s actions throughout the movie tell a story of the invisibly wounded 
combat veteran: they do not fi t in, commonplace things are enemies, and 
society needs to take care of them. The suspicion of Helen’s murder falls 
on Buzz. As Joyce picks at a blue dahlia, Buzz confesses to the murder 
evocative of what we today would understand as a fl ashback. However, 
Johnny, enacted as Buzz’s leader and protector, the militarized hero, and 
all-around good guy, comes in and saves Buzz from war fatigue and those 
unexpected things (suspicion, exclusion) associated with it.
Conceptualizations of fatigue diff er, depending on one’s subject po-
sitioning, just as psychiatric wounds disclose diff erent realities. In The 
Stranger (1946), the war veteran in this fi lm is a Nazi—Franz Kindler 
(played by Orson Welles), the fi ctional mastermind of the Holocaust. Mr. 
Wilson (Edward G. Robinson) is the War Crimes Commission offi  cer. In 
order to track Kindler, he releases another war criminal, Konrad Meinike 
(Kostantin Shayne), knowing that Meinike would lead him to Kindler. 
Meinike fi nds Kindler posing as Charles Rankin, a school teacher in a 
small New England town, engaged to be married to Mary Longstreet (Lo-
re  a Young). Once Rankin/Kindler realizes that Meinike has been broken 
by his experiences in the war and can no longer be trusted for the cause, 
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Rankin follows him, kills him, and buries him in the woods behind his 
home. Ba  le exhaustion plays out through Meinike, characterized as a 
weak link, living in a state of nervous breakdown, seeking forgiveness for his 
past deeds through religion. We call the expression of this particular set of 
bodily sensations a “breakdown” in the sense of ba  le exhaustion; moral-
ists might call his fanatical conversion to Christianity as compensation for 
his guilt. During the Second World War, Allied military psychiatry was in 
the midst of a shi   from explaining war neuroses as a result of something 
inherent in soldiers themselves toward understanding war neuroses as 
something that could happen to anyone. German military psychiatric ex-
planations for ba  le exhaustion primarily linked weakness and cowardice 
to a lack of strong leadership. So, once Meinike was captured, he had no 
leader to follow and suff ered a breakdown.
What is interesting about this fi lm is that the German veteran actu-
ally has wheedled his way into a quiet, commonplace life in small town 
America relatively easily in comparison to American veterans in other 
fi lms. Rankin, too, could be read as having symptoms related to ba  le 
exhaustion, but, because he is a Nazi, we see Rankin as a menace, patho-
logical liar, and supreme manipulator. Evil is the illness, not something 
brought on by experiences of war. Discursively, anti-fascism outfl anks 
ba  le exhaustion; unlike in other fi lm noir with combat veterans, these 
men remain enemies and both Kindler and Meinike die.
Some of the main characters in fi lm noir deal directly with their ba  le 
exhaustion rather than have it inform the way in which they take up their 
postwar lives. Usually war fatigue impedes the transition to civilian life 
and forces the veteran to search for a place to belong and an identity to 
slip into. Somewhere in the Night (1946) opens in a fi eld dressing station 
with a soldier whose face and head are fully bandaged a  er he has fallen 
on a grenade. In a voiceover, the audience and the soldier understand 
that this is “something that happens to you. You forget who you are or 
where you belong.” His identifi cation papers mark him as George Taylor 
(played by John Hodiak), but the name does not feel right to him. Some-
thing is amiss. Clues to his true identity (if there is such a thing) initiate 
a hunt for a man named Larry Cravat and a missing two million dollars. 
The pursuit of Cravat drags him through criminal hangouts and thug life 
along the California coast. Christy Smith (Nancy Guild) as a new love, Mel 
Phillips (Richard Conte) as a nice bar owner, and Donald Kendall (Lloyd 
Nolan) as a police lieutenant, assist him in his journey. Although Taylor 
never truly remembers, he comes to understand who he was and who 
he is, and they are two very diff erent people—the folds seem all messed 
up. George came home, but not to the person he was before; that man is 
gone and so is the woman he loved. Now there is a new home with a new 
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woman, situations and identities he can slide right into. Although a man 
of questionable moral fi ber before the war, Taylor is saved by a textured 
sense of the concepts he used to disclose his new life: his notion of hero-
ism. Ba  le exhaustion permi  ed him to complete the transformation he 
made upon enlisting in the service. He is more like Frank McCloud than 
Buzz Wenchak; through his amnesia from the head wound, he purges and 
cleanses himself in his preparation for a new life.
Unlike George Taylor, veterans in fi lm noir do not always want to deal 
head-on with ba  le exhaustion, unless forced to. In The Chase (1946), 
Chuck Sco   (played by Robert Cummings) returns a wallet to its owner, 
gangster Eddie Roman (Steve Cochran). Upon arrival, Eddie’s sidekick, 
Gino (Peter Lorre) fi nds a job for Chuck as a chauff eur and issues him 
a uniform. Chuck becomes primary driver for Eddie’s wife, Lorna (Mi-
chèle Morgan). Together, he and Lorna eventually concoct a plan to fl ee 
to Cuba so that Lorna can be free of Eddie’s tyranny, and Chuck can be 
her savior. The plan goes off  without a hitch, but in Cuba Eddie tracks 
them down. Just when Chuck is going to die … he wakes up, and cannot 
remember much of the last few days. He runs out of the house directly 
to the naval hospital to treat his ba  le exhaustion. The commander (Jack 
Holt) reassures Chuck that everything is okay, that shock cases o  en have 
black outs, and that anxiety neuroses prevent him from remembering things 
clearly. Once things se  le down, the commander reassures Chuck that he 
will remember why he was where he was and what the uniform means. 
The commander treats Chuck as he would have in the fi eld—that is, with 
reassurance, abreaction, and with the expectation that he would return to 
what was bothering him. But, in a fl ash, Chuck remembers and is off  again 
running away to Cuba with a gangster’s wife.
Parallel to the plot in The Blue Dahlia (1946), the veteran with ba  led 
exhaustion is the murder suspect in Crossfi re (1947). The movie opens with 
a murder. Shadows and low camera angles prevent the viewer from see-
ing who is murdered or who the murderer is. Homicide detective Captain 
Finlay (played by Robert Young) runs the investigation of the murder of 
Joseph Samuels (Sam Levene). Sergeant Peter Keeley (Robert Mitchum), 
the prime suspect’s best friend, runs an investigation of his own. The story 
unfolds in a series of fl ashbacks from diff erent viewpoints. The prime sus-
pect, Corporal Arthur Mitchell (George Cooper), is described by his army 
buddies as someone who is not tough, an artist, and the type of man who 
needs a wife. In a conversation with Finlay, Keeley says that he himself 
has killed men “where you get a medal for it,” but Mitchell could not kill 
anyone, even there. Suspicion falls on Mitchell because on the night of the 
murder, he is described as being in a strange mood, unfocussed, intoxicated, 
ji  ery, depressed, and unable to remember what has happened. In this fi lm, 
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ba  le fatigue is worked up as something “natural” and almost expected 
among men who are so   with artistic temperaments. The point is not that 
soldiers returning home a  er having been displaced for four years bring 
with them the trauma and activities of war, and then act unscrupulously; 
rather, the point is that veterans are being asked to return to a society that 
has only a few available slots for veterans, all of which are full of problems 
that entangle the veteran in a new, disillusioned world, including anti-
Semitism, greed, violence, and fear.
Temporal Resonance
Critically reading cultural texts provides insight into the ways that soci-
ety views the psychological, emotional, and spiritual wounds of soldiers. 
The artistic and creative depictions reviewed here work to undermine the 
masculine norm of the fi ghting soldier without invoking the negation of 
manhood (read: woman) as the key element in challenging the notion of 
war. The eff ects of these texts support the idea that there is some reso-
nance in the types of war neuroses among weary warriors from diff erent 
wars. That is, even though the specifi cs of the trauma vary, the cultural 
enactments are similar. Pat Barker’s novels were published at the same 
time that British veterans of the Gulf War were lobbying for disability pen-
sions. GWS was, and still is, a hotly contested illness, particularly because 
of the role the environment played in its etiological discussions, hearken-
ing back to the days of contestation over the spraying of Agent Orange by 
the American military (P. Brown et al. 2012). The idea that the illness was 
all in one’s head was popular among physicians, psychiatrists, journalists, 
and the public in general. Soldiers suff ering from a combination of what 
was considered to be largely physiological symptoms, such as burning 
semen, cognitive impairment, loss of muscle coordination, and fatigue, 
were cast as a group as malingerers, whiners, and fakers. Tim Carlson’s 
work, too, focuses a  ention on the vicissitudes of shi  ing from the war to 
the domestic front living with the shock of war, and how some bodies get 
lost in that transition.
Just as we are taking up the nomadism of the weary warrior as subject, 
autobiographies by weary warriors themselves indicate that becoming ill 
is but one pathway through which they become who they are as a subject 
at any given moment. In other words, each soldier’s own specifi city is 
much more complex than what we could ever call into evidence as a dem-
onstration of the complexity of subjectivity. Their folds are manifold. Their 
stories tell us much about how their own sense of self transforms, some-
times with a slow reconfi guration of a variety of infl uences and sometimes 
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in a fl ash. Film noir was the signature genre of a generation of youth called 
on to fi ght a war that was beyond what had ever been imagined. These 
post–Second World War fi lmmakers as visual artists set as their task the 
weaving of cultural moments into a tapestry of real life. As part of captur-
ing these youth, fi lmmakers used depictions of emotionally distressed 
warriors and psychologically wounded soldiers to draw a  ention to the 
social ills ushered in because of the war.
Notes
 1. For the American case of over 90 percent survival rate, see Gawande 2004.
 2. We use the term “Markov chain” to highlight the contingency of the interac-
tion of variables with which individual subjectivities emerge. Andrei Andrei-
vish Markov (1856–1922) was a mathematician who described the movement 
of one state to another through a set of random variables in terms of indepen-
dence. Although we are not claiming the past and future of weary warriors are 
independent of the present, we are drawing a  ention to the present as part of 
a set of circumstances that are considered to have their own individual histo-
ries and futures. It is the contingent constitutive nature of these interactions 
that is signifi cant in the emergence of a subject. But it is somewhat random 
which variables are enacted; that is, subjects cannot be predicted, nor always 
traced.
 3. Bichat was an anatomist and physiologist. His works, though few in num-
ber, were infl uential in the emergence of the fi eld of pathology. He studied 
through post mortems how particular bodily organs functioned and how 
disease processes altered organs. He died at the early age of thirty. 
 4. In fact, she argues that philosophy, too, needs to focus on the exemplary situa-
tions in wri  en texts so as to cultivate the words and images they invoke (Mol 
2008).
 5. Tyquin (2006) does a fi ne job in detailing the long-term eff ects of shell-shocked 
soldiers in Australia, well into the 1930s. 
 6. Page number references refer to the Quality Paperback Book Club publication 
of the three novels in one volume (Barker 1997).
 7. On the discussion of calculating the death toll, see Verpoorten 2005.
 8. One use of fl ashback brings a  ention to the idea that someone or something 
survived, even though it may not have been the main character. 
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Fixing Soldiers
The Treatment of Bodies, 
Minds, and Souls

The object of these pages is a practical one. It is to collate and present 
in a convenient form the information which may be useful to those 
who are engaged in the treatment of soldiers and civilians—by 
heat and cold in baths, by electricity and radiation, by massage, 
mechanical apparatus, exercises and medical gymnastics, as well 
as by medicinal waters and climate in British health-resorts.
—R. Fortescue Fox, Physical Remedies for Disabled Soldiers
The invention of the “group,” the conception of “social” or “human” 
relations as key determinants of individual conduct, were the most 
consistent lesson of the psychological and psychiatric experience of war.
—Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul
During the Great War, faradization (electroshock therapy) was one of the 
methods for treating the psychoneuroses of soldiers, an application by 
physicians of strong electrical currents to diff erent body parts of a weary 
warrior. As described at the time by a professor in the faculty of medicine 
in Paris,
The patient lies absolutely naked on the bed, where he is fi rst treated in 
the recumbent position, especially in motor aff ections of the lower limbs. 
A  erwards, he is treated si  ing down, then standing up, walking, running, 
etc. The apparatus for faradizations supplied to the medical services is the 
type used; the dry cells may be advantageously replaced by Leclanché bat-
teries, which are connected up in series. A spool of fi ne wire is used, and as 
stimulators at fi rst pads, then revolving cylinders, then a metal brush. The 
current is at fi rst feeble and then gradually increased; the poles are fi rst ap-
plied to the aff ected parts of the skin surface (ears, neck, lips, sole of the feet, 
perineum, scrotum). Care must be taken to proceed gently at fi rst … then, 
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if need be, the strength of the current is increased and more energetic mea-
sures used (Roussy and Lhermi  e 1917, 168)
In more recent wars, those in the past thirty years or so, third location 
decompression (TLD) is one of the methods used to treat soldiers’ psyches 
as they transition from being a soldier to being a veteran. Decompression 
is “a process designed to allow service personnel returning from deploy-
ment to adapt to the home environment in a graduated way, with the 
aim of reducing the potential for maladaptive psychological adjustment” 
(Hacker Hughes et al. 2008: 534). TLD refers to managing the decom-
pression process in a pleasant, relatively isolated place, removed from 
what soldiers will most likely be facing on returning home. Several NATO 
countries have developed TLD programs, including Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (de Soir 2011). The success of TLD for supporting soldiers transi-
tioning from deployment to domestic life comes from diverse sources, 
including spouses, the armed forces, and the soldiers themselves (Marin 
2007; McRaven 2012; Sourbeer 2008). According to a Veterans Aff airs Can-
ada newsle  er article, decompression sessions have three goals:
1.  Release—Decompression gives Canadian Forces members a chance to 
switch from their combat state of mind before returning to their families 
and communities. “A  er soldiering with adrenaline running 24-hours a 
day, many troops have to get stuff  off  their chests,” said [Tom] Martineau 
[Peer Support Coordinator, Operational Stress Injury Social Support Pro-
gram, Kingston, Ontario].
2.  Relax—Canadian Forces members participate in a number of leisure ac-
tivities to help them unwind, including sports, cultural events or just 
cha  ing with comrades.
3.  Reassure—Educational sessions focus on adjusting back to “normal” life, 
the mental health impact of serving in hostile areas and spo  ing the signs 
of OSIs. Participants learn about programs and services they can turn to 
for help. (Salute! 2008, n.p.)
For the Canadian Forces, like many of the NATO countries, TLD takes 
place in a nice hotel in Cyprus. Over a fi ve-day period, soldiers adjust to 
postdeployment life while a  ending seminars, undergoing psychological 
testing, and taking in the local a  ractions.
For addressing the psychological health of combatants, these two ac-
counts obviously represent diff erent treatment modalities for diff erent 
types of soldiers. Each entails a particular form of power and knowledge 
as well as a specifi c kind of military psychiatric practice. The use of fara-
dization illustrates an exercise of an anatomopolitics of the body through 
the deployment of disciplinary power—infl icting pain on the soldier’s 
fl eshed body to restore physical and functional capacities in line with 
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military objectives. The location, intensity, and duration of the electrical 
current are strategically arranged and closely observed for bodily reac-
tions by the psychiatrist.1 TLD illustrates a form of biopolitics, because it 
is a general policy managing a distinct group with the aim of improving 
soldiers’ resiliency and eff ectiveness.
We present these two accounts not to claim that over recent history 
treatment methods for weary warriors have undergone a progressive 
and continual shi   in sophistication or in modalities, nor to suggest that 
the shi   in treatment focus is simply from the bodies of soldiers to their 
minds.2 In fact, faradization, when applied to soldiers in the Great War, 
was accompanied by other psychiatric techniques such as hypnosis, en-
couragement, and disciplinary suggestion (Yealland 1918). In the inter-
vening generations and wars between these accounts, there have been 
both changes and continuities in the way soldiers are treated for emotional 
wounds. Lessons of treatments from previous wars are seemingly forgot-
ten and in part rediscovered by military psychiatrists in later confl icts. 
Old practices ladened with terms and theories from the past, resurface, 
contending for acceptance alongside newer practices, phrases, and ap-
proaches. Faradization as a treatment for soldiers’ psychological wounds 
has not disappeared.
In the early decades of the twenty-fi rst century, the traumatized sol-
dier is the object of analogous fi xes. More generally, we argue that for 
over a century now, the body, the mind, and even the soul have been 
points of psychiatric treatment practices in military environments. These 
two accounts reveal a number of the dimensions and thus debates and 
choices over treatment methods including techniques for individuals and 
for groups of soldiers that tend to be more reactive than preventative; ten-
sions among goals for redeployment to combat, reintegration to civilian 
life, and care or cure for illness; and eff ects of power that are intrusive and 
coercive or supportive and fl exible, or some mixture of all. Whatever the 
style of methods used for fi xing soldiers, sets of authority relationships, 
most evidently but not exclusively military, frame each encounter. Treat-
ment involves the application of both psychiatric techniques via practices 
emanating from medical sciences directed at the minds and bodies of ill 
soldiers; and techniques involving ideas and practices arising from reli-
gious, moral, and spiritual knowledge directed at soldiers’ souls.
In this chapter we discuss three distinct, though interlinked, ways of 
organizing power and exercising knowledge to treat soldiers enduring ex-
treme psychological and emotional distress—that is, those focusing on the 
body, the mind, and the soul. We consider actual examples of treatments 
used by military psychiatrists in wartime and of pastoral care for weary 
warriors in diff erent time periods, diff erent armed forces, and diff erent 
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places of combat.3 Fixing soldiers’ bodies, minds, and souls involves or-
ganizing personnel and facilities across a diverse geography of treatment 
sites, protecting and stabilizing the injured bodies, ravished minds, and 
troubled souls of combatants, and then providing an assortment of sup-
ports and services for mending or repairing them. Treatment measures 
for weary warriors, then, can be thought of as regimens for managing the 
movement and deployment of large numbers of people under military au-
thority and wartime contingencies. Within all these treatments of curing, 
counseling, and consoling, the intention is to restore the body, reaffi  rm 
masculinity, and preserve—as far as possible—the soldier’s health, sanity, 
and spirituality.
Curing Soldiers’ Bodies 
From the vantage point of the military as an institution, the recovery of 
soldiers’ wounded bodies is a means to another end—namely, redeploy-
ment with a full return to the unit (RTU). Failing RTU, assignment to other 
military duties is possible for the partially fi xed soldier who can still func-
tion, but only within a set of identifi able limits. Failing both, the unfi xable 
soldier undergoes further discipline and control by means of evacuation, 
segregation, or even expulsion from the military. The belief that individu-
als “affl  icted with mental disorder are the outcasts of society—a trouble-
some waste product [is] an idea which the Army, at any rate, must get rid 
of without delay, and without compunction” (Lepine 1919, xvi). In war, an 
army’s objective is one of “maintaining at its maximum the numbers and 
value of the eff ectives in the fi ring line, of using to the last man all reserves 
at the base” (xxi). These are the words not of a military commander but 
of a clinical professor of nervous and mental diseases at the Université de 
Lyon who had overseen the treatment of some six thousand patients. 
A Canadian physician serving at the XI General Hospital, in Boulogne, 
France, during the Great War, Robert D. Rudolf observed that the major 
complaint among soldiers was not psychological, but based in the body, 
as a type of myalgia, with “indefi nite but very o  en crippling pains and 
tenderness in the various groups of muscles” (Rudolf 1915: 257). His de-
scription of the wounded soldier’s initial arrival echoes the diagnosis and 
immediate treatment message in the forward psychiatry used in the ex-
haustion units in the Second World War and foreshadows contemporary 
use of TLD centers for transitioning soldiers from Afghanistan:
When they fi rst arrive they are tired out and generally sleep for most of the 
fi rst few days, unless their condition keeps them awake. A few, however, are 
a stage farther than this in exhaustion and cannot sleep at all for a time. They 
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are undressed, thoroughly washed and put into clean beds between sheets; 
and it must seem to many of them as if heaven could really exist on earth, 
as they lie there clean, warm, well fed, with nothing to do and no sound of 
fi ring in their ears. (Rudolf 1915: 256)
In his report, there is no mention of nerves, shock, or breakdowns.4 Granted, 
the majority of nerve cases would have taken a diff erent path through the 
Canadian medical services and may not have been admi  ed to any gen-
eral hospital, yet it seems strange that, even as a physician, Rudolf made 
no mention of the connection between ambiguous pain pa  erns and the 
diagnostic category of hysteria.5 The upbeat and optimistic patina of his 
remarks is reinforced by his comments about the usefulness of pu  ing 
into practice Frederick Walker Mo  ’s (1916: 553) idea of the “atmosphere 
of cure.” Although psychotherapy and abreaction were included in treat-
ment regimens for nerve cases, Mo   did not see a need for these treatment 
modalities. The atmosphere of cure, employed in Allied hospitals across 
France, reduces all ailments—no ma  er the diagnosis ascribed to an ill 
body—to one treatment approach that tends to the cheerfulness on the 
part of the doctor and nurse, diversion from the recollection of the trauma 
of war, and the “comfort, welfare, and amusement” of each patient (553).
Recall that in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century psychiatry and 
neurology were vying for dominance over the mind as object of the fi eld of 
study. During the Great War, a number of English and French physicians, 
among others, wrote texts on physical treatments for soldiers suff ering 
shock, nerves, and trauma (Fox 1917; Lepine 1919; Roussy and Lhermi  e 
1917; Yealland 1918). Robert Fortescue Fox, honorary director of the Red 
Cross Clinic in London, England, for the treatment of disabled soldiers 
wrote a comprehensive text on physical remedies. He noted, “many men 
coming back from the fi eld are seriously ill. Besides surgical and medical 
infections, they have wounds or disorders of the nerve centers. And the 
nervous injury is shown not only by many forms of paralysis and func-
tional nervous disorder, but by disturbances of the circulation and nutri-
tion” (Fox: 5). Fox accordingly catalogued the therapies and remedies 
in terms of climatic, hydrological, mechanical, and electrical treatments. 
Climatic therapies (akin to spa and waters therapy) for Fox meant using 
scientifi c knowledge of sunshine, humidity, winds, and mean tempera-
tures throughout Great Britain to treat disabled soldiers. A related set of 
methods for fi xing soldiers concerned rest, and quiet, tranquil conditions, 
such as resort facilities.
Hydrotherapy involved remedial baths, medicinal waters, and 
springs, with baths classifi ed by temperature ranges as cold or cooling, 
subthermal, thermal, and hyperthermal baths. Remedial baths ranged 
from douche baths, shower baths, needle baths, hot air and vapor baths, 
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whirlpool baths, and sand baths; sand baths entailed an ancient practice 
of covering the aff ected limb with heated sand, mud, or peat. Mechanical 
treatment methods include massage, physical exercise, and medical gym-
nastics deploying weights, cords, and pulleys. This physical education 
could include “systematic exercises directed towards the re-establish-
ment of the lost functions—motor re-education, helped by massage and 
passive movements” as well as physiotherapy (Roussy and Lhermi  e 
1917: 169). Participation in some recreational and sport activities as well 
as some agricultural labor, factory work, or domestic duties in the facility 
were regarded as therapeutic measures, too ( Kloocke et al. 2005; Lepine 
1919).
Electrical remedies, medical electricity, or electrotherapy (faradism and 
also called galvanism) for neurasthenia or shell shock were not intended 
to be the only treatment modality. As Fox describes,
Electricity can never play the sole part in the treatment of these conditions; 
but it is a valuable aid. The full-body bath is employed fi rst, with a mild 
sinusoidal current; also cerebral galvanism, positive pole on the forehead. 
This should be done only by skilled persons, and either a cell ba  ery or a 
small earth-free generator must be used. At a later stage the high-frequency 
spark up and down the spine has a bracing eff ect, and tends, amongst other 
good eff ects, to raise the blood pressure, which is frequently low in neuras-
thenic patients. (Fox 1917: 166)
The use of electrical shock by means of a pad electrode was endorsed by 
Yealland as eff ective in treating disorders of speech, hearing, and vision 
among veterans. Even the mere presence of the faradic ba  ery served as 
“an implement of suggestion” to improve the a  itude of a patient (Yeal-
land 1918: vi). Roussy and Lhermi  e claimed that faradization “is of spe-
cial value in psycho-sensorial and sensory disorders due to shock, nervous 
crises, and most of the psycho-motor disorders. It really depends on pro-
ducing a kind of ‘crisis,’ which we should try to obtain at the fi rst séance 
[sic; read: instance]. The la  er o  en has to be continued for some hours, 
until the patient is fi nally ‘mastered’ ” (1917: 168).6 Throughout the Great 
War the use of electrotherapy faced sharp criticisms by medical profes-
sionals and by soldiers in Germany as well as in England. At the end of the 
war, in Germany “there were mutinies following the use of electrotherapy, 
which the soldiers felt was torture and abuse, and when those aff ected 
went to court and brought lawsuits against the military doctors who had 
treated them” (Kloocke et al. 2005: 54).
Another bodily treatment involved diet control and the frequent pre-
scription of warm milk, a bread-and-water diet, or rice pudding with 
tea until the symptoms improved (Roussy and Lhermi  e 1917). This had 
been a common measure of treatment dispensed in asylums before the 
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turn of the twentieth century for patients with nervous disorders not able 
to sleep. In the German armies in the Second World War, particularly in 
the early years, “soldiers suff ering from mental and physical strain more 
o  en showed psychosomatic reactions [than war neurosis disorders], for 
example peptic ulcers. Eventually, there were so many of them that they 
were put together in special ‘stomach ba  alions’ in which all soldiers 
shared the same diet” (Kloocke et al. 2005: 46).
For certain medical offi  cers serving U.S. forces in the Pacifi c during the 
Second World War, where there were few psychiatrists, the complaints of 
troops under their care and supervision were not surprisingly fundamen-
tally physiological in nature. One American regimental surgeon observed, 
“some Pacifi c troops had engaged in hard labor under aerial bombard-
ment and strafi ng and in tropical conditions for more [than] eight months 
straight. … Many were completely worn out, and had severe back and 
abdominal pains. … Observations like these tended to stress the need for 
rest periods and/or breaks from routine” (Bresnahan 1999: 145–46). Other 
medical reports noted environmental stresses associated with the heat and 
humidity and rugged terrains that are important in making soldiers’ bod-
ies ill. The diagnosis of tropical neurasthenia, with symptoms of weight 
loss, li  le physical stamina or endurance, exhaustion, and low morale was 
treated much like everything else: limited tours of duty, rotation of troops, 
and, for serious cases, stateside evacuation.
With a rapid increase in the number of mortar blasts and other explo-
sions in Pacifi c combat in 1943, medical offi  cers reported on what some 
called “blast concussion with implications for brain physiology,” a term 
and diagnosis reminiscent of the debate in Europe over shell shock during 
the Great War. Bresnahan (1999) gives the following account:
Many medical offi  cers, even those with prior psychiatric training, seemed 
to have been taken aback by their experiences with soldiers who had some-
times literally been blown ten feet by a mortar blast or other explosion. “I 
thought I knew something about psychiatry,” one medical offi  cer remarked, 
“but with the sudden shockingly brutal, dramatic, precipitating factor in 
front line action to contend with, I’ve seen cases I’ve rarely seen in civil-
ian life.” His report referred specifi cally to “blast concussion” as a specifi c 
disease entity in which a shell or mortar or bomb explosion does not hit a 
person directly but always knock them unconscious for several minutes. 
Typically, the victims could not walk unassisted a  er regaining conscious-
ness and had severe headaches, joint pains, and irritation of eyes for at least 
a week. The medical offi  cer speculated that the “underlying pathology is the 
production of tiny petechial hemorrhages in the brain and other parts of the 
body.” The cases improved a  er a few days and wanted to rejoin the squads 
but “every time they hear an explosion—even a distant one—they go into 
the syndrome immediately.” (Bresnahan 1999: 146–47)
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Recurring and lingering eff ects from such blast concussions, in the form 
of tremors and panic episodes, meant that soldiers were not really fi t for 
combat duty, which frequently resulted in evacuations.
Combat fl ying fatigue received some a  ention by the nascent fi eld of 
aviation medicine in the Great War and became the subject of further 
study and analysis during the Second World War. One such study was 
prepared for the Air Surgeons Army Air Forces into the experiences of 
the U.S. Eighth Air Force in their fi rst year of combat from July 1942 to 
July 1943 in the European theater of operations from bases in England. 
The study examined the pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and gunners in 
heavy bombers; the B17 Flying Fortress and the B24 Liberator with mis-
sions deep into Germany (Hastings, Wright, and Glueck 1944). While the 
purpose of the study was to report on facets of psychiatry among com-
bat fl ying personnel, the report did draw a  ention to physical aspects of 
combat fl ying which the authors called fl ying fatigue. One purpose of this 
term was to normalize a certain amount of fear and stress with combat 
fl ying, and another was to distinguish that realm of belligerent behaviors 
and breakdown with more serious forms of depression, severe anxiety, 
and emotional illness that the report called “operational fatigue.”
Flying fatigue the report defi ned as “ordinary fatigue and the physical 
and mental symptoms of it,” adding that it is “the same as the fatigue any 
individual would suff er if he had insuffi  cient sleep, rest, relaxation, and 
had been exposed to the nervous strain of fl ying” (Hastings et al. 1944: 26). 
Other contributing factors or causes of fl ying fatigue were high-altitude 
missions and missions too close together on consecutive days. The report 
emphasized that fl ying fatigue “does not imply that the individual is emo-
tionally sick” (27) and therefore does not require specialized treatments. 
Rather, combat fl ying personnel displaying fl ying fatigue “can be cured 
readily by giving the individuals two to fi ve days of rest” (27). The body 
of the soldier is the object of treatment, not the mind.
“Operational fatigue,” by contrast, was the term used to describe a 
breakdown in emotionally stable individuals. The symptoms were that 
the face of the aircrew member was “pale and drawn. He is tense, irritable, 
and frequently has a tremor of the fi ngers. The irritability is especially 
apparent when discussing the combat situation, the patient becoming ag-
gressive and belligerent on li  le provocation. He quarrels easily … over 
trifl es … [and] frequently begins to avoid his fellows in an eff ort to avoid 
quarrels” (Hastings et al. 1944: 70). Other symptoms of operational fatigue 
were loss of appetite, weight loss, severe anxiety, and intense dreams or 
nightmares. Rest and cessation from fl ying were insuffi  cient treatments 
for a cure. Additional treatment measures recommended were a thorough 
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examination of the patient and observation for three to four days. A  er 
assessment was completed, there was usually a two- to four-day period 
of narcosis or sleep therapy, giving doses of a sedative drug to produce 
a prolonged sleep for twenty out of twenty-four hours, doses that were 
repeated depending on the severity of the stress. A convalescent period of 
three to four days with a high-caloric diet prepared the aircrew member 
for a two-week program of physical reconditioning as well as short-term 
day leaves from the hospital. From these three to four weeks of active 
therapy, the U.S. Eighth Air Force found that about 70 percent of the pa-
tients returned to combat fl ying while the remaining 30 percent returned 
to their units for ground duties.
From this discussion, we see that several treatment mechanisms are 
embodied through individuals. In other words, certain kinds of knowl-
edge manifest as a materiality through the bodies of individual soldiers. 
Treatments are techniques not only for fi xing bodies, but also for address-
ing military requirements.
Counseling Soldiers’ Minds 
Psychiatric practices for treating soldiers tend to concern the interior lives 
of warriors. This is the soldier as psychological being with a  itudes, be-
liefs, feelings, deep reminiscences, morale, morality, intelligence, and per-
sonality. From a human sciences perspective, fi xing soldiers centers on 
the person, a modernist concept that represents “a bounded sphere of 
thought, will, and emotion; the site of consciousness and judgement; the 
author of its acts and the bearer of a personal responsibility; an individual 
with a unique biography assembled over the course of a life” (Rose 1989: 
217).
Wartime conditions generate psychological and emotional eff ects as 
well as physical and functional eff ects. These eff ects produce anxieties, 
traumas, psychoses, and neuroses that—at least some specialists argued—
were distinctive and associated with new technologies and sheer slaughter 
of human beings. Psychological a  ributes and eff ects of wartime condi-
tions identifi ed during the Great War were “the sudden departure, the 
leap into the unknown, the separation from one’s dear ones, the frightful 
uncertainty as to what might befall one, the great fl ame of patriotism, 
which sustains, but also exacerbates the nervous tension … the anxious 
waiting of results, the violent emotions and in of ba  le, the commotions 
and shocks [and, in terms of morale,] the heavy losses, the general and 
continuous danger, the need of living perpetually on the alert, and above 
all, the duration of the war [from 1914 to 1918]” (Lepine 1919: xviii, xix). 
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Such psychological strains of combat conditions have reappeared in sub-
sequent wars and confl icts throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-fi rst century. For aircrew engaged in combat in the Second World 
War, so-called normal events for bombers involved “watching close-in 
and constant enemy fi ghter a  acks, fl ying through seemingly impenetra-
ble walls of fl ak, seeing neighboring planes go down out of control and 
at times explode in the air, returning with dead or seriously wounded on 
board and other such experiences, [all of which] imposed a severe and 
repeated stress” (Hastings et al. 1944: 5). Some authors suggest that recent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—which include novel ba  le situations such 
as terrorist tactics (suicide bombers and IEDs) and pervasive ba  lefronts 
in both civilian and military zones—have made currently serving mili-
tary service members more at risk for PTSD than in the past (Simms, 
O-Donnell, and Molyneaux 2009). But what does more at risk for PTSD 
really mean?
Following D-Day and the invasion of Normandy by Allied troops in 
June 1944, fi erce ba  les and heavy losses ensued over the next several 
months, both of wounded casualties and soldiers presenting with ba  le 
exhaustion or neuropsychiatric casualties. Copp (2003), in a study of Cana-
dian troops in Normandy writes, “The intensity of combat was imposing 
an extraordinary burden on men’s minds as well as on their lives” (87; see 
also Copp 2006; Copp and McAndrew 1990). The senior psychiatrist for 
the Second British Army explained the soaring rates of ba  le exhaustion: 
“The initial hopes and optimism were too high and the gradual realiza-
tion that the ‘walk over’ to Berlin had developed into an infantry slogging 
match caused an unspoken but clearly recognizable increase in the inci-
dence of psychiatric casualties arriving in a steady stream at the Exhaus-
tion Centres and reinforced by waves of beaten and exhausted men from 
each of the major ba  les” (quoted in Copp 2003: 111). CEUs were set up 
to deal with anticipated cases of ba  le fatigue because psychiatrists had 
convinced the military command that troops invading Normandy were at 
higher risk of developing ba  le fatigue given their experience in previous 
campaigns.7
Leading up to the Second World War, military and psychiatric authori-
ties assumed that screening programs would detect and remove the unfi t 
and unsuitable recruits, including those predisposed to mental illness or 
a nervous breakdown. As well, American military leaders and likely the 
general population in United States at the time, believed “that sturdy, 
well-adjusted soldiers of strong character would be able to withstand the 
stresses of war. … In the opening days of World War II, only 35 psychia-
trists were involved with the military. By the end of the war, this number 
had risen to nearly 1000, just short of one third of all American psychia-
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trists” (Pol 2006: 145, 146). In addition to psychiatrists, the U.S. military 
drew on the services of anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and 
other social scientists to assist in understanding the dynamics of wartime 
stresses on combat troops. In 1944 a University of Chicago professor of 
psychiatry writing about psychiatric casualties of war noted “recent in-
formation indicates that approximately 30 per cent of casualties in ba  le 
zones are psychiatric in nature. In some places, the proportion is even 
higher. With early treatment, however … it is expected in view of British 
experience that 70–80 per cent of these men can be returned to duty” fol-
lowing treatment (Slight 1944: 156–57). The potential of psychiatric treat-
ment to an armed force thus seemed substantial with a success rate of 
fi xing and returning to full duty between one-in-fi ve to one-in-four of total 
military casualties.
Underpinning the psychiatric treatment of weary warriors is a history 
of diff erent aims and practices along with divergent theories and beliefs 
about probable causes and favored professional cures. We can identify 
four such treatment regimes organized around reassurance and resto-
ration, aversion, psychoanalysis, and social psychology. Each treatment 
regime focuses on the soldier’s state of mind as an object of inquiry and 
action, but the regimes diff er in how the body and mind are understood 
and treated.
Reassurance and restoration methods devote considerable a  ention to 
physiological elements and physical remedies. There is no sharp Carte-
sian mind-body dualism here for psychiatric casualties in ba  le zones:
The treatment required is o  en the simplest variety, including rest with the 
aid of sedatives as necessary, good food, quiet, and reassurance. The success 
of these measures is dependent on their early application and before the 
casualty is removed too far from the combat zone. … [Such treatments are 
eff ective in] acute forms of emotional disorder associated with fear, panic, 
anxiety, or confusion and due to physical strains, to excessive fatigue, loss of 
sleep, exhaustion, hunger, and other forms of deprivation. They may thus be 
of a transitory nature if treated immediately. More lasting forms of disorder 
must be removed from the combat zones for prolonged treatment or even 
returned to this country. (Slight 1944: 158–59)
Aversive therapy, sometimes called active treatment, is a type of condi-
tioning and consists of a psychiatrist scripting a situation (stimulus) and 
the ill soldier being subject to discomfort, pain, or another negative re-
percussion.8 Ruth Kloocke, Heinz-Peter Schmiedebach, and Stefan Priebe 
(2005) describe how German psychiatrists in both World Wars treated 
soldiers suff ering from psychological trauma and stress. They point out 
that for the fi rst few years of the Great War most German soldiers with 
psychological injuries from combat were discharged and provided state 
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pensions, but that as the war dragged on “the same patients were re-ex-
amined and in some cases pensions were withdrawn. … [M]any of the 
‘neurotics’ who had been previously discharged as incurable were sub-
jected to a new system of treatment” (46–47). Neurotics were separated 
from the chronically mentally ill and malingerers, and if treatment was 
considered useful, these patients were sent “to specialized stations where 
so called ‘active treatment’ was administered, alongside certain forms of 
psychotherapy. Diff erent forms of aversive therapy were included under 
the heading of ‘active treatment.’ These were eff ective with a mixture of 
hypnosis, discipline and punishment” (47).
Suggestive hypnosis, as developed by a Hamburg neurologist, involved 
three elements in order to work: “absolute self-confi dence on the part of 
the doctor, complete subordination on the part of the patient, and the 
creation of an atmosphere in which the success of the cure was a foregone 
conclusion” (Kloocke et al.: 47). Some British specialists during the Great 
War also practiced treating war shock in soldiers via suggestion under 
hypnotism of the patient, reporting promising results and suggesting that 
“the soldier is peculiarly susceptible to suggestion; the whole training 
and discipline make him respond to the authority of the Medical Offi  cer” 
(Eder 1917: 130).
Electrotherapy is another technique of active treatment prescribed for 
neurotic soldiers. Painful sensations of an electric current combined with 
military exercises and military subordination enforced on the patient were 
used at Maghull for British rank and fi le soldiers (Lerner 2003). Similar 
techniques were applied by physicians and specialists in the armies and 
military care facilities of other countries, although some specialists saw 
such therapy as a primary method while others viewed it as secondary or 
tertiary importance in cases of war shock (Eder 1917; Yealland 1918).
To a considerable extent, the psychoanalytic ideas, techniques, and in-
fl uences of Sigmund Freud on modern societies came through military 
institutions and wartime in 1914–18 and still more so in 1939–45 (Bres-
nahan 1999; English 1996; E. Jones 2006; Pol 2006). Corresponding treat-
ments involved the analysis of dreams, hypnosis, and free association by 
psychoanalysts like William H. R. Rivers at Craiglockhart in Britain. Also 
part of the psychotherapeutic treatment regime was the practice of inter-
viewing soldiers to determine their family background and relationships 
with their parents and siblings, which o  en segued into the so-called talk-
ing cure of encouraging weary warriors “to re-experience their trauma in 
psychotherapy sessions” (Pol: 146). In the words of a psychiatrist working 
in the American military in the Second World War, “individuals who have 
some unresolved Oedipal ties or sibling hostilities with consequent guilt 
manifestations are more susceptible to break under the strain of combat” 
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(quoted in Bresnahan: 143). The deeply distressed soldier or the ji  ery 
aviator had failed to meet the expectations of manhood because of a sub-
standard childhood, inferior heredity, an anxious personality, or some 
other character defect. The upshot of such psychoanalytical analysis in the 
Pacifi c theater was the evacuation of neurotic soldiers—a mass departure 
to hospitals in the United States, usually to mental wards of veterans’ 
hospitals, resulting in a further medicalization and institutionalization 
of weary warriors. Others were simply discharged from military service 
without access to support.
Social psychology emphasizes the place of the individual within dif-
ferent groups and organizational contexts. Rather than focus on past 
experiences from childhood or the rather fi xed nature of individual pre-
disposition, this approach presents arrangements and future possibilities 
in networks of relations and group dynamics for helping to prevent com-
bat stress and to alleviate certain kinds of combat breakdown. Psychia-
trists a  empt to connect social capital of the individual (group cohesion, 
leadership, and sense of trust) to the symbolic and cultural capital of the 
military se  ing (ba  le morale, combat duty, and national patriotism). A 
prominent twentieth-century military psychiatrist remarked, “perhaps 
the most signifi cant contribution of World War II military psychiatry was 
recognition of the sustaining infl uence of the small combat group or par-
ticular member thereof, variously termed ‘group identifi cation,’ ‘group 
cohesiveness,’ ‘the buddy system,’ and ‘leadership’ ” (Albert Glass quoted 
in Pol 2006: 148). In this vein, to prevent and to address psychological 
stresses of combat, militaries introduced group discussions and materials 
on morale, though with limited success and sometimes with unintended 
consequences (Bresnahan 1999: 222–24; Pol: 147). In the Canadian army in 
Europe during the Second World War, “[s]enior offi  cers were deeply con-
cerned by the suggestion that men who had recovered from the symptoms 
of ba  le exhaustion should not be returned to combat, and the recommen-
dations made by [army medical offi  cers and psychiatrists] were ignored. 
Instead, a  ention was focused on various initiatives to improve morale” 
(Copp 2006: 181). These measures stressed the importance of building 
team spirit, off ering a new policy of forty-eight-hour leaves, and explain-
ing the Canadian government’s war service gratuities policy. This is not 
to overlook the more practical aspect of using the talking cure among a 
group of soldiers: there were so many soldiers breaking down during 
peak ba  le times that the most expedient way to process the wounded 
was to process the mentally wounded in groups.
Social psychology treatment regimes grew in popularity during the 
second half of the twentieth century. In the United States, so-called rap 
groups emerged as part of self-help groups among Viet Nam War veter-
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ans to deal with “Vietnam Syndrome” and delayed stress (Shatan 1973). 
In Canada, as a result of the psychological wounds peace-keeping soldiers 
endured throughout the 1990s, a network of federally funded peer sup-
port programs for veterans with OSIs was established (Grenier et al. 2007; 
Linford 2013). Even in the twenty-fi rst century, the introduction by several 
NATO countries of TLD center programs for service personnel return-
ing from deployment was intended to promote recognition, renewal, and 
reintegration of the soldier (Hacker Hughes et al 2008) by treatment tech-
niques releasing, relaxing, and reassuring combat troops (Salute! 2008).
Caring for Soldier’s Souls 
We follow Foucault (1979, 2000a, 2007), Rosi Braido  i (2006), Margaret 
McLaren (2002), and Nikolas Rose (1989), among other social theorists, in 
understanding the soul as having an existence, a “bodiless reality” con-
tinually produced in, and by the body (Foucault 1979: 17). The soul and 
related notions of ethics, religion, and spirituality encompass notions of 
faith and sacrifi ce, good and evil, mercy and salvation, truth and obedi-
ence, perhaps a relationship to a guiding power or God, and a herea  er or 
other world. Most practices associated with the soul include sacredness, 
prayer, benediction, confession, refl ection, guidance, meditation, or con-
templation. Foucault developed the concept of pastoral power as a model 
of procedures for the governance of people and their souls. Pastoral power 
in a sense is “exercised over a fl ock of people on the move,” “a benefi cent 
power” by which the duty of the pastor is “the salvation of the fl ock,” 
and “an individualizing power, in that the pastor must care for each and 
every member of the fl ock singly” (Golder 2007: 165). The idea of exercis-
ing power over an individual while maintaining connections to a wider 
group, beyond just immediate kin or community, sets up the relationship 
to care for the connections individuals have with each other as humans.
Given our interest in weary warriors, we are intrigued about the ap-
plication of pastoral care in the armed forces. We situate pastoral power 
within the fi eld of practices and relationships concerned with treatments 
of soldiers, while a  ending to the spirit and psyche of exhausted combat-
ants. From this standpoint, traumatized soldiers are also troubled souls, 
struggling with crises of faith and confl icts of conscience.9 The military is 
an institution where pastoral and religious activities have been situated 
and exercised for centuries (Bergen 2004). We suggest that pastoral power 
is not coincident with that exercised by the military and nor is pastoral 
power, in the guise of military chaplains, totally assimilated by military 
command. At certain times and places, however, from the perspective of 
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frontline soldiers the work of pastoral care through chaplains has seemed 
indistinguishable from the practices and objectives of military leaders. At 
other times, though, pastoral care is regarded as serving a distinctive and 
valuable service for soldiers of all ranks in a military.
A military chaplain is “a minister sent by the church and accepted by 
the military to care for the souls of the men and women in the smaller and 
closely-knit community of service life” (Zahn 1969: 225). As a formal reli-
gious institution, the chaplaincy derives from the Christian past (Benham 
Rennick 2011; Bergen 2004); in more recent times, however, the chaplaincy 
has evolved to become more of an interfaith organization with numerous 
denominations or religious groupings represented and served by Catholic 
priests, Jewish rabbis, Protestant ministers, and Muslim imams in militar-
ies in Britain, Canada, the United States, and other nations (Bourque 2006; 
Crerar 1995; Crosby 1994; Fowler 1996; Slomovitz 2001; Snape 2005).10
“Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks a  er the fl ock,” wrote Fou-
cault (2007: 127); it is then a type of biopolitics. In a military context, pas-
toral power has other important qualities and relationships. Typically, the 
chaplain or pastor in an army wears a military uniform and has an offi  cer’s 
rank although he or she does not exercise military command over troops 
in the conventional hierarchical manner of a formal organization. The 
rank does carry with it certain privileges and responsibilities, of course, 
and also has a symbolic importance. As Zahn suggests (1969: 224–25), “the 
pastor in uniform constitutes an affi  rmation—rightly or wrongly so—that 
there is no basic incompatibility between the values represented by the re-
ligious community and the war being waged by the secular ruler.” Other 
factors that may contribute to the status and infl uence of the military pas-
tor are the self-regulation by at least some soldiers through self-refection, 
guidance by one’s conscience, meditation, and confession; “the clergy’s 
natural unworldliness”; and, compared to most troops, “their compara-
tively high level of education” (Snape 2005: 135). Additional resources 
available to military chaplains are their religious traditions and practices, 
physical symbols, and sacred spaces (Benham Rennick 2011: 167). Images 
of the military chaplain through the ages are of a warrior of Christ, a holy 
person, an aloof fi gure detached from the frontlines, an engaged rabbi, a 
pastor on the ba  lefi eld (Crosby 1994; Slomovitz 2001), “obedient rebels” 
(Crerar 2006), a trusted confi dante, and a go-between playing “a neutral 
role in the competitive and hierarchical military environment” (Benham 
Rennick: 167; see also Bergen 2004; Fowler 2006; Hadley 2006).
The work of military chaplains falls into three interconnected types: 
tasks related to religious considerations, tasks related to the military orga-
nization, and tasks related to counseling and treating individual soldiers 
and perhaps their families. Ministering to the spiritual and moral needs of 
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all ranks in their own faith involves performing religious ceremonies and 
services of a variety of kinds in a variety of locations, as well as facilitat-
ing opportunities for worship by soldiers of other faiths. Military-related 
work involves upholding armed forces values, promoting self-discipline, 
advising commanding offi  cers on personnel issues, working with military 
medical staff , delivering educational lectures to the troops on such mat-
ters of sexual morality as fornication and adultery, and encouraging the 
morale of the troops (Bourque 2006; Crerar 1995; Crosby 1994; Fowler 
2006; Zahn 1969). Tasks related to counseling and treating include assist-
ing the sick and wounded and giving fi rst aid; rescuing and carrying the 
wounded; visiting hospital wards; retrieving, identifying, and burying 
the dead; writing le  ers of condolence to relatives; and off ering counsel 
to veterans and their family members on reintegration (Crerar 1995). In-
terestingly, many aspects of pastoral work—talking with and listening to 
soldiers’ thoughts and concerns, having empathy for them, spending time 
with troops, forming relationships of trust and confi dence—prefi gure or 
parallel psychoanalytical techniques. It should not be surprising, then, 
that Freud saw the role of the psychotherapist as a teacher, enlightener, 
and confessor.11
In an empirical study of religious faith in the contemporary Canadian 
military, Joanne Benham Rennick (2011) highlights the role of religion 
as a resource for helping solders deal with trauma and stress, including 
PTSD. She writes, “Beyond the traditional pastoral duties, modern-day 
chaplains dedicate a signifi cant portion of their time to counseling in-
dividuals. Many of those who approach the chaplains for their service 
suff er from stress associated with military duties” (63). In the Canadian 
Forces, chaplains have a remarkable measure of independence to circulate 
among personnel. This structural feature of their role, in addition to their 
work practices of absolute confi dentiality and not being obliged to keep 
records of those who ask for advice and support, means that chaplains 
are frequently “the fi rst people to identify personnel who are showing 
symptoms of operational stress injuries” (63). Military personnel may ini-
tially approach a chaplain rather than a social worker or a mental health 
specialist “because of the fear of stigmatization” (78). For soldiers strug-
gling with stress, depression, or trauma, a military chaplain can present 
an alternative viewpoint, that of human spirituality to that of the human 
sciences of psychoanalysis or psychotherapy, while maintaining confi den-
tiality. And it is only when believed necessary to do so, that a chaplain 
shares information with other specialists.
“Pastorship is a fundamental type of relationship between God and 
men and the king participates” (Foucault 2007: 124). A frequent issue of 
pastoral practices in the armed forces concerns the question of tensions 
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among the various roles military chaplains play. They o  en deal with 
cross-value predicaments, ethical dilemmas, and divided loyalties. “When 
faced with the real needs of the soldiers in his [sic] pastoral care, to whose 
voice should the chaplain listen? To that of his God, his church, or the 
leaders of his country’s army?” (Hadley 2006: 3). To further complicate the 
circumstances of religious forms of treatment other voices can be added, 
including those of the soldiers, their families, or the military’s medical 
staff . A study of chaplains in the RAF reported that religious leaders in-
sist, “The presence of a chaplain in a military unit … does not indicate 
that ‘the Church’ has given its formal approval to war in general or to 
any specifi c war that may be in progress; instead, [the chaplain] is there 
merely to serve as a specialist promoting religious services and providing 
sacraments only [a chaplain] is qualifi ed to perform and provide—just as 
other specialists (the doctor, the dentist, the psychologist, etc.) are there to 
provide equally limited services” (Zahn 1969: 225).
A British scholar observes that military commanders in both World 
Wars “were concerned with using the army’s chaplains to sustain a vigor-
ous sense of purpose and righteous enthusiasm” (Snape 2005: 245). The 
military role of chaplains was signifi cant and multifaceted: “chaplains 
undoubtedly provided enormous support for solders both individually 
and collectively; they developed a powerful moral and religious idiom 
with which to inspire them, they entertained them in their idle hours, they 
off ered support in their domestic problems, they prepared them for ba  le, 
tended to their wounds and provided a vestige of dignity in death” (137). 
From her study of the contemporary Canadian Forces (army, air force, 
and navy), Benham Rennick (2011: 167) maintains that chaplains negoti-
ate structural realities (much like a social worker) and manage potential 
tension among their own roles as chaplains, by means of bypassing “the 
chain of command to resolve issues,” maintaining confi dences, and “deal-
ing with irrationalities within the system by mediating between the bu-
reaucratic and hierarchical elements of military society and basic human 
needs for familiarity, community, and support” (167).
Calls for a closer relationship between pastoral care and professional 
forms of treatment sound like welcome suggestions for greater collabo-
ration in a  ending to the mental health of soldiers (Seddon et al. 2011). 
However, we question the taken-for-granted obviousness of benefi ts from 
closer working relationships between professionals treating soldiers with 
deep emotional distress. Some research strongly indicates that “chaplains 
are important sources of non-stigmatized consolation and comfort who 
provide an alternative to the professional mental health resources” (Ben-
ham Rennick 2011: 170). Yet tighter and more-formal linkages between 
chaplains and mental health professionals risk imbuing relations between 
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a soldier and a chaplain with overtones of professional power, other di-
agnostic labels and records, perceptions of stigma, and a loss of confi -
dentiality within the military system, thereby corralling the frayed edges 
of power relations and knowledge claims into a more unifi ed system. In 
addition to the further diff usion of psychiatric knowledge and power 
into spirituality and religion, such collaborative schemes could result in 
contracting pastoral practices as frontline crisis intervention and safe con-
tacts for emotionally stressed soldiers, making soldiers become less of a 
knowing subject and more of a known object. Pastoral care has implica-
tions, therefore, for what counts as relevant and appropriate knowledge 
and who gets to interpret and use it in what ways. As part of an agentic 
resistance strategy within a military truth regime, military chaplains off er 
a respectful pathway for knowledge coming from soldiers with combat 
trauma in the form of personal accounts, experiences, and illness stories. 
As well, chaplains take up knowledge production in a biopolitics that 
may also be called popular epidemiology or lay knowledge about stress, 
health, and care (G. Williams and Popay 2006).
Pastoral care and power, while rooted in ancient religious institutions, 
has long been associated with military institutions (Bergen 2004) and re-
mains a feature in twenty-fi rst-century armed forces. Pastoral power is ex-
ercised through an expanded interfaith space in which chaplains receive 
training in stress management and suicide prevention (Bourque 2006). 
“The provision of the security and comfort off ered by the sacraments 
and other services performed by the pastor of the military parish is seen 
as necessary or helpful to the military organization solely in terms of its 
contribution to morale” (Zahn 1969: 235). More than that, in terms of treat-
ment of soldiers with anxiety and trauma, military chaplains are “helping 
personnel order their experiences, providing comfort in the face of suff er-
ing, loneliness, and fear and interpreting some of the violence they see in 
their role” (Benham Rennick 2011: 163). This, in a pastoral sense, is the art 
of fi xing soldiers.
Facilities for Fixing Soldiers
“The essential function of psychiatric power,” writes Foucault (2006: 143), 
“is to be an eff ective agent of reality, a sort of intensifi er of reality to mad-
ness.” In treatment within a military context, especially one during war-
time, the question is whose reality? The answer, in part, depends on where 
and when the treatment is taking place, the distribution of care in space 
and time. For fi xing combat soldiers there are multiple locations, from 
each of which power emanates, passes along, and is exercised through 
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encounters, gestures, relationships, protocols, decisions, and movements 
over time. Schematically, the organization of combat-related treatment 
has encompassed four zones as social spaces: (1) In the fi eld and war 
front: fi rst aid posts, forward medical stations, casualty clearing stations, 
fi eld hospitals, ambulance trains, combat exhaustion units, evacuation 
ships and hospital ships, and mobile fi eld hospitals; (2) At home or in 
an allied territory: rest homes, convalescent hospitals, civilian general 
hospitals, veterans’ hospitals, neurological facilities, asylums, and other 
mental health facilities; (3) Post deployment facilities: OSI centers, trauma 
units, TLD centers, self-help groups, and warrior transition units; and (4) 
Disciplinary mechanisms: discharge from the military; court-martial pro-
ceedings; jail; placement in concentration camps; work in factories, farms, 
or mines; detoxifi cation centers; and homelessness. To illustrate the way 
that fi xing strategies are caught up in specifi c social spaces, we off er two 
brief examples.
First, the organization of methods of treatment for war neurotics among 
German troops in the Second World War comprised a range of medical 
and military techniques and locations, both of care and of compulsion. 
From resting places and recreation areas with return to active duty for 
those who recovered, to special wards in army hospitals, to lunatic asy-
lums for mentally ill soldiers, to special services in the reserve army for 
maladjusted soldiers, to delinquent ba  alions for so-called bad characters. 
The treatment was sometimes the same as the cause: if warfare wounded 
the soldiers, warfare would fi x it. For soldiers with psychological prob-
lems who did not recover enough and were thus unable to carry out du-
ties, “they were court-martialed or sent to a concentration camp” (Kloocke 
et al. 2005: 49). These increasingly radical treatment techniques and loca-
tions meant “the therapeutic arsenal took on a new quality” (56) one more 
threatening and coercive in discourse and eff ect.
Second, the evacuation of American troops suff ering neuropsychiatric 
problems from the Pacifi c theater of the Second World War illustrates the 
care/compulsion dynamic in fi xing ill soldiers. Shipping neuropsychiatric 
patients home was the last priority, ranked a  er the critically ill and seri-
ously wounded troops, and only when ships were available. Transports 
were not outfi  ed for psychiatric care for the month-long voyage to the 
United States.
The merely “psychoneurotic” were crammed into stifl ing bunks adjacent to 
their psychotic shipmates, and were o  en not allowed on deck ostensibly for 
safety reasons, but more likely because of the dearth of experienced staff  to 
supervise them. Supplies of sedatives were scant, as were a  endants trained 
to administer them, and frankly and/or violently psychotic patients were 
o  en locked up in cages for the duration of the voyage. … The cages into 
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which these ill American soldiers were locked were donated by Australian 
and New Zealand zoos, most of which had been used to confi ne gorillas. 
(Bresnahan 1999: 134–35, 135)
We have here a mid-twentieth-century case of the medieval ship of fools 
approach to madness (Barchilon 1988)—a way of dealing with persons 
diagnosed with serious emotional and psychological injuries. Psychologi-
cally wounded warriors were evacuated to the United States, confi ned in 
the bunks and holds of naval boats or even cages under military supervi-
sion, experiencing li  le if any pleasure from the oceanic voyage. Unlike 
in the allegory, the destination was known, to the west coast of America, 
usually to hospitals and asylums, not to a family home, not for a time at 
least. And, again, unlike the fable of the ship of fools, there was no public 
spectacle when these ships arrived at the docks on the west coast; rather, 
these abnormal, deviant soldiers arrived at night, hidden from the gaze of 
the media, slipping under detection by the civilian population.
The advent of actual spatial treatment locations is infl uenced by a num-
ber of things, including medical considerations of time and distance from 
the front and point of casualty whereby the implementation of the mili-
tary strategy of rapid treatment and redeployment causes security con-
cerns for safe distances from the front to avoid a  acks to healing spaces 
(E. Jones 2006: 450). Facilities o  en diff erentiate between offi  cers and the 
rank and fi le in order to preserve the authority of military hierarchy. The 
capacity to engage in offi  cial religious acts alongside personal decisions 
by particular military chaplains aff ect the positioning of facilities for fi xing 
soldiers (Crerar 2006; Fowler 2006).12 Frontline facilities rely on the avail-
ability of local buildings. For example, all over France during the Great 
War the military used cellars and wine vaults, monasteries and churches, 
hotels, spas and resorts, or lunatic asylums for therapeutic space.13 Front-
line facilities also rely on speed, fl exibility, and mobility. For example, 
a twenty-fi rst-century U.S. Army Forward Surgical Team with roughly 
twenty members can set up an entire surgical unit in one hour, including 
a unit with six hours of postoperative intensive care (Gawande 2004).
While the reality in and of treatment facilities for ill soldiers may be 
concentrated in the military, that reality is also shaped by, acted on, and 
worked through medical and nursing staff , other patients, military chap-
lains, and family members. Even in treatment practices that involve sepa-
ration and isolation, there is much external to hospitals, rest homes, or 
transition units that infl uence the organization and workings of these 
treatment sites. Realities of the outside world make their appearances 
in convalescent facilities or psychiatric units in several ways: through 
dreams, thoughts, nightmares, and panic a  acks; in the form of family 
background identifi ed in assessments and discussed in interviews; in re-
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gards to one’s military obligations and national duties via lectures and 
talks by chaplains and offi  cers; and in referencing a soldier’s current trou-
bled status to normalcy in the outside world. Both desirable and horrible 
aspects of realities contend for a  ention.
In the institutional world of treatments, the subjectivity of the ill com-
batant is not only that of patient. They are of course complex hybrid sub-
jectivities that unevenly play out in specifi c facilities. There are cross-links 
among military personnel with specifi c ranks and from specifi c branches 
of the armed services that carry with them particular brands or types of 
masculinities (Belkin 2012; M. Brown 2012). As soldier-civilians or veter-
ans, ex-soldiers become citizen-soldier-veterans that are part of families 
as parents, sons and daughters, and siblings. They have deeply personal 
histories that combine experiences of race, social class, gender, and family 
that come to constitute their understandings of themselves and others. As 
well, ill combatants are ethical beings, drawing on spiritual and religious 
guidelines and beliefs that are shaped within and outside how they are as 
soldiers or civilians.
Whatever else they may be, facilities for fi xing soldiers are not inde-
pendent and homogeneous places of complete exclusion from civil so-
ciety or internally monolithic sites of traumatized soldiers. Facilities as 
organizations take on several roles and functions. From the perspective 
of Foucault’s earlier works, treatment facilities are disciplinary orders for 
administering and regulating military personnel, sometimes within and 
sometimes outside formal military services; a force fi eld or confi gura-
tion of power relations with a fundamental dissymmetry of authority and 
status; and places with practices of medical(ized) observation, diagnosis, 
and therapeutic interventions that can be either close to the ba  lefi eld, 
or located at more distant positions as a safe haven. Just as facilities can 
be a dumping ground for deviant soldiers, a purposefully segregated 
institutional place of isolation and surveillance, they can also be a site of 
diff erential support for fi xing the bodies, minds, and souls of soldiers who 
have experienced the horrors of warfare.
Treating Weary Warriors 
Historically based and organizationally situated treatments of wounded 
warriors are mediated events. Treatment is much more than just the ap-
plication of care to a patient. It also involves techniques of compulsion and 
contestation over roles. There is a dark and troubling side to fi xing combat 
soldiers with trauma. Treatment measures have included electroshock 
therapy, reenactments of shell blasts by using mortars, and the talking 
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cure. Soldiers have been restrained in shackles, stigmatized with highly 
moralistic labels, confi ned in cages in the holds of ships for weeks, and 
overmedicated. In the modern history of treatment, many weary warriors 
have been rehabilitated and returned to active service. Others, in the name 
of treatment in times of armed confl ict, have been demoted in rank or dis-
charged altogether; criminalized; sentenced to hard labor; or doomed to 
lunatic asylums, concentration camps, or other total institutions. Confl icts 
invariably arise over the performance of roles within treatment regimes, 
between frontline doctors and headquarter commanders (Bresnahan 
1999), among buddies in rap groups, and within a psychiatrist as a mem-
ber of a medical review board. Treatment regimes, techniques, methods, 
and associated terminologies compete for acceptance and application in 
fi xing ill combat solders. Basic approaches such as psychoanalysis and 
social psychology vie for acceptance in military environments, in tackling 
the treatment for the emotional breakdown of soldiers. For military chap-
lains, issues of their pastoral roles relate to allegiances to denominational 
superiors, army commanders, government offi  cials, or defense depart-
ments. These realms feed into an overarching military and psychiatric 
imperative: fi x these soldiers, for we want them back as warriors.
Notes
 1. Some readers may regard these features of electroshock therapy or faradiza-
tion as resembling those in penal torture. They would not be far wrong, as 
a review of Foucault’s work on discipline and punishment shows (Foucault 
1979).
 2. Following from our discussion in chapter 1, we reject dualistic thinking that 
rigidly separates mind from body and that typically ignores the soul as a dis-
cursive-material entity (see chapter 4). Moreover, we do not assume the physi-
cal body is a unifi ed and neutral subject. We engage with the ideas of Foucault 
and various feminists, and expand upon them in our understanding that there 
are permeable boundaries between and amongst bodies, minds, and souls of 
soldiers who suff er extreme distress as a result of combat.
 3. This distinguishes our approach of looking at concrete practices and working 
institutions from that of Foucault, who tended to discuss medicine, psychiatric 
power, and pastoral care in reference to texts and theoretical developments. 
Apropos Foucault, we explore how treatments function and the relations of 
power that permeate treatment practices and institutional facilities. Moreover, 
within our feminist poststructural analytic, we approach the assemblage of 
treatments for weary warriors in reference to the material-discursive elements 
of practices and relationships among bodies.
 4. Rudolf wrote about irritable heart and paralysis from fright later in the war 
(Rudolf 1916a, 1916b).
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 5. Reports of diff use pain and migrating aches surfaced in the diagnostic param-
eters of GWS.
 6. See also Leese (2002) for a description of the use of faradism to treat hysteria. 
 7. One of the CEUs had already operated relatively successfully, at least accord-
ing to the military command, in the Italian campaign. During the Ba  le of the 
Scheldt, a psychiatrist was ensconced in a fi eld dressing station for the First 
Canadian Army, even farther forward than the CEUs, to deal only with cases 
of ba  le exhaustion (Copp and McAndrew 1990: 141). 
 8. Aversive theory is akin to trauma re-enactment of the late twentieth century, 
except in the instance that the re-enacting was done on location with live artil-
lery fi re and threat of death.
 9. Admi  edly, the topics of pastoral power and religion are vast and extend over 
many histories, raising issues of the relationships of church and state, faith 
and civil society, and religious and military institutions, whereas spirituality 
and other worldliness intersect with the materiality and hellish world called 
war. A related topic concerns resistance to exercises of pastoral power (Fou-
cault 2007: 204–14), a subject that we do not fully examine here. 
10. Some chaplains are female, which stands in contradistinction to many formal 
religious doctrines. Note here that the soul is being taken up narrowly by the 
military institution. Whereas we might take up a conceptualization of the care 
of the soul through psychiatric practice, the military does not. The soul falls 
under the purview of spiritual leaders within specifi c religions.
11. Parallel to psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, care of soldiers’ souls have 
been assigned to both chaplains and psychiatrists culturally through televi-
sion shows, as, for example, Father Francis J. Mulcahy, an American Catholic 
priest, in M*A*S*H; and Major Grace Pedersen, an Australian psychiatrist, in 
Combat Hospital.
12. In the Second World War, Canadian Navy and Air Force chaplains “were 
normally at arm’s length from the killing fi elds of their ships and squadrons,” 
whereas Army chaplains “came into closest contact with the enemy” (Fowler 
2006: 36). See also Crerar (2006: 14) on similarly varied practices in the Great 
War.
13. In the Great War, Canadian forces in Britain procured prewar health spas and 
resorts in England to treat wartime soldiers with nervous disorders, whereas 
the British operated hospitals that were part of the lunatic asylum network. 
However, this diff erence in treatment facilities largely disappeared when Ca-
nadian troops returned home, as “they were sent to existing provincial lunatic 
asylums for treatment” (Humphries and Kurchinski 2008: 110). For Austra-
lian soldiers during the Great War, a long voyage home meant psychologi-
cally wounded soldiers had engaged in some form of treatment. Nonetheless, 
upon arrival, a similar system to that of Canada and Britain emerged. Many 
soldiers with psychiatric illness were admi  ed to civilian asylums funded by 
individual states. Soldiers not fi nding places in the asylum were admi  ed to 
Australian auxiliary hospitals, which were private mansions, transformed 
into military psychiatric care facilities (Tyquin 2006: 79–80).
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(1) Immediacy. Behavior disorders are best treated as soon a  er their 
occurrence as possible, before the complexities of “chronicity” (which 
possibly includes ritualization of the symptom) have had an 
opportunity to further add to the patients’ problems. 
(2) Proximity. Behavior disruptions are best treated in close proximity 
to the place of their occurrence and as transactions with the customary 
milieu. Casualties should be kept away from hospitals, on the job, 
and in their social frame whenever humanely possible.
(3) Expectancy. Psychiatrists in combat observed that psychiatrically 
disabled soldiers could be provided with a few comforts, rested, 
interviewed in the third day and returned to the unit on the fourth, 
and that this treatment produced be  er results than any other. This 
knowledge enabled them to expect restoration of function, and 
to respect the anxiety of their patients without being frightened 
by it into stereotyped concepts such as “long-term treatment.”
—Kenneth L. Artiss, “Human Behavior under Stress”
Like physical injuries, the natural course of most injuries caused 
by stress is to heal over time. But also like physical injuries, stress 
injuries heal more quickly and completely if they are promptly 
recognized and aff orded the proper care, if only a brief period of rest.
—Charles R. Figley and William P. Nash, “Introduction: 
For Those Who Bear the Ba  le”
In previous chapters we focused on the eff ects of the inter- and intra-actions 
of various apparatuses. Our understanding of the unfolding of the practice 
of diagnosis, the policy milieu for veteran benefi ts, soldiers’ subjectivities, 
and treatment regimens that it is a fractured, irregular process playing 
out as a series of discontinuities. Diagnostic practices that classify bodies 
along the lines of clinical observations disclose how soldiers come to be 
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designated as ill through the systematic application of a power/knowl-
edge formation that holds within a set of values surrounding emotional 
distress and mental breakdown that tend to be restricting, exclusionary, 
and debilitating. Recalling the history of health-care and disability bene-
fi ts for veterans discloses some of the institutional mechanisms of both the 
military and civil society that make visible soldiers’ war wounds and the 
barriers soldiers with ill bodies have to navigate in order to have partial 
fi nancial security. Individual negotiations of war-induced psychic trauma 
are fl ashpoints of experience that inform the generation of the multiple, 
variegated warrior subjectivities. Variation over time of treatment modali-
ties have an impact on the ways in which soldiers live their lives as the 
walking wounded both in the military and in civil society. In this chapter, 
rather than focus on the eff ects of military psychiatry on soldiers we focus 
on how these practices do what they do—that is, how apparatuses articu-
late with each other and what eff ects that articulation generates.
When taking embodiment seriously, we recognize that parts of an anal-
ysis may seem trivial or pedantic. But we do not want to reinforce this 
impression. We argue that disciplinary apparatuses are embodied. They 
mark bodies both in the sense of the bodies they encounter and in the 
spaces they take up. There are certain processes that hold soldiers and 
veterans with emotional wounds in place—fi x them—as ill bodies dur-
ing the breakdown of the psyche as well as years a  erwards in veterans’ 
everyday lives. These fi xing processes draw from multiple sources—dis-
courses within and about psychiatry, masculinity, and the military; and 
the practices that enact soldiers and veterans as weary warriors—that 
shape the ways both individuals as ill bodies and people who encounter 
these ill bodies make choices and act. We have chosen to draw out two 
processes—the militarization of psychiatric wounds with the impact on sol-
diers as ill bodies and on the psychiatrization of the military bodies with the 
impact on veterans as ill bodies; we elaborate on these two processes in 
order to illustrate what it is we mean by fi xing weary warriors in an ongo-
ing generative process that changes with every moment.
To this end, we try to think of embodied entities and events relationally. 
These relations and elements are fl uid, whether biophysical processes of 
bodily stress, stable authoritarian institutions like the military or the state, 
or masculine expressions of identity. Within a positive ontology (follow-
ing Deleuze and Gua  ari 1987; see also Bray and Colebrook 1998), there 
is a relational aspect of elements composing a dispositif (Foucault 1980b: 
194–95) just as there is an interactionist aspect (Barad 2003). Nancy Tuana 
(2008: 188) refers to this notion as “viscous porosity.” She argues that 
viscous porosity is “a means to be  er understand the rich interactions 
between things through which subjects are constituted out of relational-
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ity.” To demonstrate her arguments about the permeability of the borders, 
shells, or skins of bounded entities, she reads the events of Hurricane Ka-
trina as a natural, geophysical phenomenon. The phenomenon of the hur-
ricane interacts with New Orleans as both a physical city and social place, 
while interspersing the (porous) fl esh of humans and their interactions 
with both. Her tracing keeps in play a generative idea of what emerges 
from a set of events from the macroscale of the state to the intimate scale 
of acquiring toxic bodies.
With regard to weary warriors, a similar tracing—though not as drastic 
an example as Tuana’s—can be made. Rather than solely concentrating on 
the discursive aspects of embodiment which is a common feature in mak-
ing sense of soldiers’ experiences of war, it is important to account for the 
material consequences of specifi c discursive constructions of weary war-
riors. Any psychological disorder raises questions as to whether a veteran 
deserves a pension or other support in a state system that values a notion 
of a strong, healthy, heroic sense of soldiers serving the patriotic cause 
while continuing to be the primary organizer and arbiter of soldiers’ lives 
a  er they again enter civil society.
Another possible tracing is following an embodied stream of relations, 
interactions, and intra-actions crystallized in a specifi c practice that enacts 
a soldier as a weary warrior. Does it ma  er if a soldier is inscribed with 
a diagnostic category of PTSD rather than mTBI? Yes, it does. A contem-
porary claim that a soldier’s body is ill because of a microlevel endocrine 
system disruption, rather than a psychiatric disorder arising from fear, 
places the soldier in a more legitimate position socially to seek assistance 
for emotional distress and other debilitating bodily sensations. Does it 
ma  er if a soldier is inscribed with a diagnostic category of mTBI rather 
than chronic mTBI? Yes, it does. Chronic is an epitaph that undermines 
the legitimacy of the claims a soldier makes about illness, bodies, and ex-
perience; popularly and o  en times medically, the term chronic produces 
the weary warrior as a malingerer. Does it ma  er if a soldier is inscribed 
with a diagnostic category of PTSD or chronic mTBI? Yes, but in compari-
son to the distinction between the others, it ma  ers much less. Soldiers 
with PTSD and chronic mTBI follow a similar medical treatment regime, 
but soldiers with chronic mTBI are still socially associated with a wound 
caused by an external event, most likely the detonation of a bomb. Trac-
ing a set of relations and interactions that feed into the constitution of an 
entity or an event entails going back and forth in time, jumping back and 
forth across spaces, and looking back and forth at every point to see what 
is happening with other entities and events; a daunting task indeed. Most 
tracings by magnitude have to be incomplete. Yet maintaining a genera-
tive outlook is exactly what embodiment is about.
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In this chapter we focus on the multiple layers of embodiment and try 
to hold onto the notion that embodiment is a multifaceted, discursive-
material generative process that holds together a set of resonances from the 
relations, interactions, and intra-actions of multiple agents. We think it is 
useful to trace the connections among these relations (as disclosures) so as 
to map out some of the processes through which weary warriors come to 
be who they are in specifi c historical contexts. We fi rst position context as 
part of an embodied apparatus. We then detail two specifi c processes, the 
militarization of psychiatry and psychiatrization of the military. To that 
end, we off er a tracing of a weary warrior through characters of a 1980s 
television show, Magnum, P.I., to demonstrate the complexity of interac-
tion between the militarization of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatri-
zation of military bodies as processes.
Context, Mangles, and Processes
The context a soldier lives in, whether in military service or in civil society, 
comprises a multifaceted jumble of relationships with family members 
and friends, other soldiers and offi  cers, and military and civilian physi-
cians. Expressions of illness diff er depending on what aspect of a relation-
ship is privileged at any given time. In the doctor’s offi  ce, migratory pain, 
memory lapses, and nightmares might be the focus of the discussion, 
whereas with friends, feeling unwell may never be part of a conversation. 
Although the elements that create a social environment for a person as a 
patient overlap considerably with those of the same person as a friend, the 
elements come together in diff erent ways; these elements then change the 
character of what happens in the interactions of those relationships.
One way to understand context as something complicated and far-
reaching, yet comprehensible and versatile, is through Susan Hekman’s 
(2010) use of disclosure. She draws on Andrew Pickering’s (1995) work 
on the mangle of scientifi c practice. Pickering uses the concept of mangle, 
defi ned as the entanglements of human and nonhuman elements as well 
as their interactions, to describe how science, scientifi c practice, and scien-
tifi c knowledge come into being. This entanglement does not determine a 
path that science must take because even discoveries are in part an eff ect 
of the social relations aff ecting the scientist. There is a high degree of fl ex-
ibility in the potential emergence of scientifi c practice. For Hekman, the 
mangle is useful in understanding the emergence of a subject through the 
relationship between words, language, and ideas, and the materialities of 
everyday living (see chapter 5 in Hekman 2010). She recognizes that, in 
the mangle, discourse is not the only thing that is constitutive; the material 
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world is, too. This insight breaks down the false binary of human/nonhu-
man and emphasizes that neither the social nor the natural world are sim-
ply givens; there is some play—or agency—via interactions, intra-actions, 
and eff ects among the elements. Disclosure and the verb “to disclose” de-
scribe the process through which realities become available to people as a 
result of the concepts they use to make sense of the world around them.
Pickering talks about scientifi c practice and Hekman writes about sub-
jects; we use these insights as a basis from which to argue that while 
individuals, professionals, and institutions have relatively distinct under-
standings of the world (through of the process of disclosure), the contexts 
within which these understandings emerge have paths that can, to some 
extent, be traced. We couple this notion with a positive, generative ontol-
ogy that emphasizes potentiality. Through these tracings we can bring 
into focus the deep discursive-material connections, inter- and intra-actions, 
and eff ects of the relationships, elements, and events that generate what 
we understand as weary warriors.
The context, with a dense network of intricate linkages, hosts a legion 
of elements that feed into potential explanations for the very existence of 
weary warriors. Paul Lerner (2003) in his account of male hysteria in Ger-
many between 1890 and 1930, places the construction of the relationship 
between war and psychiatry alongside the history of traumatic neurosis. 
Traumatic neurosis, a popular psychological diagnostic category among 
German physicians in the 1890s, set the cause of psychological breakdown 
in an external event. When coupled with a system that awarded pensions 
to those suff ering trauma from, say, railway accidents or war, traumatic 
neurosis paved the wave for medical claims of economic-goal behavior 
such as simulation, malingering, and faking. In contrast, male hysteria as 
a diagnosis represented that which was problematic in the German state 
in its race to modernity. Cast as a pathological entity lacking willpower 
and self-control, a construction reinforced by a German masculinity based 
on physical fi tness and emotional rigidity, the male hysteric freed the state 
from its responsibility of compensating individuals who had suff ered 
neurosis as a result of trauma and paved the way for an a  ack by authori-
ties against social insurance for soldiers and workers. Lerner (33–36) notes 
that although the number of social insurance claims for the diagnostic cat-
egory of traumatic neurosis was economically inconsequential, politically 
the notion of the greedy, whining, morally weak, pension-monger set up 
the opposition to a  ack the social insurance system.
In contrast, Ben Shephard (2000), in a history of the relationship be-
tween soldiers and psychiatrists in the twentieth century, argues that jux-
taposing approaches for defi ning nervous disorders among soldiers set 
up a framework through which he could read various accounts of war 
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neuroses. On the one hand, realists were interested in ge  ing the soldiers 
back into the fi ghting theater quickly, which was an approach valued by 
the military as an institution that posed challenges to military psychia-
trists. On the other hand, dramatists were interested in sorting through 
the minutiae of the manifestation of symptoms among soldiers individu-
ally and collectively, and then writing them up, which was an approach 
valued by psychiatry as an institution that was not always eff ective as a 
military strategy. Shephard’s (xxii) juxtaposition provides an entry point 
into the discussion of what constitutes the traumatized soldier, for the two 
approaches work most eff ectively when in tension with one another. He 
argues that at many points over the century, the absurdity of some claims 
(trauma scales for measuring the impact of traumatic events on individu-
als in all countries; 396) and the promising insight of others (some type 
of repression follows a traumatic experience; 389) make it clear that the 
psychological wounds of the soldier are probably inevitable (397).
Unlike either Lerner or Shephard, reading context through disclosure 
is like twisting a kaleidoscope of circumstances and experiences one way, 
and then another. Doing so produces pa  erns that can then be read criti-
cally as part and parcel to a particular confi guration of power/knowledge; 
a confi guration that may, for example, designate moral weakness, lack 
of positive male role models, overbearing mothers, or psychiatric illness 
as the cause of nervous exhaustion in combat. The complexity of this mi-
lieu—as laid out here—is o  en played down by soldiers suff ering deep 
emotional distress as they make their way through their daily lives, lives 
that usually include some form of treatment and almost always a set of 
coping strategies for recovery. Even though warriors’ entanglements in 
the mangle are fodder for generating manifold and competing accounts of 
weary warriors, elaboration of context is still important—not because all 
infl uences can be traced, but because a certain set of elements can be fore-
grounded in an account of weary warriors that can provide insight into a 
diff erent way of thinking about emotional distress.
Twisting the kaleidoscope of circumstances and experiences of weary 
warriors permits us to alight on some of the processes that generate the 
distinctiveness of the way in which the elements of the embodied appa-
ratuses of psychiatry and the military come together to produce weary 
warriors. Foucault (2006: 222) argues that because psychiatry functions 
as power over madness and abnormality, as a disciplinary apparatus it 
is well positioned to be plugged into other disciplinary apparatuses—in-
cluding the military. This plugging does not happen as either a ma  er 
of course or haphazardly; there are processes that permit apparatuses to 
articulate in both ordinary and unique ways, producing something other 
than what either can off er on its own. Both psychiatry and the military are 
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part of a similar array of elements, ranging from the intense regulation of 
administrative tasks to the organization of specifi c spaces. Both psychiatry 
and the military also draw on similar sets of discourses, such as orderli-
ness, deference, and masculinity, as a way to frame soldiers with invisible 
wounds and broken embodiments. The sets of elements we found when 
the kaleidoscope’s twist came to rest were two processes that mediate the 
plugging in of the apparatuses of psychiatry and the military: the militari-
zation of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization of military bodies.
The power of the psychiatrist that Foucault discusses in Psychiatric 
Power (2006: 184) relies on the notion that the psychiatrist himself must be 
present everywhere, and it is through his expression of knowledge that 
power comes to function in the asylum.1 When applied within the military, 
the psychiatrist’s power is not simply, nor even complexly, transferred 
from the asylum to the ba  lefi eld. Rather, a transformation of psychiatric 
practice for emotional wounds takes place in the face of the immediacy of 
ba  lefi eld needs. Although the organization of the disciplinary apparatus 
of psychiatry is similar to the military (in that the general in the ba  lefi eld 
parallels the position of the psychiatrist in the asylum), the presence of 
psychiatric illness, especially in those suff ering emotional distress in com-
bat, is not necessary for the functioning of the military. In fact, it is most 
undesirable. There has been, we propose, a militarization of psychiatric 
wounds—not in the sense that psychiatry as a science or discipline has 
been militarized as part of being further developed as a specifi c knowl-
edge base (although this may indeed be the case), but as an integrated 
confi guration of power/knowledge where the purpose of the practice tend-
ing to psychiatric wounds is actually delineated by military imperatives.
Weary warriors, historically, have been seen to be an unfortunate though 
inevitable result of war. It was only a  er the nearly unbelievable numbers 
of soldiers with psychiatric wounds during the Great War that military 
establishments sought some action to reduce emotional breakdown in 
combat. The knowledge in psychiatry in the fi rst decades of the twentieth 
century focused on neurasthenia and hysteria, following the works of 
Jean-Martin Charcot and Sigmund Freud. It is easy to understand, at least 
on the surface, that when soldiers began exhibiting symptoms similar to 
those of neurasthenics and hysterics the military turned to psychiatry. But 
just as the power in the asylum did not easily transfer to the ba  lefi eld, 
the soldiers produced through the military, even with psychiatric wounds, 
did not respond the same ways as did the mad in the asylum. Alongside 
the transformation of the social practices of psychiatry, including the so-
cial practices of diagnosis, explanation, and treatment, the soldier as both 
a category and a fl eshed body underwent a transformation, shaped by 
the military’s need for emotionally stable soldiers. Increasingly over the 
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twentieth century and into the twenty-fi rst century, the military drew and 
continues to draw on psychiatry as a knowledge base, and has introduced 
policies and practices that serve military interests in securing a force that 
would not collapse in combat. This psychiatrization of military bodies—a 
process beginning at recruitment and extending through ba  le and long 
a  erwards—sets each and every existing and potential soldier’s body as a 
possible psychiatric case.
We off er a reading of how the apparatuses of psychiatry and the mili-
tary provide specifi city to the context within which soldiers break down. 
Soldiers, who have endured deep emotional distress as a result of combat 
come to be constructed as ill, come to act and react in particular ways, 
come to understand themselves and be understood as a soldier with in-
visible wounds, and come to be part of a treatment protocol or be consid-
ered as recovered. We trace a series of folds, events, and practices within 
psychiatry and the military to fl esh out parts of the specifi c relationship 
between the two and how they function together to develop, block, uti-
lize, disclose, and enact on demand aspects of each apparatus on its own 
and in conjunction with the other. We argue that these practices generate 
defi nitional boundaries of psychiatric wounds and mediate the relation-
ships among the various elements constituting psychiatry in the military.2 
We also look at the military practices that deal with classifying and sort-
ing emotionally wounded bodies based on psychiatric knowledge and 
practices derived from that knowledge. We review psychiatric practices 
associated with ba  lefi eld emotional casualties, intended to either reduce 
the overall number of psychological wounds or to treat in situ those expe-
riencing emotional distress.
Militarization of Psychiatric Wounds
The history of psychiatry is closely linked to the history of military psy-
chiatry; this was particularly true at the onset of the Great War. Debate 
among psychiatrists at the time questioned whether the neuroses and 
hysteria among civilians were the same among soldiers. The distinction 
between peace and war neuroses framed much of the discussion among 
military psychiatrists, particularly psychoanalysts (Culpin 1920; Ferenczi 
and Abraham 1921; Lumsden 1916; Ross 1919). Interwar and post–Second 
World War interests in dealing with the emotional distress of combat sol-
diers and war veterans tended toward securing pensions, maintaining 
mental hygiene, and readjusting to civilian life (Drought 1944; Gilbert 
1945; Grant 1944; Micale and Lerner 2001; Russell 1930). These debates 
both informed and were informed by specifi c military psychiatric fi eld 
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practices (see analyses in Leese 2002; Lerner 2003; Shephard 2000). These 
practices serve as an entry point into a demonstration of how psychiatry 
and the military plug into each other: The practice of tending to psychi-
atric wounds is delineated by military imperatives just as the need for 
frontline troops is circumscribed by the treatment for war nerves.
The psychiatric power Foucault so aptly described took on a diff erent 
patina when introduced through military mechanisms. The ba  lefi eld 
general, the principal person through whom military power was chan-
neled, was no psychiatrist. Thus, the prominent power position held by 
the psychiatrist in the asylum can only be transferred unevenly to the mili-
tary. Unlike those in the asylum who had at least some contact with the 
fl eshed incarnation of psychiatric power—that is, the psychiatrist—the 
vast majority of soldiers had no contact with a general.3 Indeed, an intri-
cately designed ladder of superiors stood in for the general and facilitated 
the hierarchical orderliness of the military, a hierarchy in which psychia-
trists were inserted as offi  cers. The circulation of psychiatric power within 
the military framed by the principles of order, hierarchy, and rank—and 
imbued with the values of duty, honor, and courage—worked toward the 
maintenance and creation of good soldiers, soldiers that could be returned 
to active duty. Implicit within the practices was the assumption that nerve 
casualties are inevitable and it is the psychiatrist’s duty to fi gure out which 
soldiers are salvageable and which are disposable within the context of 
fi ghting the enemy.
A key practice emerging during the Great War that acutely demon-
strates the articulation between the military and psychiatry as embod-
ied apparatuses is forward psychiatry. Forward psychiatry is a system 
whereby psychiatric treatment principles are enacted on the ba  lefi eld 
and just behind the frontline. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, 
the Russians had two systems of evacuation—one for nervous soldiers 
and one for the physically wounded. Both were situated close to the front 
and initiated through evacuation hospitals (Wanke 2005). Although not 
particularly successful and pre  y much forgo  en in European and North 
American militaries, the idea of forward psychiatry emerged in some fi eld 
practices. Prior to a full-on implementation during the Great War, for 
example, care for all wounds—both physical and psychiatric—involved 
a system of medics, dressing stations, and fi eld hospitals along the front-
lines. Medics brought in the visibly wounded and rounded up the oth-
ers that were crouching, hiding underneath mounds of dirt, wandering 
around dazed in the fi eld, crying inconsolably beside the body of a dead 
friend, or lying unconscious anywhere—in a trench, a foxhole, or beneath 
a dead body. Dressing stations were used to sort through the wounded, 
and the more serious cases were evacuated to the fi eld hospital behind the 
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fi ghting lines. In addition to the ba  les themselves, the routine of trench 
warfare spawned broken-down bodies: extensive periods of waiting and 
watching for bombs to go off , gases to be released, and snipers to shoot; 
building new and reinforcing stretches of the trenches while living with 
rats, continual fl ooding, ongoing rains, and ever-present mud; engaging 
in regular nigh  ime forays into the land between the trenches to dig fox-
holes, lay out barbed wire, rescue wounded soldiers from the day’s fi ght-
ing, and recover dead bodies; and preparing for the next time to rush the 
enemy’s trenches with bayonets.
Because of the massive number of soldiers breaking down in ba  le 
emotionally throughout 1914 and at the beginning of 1915, the existing 
structures were rendered ineff ective for treating nerve cases.4 Each mili-
tary dealt with remedying the structures in diff erent ways. The French, for 
example, shared the use of the hospitals built along the western trenches 
with the British because they had no other place to evacuate the wounded 
soldiers to. By 1915, most psychiatrists in Britain and Germany had volun-
teered or been pressed into military service, and many public and private 
hospitals in both countries had been taken over by the military to care for 
the evacuees (Leese 2002: 34–35; Lerner 2003: 42–43). Psychiatrists on both 
sides of the trenches were in agreement that soldiers with traumatic neu-
roses, hysteria, and mental illness needed quick treatment if they were to 
be of use to the military. The French implemented forward psychiatry in 
1915. All nerve cases were diagnosed as hysteria, brought to the hospitals 
on the frontline, treated with Joseph Babinski’s so-called cure by persua-
sion, and returned to action. Babinski, trained by Jean-Martin Charcot at 
the Salpêtrière, believed that war neuroses were forms of hysteria. And, 
because hysteria arises from the relationship between the psychiatrist and 
the patient, so too does the cure. Early intervention through a combination 
of physical and psychological therapies, as for instance simulation (in-
cluding electroshock therapy) and persuasion, provided the most success 
in returning soldiers to the frontline (Babinski and Froment 1918). The 
French military refused the diagnosis of hysteria as legitimate and treated 
those so diagnosed as cases of insolent insubordination, a policy that sup-
ported both the diagnosis of hysteria (or pithiatism) and the painful and 
stringent therapeutic practices used in Babinski’s treatment.
In Germany the implementation of a standardized and centralized sys-
tem for caring for psychiatric wounds by the end of 1915 was based on pre-
vention. Reliance on eff ective leadership not just among offi  cers, but also 
among small units of troops, was the cornerstone of the approach. Thus, 
when nervous breakdowns happened to soldiers, the military treated them 
as having an organic illness, provided them with some rest and talk, and 
returned them to the frontline. War neuroses were diff erent, and were a 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The Soldier in Context 171

ma  er of discipline rather than medical treatment. Neurotic soldiers were 
a detriment at the front and were evacuated as quickly as possible, treated 
away from the frontline, and returned to duty in other sectors of the war 
economy.
In the British military a new system was implemented in 1916 that set 
a diff erent path that a psychologically wounded warrior would take and 
located the authority for diagnosis early on in this path. The new system 
included a casualty clearing station, regimental aid post, advanced dress-
ing station, a base or fi eld hospital, and, for the most extreme cases, evacu-
ation. The regimental offi  cer at the post made quick diagnoses and tagged 
soldiers with scribbled pieces of paper a  ached to the toe by a wire. Two 
categories of shell shock were noted: shell shock–S, referring to nervous 
shock, and shell shock–W, referring to a wound by concussion. This diff er-
entiation between somatic and psychic wounds fell away, and was eventu-
ally replaced with NYD(N) by 1917. Rather than depending on the French 
hospitals, which were used rather heavily, the British military evacuated 
the most severe cases back to Britain by ship.
As the war wore on, these fi eld practices shi  ed. Fighting grew more 
intense; as more and more nerve cases emerged, the French continued to 
use Babinski’s strict and authoritarian traitement brusqué. The more the 
defi nition of hysteria among soldiers became strictly delineated, the stron-
ger the support the French state had for the forward treatment centers. 
The design of French forward psychiatric practices, in part devised out 
of necessity, were informed by the Russo-Japanese immediate treatment 
fi eld practices implemented a decade before (MacLeod 2004). Locating 
the illness outside the body in the relationship between the military psy-
chiatrist and ra  led soldier—as suggestion or auto-suggestion—proved 
eff ective in returning soldiers to the front (Shephard 2000: 98). The Ger-
man military shi  ed focus and treated nervous breakdowns primarily 
as hysteria (following Robert Gaupp, Max Nonne, and Karl Bonhöff er) 
rather than as traumatic neuroses (following Hermann Oppenheim) (see 
Lerner 2003: 61–85). Coupled with the limitations of evacuation by train, 
Germany built a series of hospitals just behind the frontline, somewhat 
like France, and used them both for soldiers and for hysterics from across 
the country. The hysterical soldiers could be more easily treated through 
reenactments of the onset of the hysteria, such as the clap of gunshot, the 
stench of decaying bodies, and the strewing of mud in the trench from 
bombs. The most severe cases of German hysterics, too, could be more 
easily redeployed to the front.
For the British there was an increase in the number of cases treated in 
situ and returned to the front. Charles S. Myers (1915), the British Army 
doctor saddled with the coining of the term “shell shock,” urged that the 
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treatment of psychiatric wounds be separated from other wounds but 
still be located close to the front. He boiled down his approach to three 
basic practices: (1) promptness of treatment in (2) a suitable environment 
with (3) psychotherapeutic measures such as hypnosis (War Offi  ce Re-
port 1922). As the safe transport of evacuees became less certain with the 
increase in submarine warfare, it made sense to treat psychiatric wounds 
closer to the front. The American psychiatrist Thomas Salmon is credited 
with the development of the three central principles of forward psychia-
try: (1) proximity, (2) immediacy, and (3) expectancy, known together as 
PIE—upon ending his tour of the front in 1917.5 The principles demanded 
proximity to the ba  lefi eld, immediacy of treatment, and expectancy of 
return to the front. The architecture of this system, elaborated in more 
detail by Charles Myers at the beginning of the Second World War (Myers 
1940), is still used today in most militaries. The American military uses BI-
CEPS, a masculine acronym, detailing more specifi cally what PIE entails: 
brevity, immediacy, centrality, expectancy, proximity, and simplicity. The 
simple and straightforward therapeutic measures are to be administered 
as soon as possible a  er onset, near the fi ghting, away from other types 
of therapies. These measures last between twelve and seventy-two hours 
so that the soldier with psychiatric wounds can return quickly to active 
duty.
These frontline practices have been shown to both inform and be in-
formed by the discussion and debate going on in military psychiatric 
circles, as well as in civilian psychiatry. By the end of the Great War mili-
tary psychiatrists came to an uneasy consensus that war neuroses were 
much like peace neuroses, especially in that the cause of the neurosis 
was fi rmly situated in the individual’s constitution, sexual repressions, or 
family background. Causes of neuroses, the equivalent to blame in most 
cases, were found to originate in weak fathers and overbearing mothers, 
lack of volition, an early sexual repressed confl ict over survival of the self 
and the species expressed in the moment of ba  le as an unresolved intra-
psychical confl ict over duty and escape, or emotional instability, among 
others.6 These debates were not, and have not, been defi nitively or even 
satisfactorily resolved. Causes of war neuroses in the twenty-fi rst century 
are similarly situated as demonstrated by any cursory reading about the 
Fort Hood shooting and by the American, British, and Canadian veteran 
suicides from service in the Afghani and Iraqi wars in the widely available 
media reports—both mainstream and alternative. Even with the develop-
ment and implementation of psychiatric practices designed to reduce the 
incidence of war neuroses, rates seem to be roughly the same now as they 
were in the Great War, if delayed stress is taken into account.
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Psychiatrization of Military Bodies
Once plugged into each other, the military and psychiatry as embodied 
apparatuses feed each other discursively and materially. The inter- and 
intra-actions among the relations generate new ways for articulation. As 
practices develop, they become closer in step with each other as the goals, 
values, and understandings of what constitutes psychologically sound 
masculine fi ghting troops begin to fuse. Over time, seemingly indepen-
dent military and psychiatric practices merge, transforming into hybrid 
forms of psychiatrized military practices and militarized psychiatric prac-
tices. By the mid twentieth century, military psychiatry had spawned a 
reorientation of war neuroses such that each and every prospective, exist-
ing, and past soldier’s body composed a potential psychiatric case. This 
premise underlay most of the military psychiatric practices implemented 
in the fi eld for the rest of the twentieth century and set the stage for the 
fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century. Empirically, what this means is that 
psychiatric practices now span the military’s bodies as recruits, deployed 
troops, and veterans. Our task here is to show how some psychiatric prac-
tices in the military psychiatrize bodies, or make them scrutinizable as 
psychiatric objects.
The imperative of creating a military force that would not break down 
in ba  le has been of paramount importance to all states throughout the 
twentieth century. Militaries took up this task enthusiastically, primarily 
because of the interest among civilian psychiatrists in early intervention 
strategies to prevent mental illness throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Mul-
lahy 1970). The enthusiasm was also fed by the need to cost out the im-
pact of psychiatric wounds operationally (strategically), so a commander 
could be  er predict casualties. Morale-wise militaries could be  er situate 
individual soldiers and troops more generally to deal with combat. As 
well, fi nancially, fewer breakdowns would mean that the pensions would 
go to the most deserving. Also at play during this time were notions about 
what military bodies in a country at war looked like. In the United States, 
in preparation for the Second World War, Harry Stack Sullivan’s military 
work involved psychological screening, a practice used to identify who 
would most likely break down in combat or develop psychiatric issues af-
ter service. Screening built on his civilian work around early intervention 
for treatment of mental illness as part of a public health agenda fed two 
societal needs: the mobilization of a country for war (Shephard 2000) and 
the marshaling of potential heroes for the cause. Recruits were thoroughly 
tested with pages and pages of psychological questions and follow-up in-
terviews, and then were trained. Cowards, homosexuals, and the disabled 
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were denied entry into the military, tightly circumscribing military bodies 
as masculine—brave, courageous heroes-in-the-making; handsome fam-
ily men serving as nation-building role models and supreme exemplars of 
physical fi tness. Those who passed the screening tests but were morally 
weak, had sensitive constitutions or were mentally ill, were either kicked 
out or assigned noncombat duties.
Troops, once deployed, were still subject to psychiatric scrutiny as mili-
tary bodies. Although the intention of screening at the onset of the Second 
World War was to cut down on those recruits who were predisposed to 
combat stress, fi eld observations refuted the basic premise that those prone 
to nervous conditions were the ones that broke down in combat (R. Greene 
1976: 376-435). American military psychiatrists in the South Pacifi c, North 
Africa, and northern Germany found many of the assumptions going into 
the war untenable: fresh troops, recruits with troubled backgrounds, and 
those with borderline mental and physical health problems were not most 
likely to break down, just as seasoned troops, recruits with uncontested 
life circumstances, and those physically fi t and of sound mental health 
were not most likely to emerge from combat unscathed emotionally or 
psychologically.7 Multiple sets of relations, including the circumstances of 
warfare and changing technologies (see Dupuy 1990), bodily stress from 
the natural environment (R. Greene 1976), and the impact of the civilian 
psychiatric shi   toward preventative practices (Binneveld 1997: 161–77) 
contributed to the consensus, by the end of the Second World War, that 
troops react in various ways to combat and that everyone has a breaking 
point.
To fi nd that breaking point became the golden ring among military 
psychiatrists, resulting in an intensifi cation of the psychiatrization of mili-
tary bodies. During the American Viet Nam War, for example, psychia-
trists were deployed to the ba  lefi eld to make clinical observations while 
troops were engaged in combat in order to follow physiological and bio-
logical evidence of ba  le stress (Binneveld 1997: 98–99). Stress hormones 
were relatively low among combatants, which indicated that they had low 
stress levels (which seems implausible) or had found a way to deal with 
stress in the moment, even if under tenuous situations for long periods of 
time (which is a more likely scenario). By the end of the Viet Nam War it 
was clear that no ma  er the care taken to prevent war neuroses, its onset 
was still an issue. Although breakdown rates in the fi eld diminished as a 
result of psychiatric testing and the introduction of more-extensive psy-
chological training for combat troops, they were replaced by a consistent 
rate of about one in three troops suff ering combat stress a  er return from 
ba  le, ranging from weeks, months, years, and nearly even lifetimes.8
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Through organizational practices developed specifi cally to treat and 
monitor symptoms of nervous breakdown as psychiatric wounds, the 
military bodies of soldiers continued to be psychiatrized. The intensity 
of psychiatric scrutiny in deployment through fi eld treatment practices 
(e.g., CEUs in the Second World War), for soldiers returning from the 
front (e.g., through education and awareness workshops and TLD centers 
for troops returning from the Afghanistan War), and for veterans through 
outpatient and nonmedicalized treatment centers (e.g., the network of 
Canadian OSI clinics and the American Defense and Veterans Brain Injury 
Center) show how military bodies are continually made into psychiatric 
objects (see discussion of treatment in chapter 6). Indeed, recent education 
a  empts by the American military to heighten awareness about the po-
tential for PTSD, depression, and TBI targets veterans and family to be on 
the lookout for postdeployment stress (Centre for Military Health Policy 
Research 2008). Keeping a watchful eye over veterans is not only a task 
for veteran services as it was in the past, but also for family members and 
the veteran. Ongoing surveillance of the possibility of psychiatric wounds 
transforms all military bodies into psychiatric bodies. Underlying these 
organizational practices is a crucial tension between duty (military) and 
cure (psychiatric medicine). No ma  er the etiology of the war neurosis or 
the personnel needs of the military, the tautness of connection between 
military imperatives and broken-down war bodies wore thin, and the 
management of war neuroses emerged as the mediated accord between 
the two apparatuses. As a management strategy, the arrangement of all 
these military psychiatric practices generates unique subjects in that sol-
diers with psychiatric wounds or with scars from emotional distress do 
not remain soldiers, nor are they cured. Rather, they take up a liminal 
space that renders them viscously porous entities that do not fi t either the 
military routines of service or psychiatric routes for treatment.
Liminality is a useful concept to help account for collective and indi-
vidual experiences of both the militarization of psychiatric wounds and 
the psychiatrization of military bodies. As a concept liminality brings 
with it its own embodiment, neither quite distinct from one apparatus 
or another, nor unable to exist without both. The spaces depicted by the 
concept are constitutive of the bodies that inhabit them just as the bodies 
are constitutive of the spaces as both driven and ill. One cannot forget 
that the liminal spaces generated are shaped by masculinity, both in the 
power/knowledge circulating as well as in the reality disclosed by our 
concepts. We next discuss how masculinity shapes both the militariza-
tion of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization of military bodies as 
processes.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
 176 Weary Warriors

“Did You See the Sunrise?”
Magnum, P.I., a popular 1980s American television series that is still broad-
cast as reruns some thirty-fi ve years later, illustrates some of the ways in 
which the embodied apparatuses of psychiatry and the military plug into 
one another through the militarization of psychiatric wounds and the 
psychiatrization of military bodies. that . Masculinity, too, plays a part 
in these processes—as both a set of scripts for individual soldiers and 
veterans to take up and as the context within which knowledge/power 
pa  erns the intra- and interactive aspects of embodied apparatuses. Al-
though fi ctional, the characters in Magnum, P.I. are a useful foil against 
which to show how both the militarization of psychiatric wounds and the 
psychiatrization of military bodies can work. In addition to Magnum, P.I., 
there are several television series that have as pivotal characters soldiers 
living with psychiatrized bodies. What is important to remember in this 
part of the analysis is not that there is a truth to be uncovered, but rather 
that the material-discourses circulating within psychiatry, the military, 
and masculinity generate familiar subject positionings into which society 
can easily see weary warriors slipping.
The series focuses on four main male characters—Thomas Sullivan 
Magnum (played by Tom Selleck), Jonathan Quayle Higgins (John Hill-
erman), Theodore “TC” Calvin (Roger E. Mosley), and Orville “Rick” 
Wright (Larry Mane  i)—all of whom have military backgrounds and 
have suff ered emotionally as a direct result of combat. Complex fl ash-
backs, threaded throughout the mysteries, murders, and the  s that a pri-
vate investigator would routinely come across in a detective series, expose 
the crevices in the characters’ emotional make-ups and thus reveal their 
psychological wounds. Each of the characters has a deep sense of honor, 
chivalry, and loyalty, and all have been deeply aff ected by their war-time 
experiences. Jonathan Higgins epitomizes the military code of ethical con-
duct. He is a baron and studied at the Royal Military College at Sand-
hurst to become an offi  cer, yet he signed up as a common soldier a  er he 
refused to tell on a fellow student when threatened with expulsion. By 
military standards he had an illustrious career: he served as a sergeant 
major in the British Army, acted as a commando in MI6, and was involved 
with UN peace-keeping forces. Upon retirement, he took up the position 
of majordomo of a rich and famous author so he would have time to write 
his memoirs. As part of his project, and to the annoyance of the other char-
acters in the series, he continually tells the stories he writes about.
Told as fragments over the eight-year run of the series, Higgins’ stories 
o  en have an edge to them, but it is only when he recounts the decima-
tion of a village and the massacre of men, women, and children by British 
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soldiers in 1953 during the Mau Mau Revolution that the extent of the 
impact of his trauma is revealed to the viewer (Magnum, P.I. 1982: 3.5).9 
The trauma for Higgins is not about witnessing the brutalities of war: it 
is about being responsible for the soldiers who commi  ed the atrocities. 
Physically wounded from a skirmish, he stayed behind while ordering the 
rest of the unit to continue trailing the Mau Mau soldiers who had killed 
and mutilated two other British soldiers. Ever the professional soldier, 
Higgins’ code tightly circumscribes him as an honorable man; he rec-
ommended courts-martial for everyone, including himself. But the mili-
tary exonerated Higgins and reprimanded the unit. Thirty years later, the 
trauma still festers in all the soldiers involved, for—as Higgins put it—a 
court-martial would have punished the men for their actions, but as it was 
the soldiers were forced to live with their memories of their acts and the 
eff ects of emotional distress and psychological trauma from combat
Higgins’ story discloses his own psychological wound—not as a psy-
chiatric illness in need of treatment, but as a constant reminder of the 
destructive nature of war. As he tells of past horrors, he accounts for his 
trauma through a military lens as a concoction of personality, military 
training, the military as an institution, masculine ideals, moral illness, 
treatment for morality, trusting friendships, and the routine of his once 
extraordinary life. Masculinity, too, shapes how Higgins sees his psycho-
logical wound. The entwinement of masculine values with the military 
values of order, honor, and responsibility encourage soldiers to distance 
themselves from the stigma of ba  le fatigue and thus permit Higgins to 
recover, at least in the moment, from a potential relapse so he can recount 
his story without reliving his traumatic past, in honor of those living in ter-
ror. Such distance keeps masculine ideals in place and emotional wounds 
neatly tucked away in the past where they belong. It is only when others 
need assistance that the characters engage with their wounds so that those 
around them can be suitably empathetic and that they themselves can be 
seen as heroes once again.
This distancing from ongoing eff ects of past war trauma is true for the 
other three characters, all of whom to some extent dealt with the eff ects 
of trauma from the American Viet Nam War. In the fi rst three years of the 
series, there were more than a handful of episodes that dealt directly with 
the tribulations of living with delayed stress. While chasing down the 
murderer of a beautiful young woman, Magnum has fl ashbacks of combat 
in Viet Nam as well as a fl ashback of saving Rick’s life (Magnum, P.I. 1981: 
1.6). At the end of the episode, against the backdrop of a sandy beach, 
ocean, and volleyball net, Magnum gingerly approaches the topic of the 
fl ashbacks he has been having. He asks TC, “You ever think about ‘Nam? 
I mean have memories fl ashed through your head without really even 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
 178 Weary Warriors

thinking about it?” (Magnum, P.I. 1981: 1.6; transcription by authors). The 
brief pause before TC answers tells the viewer that yes, he does, but he 
tells Magnum that he does not. This interaction draws out the masculine 
norm of not talking about emotions and reinforces the idea that any men-
tal issue, particularly about not being in control of one’s own thoughts, is 
to be kept quiet in case anyone should think one is ill, unstable, or in need 
of a psychiatrist. Masculinity, like psychiatry, masks unreason and keeps 
it in its place.
Only through minor characters does the impact of delayed stress on 
the lives of veterans fully manifest. In one episode, Magnum crosses paths 
with a surgeon he knew in Viet Nam and investigates the deaths of three 
of her patients (Magnum, P.I. 1982: 3.12). Karen (Marcia Strassman), ac-
cused of poisoning the patients, is still coming to terms with the deep 
emotional distress she encountered as a nurse in Viet Nam. By the end of 
the episode, her troubles, as they are constructed through the script, have 
merely been identifi ed, and the emotional work before her is just begin-
ning.10 What is interesting about this specifi c storyline is that conventional 
gendered stereotypes of women being emotional and men not dealing 
with their emotions, usually part of sustaining masculine dominance, are 
reversed: the woman has yet to begin dealing with the psychological im-
pact from her traumatic war experiences and the men have dealt with their 
emotional distress arising from combat. Mixed up in this representation 
is the marginalization of noncombat troops (nurses) within the military, 
who are not being diagnosed with and treated for delayed stress. These 
inversions indicate how psychiatry in the military deals with traumatized 
psyches. The military has recognized and is organized around diagnosis 
and treatment of psychiatric wounds among combat troops who, with few 
exceptions, are male.
The processes of the militarization of psychiatric wounds and psychia-
trization of military bodies continually frame the bodies of Magnum, Hig-
gins, TC, and Rick as seemingly well-adjusted veterans. Throughout the 
series, individual episodes contribute to the unfolding story of how weary 
warriors live among us and show the extent of how the construction of 
their subjectivities are still mediated by psychiatry and the military as 
embodied apparatuses. “Did You See the Sun Rise?” (Magnum, P.I. 1982: 
3.1, 3.2) shows how militarization and psychiatrization work together to 
weave various elements and events that in turn disclose the complexities 
of living with psychiatric wounds from war trauma. Masculinity as mate-
rial-discourse shores up these embodied dispositifs within which weary 
warriors navigate their lives and gives form to the way veterans express 
who they are. The plot slowly stretches across the two-hour time slot. TC 
meets up with Nuzo (James Whitmore Jr.), someone he served with in Viet 
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Nam, and together they concoct what appears to be a plan to kill Ivan (Bo 
Svenson), the Russian commander of the POW camp where TC, Nuzo, 
and Magnum were held for three months. Mac (Jeff  MacKay), Magnum’s 
friend and Navy contact, is killed with a car bomb intended for Magnum. 
Unbeknownst to Magnum, Mac was sticking close to him because naval 
intelligence linked Magnum to an assassination to take place imminently 
orchestrated by Ivan. A  er his death, Magnum fi gures out that Ivan is 
actually in Hawai’i, that TC and Nuzo are experiencing an incident of 
delayed stress, and that the target is a Japanese prince visiting Oah’u. 
Magnum fi gures out that Nuzo has been drugging TC in an a  empt to 
reactivate TC as a killing machine to assassinate the Japanese prince. 
Magnum is able to break through to and bring home TC, who in a drug-
induced haze fi lled with fl ashbacks thinks that he is killing Ivan.
Integral to the storyline is the belief that delayed stress is a justifi able, 
but not quite naturalized, response to war, even for the most elite warriors. 
Although cowardice and dastardly acts in combat are moral weaknesses, 
psychological and emotional diffi  culties as results of war are diff erent, 
and more acceptable. No ma  er the way weary warriors deal with deep 
emotional distress, the naturalization of trauma holds steady. Magnum, 
a former Navy SEAL and naval intelligence offi  cer with an exemplary 
career, spent time in a psychiatric hospital a  er returning home from the 
war. As career military, he did what he was supposed to do to fi x himself: 
he got help and got over it. His psychiatric problems are not a routine 
part of his life, nor are they a recurring theme in the series. It is only when 
something is stirred up in his psyche that his breakdown is mentioned. 
And when it is mentioned, he is quick to point out that his problem now 
is not part of his war memories, something that is then reinforced through 
the story (e.g., Magnum, P.I., 1982: 2.15; 1984: 5.3).
In contrast, TC, a college graduate and football tight end sensation, 
volunteered a  er graduation and did three tours in Viet Nam as a Marine 
Corps helicopter pilot. Though deeply aff ected by his wartime experiences 
in combat and as a POW, he never sought treatment and kept the eff ects of 
his choices to himself; that is, breaking up with his wife and not seeing his 
children for years (Magnum, P.I. 1986: 7.11). His military sense of duty and 
service dovetails with his strategy of denying the impact of his trauma. He 
kept himself tightly wound, refusing to display acts of fraying or break-
down; these are the marks of a good warrior. Both strategies of fi xing and 
denial fi t with the military code because both strategies naturalize onset of 
delayed stress. As a result, Magnum and TC, like the other military char-
acters, are aff orded the appearance of a stigmatizing weakness because 
they have proven themselves to be good warriors. Their moral fortitude, 
courageous valor, and inexorable honor, made even clearer by surviving 
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captivity, sets them apart from other combatants, those who are weaker in 
body and spirit.
This militarization of psychiatric wounds, where soldiers and veterans 
engage with trauma and emotional distress through the set of values es-
poused by the military, also carries with it the idea that when problems 
do exist there is some external force or enemy to blame. In this episode 
(Magnum, P.I. 1986: 7.11), the framing of brainwashing consists of taking 
advantage of warriors at their most vulnerable, exploiting a weakness, 
burrowing into a psychiatric wound. Strengthening this idea are other dis-
courses, such as those a  ributing brainwashing techniques to the Chinese, 
Korean, and Russian militaries in the second half of the twentieth century 
and se  ing up military confl ict as “us and them” through the Cold War 
mentality. What appears in the episode is a rendition of The Manchurian 
Candidate (1962), where psychiatric wounds were later exploited for mili-
tary ends.11 Nuzo’s character as an undercover Russian operative trained 
by Ivan in North Viet Nam works well against the 1980s backdrop of 
Cold War global politics between the United States on one side, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China on the other. He shows 
how reprehensible “they” are by exploiting the unwri  en military code 
of “buddies” and “escaping” from the POW camp with Magnum and TC. 
Buddies understand, trust, and support each other; reinforce each other’s 
masculine identity; and protect each other from the enemy. The bond cre-
ated from the intensity of the POW experience facilitates the reunion with 
TC and paves the way for Nuzo to activate the programming experiments 
carried out in the camp. Camaraderie, strength of military honor, and 
orderly conduct contort into a weakness when Nuzo drugs TC, through 
bubblegum and then a hypodermic needle, to facilitate a more forceful 
psychological manipulation. The drugging is even more shameful in that 
TC is a teetotaler, something a buddy would know and respect.
Still, TC cannot be held responsible. His initial brainwashing and later 
drugging are external culprits and easily blamed for his actions. TC acts 
honorably, helps his buddy, and cannot be held responsible for the decep-
tive act of the enemy who exploits an Achilles heel. Yet it is the same Achil-
les heel that Magnum exploits, though he does so honorably, and brings 
TC back to a reality where he belongs. Thus, there is no challenge to his 
masculinity as a result of mental weakness or (resurfaced) emotional dis-
tress. TC is a blameless victim who was exploited at his most vulnerable 
when Ivan—not Vietnamese, but Russian—broke down TC’s psyche us-
ing nearly unbearable distress and took advantage of his weakened state 
in order to serve the goals of another military. The reactivation of a human 
being, an ex-combat troop, reinforces the idea that psychiatric wounds 
arising from war trauma are deeply imbricated in the military relations 
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within which they emerge. And, as the series shows, when le   alone the 
tessellated layers of war trauma are only one factor in shaping a person’s 
identity. The wounds only become a problem when the context shi  s and 
the military dimensions are brought to the fore. Unfortunately, for most 
veterans, unlike TC, the eff ects of the militarized wounds seep into every-
day life, transforming immediate environments into a plethora of external 
causes that could ignite another destructive traumatic reaction.
“Did you see the Sunrise?” (Magnum, P.I. 1982: 3.2) lays out some of 
the possible expressions (disclosures) of the process of the psychiatri-
zation of military bodies. It illustrates how behavior is under the sway 
of the psyche and becomes part of the way psychological wounds are 
understood. Controlling behavior is part and parcel to military train-
ing. Soldiers are told what to do: they submit to authority, follow the 
hierarchy, and defer to rank. Soldiers are also trained to act morally and 
with honor, and to serve their country with pride. This tension between 
receiving instruction and acting morally is accentuated in this storyline 
when TC engages in the act to assassinate the prince of an American ally. 
Hence, when behavior is beyond one’s ability to control—for if anyone 
could have controlled behavior, it would have been TC as a former elite 
Marine—then there is something wrong with the soldier. In TC’s case 
there had to have been a deep psychic injury in order for him to permit 
Nuzo to control him, even though Nuzo used hallucinogenic drugs. In 
the psychiatrization of military bodies, a competing category of mascu-
linity is created whereby the role of the psychologically wounded soldier 
is tightly circumscribed and distanced from military codes so that mental 
problems cannot be used to justify unsoldierly acts. The rationale would 
be that the soldier is no longer a soldier but rather a mental patient. 
But like other concepts in the mangle, the meaning of “unsoldierly” is 
changeable for other acts of violence, acts that are not necessarily linked 
to national security, as was TC’s act.
TC’s apparent psychological collapse and Ivan’s success in creating a 
live ticking bomb throws into doubt much of what the U.S. military has to 
off er veterans as part of a recovery and ongoing support for psychological 
distress. Even the notion of delayed (mental) stress shows that soldiers 
and even ex-combat troops are continually (re-)constituted as military 
bodies. Through the diagnostic category of delayed stress, the veteran 
maintains a connection to the psychiatric power circulating in the military 
sometimes long a  er soldiers are deployed in combat. Resistance to such 
a connection is common, as evidenced by Magnum’s insistence in several 
diff erent episodes that his actions are not related to delayed stress (e.g., 
Magnum, P.I. 1982: 2.15; 1984: 5.3). This resistance in part plays out the 
masculine ideal of an independent will and extreme individualism, more 
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characteristic of Magnum than of TC. We call this a “don’t psychiatrize me 
as a military body” strategy that reasserts agency in the constitution of the 
veteran’s own subjectivity. The colonization of the idea that all nervous 
disorders among veterans have to be linked to an injured psyche sets up 
the veteran to reengage with the military only through psychiatry and 
psychiatric power. The resolve to crack open the label of delayed stress 
slices both ways: it can free a veteran of the heaviness of trauma (as in the 
case of Higgins) or impede emotional healing (as in the case of Karen). 
The tensions among camaraderie, honor, delayed stress, mental stability, 
control of behavior, agency, and global politics, destabilized through the 
relationship between Nuzo and TC, are refortifi ed as Magnum puts the 
pieces of the puzzle (mangle) together.
The second part of the two-part episode (Magnum, P.I. 1982: 3.2) ends 
with a confrontation between Magnum and Ivan, wherein the two pro-
cesses of the militarization of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization 
of military bodies collide:
Ivan: If you are going to shoot me, do it now.
(Pause.)
Ivan: You won’t. You can’t. I know you, Thomas. I had you for three months 
at Doc-Wei. I know you be  er than your mother. Your sense of honor, and 
fair play. You could shoot me if I was armed and coming a  er you. But, like 
this, Thomas, never. Good-bye, Thomas. Dasvidaniya.
(Ivan turns, and begins to walk away.)
Magnum: Ivan?
Ivan: Yes?
Magnum: Did you see the sunrise this morning?
Ivan: Yes. Why?
Cut to close up of Magnum’s eyes. Cut to upper body shot. He raises his arm 
and fi res the gun. The frame freezes with the blast to Magnum’s right, with 
the sound of the shot echoing and fading over the frozen image. (Magnum, 
P.I. 1982: 3.2; transcription by authors).
By shooting Ivan without blinking an eye, Magnum tidily sweeps away 
uncertainty, pushes psychiatric illness aside, and reestablishes a milita-
rized masculinity that rationalizes a revenge murder under the auspices 
of national security—at least on the surface. As Michael Ignatieff  (1998: 
158) has wri  en, “There are human and inhuman warriors, just and unjust 
wars.” The tale seemingly supports the need for military vigilance in time 
of peace. Just by tracing these two processes, linking psychiatry and the 
military with a masculinity lens undermines the simplicity of the popu-
lar message. Magnum’s act could be said to disclose a path through the 
mangle that rationalizes murder and restores normalcy. TC gets “fi xed” 
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by going stateside for debriefi ng and Magnum goes back to being a pri-
vate investigator.
The Fit of Psychiatry and the Military
What happens when a soldier breaks down during combat or a veteran 
exhibits delayed stress? What practices, interactions, and processes take 
place that assemble a context for dealing with the deep emotional dis-
tress of combatants? How, in other words, do soldiers or veterans become 
weary warriors? In this chapter we have off ered a way of thinking about 
power/knowledge apparatuses that, in the context of soldiers, intermingle 
in embodied ways to generate weary warriors of diff erent kinds. Follow-
ing Hekman (2010) we have suggested that the identities of soldiers are 
real; and that these realities are disclosed through concepts and under-
standings of specifi c subject positions. And, following Pickering, we have 
portrayed the soldier in context as a mangle of practices and pathways, 
of a discursive-material mode, from which emerge various subject po-
sitionings of warriors. These contexts are a series of entanglements of 
knowledge and power confi gurations and multiple connections and dis-
connections. As well, these contexts are any number of disclosures and 
enclosures generated by diagnostic categories and decisions about the 
true state of the exhausted soldier. To be  er understand the circumstances 
and experiences of weary warriors, we have examined in some depth the 
militarization of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization of military 
bodies.
The militarization of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization 
of military bodies are simultaneous processes, most of the time work-
ing together to construct illness and generate ill bodies in ways that are 
specifi c to the contexts within which all this happens. In contrast to the 
organizing presumption that emotional breakdowns can happen to any-
one, anywhere, anytime, given the right set of circumstances, more-re-
cent popular accounts focus on the specifi city of particular bodies that 
are psychiatrized. Alongside and interactive with the militarization of 
psychiatric wounds, military bodies are subject to psychiatric power. As 
the practice of psychological screening shows, all military personnel are 
treated as potential psychiatric cases. Military troops train for strength, 
agility, and endurance as well as for obedience to authority, deference to 
rank, and honor in death. Just as psychiatric power circulates through the 
military training practices that shape the psychological make-up of indi-
vidual troops, psychiatric power also circulates between the experience of 
trauma and its somatic and psychological articulation. Both somatic and 
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mental stress, thus, push the boundaries of a combat troop’s capacity to 
deal with diff erent types of trauma, depending on the context.
We have looked in this chapter at how the practices of the military 
and psychiatry function and articulate with each other and with other 
mechanisms in civil society, and with what eff ects. Taking seriously the 
entanglement of deep discursive-material connections, inter- and intra-ac-
tions, and eff ects of the relationships, elements, and events, we are be  er 
able to disclose the multiple eff ects of the processes that generate weary 
warriors as fl exible, porous, and in fl ux—liminal—rather than as infl ex-
ible regulated entities. Taking context into account for us means identify-
ing and then tracing some of the processes that connect various elements 
within embodied apparatuses that are plugged into each other. This idea 
of context is active, generative, and (ontologically) positive. The soldier in 
context occupies temporal dimensions, spatial considerations, and per-
sonal and professional expectations, all interacting in fl uid relations for 
fi xing or holding in place the ill soldier. Thus, rather than relying on the 
phrase “depending on the context” or ge  ing stuck in an endless cycle 
of exceptions, we can use context as constitutive in and of itself to speak 
about disclosures, entanglements, and mangles in a way that has sub-
stance, a substance where diagnostic categories and treatment modalities 
ma  er deeply to soldiers and veterans, as well as to psychiatrists and 
military leaders.
Notes
 1. Our use of “his” and “himself” are intentional uses of gendered pronouns.
 2. Note that we use the word “wounds” here as opposed to “psychiatric illness”; 
the la  er resists the dominance of both psychiatry and the military as disci-
plinary apparatuses.
 3. Foucault notes that overcrowding in asylums limited contact between the 
psychiatrist and the insane or abnormal. But the principle still holds: in order 
for psychiatric power to operate well, the psychiatrist must have contact with 
the mad. This is not the case in the military.
 4. For details about the structures in place for caring for wounded soldiers, see 
E. Jones and Wessely (2005a); Leese (2002); Lerner (2003); Shephard (2000). 
  We draw out descriptions of the fi eld practices from a number of sources. 
The sources we cite here are those with the most systematic descriptions of 
both the conditions leading up to the implementation of forward psychiatry 
as well as of forward psychiatry itself. Our account of the development of 
forward diff ers slightly from all these sources.
 5. PIE was introduced a  er the Second World War to describe the principles. See 
Artiss (1963) for a discussion of PIE.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The Soldier in Context 185

 6. See the discussion in this volume, chapter 3, about classification and 
diagnosis.
 7. John Appel, S. Alan Challam, E. W. Cochran, Roy Grinker, Martin R. Plesset, 
William D. Sharp, Herbert Spiegel, and Melvin Thorner were among the 
American military psychiatrists who, at the beginning of the Second World 
War, argued for the predisposition thesis; by the end of the war, they had 
abandoned it, replacing it with a complex set of factors contributing to combat 
breakdown including low morale, harsh natural environment, boredom, lack 
of appropriate training, bodily stress (e.g., trench foot), sexual deprivation, 
ineff ective leadership, isolation, and lack of wider context for military cam-
paigns, among others (R. Greene 1976).
 8. For rates of breakdown in the early years of Viet Nam, see Binneveld (1997: 
97), Shephard (2000: 340), and Wanke (2005: 18, 24).
 9. The racialization of his trauma plays out in complex ways in this episode, 
indicative of the other ways race plays out in the series. African American 
culture is celebrated through references to jazz and sports usually, but not al-
ways, via TC. Magnum, P.I. is not a series that is o  en analyzed in the literature 
on 1980s primetime television in media studies. For racialized representations 
of characters on 1980s primetime television, see Greenberg and Colle  e (1997) 
and Stroman, Merri  , and Matabane (1989). See Brislin (2003), Gray (1995), 
and Hamamoto (1994) for insights into African American, Pacifi c Islander, 
and Asian representations, all of which play some role in the characterizations 
in Magnum, P.I.
10. The gendered aspect of delayed stress in this episode is central. The choice to 
bring this issue to the fore through a storyline of a female nurse who is now a 
surgeon layers the militarization of psychiatric wounds in interesting ways. 
11. A remake of The Manchurian Candidate was released in 2004, with the se  ing 
changed from Korea and the Korean War of the early 1950s to Kuwait and the 
First Gulf War of the early 1990s.
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Soldiering On
Care of Self, Status Passages, 
and Citizenship Claims

One thing I do know: everything that is sinking into us like a stone 
now, while we are in the war, will rise up again when the war is over, 
and that’s when the real life-and-death struggle will start.
—Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front
Returning troops faced bunting, bands, speeches, and hidden fears.
—Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada
The psychologically wounded veteran is a major fi gure in contemporary 
society. Despite new methods in psychiatric training, popularity of coun-
seling, and transformations in psychiatric care, the ma  er of soldiering 
on for the weary warrior a  er the military campaign and returning home 
remains a vexing issue of public policy-making around the world. The 
concept of “soldiering on” commonly refers to perseverance, resolve, de-
termination, and fi rmness, qualities and actions associated with the ideal 
image of the masculine fi ghting soldier. It is o  en equated with a discourse 
of returning home and the culturally anticipated processes of overcoming 
challenges, making adjustments, and ge  ing on with one’s life. Families, 
too, are implicated in this discourse of soldiering on: they are asked, in-
deed expected, to stay brave in the face of awkward reunions or setbacks 
in transitions, to conquer their own anxieties and fears about the returning 
veteran, and to monitor the state of mental health the veteran displays.
We suggest here, as elsewhere in the book, that, as veterans returning 
home, weary warriors are enacted through specifi c practices arising from 
various forms of power relations: biopower of psychiatry, disciplinary 
power of the military, and the sovereign power of the nation-state. These 
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power or force relations frame the private struggles of the returning vet-
eran in terms of care of the self and the place of the family in relation to 
the fi ghting soldier and the returning psychologically wounded veteran. 
Also a part of the return and transitioning for the soldier is a collage of 
normative images or discourses on who a weary warrior is and the role of 
the family in the soldier’s demilitarized life. Whether positive or negative, 
some normative material-discourses have been more prominent than oth-
ers over the past 125 years in the modern history of the weary warrior.
As an embodied subject, the weary warrior may be present in a mate-
rial way, to family and others, but almost totally absent in a discursive 
way, ignored culturally, withdrawn socially, and distant emotionally from 
even those most intimate with the veteran. In recent times across several 
nations, we have observed, relative to wars in earlier decades, an upsurge 
in community recognition and offi  cial commemoration of the biological 
deaths of veterans. In itself, body counts are signifi cant to consider theo-
retically (see Hyndman 2007). It is also signifi cant for another reason: to-
gether with this increasing public remembrance of the fallen soldier, there 
is an ongoing offi  cial contestation of soldiers with traumatized psyches 
by government authorities, and general disregard by the public, over the 
social death of veterans living among us.
Similarly, the political life of weary warriors as veterans is full of or-
ganizing and mobilizing to gain profi le, express shared struggles, incite 
state action, and thus secure rights and services in order to secure a sense 
of fairness and quality of life. The unevenness in the way in which the 
nation-state has responded to the lived circumstances of, and political 
claims by, psychologically wounded soldiers bears scrutiny. We maintain 
that the will of the state, as exercised through sovereign power, can be to 
acknowledge, to assist, or to abandon individual veterans or groups of 
veterans with certain embodied subjectivities and contested illnesses.
In this chapter we examine this conception of soldiering on, showing it 
to involve images, discourses, and actions. Soldiering on by psychologi-
cally traumatized veterans relates to the impact of war on civilian popula-
tions generally and families more specifi cally (Finkel 2013; Linford 2013; 
Thomas 2009). Soldiering on, we maintain, involves the (re)cultivation of 
the civilian self and the care of the psychologically wounded veteran by 
the veterans themselves, by some peers and by family members, and either 
civilian or military psychiatrists or mental health-care workers associated 
with recovery, addiction, and support centers. A politics of claims making 
and social change is a formative part in soldiering on by veterans in their 
struggles for recognition of wounds and distress as a result of combat. In 
these struggles, a series of relationships are activated and issues are con-
tested in military, state, and political institutions. In this sense, we make 
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the case that it is not just those soldiers diagnosed with war shock, combat 
fatigue, delayed stress, or PTSD, that are traumatized veterans: all veter-
ans now have become potential psychiatric cases for the military because 
of the way in which due processes and resources from welfare states care 
for and support of veterans form.
Reconstitution of the Distressed Subject
In previous chapters we challenged standard images of the military as a 
stable, closed, and formal system by drawing a  ention to tensions that 
mask acts of resistance and discretion operating within these institutional 
systems. We also reject the early Foucauldian view of soldiers as thor-
oughly docile bodies and static machines by emphasizing instead that the 
soldier can be an unstable identity, generated through multiple practices 
and contested relationships. In particular, we suggest that the veteran can 
be thought of as an embodied subject constitutive of material and discur-
sive forces within a specifi c power/knowledge confi guration. By the end 
of the Second World War, psychiatrists were in agreement that nearly 
anyone could break down, given the circumstances of war. So, it comes as 
no surprise that, with regard to Viet Nam veterans in the United States, 
a psychiatric consultant claims, “The individual [soldier] becomes totally 
submerged in the goals and needs of the military organization [because] 
military training requires submission to the aggression of superiors” 
(Tanay 1985: 30–31). There is much truth in this observation, yet our analy-
sis in previous chapters casts doubt on the absolute nature of these claims. 
In various confl icts over the past century, when ill soldiers have not per-
formed in accordance with their commands, a frequent diagnosis was that 
they had been unduly infl uenced by their civilian personality, usually 
in the form of family upbringing, a character fl aw, or possible suff ering 
from nostalgia. Militaries continually adjusted recruitment screening and 
training programs with a view to improve the emotional breakdown ratio 
among combat soldiers, refl ecting the reality that their success is always 
limited. Allegations of malingering and of insubordination, among other 
issues facing military authorities, also indicate that total submission and 
complete indoctrination rarely if ever occurs in military organizations, 
however powerful and coherent they may appear to insiders as well as 
outsiders.1
Likewise, we resist adopting images of civil society as an open, demo-
cratic, and supportive social world for veterans, especially traumatized 
veterans. Demobilization—the shi   from active duty and military service 
to private civilian life—may be thought to be a form of deinstitutionaliza-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Soldiering On 189

tion. We think here in terms of changing primary social locations from 
within the largely authoritarian institutional domain of military life (with 
pockets of total institutional spaces) to a generally more diversifi ed array 
of social structures. However, we cannot overlook the fact that civilian life 
takes place within a context of small social organizations and large institu-
tional sectors, including families, support groups, and mental health–care 
facilities, in addition to psychiatric professions, judicial systems, veterans’ 
groups, and government bureaucracies. It is more apt, then, to think of 
the demobilization of veterans, indeed of postdeployment life, as a type of 
reinstitutionalization.
A conventional account of demobilization sets up a status passage com-
prising three phases: separation from a soldier’s present military identity; 
transition from that to another, civil identity; and fi nally the incorporation 
into a new (or former) personal identity in civil society (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Jenkins 2004: 150–51). The place the traumatized soldier takes up 
in society is clearly absent. Sociologically, reconstitution of the subject 
is a formal pa  ern of rituals and institutionally approved and regulated 
changes in status, with a beginning and end to the status passage. John 
Wilson and G.E. Krause (1985) describe the homecoming experience as 
made up of three major phases. The fi rst phase is the return from the 
war zone to the United States and “the initial return to a civilian way of 
life.” The second phase is the homecoming period, which they defi ne 
as “the fi rst six months home from the war.” Here “the relative degree 
of support from signifi cant others and a meaningful community are im-
portant” (113). Following these is a third phase of favorable assimilation; 
that is, stabilization, positive adaptation, normal personality functioning, 
and constructive character changes, such as personal growth. It is worth 
noting that Wilson and Krause do note a fourth outcome, not quite an 
alternative phase, of nonassimilation or failed adaptation refl ecting, they 
suggest, the presence of pos  rauma stress, character disorder, or neurotic 
traits. Recognition of the potential of psychological or emotional eff ects of 
war in soldiers’ lives postdeployment indicates more that this is a disrup-
tion rather than a manner in which some veterans live their lives.
The theme of returning home is another infl uential way of talking about 
civilian life a  er military service and how the subject of the warrior is or 
ought to be reconstituted. Returning home a  er military deployment is 
o  en described as “ge  ing back to ‘normal’ [a  er their] return, … to pick 
up where they le   off , [recognizing that some] post-homecoming frictions 
are normal and predictable” (Lyons 2007: 311). In this context, reconsti-
tution of the veteran is a process of renormalization and reunifi cation. 
Parts of a family are reconnected by a soldier returning to a household 
and local community. One’s self, too, becomes of site for normality to take 
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hold. Previous roles and relationships become part of daily life again by 
veterans and others alike. It is a return to being a spouse, a parent, a sister 
or brother, a son or daughter, an aunt or uncle. An affi  rmation of one’s 
bundle of social roles and overall identity facilitates the process of com-
ing back to one’s previous life, one’s true self. In this idealized process of 
returning home, the dominant discourse on the reintegration of veterans 
into civilian life highlights the emotional process of seeing loved ones, full 
of joyful occasions of reconnecting. The experience of war is to be pack-
aged and neatly tucked away, not to be shared with intimates because it 
would spoil the moment, the occasion, the relationship, the ideal. Adjust-
ments to private life including the tweaking of relationships to keep un-
reason at bay are to be expected and may take some time, some missteps, 
but not too long and not too many. With reintegration the goal, returning 
home is but a transitional phase with a few ups and downs that can be 
smoothed over with the aid of information and advice from government 
agencies and veterans’ services. In the end, a new balance is established 
for veterans, their families, and their social networks, ones that hold to-
gether a normal life, at least on the surface.
Another far more critical discourse on returning home is to be found 
in clinical literature and in military memoirs, along with news stories in 
the popular press and social media and in cultural products such as war 
movies, plays, and books. It is remarkably evident in works dealing with 
Viet Nam War veterans in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in 
works on recent confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a disruption to the 
theme of coming home is the issue of coming to terms with the symptoms, 
diagnoses, and treatments associated with war neuroses, ba  le fatigue, 
and delayed stress. Coming to terms with disabling and disabled identi-
ties, as well as psychiatric labels and interventions are implicated in the 
identity reformation of distressed military subjects (Gerschick and Miller 
1995). Status passages for weary warriors are neither so straightforward, 
nor portrayed so positively or optimistically, nor so pa  erned in adjust-
ments from service in the armed forces to family life in civil society. Their 
status passages are more unpredictable and multidirectional, framed as 
troubling for the path to normality. They entail both adaptation and de-
terioration to things like pain, anger, and turbulence alongside recovery, 
gratifi cation, and composure. Of course, the passages are not temporally 
or spatially confi ned. They span not just weeks, months, or a few years 
of adjustments, but decades of ravaged minds. It is not just in hospitals 
and psychiatrists’ offi  ces that breakdowns take place: they occur in the 
bedroom, on the street, and on the steps of the courthouse. An American 
study published in 1981 documented that while most Viet Nam veterans 
were “unscathed by their experience,” several years a  er the war was over 
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an estimated “500,000 to 800,000 Vietnam era veterans, particularly those 
who endured the most severe combat-related stress and psychic trauma, 
were still encountering varying degrees of inability to adjust successfully 
to civilian life” (quoted in Fuller 1985: 9).
“Coming home from the war,” notes a former U.S. Army nurse, “turned 
out to be a devastating experience, however, for many Vietnam veter-
ans” (Van Devanter 1985: 156). She adds, “many women have indicated 
that they just felt generally very diff erent from their old selves and from 
their families and their friends when they returned” (158). In addition to 
strained relations over gendered roles and expectations, veterans may be 
returning in other concrete embodied terms with substance use issues, be-
havioral problems, and remoteness from family and friends. The aff ective 
distance between their traumatized self and their previous self produces 
intense anguish, grief, and despair. When home, discharged soldiers con-
front employment challenges and prolonged unemployment. There may 
be sudden onset of bodily sensations that were never part of their experi-
ence during deployment. Depression, anxiety a  acks, fl ashbacks, halluci-
nations, fatigue, and emotional numbing are relatively common among 
Viet Nam veterans. “There is a striking absence of preparation of war 
survivors for the adaptive crisis which awaits them upon return to the 
civilized world [and in certain cases an] existential crisis, questioning the 
meaning of life” (Tanay 1985: 30, 34). 
Viet Nam veterans returned from a deeply unpopular war and a failed 
military campaign in Southeast Asia. No heroes’ parades or even warm 
welcomes were there for these soldiers when they returned home. There 
was only a collective sigh of relief that the war was over and the a  itude 
toward demobilized soldiers—most of whom were conscripted—held a 
hint of disdain. A commonplace occurrence for Viet Nam veterans was to 
be shunned and stigmatized from the general American public, govern-
ment agencies, and even other veterans groups. “Unlike WWII veterans 
who returned home to a hero’s welcome, the Vietnam veteran returned 
home feeling defeated and witnessing antiwar protests and marches. 
There was li  le or no time for readjustment. Some men had to make the 
transition from the rice paddies of Vietnam to home within 36 hours!” 
(Woods, Sherwood, and Thompson 1985: 253). These observations indi-
cate how the logistical process of demobilization and the cultural meaning 
of homecomings are shaped by technological developments in transporta-
tion and by generational-based assessments of wars and veterans.
The subject of the ill soldier, the weary warrior, results from the circu-
lation of meanings in customs, stories, myths, symbols, narratives, and 
rituals. Over the twentieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries, we identify 
seven fi gures apparent in the cultural domain of public beliefs and social 
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a  itudes toward psychologically wounded veterans and in self-perceptions 
held by veterans themselves (Childers 2009; Galovski and Lyons 2004; 
Haley 1985; Silver 1985). In brief, the seven fi gures of shaping weary war-
riors as veterans are
1.  The good warrior. Soldiers who did their duty and served their country 
with honor and are publicly recognized as heroes
2.  The troubled hero. A good warrior, yet with some internal struggles 
that, overall, are not incapacitating
3.  The outlaw. The shunned, feared, and reviled veteran who is regarded 
to be aggressive and explosive in his (her) actions
4.  The misfi t. More oddball than outlaw, and thus less threatening in ref-
erence to prevalent societal norms and practices
5.  The forgo  en (abandoned) soldier. Not publicly recognized, hidden 
from sight, dealt with by the military and the state in trivial ways, and 
marginalized from military and nation-state histories
6.  The disadvantaged outsider. Outcasts of society who are homeless, job-
less, and in hopeless poverty
7.  The survivor. A soldier, who, despite various travails, engages post-
deployment life without either direct engagement or marginalization. 
Clearly this typology is merely heuristic, an exploratory schema with po-
rous boundaries holding the shape of each category. Even so, each type 
readily generates images that facilitate an understanding of how weary 
warriors are mediated discursively through ideas about what constitutes 
an honorable veteran and materially through the practices in which both 
the veterans and the people associated with veterans’ issues engage.
For example, the survivor, if a POW, may feel blameworthy and re-
main trapped in silence. Some survivors see themselves as under a per-
sonal duty to live a good life in order to validate those sacrifi ced, which 
can be seen as a form of survivor’s guilt (Childers 2009). A survivor, if a 
witness to atrocities and genocide, may well be struggling with recur-
ring nightmares of death and destruction, and take up the role as moral 
witness to humanity for failed policies and practices (Dallaire 2003). Less 
dramatically, the survivor may adopt a pragmatic stance or perhaps a fa-
talistic viewpoint claiming to be one of the lucky ones, being dutiful, and 
ge  ing on with living, and may have what can be referred to as “delayed 
stress” or “delayed trauma.” And there are the survivors who are active 
political subjects, possibly organizing around mental health issues and 
doing ba  le with various state and social institutions (Douce  e 2008). In 
the rest of this chapter, we bear in mind the wideranging scope of vari-
ous veterans who live with the experiences of war and the ways in which 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Soldiering On 193

they deal with their experiences of emotional distress and psychological 
wounds.
Private Struggles over the Care of the Self
Crucial to the work of soldiering on for the traumatized soldier is the care 
of the self. For weary warriors, such caring practices are not merely soli-
tary activities, but also involve both formal and informal relationships of 
solidarity, support, and surveillance. The embodied soldier is an embed-
ded subject positioned in confi gurations of interpersonal and bureaucratic 
relations as well as mutual dependencies and shared experiences with 
other sha  ered fi ghters. We note three aspects to the practices of the care 
of the self by weary warriors as veterans: caring about others, specifi cally 
one’s comrades; struggling to care for one’s self; and caring with others in 
veterans’ support groups.
Helen O’Grady observes, “care for the self has tended to be a male pre-
serve, while caring for others has been assigned to women and a  ributed 
the customary devaluation” (2004: 109). O’Grady grants “the reality of 
men’s care for others” and that men are not always more oriented toward 
the self than others. However, she maintains that the self orientation ap-
plies as “a general claim about the common eff ects of gender socialization 
processes” (112). Within the armed forces and military establishments, dis-
tinctive socialization processes seem at work that, while unquestionably 
organized for males, masculine in nature, with an element of machismo, 
contain a philosophy of care for the other. The norm of care for the self is 
subordinated to the value of care for others in the unit; individual safety 
and survival is secured through mutual support and commitment. Care 
of the self is placed under the authority of superior others and, equally 
important, under the scrutiny of signifi cant others. As Cameron March 
and Neil Greenberg (2007: 247) state, “The essential ethos for the U.S. 
and British Marines was: ‘Mission, Men, Self’—always in that priority.” 
This suggests, to us, that care of the self and of others are contingent and 
situational practices. The Red Badge of Courage, wri  en by Stephen Crane 
([1895] 2004), a classic novel about the American Civil War, provides an 
illustration of the solidarity of a company or regiment and the felt sense of 
responsibility to one’s comrades:
He suddenly lost concern for himself, and forgot to look at a menacing fate. 
He became not a man but a member. He felt that something of which he 
was a part—a regiment, an army, a cause, or a country—was in a crisis. He 
was welded into a common personality which was dominated by a single 
desire. …
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 There was a consciousness always of the presence of his comrades about 
him. He felt the subtle ba  le brotherhood more potent even than the cause 
for which they were fi ghting. It was a mysterious fraternity born of the 
smoke and danger of death. (Crane [1895] 2004: 34–35) 
Warriors develop a deep connection to the soldiers close by for which care 
becomes a key in maintain an interdependent relationship. Having to de-
pend on someone to protect you inspires you to protect and care for those 
around you, especially during ba  le. Breaking up these relationships can be 
a source of danger. Soldiers’ ji  ers, preoccupations, and, in extreme cases, 
nervous breakdowns disrupt the tightly woven fabric of the so-called ba  le 
brotherhood. These ties, however, are strong and remain long a  er ba  le, 
breakdown, and reunifi cation (RTU). Soldiers take these connections and 
draw on them a  er the war is over and military service is done.
The combatant struggling to engage in self-care a  er coming home is 
the second example of soldiering on by weary warriors. The traumatized 
veteran is a fi gure of stress-injured military personnel, primarily in the 
sense of an abnormal or deviant self (a  er Foucault 2003). Not so much a 
docile body as a diminished mind, the psychologically wounded soldier 
lives at the edges of the self. The relationship these veterans have with 
themselves, their own sense of self, is portrayed in a considerable body of 
literature as permanently altered in personality, markedly damaged in ca-
pacity, and with considerably limited agency in everyday living. Emotion-
ally, soldiers feel some type of self-guilt, self-blame, and self-doubt, while 
negotiating daily life through damaged self-esteem. In the a  ermath of 
being traumatized, it seems “one can no longer be oneself even to oneself” 
(Brison 2002: 40; emphasis in original). Practices of the self, in this context, 
are practices of struggle in relation to one’s body, one’s thoughts, and one’s 
own soul.
Yet practices of struggle do suggest that some degree of movement, 
agency, and resistance is still in eff ect. Studies speak to ba  ling “the enemy 
inside” (Baird 2010) and the link between an operational stress disorder 
and thoughts and acts of suicide (Coleman 2006), and the juxtaposition of 
“public peace, private wars” (Muir 2007). Soldiers write about their emo-
tional experiences, likening themselves to “empty casing[s]” (Douce  e 
2008), fi nding solace in the thought that “this, too, shall pass” (Richardson 
2005), and describing acts of self-care to preserve their sanity (Graves 
[1929] 1995). These conceptions of the damaged self can be seen to imply 
that care of the veteran requires medical treatments and psychiatric inter-
ventions. A frequent reference in this domain of the traumatized self is the 
image of “ghosts” as part of the legacy of combat, whether in regards to 
the Great War (Barker 1991, 1993, 1995), the Viet Nam War (Isaacs 1997; 
Kwon 2008; Moore and Galloway 2008), the Iraq War (Wasinski 2008), the 
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Afghanistan War (Steele 2011), or confl icts elsewhere (Mithander, Sund-
holm, and Holmgren Troy 2007).
Healing the traumatized self to allow some kind of moving on for 
veterans can entail remembering and reaffi  rming as much as forge  ing 
(Achugar 2008). More than forty-fi ve years a  er a ba  alion of the 7th 
U.S. Calvary ba  led North Vietnamese regulars in November 1965, two 
veterans recount, “All along our war and our ba  les remained fresh in 
our memories and our nightmares. We had a lot of unfi nished business 
that could only be conducted on those long-ago ba  lefi elds. We had old 
ghosts, old demons that tugged at our hearts and minds and sent some of 
our comrades in search of a name for what ailed us, and help in dealing 
with that ailment” (Moore and Galloway 2008: xvi).
Erich Maria Remarque’s novel, All Quiet on the Western Front ([1929]
1996), provides a compelling example of how warfare produces in com-
batants, in this case among young German soldiers during the Great War, 
a sense of detachment from their former selves: We’re no longer young 
men. We’ve lost any desire to conquer the world. We are refugees. We are 
fl eeing from ourselves. From our lives. We are eighteen years old, and we 
had just begun to love the world and love being in it; but we had to shoot 
at it. The fi rst shell to land went straight for our hearts” (61). Remarque 
elaborates on this uncoupling and separation from one’s self: “And even if 
someone were to give us it back, that landscape of our youth, we wouldn’t 
have much idea of how to handle it. The tender, secret forces that bound 
it to us cannot come back to life” (84). This separation is also perceived by 
the traumatized young veterans in generational terms: “in front of us there 
is a generation of men who did, it is true, share the years out here with 
us, but who already had a bed and a job and who are going back to their 
old positions, where they will forget all about the war—and behind us, a 
new generation is growing up, one like we used to be, and that generation 
will be strangers to us and will push us aside” (199). The fear expressed 
here is that no one will understand burnout and the broken embodiments 
of young veterans as they struggle to understand themselves, many not 
knowing what to do, while melancholy and confusion make their way 
into their thoughts whether their “conscious self likes it or not” (200).
This literary account of young German soldiers during the Great War 
is uncannily echoed in a historical account of American veterans who 
served in the Viet Nam War: “Life, as they say, went on day by day for all 
of us. We took the good with the bad and kept moving ahead, each in his 
own way, always with an inner understanding that we had already seen 
both the best and the worst that men can do to other men, and that noth-
ing—not even the passage of four decades—can fully erase these images” 
(Moore and Galloway 2008: xvii–xviii).
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A third example of the practices of a  ention to the self by weary war-
riors is caring with others in veterans’ support groups. These particular 
practices relate, in a Foucauldian sense, to technologies of the self in which 
veterans constitute themselves in an active manner by drawing on the 
mental health service users’ movement (Rogers and Pilgrim 2001), exist-
ing models of self-help and mutual aid groups, and, in 1970s and 1980s 
American culture, rap groups as part of consciousness-raising practices. 
In a number of countries from the 1960s onward, anti-psychiatry critics, 
consumer survivor groups, and patients’ rights movements emerged that 
questioned established theories and practices of treatment. These critics 
slammed the hierarchy of asylums and authority of specialists while at the 
same time advancing the interests of marginalized groups of sick and mad 
persons. The principles on which these groups emerged included self-
advocacy and group solidarity (Foucault 2004, 2006; Rogers and Pilgrim 
2001). More than coping mechanisms, these activities represent practices 
in social critique and social change. They represent a depsychiatrization—in 
lieu of the more common process of deinstitutionalization—of how the 
troubled self should be labeled and how health professionals should best 
treat that self. Peer support, as one example of this technology of the self 
and one with antecedents to practices in the Great War, emerged as a pre-
ferred intervention by many American veterans during and a  er the Viet 
Nam War. “It is known,” write March and Greenberg (2007: 251), “that 
military personnel who do want to speak about their operational experi-
ences prefer to speak to a peer rather than to other forms of support such 
as medical staff  or managers.”
The Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) program is a for-
mal peer support program in collaboration between the Canadian forces 
and Veterans Aff airs Canada (Grenier et al. 2007). It arose at least in part 
from a recognition that “[m]ost providers of mental health services in the 
Canadian military are now civilians, who fi nd themselves at a disadvan-
tage when trying to understand and empathize with the particular work-
related situations facing their clients” (268). Relationships between service 
consumers (i.e., veterans) and clinicians and therapists raised issues of 
suspicion and trust, and of power relations and accountability. Peer sup-
port became seen as a way of addressing these issues and as a way of culti-
vating cohesion among veterans (Linford 2013). Thus, the OSISS program 
includes a self-care regime that is described as “what you do for yourself. 
It is recognizing your own limits and being kind to yourself. It is under-
standing what you need and making sure your needs are met at work and 
at home. Self-care is utilizing your team of colleagues and consultants. It 
is staying involved in your personal relationships, and it is respecting the 
choices of others” (278).
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Beside such formal peer support groups and inpatient programs at-
tached to the military and veterans’ administrations, as in this Canadian 
example, other more independent and informal self-help programs, sup-
port groups, recovery programs, and veteran-driven meetings are note-
worthy practices of care of the self via caring for others. One example is 
the Viet Nam veteran rap groups and similar storefront group approaches. 
Steven Silver explains the purpose and the success of these rap groups:
The emotional and o  en physical isolation of the past is altered by joining 
with others sharing basically the same experience. This process is aided by 
the desire of most veterans to see their relationship in Vietnam as positive 
and supportive, and in many cases more so than they actually were. This 
makes joining with other sharers of the trauma easier—it is a return to a 
supportive system, rather than an initiation of one. It is not necessary that it 
once did exist, or that it did to the degree the mythos presents [the mythos 
here being the prevalent beliefs of American culture with regard to the Viet 
Nam veteran]. It is only necessary that it exists now. (Silver 1985: 50)
Through a weary warrior joining with other sharers of combat trauma, 
we catch sight of “the interplay of the care of the self and the help of the 
other” (Foucault 1988b: 53) through “the talks that one has with a confi -
dant, with friends, with a guide” (51).
The Family, the Military, and Psychiatry
The state, psychiatry, and the military have been interested in the family 
for centuries. While the nature of these interests has undoubtedly changed 
over time, as have the assumptions and models of family life that un-
derlie practices, military concerns and psychiatric customs remain pri-
mary in policies and services for and about the families of weary warriors. 
Through state propaganda, military recruitment campaigns and general 
practices, nationalist cultural practices, and through discourses of health 
professions, the family has been represented in numerous ways. Some 
depictions contradict one another; all depictionsare contextual in mean-
ing and consequential for the way in which confi gurations of power and 
knowledge impact weary warriors.
In 1678 a Swiss physician, Johannes Hofer, wrote a paper on an illness 
among soldiers serving in foreign campaigns. Hofer called the illness nos-
talgie, or mal du pays, a “pain which the sick person feels because he is not 
in his native land, or fears he is never to see it again” (Babington 1997: 8). 
Symptoms of this homesickness, this yearning for family, according to 
Hofer, included, “melancholy, incessant thinking of home, disturbed sleep 
or insomnia, loss of appetite, anxiety, [and] cardiac palpitation” (8). In the 
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late 1700s an Austrian physician echoed Hofer’s diagnostic category of 
nostalgia, noting, “When young men, who are still growing, are forced to 
enter military service and thus lose all hope of returning safe and sound 
to their beloved homeland, they become sad, taciturn, listless, solitary 
musing, full of sighs and moans” (8). Anthony Babington writes that in 
1863, during the American Civil War, a military surgeon in the U.S. Army 
recorded that “many a young soldier has become discouraged and made 
to feel the bi  er pangs of home-sickness, which is the usual precursor of 
more serious ailments. That peculiar state of mind, denominated nostalgia 
by medical writers, is a species of melancholy, or a mild type of insanity, 
caused by disappointment and a continuous longing for home” (14). Two 
decades later, near the end of the nineteenth century, a U.S. government 
study concluded that “young men of feeble will” and married men away 
from home for the fi rst time were most prone to nostalgia (14). During the 
Great War some British servicemen were dubbed “home men,” signifying 
that their primary allegiance was seen to be to their families rather than 
to their king or country (Barham 2004: 314). From an early age, then, in 
modern warfare and psychiatry, the private domain of family life has been 
an object of disquiet, among other things, in the public realm of military 
and state aff airs.
One conception sets up the family as a source of troops and other valu-
able resources, or, in other words, the family is “the regular purveyors 
of material to the military machines” (Barham 2004: 117). In Britain, dur-
ing the Great War, conscription was introduced in 1916 with the passage 
by Parliament of the Military Service Act. This legislation was called the 
Bachelor’s Bill because “all male British subjects between the ages of 18 
and 41 who were either unmarried or widowers without dependent chil-
dren were called up to enlist” (25). This illustrates a claim made by Fou-
cault (2006) that “the obligation of military service was imposed on people 
who clearly had no reason to want to do military service: it is solely be-
cause the State put pressure on the family as a small community of father, 
mother, brothers and sisters, etcetera, that the obligation of military ser-
vice had real constraining force and individuals could be plugged into this 
disciplinary system and taken into its possession” (81). Beyond the image 
that Foucault presents of the pressured family are those of the reluctant or 
resistant family, o  en portrayed in popular culture in terms of the worried 
mother not wanting her son or sons to enlist (Crane [1895] 2004; Findley 
1977). As well, other notable images of family in relation to the military 
include the patriotic family, with recruits and relatives of soldiers identi-
fying with heroic images of loyal service and steadfast sacrifi ce for one’s 
country (Barham 2004: 177; Morton 2004; Remarque [1929] 1996); and the 
hopeful traditional family, the belief of a father “that the military life might 
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prove to be the making of his son” (Barham: 177), or the hope of parents 
and siblings “that war service might have transformed a wayward and 
burdensome son and brother into a manly patriot” (179). All these images 
center on the processes of recruiting troops and mobilizing related materi-
als for the military. The resources which families provide for a military or 
war eff ort include embodied conscripts or volunteers as well as fi nances 
through war bonds and taxes, the rationing and donation of goods and 
services, and expressed symbolic and moral support or, conversely, active 
or passive political opposition.
Once the soldier becomes part of the military, the family itself becomes 
psychiatrized—that is, the family becomes the source of a soldier’s psy-
chological traits and identifi able strengths or weaknesses. Since the early 
notions of nostalgia and homesickness for soldiers serving in foreign 
lands, which can be considered a precursor to the psychiatrized under-
standing of emotional illness as combat stress, the family has been re-
garded as a cause of something as benign as emotional distraction and 
as serious as nervous troubles or mental disorders. In the late nineteenth 
century family history became a topic of growing interest by militaries 
when recruiting and screening applicants, when diagnosing ill soldiers, or 
when disciplining soldiers. A  ention has been devoted to learning about a 
soldier’s education, his general demeanor, his physical stature, his health 
and medical history, and his parents and other family members’ health, 
especially any record of nervousness, hysteria, or insanity in his mothers, 
sisters, or aunts. A troubled, problematic family history of a soldier could 
“assist the military authorities in casting him as a constitutional inad-
equate, for whom they did not need to assume any special responsibility 
nor make a focus of intensive therapeutic zeal” (Barham 2004: 21). If it is 
assumed that a soldier can have a predisposition to exhaustion, shock, or 
fear, then it follows that the family is implicated in that susceptibility.
A comparable line of concern is the idea that families can be a distrac-
tion to the timely recovery of ill soldiers. A belief among military surgeons 
in the American Civil War (prior to the advent of military psychiatry) was 
that “soldiers who were sent to hospitals near their homes were always 
more liable to contract nostalgia than those who went to hospitals near 
to the Army which they belonged” (Babington 1997: 16). Much-more-
recent clinical literature on the stressors of war likewise view the family 
as a source of “loyalty confl icts” (Nash 2007: 23) for those deployed and 
especially in combat operations, confl icts triggered by emotional stress or 
depression and feelings of guilt and helplessness about domestic ma  ers 
at home (23–24).
Families are not always regarded as a source of mental or emotional 
problems for soldiers. Families can also be indispensable support systems 
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for healing, through their practical assistance along with love and hope 
(Greene and Greene 2012). A psychotherapist who worked with U.S. vet-
erans and their families has concluded, “spouses, family, or close friends 
are the last line of defense against the hostile world and death” (Marrs 1985: 
88; emphasis added). Here the image of the family for the veteran is a safe 
haven, “an emotional support system outside of the hospital” (Racek 1985: 
284). As a natural support system and private world of love, the trauma-
tized soldier fi nds understanding and assistance in whatever adjustments 
need to be made in soldiering on a  er the public war is over.
When Foucault wrote about the family he usually was referring rather 
conventionally to a married couple, parents, and children. Fundamentally, 
the type of power Foucault saw exercised in the family was that of sover-
eignty, but not a form of sovereign power derived from the state. Instead 
the sovereign power of the family operates as an independent form, in-
trinsic to “the order of inheritance, relationships of allegiances and obedi-
ence” (Foucault 2006: 114; see also Taylor 2012). It is this idea of the family 
alongside the values of domesticity as a foundational societal unit and 
of deep-seated systems of commitments and obligations that appear in 
debates over the role of the family in providing postdeployment for the 
traumatized veteran. To give one instance of this role of the family, “In the 
absence of an offi  cial policy or programme of community care in the inter-
war period [between 1919 to 1939], to a large extent it fell to ex-servicemen 
and their families to manufacture alternatives to the chronic destines [of 
permanent incarceration in asylums or mental institutions] that would 
otherwise have greeted them” (Barham 2004: 366; see also Tyquin 2006).
At the same time that the family is cast as the last line of defense in 
the support of the weary warrior, the family is also an emotional ba  le-
fi eld and a place of stress (Finkel 2013). For some veterans living with, 
PTSD, the family can become an uncivil place in civilian life. Anne Rogers 
and David Pilgrim (2001: 121) point out, “[s]ituations may arise in which 
relatives may care about a person but at the same time [may] be very 
distressed or frightened by their actions.” Family members’ fears are com-
pounded by the emotional distance psychological wounded veterans fos-
ter in their intimate relationships. “Many times veterans will push away 
their spouse although loving them, because their negative self-image is 
so strong they cannot stand to be loved” (Marrs 1985: 88). Tying the loose 
threads of this emotional sensitivity are marred lines of communication 
that are “one of the factors increasing the veteran’s alienation, thereby 
causing them to further distance themselves from their support systems” 
(Marrs 1985: 92). The weary warrior who demonstrates general indiff er-
ence or conveys a lack of aff ection while exhibiting undependable behav-
iors will be regarded by his closest social connections as not being part of 
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the family. Indeed, strains put on a family by a traumatized soldier have 
multiple eff ects, including, but certainly not limited to, caregiver burden 
and burnout; fi nancial hardships of modest salaries, loss of earnings, and 
accumulated household debts; persistent anger, aggression, and violence 
within homes; secondary traumatization of parents, spouses, and among 
children of veterans presenting as depression or emotional distress; high 
rates of divorce; and signifi cant rates of suicide among veterans them-
selves (Gomulka 2010; Muir 2007; Racek 1985; Waysman et al. 1993). At 
its most extreme, the family becomes a site of relatively contained confl ict 
with high levels of discord, li  le cohesion or expressiveness among family 
members, and a general lack of structure in the way the family operates 
(Waysman et al.).
There can also be troublesome normative gazes of masculinity and 
military beliefs across generations. Of British veterans of the Great War, 
“it was generally fathers of the old school who were most resolute on 
checking their sympathies for their distraught sons” (Barham 2004: 178). 
Old-school fathers would perceive their son’s melancholy, nervousness, 
frailty, and anguish “as an exhibition of weakness, a failure to live up to 
the expected standards of manliness,” rather than as resulting “from a le-
gitimate war-related disability” (178). Consequently, silences would hide 
the harsh realities of military service. Of American veterans of the Second 
World War compared to their sons of the Viet Nam War, “Considerable 
value confl icts also undermine the veteran’s support base within his fam-
ily. ‘Tell it like it is,’ and ‘Grin and bear it’ are mutually exclusive concepts 
resulting in a clash of the veteran as survivor and the veteran as troubled 
hero, outlaw, or misfi t. Many fathers who fought in the Second World War 
cannot understand their sons’ alienation, and are thereby preventing them 
from seeking relief and understanding” (Marrs 1985: 98).
Parallel to the psychiatrization of the family as a source of psychiat-
ric problems for the recruit, the family members, too, become objects of 
psychiatric and mental health practice interventions. The military family 
has always been a site of surveillance of the troubled veteran through lov-
ing care and a  entiveness; however, in recent decades, families are more 
formally plugged into military and psychiatric apparatuses. In a sense, 
family members have become stand-ins for the psychiatric care system, 
with spouses in particular acting as mental health workers in absentia. 
Who be  er than a spouse or parent to know the weary warrior as a per-
son and his inner thoughts, his life plans, and his unique biography as an 
individual? In this context, the family is a place of welcome and accep-
tance as well as a site of watchfulness and surveillance as family members 
monitor the veteran, sometimes quite closely, for signs of erratic behavior, 
outbursts of anger, and other symptoms of OSIs and postdeployment 
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trauma. The returning veteran becomes an object of concern and a target 
of studied observation and potential disclosures by family members. Rel-
atives are deployed in looking for signs of recovery, mental breakdown, 
relapse, or stability; and for the presence or absence of particular bodily 
behaviors and emotions. By means of intimate knowledge and personal 
interactions, spouses and other signifi cant relations take on a disciplin-
ary role in observing the returned warrior; in identifying what is normal 
and abnormal in the warrior’s actions, thoughts, and personality; and in 
engaging in the practices that enact the veteran as a weary warrior. One 
eff ect of this constancy of surveillance by family members can be an emo-
tional distancing by loved ones as well as by the weary warrior who has 
come home.
The military family, moreover, has become a therapeutic project in it-
self, an object of professional counseling, advice, and information, and 
various psychiatric therapies. Traditionally, the military family in grief 
over the “loss of husbands, sons, fathers, brothers or friends in war” (Muir 
2007: 61) or the loss of wives, daughters, mothers, or sisters, would receive 
some offi  cial recognition of the loss from the military and perhaps some 
assistance from veterans’ groups or religious counselors and others in 
the community in dealing with the emotional and practical work of loss. 
Gradually over the twentieth century and into the twenty-fi rst century, the 
family came to be seen as not just a source of recovery for the traumatized 
veteran, but also as a site requiring mental supports for recovering and 
adapting to the challenges associated with the weary, demobilized war-
rior (Rogers and Pilgrim 2001). In the words of a former military person-
nel and counselor with veterans, “Most frequently the immediate family 
has no conception of the nature of the problems which cause the veteran 
to behave in these ways which are destructive to the family” (Racek 1985: 
284).
Family involvement in the treatment of psychologically wounded 
veterans has branched out over time from participating in the veteran’s 
treatment as a patient to ensure a connection with the real world. Family 
therapy is a signifi cant type of intervention with sessions involving just 
the spouses, then perhaps including children, then individual therapy 
session with the spouses and the children. Sometimes psychological coun-
seling is off ered to extended family members of both the veteran and the 
spouse. In the United States, family-oriented interventions for veterans 
with PTSD from military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their in-
timate partners include behavioral conjoint therapy, cognitive-behavioral 
conjoint therapy, emotionally focused couple therapy, strategic approach 
therapy, support and family education programs, and strong bonds for 
couples (Monson, Ta  , and Fredman 2009). In the Canadian Forces, the 
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OSISS program includes a family peer support coordinator role that fo-
cuses on families of military members and veterans with an OSI in order 
to provide one-on-one assistance, to organize psychoeducation group ses-
sions, and to present program outreach briefi ngs.
The weary warrior’s family thus becomes a consumer of psychiatry and 
a site of psychiatric practice. Family-oriented interventions for veterans 
and family peer supports connect the family to other systems of power 
and knowledge and the intrafamilial relationships “become the domain 
of investigation, the point of decision and the site of intervention for psy-
chiatry” (Foucault 2004: 146). Elsewhere Foucault called this process an 
internal disciplinarization of the family in which, through the transfer of 
disciplinary techniques of power into families, “the family becomes a mi-
cro-clinic which controls the normality or abnormality of the body, of the 
soul” (Foucault 2006: 115). At the same time, another process is at work 
here which we call the “refamilialization of the veteran’s life”: the family 
as the reference point and site for reintegrating the weary warrior into 
civilian life and the social world; and for rebuilding and strengthening the 
family system itself in response to the strains of the traumatized combat 
veteran returning home.
The Social and Public Death of Traumatized Veterans
There has been a change in death in modern wars. Across nation-states 
veterans of both old and recent armed confl icts, while biologically alive, 
are socially dead; this is especially true for severely weary veterans. With 
medical advances and increases in treatment practices, with continued 
misconceptions and denials over mental health conditions, and with the 
intensifi cation and fragmentation of warfare techniques, more soldiers 
injured in combat are surviving from blasts, burns, wounds, and head 
injuries; however, among these weary warriors more are returning home 
in a state of social death. The academic and clinical literature has not caught 
up with this development although there are instances of recognition of 
social death in cultural and philosophical works.2
Unlike fallen comrades who have passed to the next world, weary war-
riors survived. But to the extent they are socially dead they may be of this 
world but are not fully in our world. What Barham (2004: 1) calls “the pro-
longed a  erlife of wars” includes a dark and distressing discourse about 
the psychologically traumatized veteran, possibly with serious emotional 
damage and mental illness and a loss of self-identity. Media accounts re-
port of family members describing a relative returned from combat as “not 
the same person anymore,” “a shell of his former self,” “not all there any-
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more,” and “as good as dead.”3 In a detailed historical study on treating 
the trauma of soldiers and civilians in France from 1914 to 1940, Gregory 
M.Thomas (2009: 126) remarks that “mentally alienated veterans seques-
tered in asylums were considered les morts vivants—‘the living dead.’ 
They were survivors of the war, but they were as good as dead to their 
families, who saw them rarely and could no longer count on them for 
fi nancial or emotional support. … Even those who escaped institution-
alization were seen to inhabit a realm that was somewhere short of truly 
living.” Sociologically, the socially dead veteran is an incomplete person; 
with the loss of basic self and public identity, the veteran is a “non-person” 
(Goff man 1959: 152). While nonpersons may be physically present in ev-
eryday relations, in certain ways they are regarded and treated as some-
one who is simply not there.
Conceptualized as a nonperson, the weary warrior no longer exercises 
the a  ributes and capacities of a so-called normal person. On a persistent 
basis, they lack self-awareness, emotional regulation or self-control, self-
caring, a sense of belonging, and active engagement in their surroundings. 
They may no longer really know themselves or others once close to them. 
Social death, then, is embedded in the living bodies of profoundly dam-
aged veterans. Socially dead veterans are of this world yet remain linked, 
however tenuous and contested, with various relationships of power and 
knowledge that are severing them from it. The social death of a weary 
warrior therefore is entangled in the biological death of others—their 
comrades, enemy soldiers, and innocent civilians as well as their living 
relationships, however fraught with tension, with intimates, family, friends, 
psychiatrists, and health-care practitioners. The Great War poet and vet-
eran, Siegfried Sassoon, in his 1917 poem “Survivors” wrote of 
their haunted nights; their cowed
Subjections to the ghosts of friends who died,—
Their dreams that drip with murder
Viet Nam veterans from the 1960s write of how they and their comrades 
were condemned “to carry their own memories of death and dying 
through their lives” (Moore and Galloway 2008: xv).
Social death is not an anonymous death, just as the weary warrior’s 
life is not an anonymous life. Both are embedded and embodied sets of 
“interrelations, constituted in and by the immanence of his or her expres-
sions, acts and interactions with others and held together by the pow-
ers of remembrance: by continuity in time” (Braido  i 2006: 252). Social 
death extends to those around the traumatized soldier trying to survive 
the day (Dekel and Solomon 2007). The social death we talk about here 
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is not, however, inevitable. Without some form of a  ention, the crevices 
apparent in veterans who have survived deep emotional distress and psy-
chological wounds would most certainly break the veteran apart. The 
a  ention veterans get—whether through emergent self-refl ection, sought-
out assistance, or as a result of close scrutiny by family and friends—keeps 
the broken pieces together in some semblance of order sometimes just 
to get through the day. Indeed, the piecing together itself is a process of 
styling one’s self to make a self sustainable (Braido  i, 252). Sustainability 
supersedes survival in this case, and pushes social death away, to at least 
an arm’s length, in order to create more space within this liminality.
A specifi c type of death of the veteran we additionally consider is the 
public death and the power of the fallen soldier. In his work, Foucault wrote 
about the disappearance of “the great public ritualization of death” (Fou-
cault 2003: 247; also see Foucault 1979). He correspondingly wrote about 
death being outside the power relationship; that power has no control 
over biological death. For Foucault, “the end of life [also meant] the end 
of power” (2003: 248). The public death of deceased soldiers is connected 
with the emergence of the military dead, in the la  er half of the nineteenth 
century and early decades of the twentieth century, as a specifi c mortuary 
category administered by military and state authorities. By the time of the 
Great War, with massive civilian and combat casualties, military deaths 
were “diff erentiated from other kinds of death [and] nation states took 
fuller responsibility for the bodies of dead soldiers” (Wasinski 2008: 116). 
“Warriors have been placed into a separate but included caste, one out-
ranked o  en only by royalty and the priesthood. This was due, in simple 
terms, to the unique role played by warriors—they killed people. Soldiers 
endured war and approached and encountered the ultimate unknown, 
death. Those who have worked and lived with death have always occu-
pied a position apart from others” (Silver 1985: 46).
In the military and in warfare, power clearly does exercise infl uence 
over ma  ers of life and death (Sledge 2005). The continuance of sover-
eign power relations in death is apparent in whether to issue a pardon or 
discharge or to execute a soldier for cowardice; the determination of the 
nature and cause of a soldier’s death and the implications such a decision 
has for the provision or not of survivor benefi ts or pensions as well as for 
stigma or honor. In the United States Army, for example, dedicated units 
of mortuary aff airs, staff ed by hundreds of personnel, undertook the man-
agement of dead American soldiers in Iraq. Technical practices and proto-
cols included the collection and refrigeration of bodies; the identifi cation 
of bodies (by such methods as dog tags, dental records, or DNA tests); the 
evacuation of bodies followed by medical inspections; the preparation 
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and clothing of bodies in new uniforms; and making, where possible, “the 
bodies viewable for the relatives” (Wasinski 2008: 118). The Army was 
also responsible for “the repatriation of personal belongings of the dead 
soldier”; the announcement of the death to the family, as a rule in person 
by two offi  cers; organization of the funeral and paying for the burial; ar-
rangement of a personal le  er to the family from the U.S. president; and 
ensuring death benefi ts in the thousands of dollars are paid to the family 
of the dead soldier. 
The reach of state power into military deaths has long extended into 
keeping memories alive through remembrance events, cenotaphs and 
other war memorials, and dedicated cemeteries for fallen soldiers. In re-
cent decades the military death is not always a silent or private aff air. 
There is a heightened emphasis of military deaths as a public event with 
media a  ention and displays of public emotion and sympathy. This marks 
a relative shi   in the nature of remembrance of past military confl icts 
in Korea in the early 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s and early 1970s, and 
the Gulf War in the early 1990s.4 Increased ritualization and public com-
memoration of military deaths is demonstrated by the formation of virtual 
war memorials, the belated recognition of forgo  en warriors and civilian 
victims of past wars, the naming of highways of heroes, the publicizing 
of military fatalities fl own home from overseas, and the regular show-
ing on television and Internet sites of the latest soldiers killed in ba  le 
in Afghanistan or in other confl icts. This public commemoration is o  en 
accompanied by rhetorical support for the troops not only by military and 
political leaders and not just by grieving families and friends, but also by 
other grateful citizens and communities.
Such public markings of military casualties are not without controversy. 
They invariably generate ambivalence: patriotism and support as well as 
anti-war protest and opposition. A competing mixture of discourses arise 
that commemoration of military deaths advances a government’s political 
agenda. Discourses of military death acknowledge individual sacrifi ces 
but also invade private lives of grieving families; they glorify militarism 
and warfare and also generate expressions of pacifi sm. Furthermore, com-
peting discourses on military death are claimed to publicize the success 
of one’s adversary—by connecting the coffi  ns with enemy action—and 
thereby weaken public morale or national resolve, and raise questions 
about national security plans and military operations or underlines the 
necessity to continue a mission. Overall, a paradox operates that while 
vigorous public debates circulate around the public death of fallen soldiers 
killed in military service, mentioning the social death of traumatized veter-
ans is taboo, largely unmentionable in civil society.
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Nation-States, Social Policy, 
and the Political Activism of Veterans
Weary warriors’ politics is a distinctive part of veterans’ politics and of 
disability politics more generally. Actually soldiering on is a multiple 
politics, concerning social status, identity formation, ontologies, weary 
warrior entitlements to material and symbolic public resources, and state 
responses of actions and inactions. The activism of traumatized combat 
veterans includes a range of activities across a range of institutions and a 
range of policy fi elds. These veterans are seeking to infl uence policies and 
decisions within institutions of the state: political executives (chancellors, 
presidents, or prime ministers and their cabinets); legislatures (upper and 
lower branches); civil service bureaucracies; the courts and police (civil-
ian and military); and, of course, the armed forces and veterans’ admin-
istrations. The politics of soldiering on, which by defi nition focuses on 
institutions of the armed forces and government decision makers, does 
reach beyond the state. In their advocacy, veterans seek connections with 
societal institutions that include the mass media and social media; health, 
medical, and legal professions; families and local communities; interest 
groups and social movements representing veterans; and other groups 
such as embodied health movements. As we noted earlier in this chapter, 
some veterans are suspicious and distrustful of state organizations and 
devote their political activism to self-organizing and nongovernmental 
organizations. Overall, though, veterans in all countries and across recent 
centuries have engaged with the politics of nation-states.
In a cultural and material sense, weary warriors are striving to close the 
gap between the public rhetoric of “support our troops” and “honoring 
our veterans” and the personal reality for many old soldiers, of strug-
gling on their own and feeling abandoned by their county. For weary 
warriors soldiering on involves living with contradictions; one of which is 
the confl ict between the discourse of loyal service, personal sacrifi ce and 
national remembrance, and the lived experience of invisibility, marginal-
ization, and inequality within society. Compensation for combat-related 
damages, pains, and losses is a fundamental claim by veterans and, in 
fact, a widespread basis for social policy responses by nation-states. So-
cial policies and other public services that are compensatory in nature 
focus on the needs of disabled veterans who participated directly in war 
eff orts as well as for surviving spouses and bereaved families (Gal 2007). 
Such policies and practices operate for the returning warriors, the soldier 
citizens, the disabled veterans, across welfare states (Cowen 2005; Gerber 
2003; Gu  mann and Thomas 1946; Larsson 2009; Morton 2004; Morton 
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and Wright 1987; Neary 2011; Neary and Granatstein 1998; Thomas 2009; 
Tyquin 2006).
The politics of weary warriors includes a variety of identity politics. 
Informal networks, formal organizations, and collective alliances form 
around the embodied subjectivities, marginalized conditions, and social 
struggles of traumatized combat veterans. In France following the Great 
War, “many wounded soldiers stuck in hospitals began to band together 
to form associations for moral support and material assistance” (Thomas 
2009: 108). Discharged soldiers also joined, and such organizations pro-
liferated through the country. “Associations focused on the practical con-
cerns of ameliorating discharge procedures and improving pensions. 
They organized social gatherings for soldiers and established permanent 
centres to disseminate information about veterans’ rights and pension 
laws” (Thomas 2009: 109). DavidGerber (2003: 603) notes of contemporary 
Western societies, “the disabled veteran’s experience of post-disability so-
cial integration has been a collective one that is intensely shared with his 
cohort of conscripted and professional military personnel.” Sharing par-
ticular issues and challenges, they mobilize in ways to confront the domi-
nant norms and images of the veteran, highlighting that weary warriors 
are o  en treated diff erently and unfairly by governments as compared 
to other veterans in their own country and conceivably to veterans in 
other countries. Activism by veterans, as identity politics, contests certain 
forms of knowledge as the only regimes of truth; seeks to gain acceptance 
of veteran’s bodily symptoms and possibly a diagnostic designation for 
their conditions; and, thus, establishes a more visible and positive image 
of veterans as psychologically wounded warriors. In addressing negative 
cultural representations and medical discourses, traumatized veterans 
are engaged in collective self-assertions by forming group identifi cations 
(Gerber 2003; Oritz 2010; Turner 1988).
Rather than being constituted invisibly by authorities as ineligible 
claimants for benefi ts or portrayed negatively as a stigmatized medical 
category, veterans’ political actions endeavor to become recognized pub-
licly as social groups, and as active political constituencies and deserving 
members of social policy communities. In this manner, identity politics 
resembles a process of making weary warriors real, practicing a type of 
ontological politics: “a politics that has to do with the way in which prob-
lems are framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled into 
one shape or another” (Mol 2002: viii).
National governments and state agencies are intriguing institutions 
for weary warriors. In specifi c times and places, states are curious and 
distinctive combinations of being responsive and helpful along with being 
resistant and hostile to the needs and claims of veterans. The state’s rela-
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tionship to sick soldiers involves several functions: the symbolic recogni-
tion and commemoration of most (though not necessarily all) veterans; 
the regulation of identities and statuses through program defi nitions and 
historical discourses; and the provision of income benefi ts, such as disabil-
ity pensions, and of services such, as housing and health care, to veterans 
and their families. As a result of struggles and claims, the state is at times 
a site of contestation and, at other times, of collaboration between govern-
ment agencies, military services, and veterans’ associations.
This multifaceted and contradictory nature of states is refl ected in 
works on the link between warfare and welfare in modern states. Some 
literature claims that military confl icts have been an affi  rmative trigger for 
the expansion of social rights of citizenship and welfare states in Europe 
and North America from the late nineteenth century through the twen-
tieth century (Klausen 1998; Neary and Granatstein 1998; Skocpol 1992; 
Titmuss 1958; Turner 1986); other literature posits a negative tradeoff  be-
tween public spending on defense and the military on the one hand, and 
public services and social programs on the other hand (Gal 2007). While 
the research is diverse and the evidence is mixed on these perspectives, it 
is clear that state structures and policies are not neutral or indiff erent in 
ma  ers pertaining to veterans and weary warriors. National governments 
and other state institutions frequently relate to disabled veterans, specifi -
cally weary warriors, in highly contentious and deeply problematic ways. 
Veterans o  en struggle with a state politics that endures as a top-down 
and inside-out deployment of sovereign power.5
A customary view of the state in relation to veterans is as a provider 
of benefi ts and services to ex-military personnel and their families, made 
available earlier in the history of modern social welfare than for most 
other groups in society, and at a level more generous and more politically 
supported than for comparable social benefi ts for civilian populations. 
Gerber (2003) clearly expresses this perspective: “Increasingly, since the 
nineteenth century, the state has undertaken to provide all veterans, but 
especially disabled veterans, with generous pensions and a vast array of 
medical, rehabilitation and reintegration services. … [I]n the twentieth 
century, veterans, and especially disabled veterans, … became both a proj-
ect of the modern Western welfare states and pioneers on the frontiers of 
social welfare policy” (899). Behind this apparent willing recognition of 
veterans’ needs by state authorities and the liberal provision of services, 
various motives and discourses are in play (Barham 2004; Bryson 1992; 
Gerber 2003; Morton 2004; Thomas 2009; Titmuss 1958): patriotic grati-
tude and/or civilian guilt; national self-interest “to ensure the continued 
readiness of individuals to participate in the war eff ort” (Gal 2007: 111); 
offi  cial concerns over civil unrest by distressed and unemployed veterans; 
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growing legitimacy of claims expressed as positive rights in terms of the 
state’s duty and obligation to those who served; fi nancial considerations 
by state treasuries about assuming too much of the costs of care for in-
jured, ill, or disabled veterans; and “the political clout of veterans and the 
degree of public sympathy for their sacrifi ce” (Gal: 111).
In Psychiatric Power, Foucault remarks on “the problem of the cost of 
abnormality that we always come across in the history of psychiatry” 
(2006: 220). The same can be said about providing pensions to veterans. 
“Acrimonious standoff s between aggrieved ex-servicemen and the state 
in the prolonged a  erlife of wars are the stuff  of modern life, involving 
the competing claims of war pension agencies, veterans’ associations and 
divergent medical authorities” (Barham 2004: 1). Peter Barham suggests 
that for working-class men who had fought in the Great War, this military 
pension provided by the British government “was perhaps in this period 
the single most important site on which the struggle for equality and for 
social justice was conducted” (8). In concrete terms, the struggle for war 
pensions meant gathering evidence on personal medical history and fam-
ily background, and assembling documentation to prove that a veteran’s 
condition was due to military service. This knowledge work to obtain a 
pension may be repeated by a veteran in order to keep a pension if it is 
reviewed by government agencies, and to appeal a rejection of a pension 
claim once or perhaps more depends on the review procedures available.
The French parliament just a  er the end of the Great War enacted a 
pension law in 1919 as to whether a soldier’s condition was caused or ag-
gravated by the war that “offi  cially removed the burden of proof from the 
soldier. A great victory for wounded and sick soldiers, this change meant 
that wounds and illnesses were assumed to have been caused or aggra-
vated by the war unless proven otherwise” (Thomas 2009: 96–97). The 
pension law provided for a right to health care for pensioners, including 
medical and pharmaceutical care and the transportation costs to hospitals. 
However, this change in France in legislated national policy on military 
pensions did not mean it was simple to claim a war disability–related 
pension, or that the public administration of benefi ts was implemented 
in a timely and effi  cient fashion, or that it was not subsequently open to 
reassessment and possible reduction or cancellation by military adminis-
trations.6 “Though the law of 1919 purported to inaugurate a new era in 
military pensions, veterans o  en found that they still had to fi ght for what 
was due to them” (142).
This history of pensions to veterans illustrates important lasting eff ects 
on the roles and relationships of the state, medicine, veterans, and politics. 
One such eff ect has been the general bureaucratization of the state via the 
formation of new civil service bureaucracies and the categorization of 
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veterans in administrative systems A second eff ect is that pension policy 
developments a  er the Great War provided for a general medicalization 
veteran and disability policy-making, creating an authoritative space for 
neurology and psychiatry in the design of pension laws and the determi-
nation and administration of disabilities. In many countries, the meager 
level of military pension benefi ts generated a third eff ect—the pauperiza-
tion of many veterans, forcing them to resort to stigmatizing forms of 
public relief and residual sources of charity (Cohen 2001; Morton 2004; 
Thomas 2009), inciting as a fourth eff ect the further politicization and 
activism of veterans throughout the twentieth century and into our own 
time.
Uneven Terrains
To think of soldiering on as a relatively straightforward process of shi  -
ing identities from an offi  cial militarized status to a demilitarized status 
is problematic, we contend, because the soldier is diminished or spoiled 
even before demobilization. As well, the ill veteran retains, as part of the 
self, an identity that has been scarred by ba  le. The politics of soldiering 
on is a particular illustration of the politics of citizenship: the struggle by 
a marginalized group for recognition and inclusion in a political commu-
nity and the rightful access to state resources of pensions, services, and 
social policy benefi ts.
Demobilization does not automatically or necessarily mean a demili-
tarization for the weary warrior. Indeed, it can mean an intensifi cation 
of military-based norms, practices, identities, memories, and fl ashbacks. 
Postdeployment exchanges one fi eld of struggle and ba  le to another and 
does not necessarily entail a quiet civilian life, but rather suggests a life 
in sharp contrast to both the deployed life and the civilian life the soldier 
came from. Yet the life remains altered, even upturned, a life fi lled with 
various tactics, strategies, moves, and countermoves. Soldiering on, as 
a fi eld of intertwined discursive codes and material experiences, has a 
dynamic and contingent character of individual bodily conditions, inter-
personal relationships, and memberships in social groups. It also engages 
public beliefs and a  itudes, social policies and bureaucratic procedures, 
and the responses of actions and inactions by armed service establish-
ments and veterans’ organizations. Soldiering on as a process enacts weary 
warriors via triumphant returns for some veterans or troubled homecom-
ings for others. It may involve public celebration and private indiff er-
ence or, conversely, private acceptance of a diagnosis of mental illness but 
public shame and discrimination toward emotionally damaged veterans 
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(Barham 2004). As well, soldiering on may usher in an exciting, new, or 
renewed life just as easily as could introduce a grim existence through 
social death. 
With demobilization from the military, soldiering on for the weary war-
rior is o  en a new kind of mobilization individually and perhaps collec-
tively through support groups. In other words, the civilian life of the ill 
veteran is another form of combat. Life is an uneven continuation of war 
by other means and to other places, of carrying out and living with war 
neuroses. There are the invasive nightmares, acute anxiety a  acks, clashes 
with old friends or family members, confrontations with mental health 
practitioners, and ba  les with government agencies.
Care of the traumatized self by caring with others in veterans’ sup-
port groups is not necessarily implicated within neoliberal technologies 
of responsibilization. Rather, we notice a remilitarization of the self that 
relies on the reformulation, if not magnifi cation, of past military roles and 
relationships. We see the success of the rap groups as part of self-care that 
scripts the context within which veterans return to a supportive system 
with other combatants who shared similar wartime experiences; in eff ect, 
an RTU. This time, however, rather than prepared for combat, the veteran 
is prepared for healing. Indeed, the dominant expectation in nations today 
is for veterans to engage with and submit to the protocols and treatment 
modalities of psychiatric and psychological care specialists. What is in-
teresting is that combat veterans’ peer-support and rap groups are activi-
ties mainly assumed by contemporary weary warriors, and are not o  en 
imposed on them by state authorities (Shatan 1973; Silver 1985). However, 
rap groups and similar forms of self-care can pose risks to veterans, such 
as carrying the burden and the personal responsibility for grappling with 
trauma. Then again, veterans’ self-care groups off er benefi ts of a level of 
self-control, understanding, and safety missing in other parts of their lives. 
There is space away from systems of psychiatrization and medicalization 
and a place for networking and mobilizing for policy reforms. In this way, 
rap groups by veterans and similar self-care techniques can produce alter-
native discourses and practices, rooted in strong interpersonal supports 
and relationships by subjects who are not economic rational actors in a 
neoliberal project, but rather are psychologically wounded combatants.
Notes
 1. Consider these remarks in a recent book by Donald Savoie (2010: 16) on power 
in modern societies: “The military has been a powerful organization through-
out its history partly because it has a single, clear purpose and does not toler-
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ate dissent in its ranks. It se  les disputes internally, and its members submit to 
the organization’s common purpose, or leave.” We see here the classic themes 
of discipline, hierarchy, mission, and obligatory submission. 
 2. We have come across quotes a  ributed to Plato that say, “only the dead have 
seen the end of war” and, “death is not the worst that can happen to man.” 
We have also come across a line from John Milton: “To live a life half dead, a 
living death.” Other philosophical and literary remarks along these lines can 
be readily found. 
 3. A British article, “Soldier Death Leap” (h  p://www.thelondonpaper.com 24 
July, 2009, 4), states, “An Iraq veteran who watched the coffi  ns of eight col-
leagues being laid to rest killed himself just days later by jumping off  a tower 
block. … Although he returned three years ago, his mother said: ‘To me, he 
was dead when he came back from Iraq. When he saw the bodies of those 
eight soldiers being brought back from Afghanistan, it must have done some-
thing to him, because he saluted at the TV and then a few days later he was 
dead.’ ” 
 4. In another example of the deployment of state power in the death of combat 
soldiers, Christopher Wasinski (2008: 119) notes that as part of a historical 
search and recovery policy by the American armed forces, “the United States 
is still expending a lot of energy on the recovery of bodies from the Second 
World War, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war.” 
 5. In the United States, the Readjustment Counselling Program for Vietnam 
Veterans, introduced in 1979, was deliberately “placed outside the physical 
and administrative structure of the VA [Veterans Administration]. The plan 
was submi  ed and approved to place the centers in communities in storefront 
se  ings with a chain of command and budget process totally apart from the 
traditional bureaucratic functions of the VA’s Department of Medicine and 
Surgery.” The reasons for this were twofold: “1) to overcome the inherent de-
struct of the VA ‘organization’ felt by the client Vietnam veteran population; 
and 2) to overcome the distrust of the program felt by those within the VA itself 
who had long questioned from the traditional perspective the nature of post-
traumatic stress disorder and the new treatment methods being implemented 
under the program” (Fuller 1985: 9–10). This move away from conventional 
veterans’ mental health service delivery represents a partial demedicalization 
and depsychiatrization of supports to stressed combat veterans. 
 6. In Germany, pensions to soldiers with shell shock from the Great War were 
ended in 1926 (Thomas 2009: 213).




Embodied Trauma, Ontological Politics, 
and Patchwork Warriors

For now that it was all over, truce signed, and the dead buried,
 he had, especially in the evening, these sudden thunder-claps 
of fear. He could not feel.
 —Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway
The guys coming back from Afghanistan, my heart goes out to them, 
because I know what they are going through. Somebody has to support 
them, because there is going to be a lot of screwed-up guys, man.
—Murray Bradshaw (Canadian Viet Nam veteran), in A  er Shocks
If you’re fi ne a  er what you’ve just experienced then 
there is something quite wrong.
—Major Grace Pederson, psychiatrist in Combat Hospital
Weary Warriors has surveyed aspects of a global phenomenon in a his-
torical period that still occupies the world: the age of war neuroses.1 The 
persistence of neurotic soldiers as a recurring crisis implicates a bundle 
of relations having to do with the association between mental health and 
military capacity through the practices of military psychiatry. Soldier-
ing, and its breakdown, is intimately tied to masculinity, its ideal, and its 
practices, as well as to the truth games played by soldiers, psychiatrists, 
scientists, physicians, chaplains, family members, bureaucrats, and politi-
cians. In these crises, at stake are soldiers’ and veterans’ identities, their 
subjectivities, and their ongoing reconstituting presence in the various 
spaces of ba  le, convalescence, homecoming, and everyday life.
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For our work, we had three overall objectives. Our fi rst was to highlight 
how the conceptual categories of soldiers’ neurotic minds, bodies, and 
souls emanate from specifi c practices in military psychiatry as well as how 
the physical expression of war neuroses are located fi rmly in soldiers’ ill 
bodies, and to illustrate how these conceptual categories and constitutive 
processes have shi  ed over time in particular places and specifi c military 
confl icts, disclosing the porosity of both the categories and the soldiers’ 
ill bodies. Our second objective was to elaborate on specifi c processes 
through which soldiers and psychiatrists in the context of many other ac-
tors (human and nonhuman) engage that generate, reinforce, and contest 
the enactments of psychologically and emotionally traumatized warriors. 
Our third objective was to extend the critical thinking and understanding 
of the practices that create, strengthen, and dispute the discourses about 
and the material existences of the broken embodiments of combat soldiers 
as well as the materiality of the discursive practices shaping their ravished 
minds, ill bodies, and troubled souls.
We accordingly sought to disentangle various sets of social practices 
and relations that give rise to the emergence of traumatized soldiers—spe-
cifi cally, practices and relations such as psychiatry, the military, and mas-
culinity through venues such as hospitals, popular culture, the family, and 
state institutions. We accomplished this task by taking up atypical lines 
of inquiry, not always focusing on the obvious, and challenging conven-
tional understandings of what a weary warrior is. We showed the impact 
of material-discourses on the way illness is experienced and we examined 
how specifi c forms of knowledge about emotional distress among soldiers 
and veterans circulate within psychiatry, the military, in the pastorate, and 
in society. Moreover, we focused on concrete cases to illustrate particular 
formations of power, knowledge, and resistance in how soldiers suff er 
trauma. We presented examples of how psychiatry and the military con-
struct ill soldiers by means of diagnosis, regulation, punishment, disregard, 
and public policy. We conceive these ways of diagnosing, managing, sub-
jectifying, fi xing, depicting, and governing as having discursive-material 
eff ects on soldiers suff ering psychic and emotional breakdowns in or a  er 
combat.
We employed poststructural and feminist theories for explaining the 
role of power and knowledge in the causes, onsets, symptoms, and treat-
ments of trauma in combat soldiers. Discourse (as a set of material prac-
tices) plays a central role in shaping understandings of (an ontologically 
multiple) reality as well as expressing relations of power. Indeed, we paid 
close a  ention to the presence of multiple and o  en competing discourses 
about the health and illness of combat soldiers. Names of symptoms, di-
agnoses, and illnesses are unstable and contextual, alongside being con-
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tested by various established professions and practitioners (Moss and 
Teghtsoonian 2008). We approached a history of weary warriors as a set 
of disjunctures in processes and contradictions in events that are manifest 
in offi  cial memories and countermemories. We were interested in how 
identities formed and in how soldiers took on any number of subject posi-
tions (via repeatable, recognizable scripts) depending on such factors as 
location and time period. Eschewing binary oppositions, while accepting 
the possibility of tensions, we embraced the coexistence of likelihoods and 
paradoxes, durability and frailty, human agency and social structure.
We have drawn out the notion of embodiment in the complex of an ap-
paratus as lived bodies that are deeply discursive and deeply material at 
the same time that, in specifi c spaces, generates multiple embodied sub-
jectivities and multiple ontological realities (Braido  i 1993; Grosz 1994; 
Hekman 2010). Within these discussions, ill bodies, minds, and souls are 
more than just ailing biological entities just as they are more than products 
of failed idealizations of healthy bodies. Ill bodies, just like ill minds and 
ill souls, are an eff ect of power relations and the production of situated 
knowledges in regard to both the material bodies and the bodily dis-
courses of individual lives. So, too, are notions of masculinity, spirituality, 
and the relational extensions of soldiers, including family, friends, and 
psychiatrists. Thus, one of our arguments in this book is that the discur-
sive and the material simultaneously constitute the subjectivity of the 
neurotic, traumatized, ill soldier.
Another argument made throughout the book is that over time a shi   
has taken place in the manifestation of symptoms of war neuroses and 
the description of the soldiers’ ill bodies. Weary warriors engage in vari-
ous struggles—in multiple ba  les (a  er Mol 2002). This is particularly 
evident in the proliferation of names for war neuroses and a  empts by 
military psychiatrists and the militaries themselves to prohibit the use of 
certain terms at various times, such as shell shock, exhaustion, and fatigue; 
and to promote the adoption of other terms, such as PTSD, OSI, or TBI, 
for diagnostic, treatment, and benefi ts purposes. Soldiers’ combat trauma 
comes in diff erent forms and is interpreted, negotiated, or imposed in vari-
ous ways. The use of any one of these terms discloses a particular reality 
that has material eff ects on soldiers’ and veterans’ lives, eff ects we have 
discussed throughout the pages of this book. More generally, in diff erent 
sites, personal and collective relationships and procedures shape the shat-
tered combatant’s experiences in the numerous confl icts. “The practices 
of power unite the discursive and the non-discursive [material] into an 
indistinguishable whole” (Hekman 2010: 57). Yet, as we have shown, that 
indistinguishable whole is uneven with puncture marks, serrated edges, 
and crumpled surfaces.
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A theme from our analysis is the always present contention of knowl-
edge claims, including claims of what knowledge is, regarding combat-
related trauma and emotional breakdown in terms of the causes, the 
prevalence, the diagnoses, the treatments, and the postdeployment sup-
ports for weary warriors. This contention of knowledge claims provokes 
debates, impositions, and resistances between and among psychiatric, 
military, pastoral, and governmental actors and institutions. As a con-
sequence, war neuroses and soldiers’ ill bodies have become the ba  le-
ground on which the fl ows of psychiatric, military, pastoral, state, and 
familial power play out. These struggles have been going on for over a 
century in the armed forces: in the bodies of military personnel, in screen-
ing and recruitment practices, in treatment facilities on and off  the ba  le-
fi eld, in military courts, in and around families, in society’s depictions of 
trauma and mental stress, in national defense and veterans departments 
of government, and in welfare state programs.
Unlike Ben Shephard’s (2000) account of military psychiatry over the 
twentieth century, we see that military psychiatrists were neither dra-
matists nor realists; rather, each one continually negotiated the tension 
between the practice goals of psychiatry and military imperatives through 
their psychiatric (diagnosis, treatment) and military (report-writing, grad-
ing, boarding) practices. The tension between the objectives of psychiatry 
and the military is only an organizing tool. The forces that facilitate the 
various shi  s in naming war shock, generating traumatized soldiers as 
subjects, treating war neuroses, and supporting veterans include power 
and knowledge confi gurations that sit snugly within psychiatry and the 
military as apparatuses. It is through military psychiatric practices that 
the generation and transformation of psychologically wounded soldiers 
were constituted as the result of individual fl aws throughout the interwar 
period yet considered normal throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. The same force relations within diff erent confi gurations of power 
and knowledge are seeking to diff erentiate the physiological eff ects of 
brain trauma and postconcussion syndrome from the psychological ef-
fects of pos  raumatic combat stress and operational injuries at the begin-
ning of the twenty-fi rst century.
Over this time frame a unique double movement has taken place. First, 
there has been a structured normalization of struggles over the broken em-
bodiments of combat soldiers and a naturalization of trauma. State propa-
ganda is a notable element of this process of structured normalization 
(Matsumura 2004). This does not mean that combat and psychiatric disor-
ders are regarded as wholly legitimate, or that they are socially accepted. 
Stigma, silence, and shame are perennial themes in the modern history of 
weary warriors. We suggest, rather, that war neuroses have become inte-
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gral to operational goals of the military while remaining tightly connected 
to the individual soldier’s body. With this integration, war trauma itself 
has been naturalized; the inevitability of psychological diffi  culties and 
emotional strain, including delayed mental stress, must be managed by 
armies using military psychiatry.
Second, and at the same time, there rages on a vital contestation of praxis 
that takes place through the various disputes over relevant theories and 
eff ective techniques for nervous disorders among soldiers. Critical ten-
sions exist between the aims of psychiatric care and military duty, both of 
which rest on masculinist claims about knowledge and masculinist ideals 
of the ideal soldier. These tensions play out in specifi c processes that gen-
erate, maintain, and disrupt the linkages within embodied apparatuses 
that are then plugged into another one through the intertwined processes 
of the militarization of psychiatric wounds and the psychiatrization of 
military bodies. Implicated in this double movement is the experience of 
weary warriors as “bodies-in-time … embodied and embedded fully im-
mersed in webs of complex interaction, negotiation and transformation 
with and through other entities” (Braido  i 2006: 154). Accompanying this 
coexistence of a structured normalization of struggles/naturalization of 
trauma and vital contestation of praxis is the ontological politics of weary 
warriors.
The Ontological Politics of Weary Warriors 
Our work here has shown that an ontological politics of weary warriors 
emerge across several sites: whether wartime neuroses are the same as 
peacetime neuroses in terms of etiology; whether shell shock, Vietnam 
Syndrome, or GWS actually exists; and whether and to what extent the 
abnormal soldier is well. These questions beg a related one: Who “is en-
titled to defi ne the norm, against those who deviate from that norm”? 
(Foucault 2003: 61). We have argued that there exist multiple ontologies 
of soldiers’ ill bodies, ravished minds, and troubled souls, and that it is 
through the various practices in which the cast players engage that enact 
soldiers traumatized by the war as weary warriors. For us, it is clear that 
culture, no ma  er its scale, is not the diff erentiating factor that determines 
onset or form of ba  lefi eld breakdown. Similarly, we refuse the notion 
that there is a timeless, organic disease that manifests diff erently in each 
armed confl ict. Nor do we embrace the idea that a war neurosis or trau-
matized soldier exists solely through the relationship between a therapist 
and a patient. We maintain that the bodies, minds, and souls of soldiers 
are discursive-material entities that are generated in a continual process of 
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becoming, and that the practices and eff ects of power fuel the mechanisms 
through which weary warriors themselves are enacted. Picking apart the 
complexities of specifi c sites yield access to these many mechanisms, some 
of which we have described across these pages.
An ontological politics also exists in the truth games of applying the 
classifi catory knowledge of psychiatry; in distinguishing between real 
and simulated illnesses and eff orts to detect malingering (the performance 
of making something real); in determining the resonance of how soldiers 
come to integrate war trauma into their ideas of what a soldier is or should 
be; and negotiating the dissonance between life a  er military service for 
individual veterans and what family life is really like for veterans and their 
meaningful others. Snippets of harmony and discord provide fodder for 
an ontological politics of the place of religious, faith-based, and spiritual 
outlets within military environments during war and peacetime. Likewise, 
the presence of ghosts as entities acknowledged by cultural writers as well 
as many combat warriors with severe trauma demonstrates the embodied 
nature of a nervous or emotional breakdown. The role of veterans’ groups 
in challenging interpretations by governmental offi  cials of their eligibility 
or not for particular services and disability compensation for those diag-
nosed with a war neurosis is charged with the same ontological tensions 
of psychiatric legitimacy and military authority. The seeming rigidity of 
a military institution, we have argued, is not a supreme universal simply 
producing purely docile military bodies. Soldiers’ bodies resist warfare, 
resulting in an uneven exterior surface, continually mediated by the mili-
tary through clinical scrutiny and multiple interventions, and as we have 
observed, through an intensifi cation of the psychiatrization of military 
bodies.
Cultural representations of war trauma portrayed in literature, fi lm, and 
television also are caught up in the ontological politics of weary warriors. 
For instance, what is the reality, if any, in Mrs. Dalloway by Virginia Woolf 
([1925] 1996)? This fi ctional work, which features among other characters 
a veteran, is certainly infl uenced by Woolf’s own struggles with mental ill-
ness and her troubling encounters with doctors as well as by the contested 
phenomenon of shell shock from the Great War. The words of Woolf seem-
ingly echo in the lived experience of the Viet Nam veteran quoted at the 
front of this chapter; a Canadian veteran of an American war who, in turn, 
projects his knowledge of what is real for veterans postdeployment onto 
“the guys coming back from Afghanistan” (M. Reid 2010: 40). One of the 
main characters in Combat Hospital (2011), Major Grace Pederson, is a psy-
chiatrist who deals with a wide range of psychiatric problems, almost all 
of which address some facet of PTSD.2 Wri  en into the storyline, however, 
is a tension signifi cant in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; that tension 
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concerns the psychiatric distinctions between PTSD and mTBI. The reality 
of war trauma does not have a fi xed, given status, but rather a changeable 
form within cultural and historical se  ings. The politics of ontology is 
about who gets to determine what belongs to the real, when it belongs, 
and how it belongs.
Ontological politics of weary warriors, therefore, involves actions and 
inactions by numerous individuals, groups, and institutions (i.e., the hu-
man and the nonhuman) with regard to the making, unmaking, and re-
making of social realities in all the aspects noted above. It also involves 
struggles over shaping what is, could be, or ought to be made more real 
or less real (Law and Urry 2004: 396; Oksala 2012). Annemarie Mol (1999, 
2002) off ers a view of an ontological politics that we fi nd congenial to our 
work. She defi nes it as “a politics that has to do with the way in which 
problems are framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled 
into one shape or another” (2002: viii). It concerns “the conditions of pos-
sibility we live with” (1999: 86). She maintains that “ontology is not given 
in the order of things, but that, instead, ontologies are brought into being, 
sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomate-
rial practices” (2002: 6; emphasis in original). To be part of the military, 
individuals require being established as military bodies, assembled, eval-
uated, and trained, and then directed to carry out particular tasks, com-
mands, and routines. These activities occur through relations of power, 
interconnections of knowledge, and exercises of resistance that can result 
in multiple struggles, multiple ba  les. Of the jumble of relationships that 
comprise a soldier’s social world, aspects that are privileged at any given 
time—the political ontology of the moment—aff ect what opportunities 
exist for meaningful interactions, what issues are up for discussion, how 
topics are framed discursively and materially, and what interventions are 
on hand.
These struggles are unmistakable when military bodies with emotional 
wounds and embodied trauma come up against established biomedical 
paradigms and clinical practices, and confront military understandings of 
what constitutes a real illness for soldiers whether it is the trenches of Eu-
rope, foxholes on Pacifi c Islands, or the mountains of Afghanistan. Veter-
ans’ activism and activism on behalf of veterans during and a  er wars has 
been a constant feature in modern times. Much of this activism has been 
undertaken by women.3 More than political lobbies for pensions and ac-
cess to a range of services, veterans’ groups across nations have organized 
around raising awareness of their experiences of illnesses and mobilized 
around the legitimacy of lay knowledge vis-à-vis expert knowledge.
We can add a temporal dimension to the ontological politics of weary 
warriors. Instead of focusing on the linearity of time, we focus on the cycli-
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cal, repetitive, discontinuous, and intermi  ence of time (a  er Deleuze and 
Gua  ari 1987; see also Braido  i 2006). For the individual soldier, there is 
the prospect of shi  ing symptoms and fl uctuations in health and illness 
over days, weeks, and months or even a much more extended period of 
time, possibly over decades in the life of a veteran. The collapse and com-
pression of time in relation to embodied responses to war trauma brings 
to the fore the issue of when the reality of an illness should be determined 
and by whom. For social movement mobilization, there is the process of 
one group of veterans with a contested illness, such as Gulf War veterans, 
learning from the tactics and achievements of an earlier movement, such 
as the struggle by Viet Nam War veterans. The struggle for recognition of 
delayed expressions of trauma in the form of Vietnam Syndrome or GWS, 
feeds into decisions about the provision of new services and support pro-
grams. Issues plaguing soldiers in the ba  lefi eld of the Great War seem 
somehow in accord with current confl icts, which illustrates the relation-
ship of history with the present.
Even though we did not present a chronological account to neuroses 
in warfare, we have been very interested in exploring assorted confi gura-
tions of the social relations of power along with the formation and circula-
tion of various kinds of knowledge across a relatively long period of time. 
Having examined events from the mid to late nineteenth century to the 
early decades of the twenty-fi rst century, we conclude there is nothing 
evolutionary about the names ascribed to emotionally ta  ered soldiers, 
nor has there been greatly enhanced clarity over the mental or emotional 
distress that combat soldiers experience. Shi  s in the names of war neuro-
ses have changed gradually and unevenly over long periods of time, revis-
iting previous iterations while marking identifi able points in the shi  ing 
nature of competing explanations and struggles in social relations over 
the applications of power and knowledge in specifi c places. Thus we reject 
a view of history as the positive unfolding toward be  er understandings 
of war trauma, be  er treatment regimes, be  er public images of mentally 
ill veterans, or be  er access to needed services and supports. We do not 
accept a conception of history that is inherently fatalistic about the possi-
bilities of social change in ideas and practices concerning weary warriors, 
because of the force of psychiatric power or the heavy hand of military 
hegemony with its bureaucratic inertia.
We generally regard the history of weary warriors as uneven, jagged, 
contradictory at times, with both positive and negative eff ects; a history 
that is contingent and always contextual; a history with instances of learn-
ing and change and openness to new diagnoses, as well as opposition 
to innovative treatments, failing to learn or forge  ing past lessons from 
specifi c armed confl icts and particular social se  ings.4 Postwar social and 
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political milieus across the globe shape the ways in which nervous sol-
diers and veterans, inextricably tied to psychiatric diagnosis, treatment 
practice, and masculine norms, are woven into the fabric of society. No 
master narrative, no total history here; no general trend of inevitable prog-
ress. History is a series of discontinuities through which we can, to some 
degree, map out certain paths of interaction such as those encountered by 
soldiers within the history of psychiatric practice in the military.
Present practices by psychiatrists and other medical personnel in the 
military remain tied to past debates over the reality of combat trauma and 
over the best means to deploy ill soldiers. Pat O’Malley (2010: 491) aptly 
observes, “Mental disorder in the ba  lefi eld has been the site of long-term 
struggle between military psychiatry which frequently regarded this be-
havior as a symptom of psychogenic injury and the generally more perva-
sive view of military command for whom soldiers who ‘broke’ were weak 
or cowards.” While we have wri  en about the psychiatrization of military 
medicine, we have also noted a tension between psychiatric practice and 
military imperatives. Concerns about malingering and overmedicalizing 
the symptoms of combat-related strains remain as salient today as they 
were a hundred years ago. In this way, we have engaged in writing a 
history of the present (Foucault 1979, 1995). To put this in other terms, 
we have wri  en historical accounts or in-depth snapshots that disclose 
associations between current terms and practices with earlier ones as-
sumed to have disappeared or been abandoned, or taken on fully as a 
real thing. “Writing a history of the present means writing a history in 
the present: self-consciously writing in the fi eld of power relations and 
political struggle” (Roth 1981: 43; emphasis in original). As a methodol-
ogy, Mitchell Dean (1994: 21) characterizes the history of the present ap-
proach as the “use of historical resources to refl ect upon the contingency, 
singularity, interconnections, and potentialities of the diverse trajectories 
of those elements which compose present social arrangements and ex-
perience.” Drawing out a history of the ravished minds, ill bodies, and 
troubled souls of combat soldiers as a set of discontinuities discloses the 
various sources of present-day standards and practices. Having done so, 
we can now look toward making “intelligible the possibilities in the pres-
ent” (21).
Foucault and Beyond 
Weary Warriors draws extensively from and engages vigorously with the 
ideas and arguments of Michel Foucault across the many phases of his 
thinking and writing. We have employed many Foucauldian notions, such 
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as dispositif, power/knowledge, resistance, classifi cation, death, pastoral 
power, subjectifi cation, psychiatric power, power-eff ects, docile bodies, 
familial power, truth games, and a history of the present. In our work, we 
advanced some critical interpretations, presented empirical applications, 
and off ered our own conceptual modifi cations and extensions. Overall we 
engaged in a sympathetic application and elaboration of concepts from 
Foucault’s considerable oeuvre. Our specifi cally feminist materialist ap-
proach assisted us in reformulating some of Foucault’s key concepts in 
unexpected ways. Our ideas about how social practices are embodied and 
how these practices contribute to the fragile yet mobile subjectivities of 
weary warriors supported our empirical applications of feminist theory. 
Enactments, disclosures, and the ways in which discourse and material-
ity intra-actively, interactively, and simultaneously exist are part of the 
ontological generation of a weary warrior. Thus, our contribution to the 
burgeoning fi eld of Foucault studies includes novel ways to engage his 
work.5 In this fi nal chapter we wish to briefl y highlight a few concepts 
used by Foucault—specifi cally, the military, death, pastoral power, and 
confession—to indicate the ways in which our work contributes to extend-
ing Foucault’s ideas theoretically and empirically, and to point toward 
possible directions for future work.
Foucault, though for a time fascinated with the potential of using war 
as a framework for examining power, never investigated armies or mili-
tary power in great depth. As an institution, Foucault viewed the military 
as the codifi cation of numerous relations of power and as the sovereign 
power of the sword, the power to kill. True, in some work he did look at 
the soldier, but usually in terms of his notion of docile bodies, thus em-
phasizing the hierarchical authority of the military and the passivity and 
submissiveness of the solider as easily managed and conformist (Foucault 
1979). For our analysis this conception was problematic having le   out, as 
it did, possibilities of human agency and resistance through specifi c and 
sometimes commonplace practices manifest in acts of military desertion, 
refusal to obey orders, self-infl icted wounds, malingering, and simulation 
of illness. So while we recognize the sovereign power and hierarchical 
authority of military establishments, we also take note of embodied resis-
tance (observed in the Great War) as well as of informal relationships and 
social dynamics (acknowledged by some psychiatrists during the Second 
World War) as central to morale and resiliency of soldiers under com-
bat. We were interested in exploring the fl uidity of the military: both the 
changeable and variable elements in the armed forces; and the unstable, 
unpredictable, and volatile nature of military operations. We paid a  en-
tion to cultural standards of masculinity, which fi ts nicely with Foucault’s 
thinking on processes of normalization.
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On the topic of death, Foucault viewed the military as a power of death, 
a machine of violence and destruction. Interestingly, he tended to stress 
the power of armies in the traditional sense of a repressive and coercive 
apparatus, and did not explore the more general theoretical claim he made 
in some works that there is a productive side to power. In his views on the 
relation between power and death, Foucault seems to follow the English 
political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who put forward the proposition 
for “a general inclination of all mankind a perpetuall and restlesse desire 
of Power a  er power, that ceaseth onley in Death” (Hobbes [1651] 1968: 
42). We examined Foucault’s belief that power ceases with the death of 
the person and we showed that, for soldiers, power relationships are alive 
even in the realm of death. Even in death, soldiers are entangled in the 
sets of relations that were part of their ontological generation. Struggles 
by family members and friends for state resources, offi  cial recognition, 
and public remembrance of soldiers continue long a  er their death. We 
also off ered the concepts of public death and social death to illustrate the em-
pirical complexities of loss of life and the passing away of weary warriors 
even though both deaths remain part of a collective memory.
Pastoral power is an intriguing analytical notion introduced by Foucault 
but never fully examined by him. The same can be said of elaborating on 
the concept of the soul as a bodiless reality (Foucault 1979). We therefore 
devoted space in this book to consider the role of religious organizations 
within military contexts with respect to military chaplains and their roles 
and relationships with soldiers to show how the soul takes on its own em-
bodiment. We noted that the armed forces have long been an institutional 
space in which pastoral power has operated. Our discussion on pastoral 
care and military personnel, in which we described the three types of work 
they commonly perform in the armed forces, concurs with Joanne Benham 
Rennick (2011: 16) that “religion retains signifi cance for many people, es-
pecially in dealing with questions of values, meaning, and morals as well 
as issues relating to operational stress.” But what of the soul, or that which 
is ontologically distinct from both the mind and the body? (Foucault 2010: 
272; 2011a: 159–62). The idea of pastoral power in the context of weary war-
riors challenges the presumed binary on which war neuroses are defi ned: 
it is the mind that is broken, not the body. What happens when the soul 
breaks? And what does military psychiatry look like then?
Confession, for Foucault, was a concept used to describe a specifi c dis-
ciplinary technology of the self. Confessional practices certainly shape 
the subjectivity of weary warriors, as manifest in the plethora of autobio-
graphical accounts of experience of nervous breakdowns and the way in 
which the body can confess mimicry of bodily claims to someone who 
knows how to read the body medically. Revelations of truths and untruths 
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are not just of a religious kind pertaining to one’s soul, but also to the con-
dition of one’s mind and body, the boundaries among them porous. Span-
ning several processes, from preselection screening to postdeployment 
programming, recruits, trainees, veterans, and ill soldiers undergo litanies 
of tests and lines of questioning about childhood memories, family his-
tories, and medical background. In part, this involves “obliging him to 
recognize himself in his past, in certain events of his life” (Foucault 2006: 
270). Such confessional acts, along with being statements and divulgences 
of biographical truths and thus processes of self-recognition (on the way 
to some sort of self-knowledge), are relations of power and techniques de-
ployed by psychiatrists and military personnel for the administration and 
management of soldiers. Confessions take place at diff erent times and in 
diff erent places as se  ings infused with particular relationships. 
In the power-eff ects and resistance games as part of the games of truth, 
the other side of confessions has to be recognized: the nondisclosure, the 
denial, the misrepresentation, and perhaps the tactical divulgence. There 
are confessions to comrades and close friends of anxiety and fears of ba  le 
just as there are worries about home life shared in confi dence with mili-
tary chaplains. Conceivably there are contrived confessions to psychia-
trists intended to secure an evacuation from active duty as well as extorted 
confessions obtained through techniques of psychiatric and military tribu-
lations. Debriefi ng sessions at TLD sites serve as depots where incidents of 
trauma and stressful experiences are expressed in group sessions by indi-
viduals or groups sharing stories of ba  lefi eld experiences. And there are 
confessions to comrades in a peer support groups or sympathetic family 
members of being unwell and needing help. As weary warriors disclose 
their broken embodiments to others, they manifest their multiple subjec-
tivities—not as an indiscernible mess, but as strategic embodied formula-
tions that can hold a shape for a while as a particular soldier or veteran. 
We see then how intimate acts of confession about diffi  cult topics and 
terrible deeds circulate within larger institutional systems, including psy-
chiatry, the military, the family, the church, and the state, and are managed 
through cultural systems such as soldiering, camaraderie, fatherhood, and 
fraternity. In this sense, the weary warrior is the eff ect of multiple institu-
tional processes and power dynamics which, in turn, warriors condition 
through their bodies, minds and souls, and discursive-material practices.
The Weary Warrior as Patchwork
The weary warrior as an analytical concept has many pieces; it is an onto-
logical multiplicity. Most generally the concept is a theoretical and histori-
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cally empirical construction of military personnel with utmost a  ention to 
combat soldiers and veterans in the armed forces, including the army, the 
navy, and the air force. We also have given specifi c a  ention to potential 
recruits, trainees, military deviants (or rejected soldiers), psychiatrists, and 
family members of those serving in the military.6 Nonetheless, our prime 
focus has been on the deep emotional stress, the psychological trauma that 
combat soldiers encounter during service or as a result of engagement in 
ba  le. These are the traumatized subjects, the so-called screwed-up guys, 
some of which become segregated subjects confi ned to lunatic asylums. 
Some soldiers with war neuroses are constructed as dangerous subjects 
both to themselves (e.g., due to suicidal thoughts) and to their unit as a 
burden and as a threat to the group’s morale. Such constructions of the 
weary warrior are a frequent cultural form and theme in fi lm noir. Part of 
being failed combatants includes the emasculation of soldiers because they 
have failed to live up to the masculine ideal of the armed warrior, thus mar-
ring them in civilian life as weak, eff eminate, and womanly. Of course, this 
ma  ers for soldiers who are male and female. In this manner, as embodied 
subjectivities, weary warriors are military bodies subject to and generated 
by the practices of psychiatric power. Through the psychiatrization of mili-
tary bodies, we have shown that any member of the armed forces becomes 
a potential psychiatric case or, at minimum, a case fi le with test results and 
interview notes and perhaps such additional information as a personality 
profi le. From this, the weary warrior may become a diagnostic category, a 
soldier with the invisible wounds of a ravished mind and troubled soul.
In addition, we examined the construct of weary warrior as a broken 
embodiment, a fl eshed body with the discursive-material realities of phys-
iological symptoms, organic injuries, cultural restrictions, and societal 
rejection. We examined the weary warrior as a troubled soul with reli-
gious needs and spiritual concerns and perhaps a crisis in his or her belief 
system or faith. We also examined adjusted veterans that can reenact their 
broken embodiments under specifi c (and sometimes imposed) circum-
stances. afi eld, we have discussed the weary warrior as a moral category, 
the social construction of deserving and undeserving individuals based 
on their own conduct as soldiers (acts of heroism or fl eeing from fear) and 
the goodness of the war (the Great War versus the Second World War, or 
the Viet Nam War versus the Gulf Wars). The weary warrior also carries 
with him or her competing power/knowledge confi gurations. There are 
tensions among what a soldier is feeling sensorially and emotionally, what 
the psychiatrist is observing physically and in the context of received psy-
chiatric training, and what government bureaucrats cram into their tick 
boxes on the pension application form. Moreover, we have shown how the 
subjectivities of weary warriors are eff ects of the many folds of the mate-
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rial part of the body, the relation between force relations, the relational 
connection between truth and being, and the outside itself.
In the realm of soldiering on, in life a  er the military, weary warriors 
of course are part of a welfare state category as clients of various benefi ts, 
programs, and services for veterans. A number of veterans, some of whom 
are weary warriors, also join the ranks of veterans as an active political 
constituency, bound by shared experiences, and involved in collective 
political action aimed at raising awareness and challenging prevailing 
psychiatric, medical, and governmental stances. These are weary warriors 
as political subjects. O’Malley (2010: 496) makes the point that “subjectivi-
ties within the military are not simply formed by military imperatives, but 
also are shaped by the liberal political environment, an environment that 
also shapes the nature of the military itself.” In this liberal political envi-
ronment, which is a fair description for Australia, Britain, Canada, and the 
United States, among other nations, some weary warriors are a discarded 
group, either abandoned or conceivably departed from family and other 
personal networks, the socially dead among us.
Without caveats we can say that weary warriors are all of these sub-
jects, a patchwork, a multiple ontology, the eff ect of numerous material-
discourses as well as several confi gurations of knowledge and power. As 
with any patchwork, there are discrepancies and disconnections, bind-
ings and links, gaps and holes. As a tapestry, there are ta  ed pa  erns, 
creases brown with age, the folds somewhat automatic. The threads are 
densely intertwined in some parts, unraveling in others, creating an un-
even yet sophisticated brocade with ta  ered edging. One can even see the 
eff ects of the reparation processes, the picking apart and cobbling together 
in both familiar and unusual ways. The pliability of the patchwork em-
phasizes that there can always be new folds, new threads, new stitching. 
Given the wide range of constitutive features shaping ill soldiers, there 
emerges uniqueness in the weary warrior, a specifi c discursive-materiality 
of the soldier’s body, mind, and soul in lived spaces. We intend our use 
of the patchwork to indicate that modern notions of trauma are produced 
through multiple struggles; that what is real about weary warriors is the 
ubiquity of ba  les multiple.
Notes
 1. Approximately 2.59 million American military personnel served in Viet Nam. 
In addition, about 300,000 South Koreans, 49,000 Australians, and 4,000 mili-
tary personnel from New Zealand served. About 12,000 Canadians served in 
Viet Nam as part of the U.S. armed forces. 
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 2. Combat Hospital (2011) is a Canadian and U.K. production of a multinational 
medical unit in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2006.
 3. For the Australian case a  er the Great War, see Tyquin (2006). For American 
women’s involvement a  er the First Gulf War, see Shriver, Miller, and Cable 
(2003).
 4. On the theme of forge  ing lessons from past wars of anticipating the psycho-
logical breakdown of military personnel and the subsequent treatments, see 
Glass (1966) and Slight (1944). 
 5. We have detailed a reworking of dispositif (apparatus) in chapter 1 organized 
around embodiment that we do not repeat here. 
 6. Beyond our focus in this book, the analysis can be extended to others fi g-
ures of combat-related trauma that include child soldiers, POWs, and special 
forces of a military. 
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